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I first met Stephanie Shields at the meetings of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology in 1998. I was in the midst of PhD research in social psychology, but it was also becoming clear to me that I had emerging interests in the history of psychology. In my early career, Stephanie was my existence proof that you could work on gender, do original historical work, and be an experimental social psychologist. (And be welcoming and encouraging to junior colleagues at major conferences). This retrospective allows me to repay debts I owe to her for support and inspiration, and I will try to do that by arguing for the continued relevance of Shields (1975) for 21st century times.

By attending to the 'mythical' functions of science, Shields (1975) used history to develop a productive critique. She described theories of gender differences that justified systemic inequalities between the sexes which had drawn on dubious evidence about what women and men *do* to reach yet-more dubious conclusions about what women and men *can* do and *ought* to do. Brain anatomy studies, theories about statistical variation, and ideas about inborn instincts were all held to account in this manner. Shields' final sentence leaves it to the reader to draw the final conclusions about the lessons of the past for the present:

That science played handmaiden to social values cannot be denied. Whether a parallel situation exists in today's study of sex differences is open to question (Shields, 1975, p. 753).

Discerning readers might have guessed how the author would answer her own question.

Shield's argument was more than timely. She anticipated the kinds of myths that would give the psychology of gender its form in the decades that would follow. Claims about sexually dimorphic brains were at the centre of debates about feminist theories of biology that emerged in the 1980s (Swaab & Fliers, 1985). When Stephanie and I first met at that conference during 'the decade of the brain,' I had recently published my first article, in this journal, which critiqued the science of 'gay brains' – an offshoot of attempts to locate sex differences in the brain (Author, 1997). Contemporary feminist work on 'brain gender' theories which essentialize the effects of fetal hormonal levels on later adult psychology (e.g., Jordan-Young, 2010) and on the different forms of sociality that are naturalized in different accounts of the mirror neuron system (Pitts-Taylor, 2013) continue critical engagement with neuroscience. This work is vital because brain myths have come to compete with mind myths to a far greater extent for the attention of funders and policy makers (Rose & Abi-Rachad, 2013). Shields (1975) analysis of how contradictory findings about brain size were used by different authors to refiy sexism in the 19th century remains more relevant now than when she penned it in the 1970s.

Shields' (1975) analysis of the variability hypothesis similarly deserves more attention among critical scholars than it has enjoyed in the last forty years. Also in 1975, Michel Foucault also published *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison*, translated into English as *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (Foucault, 1975/1995). This genealogy of justice narrates the rise of 'disciplinary power' and the psy-disciplines as the morality of justice shifts away from the just exercise of sovereign power toward the benevolent and rationalized exercise of power in the service of disciplining the mind and rehabilitating the conscience. As accounts of

power/knowledge in early psychology, Stephanie Shields' and Michel Foucault's writings from 1975 are at odds in one important respect. Foucault emphasized how disciplinary power targeted abnormal behavior and individuals, and sought to normalize both to ensure the smooth running of institutions. In such a system of power, variation from the norm becomes visible and subject to correction and discipline. On the other hand, Shield's emphasis on the variability hypothesis exemplifies how Darwinian thinking made *variability* and atypicality potentially valued attributes of individuals and groups, and contributed to the making of different kinds of myths. Whilst early 19th century definitions of the *normal* had considered extreme variation a worrying sign of social instability, Darwinian theory allowed extreme cases to be understood as evidence of particular fitness, and the raw material upon which evolutionary processes operated i (see also Hacking, 1990). The variability hypothesis created continuity between Darwinian psychologizing and the IQ testing movement in early American psychology. As Shields (1982) detailed elsewhere, it became both a matter of repeated disagreement between women and men psychologists in that movement and repeatedly mired in debates about the measurement of variability. The Foucaultian notion of 'disciplinary power' leads us to assume that atypicality becomes visualized and targeted by power/knowledge in psychological disciplines. The variability hypothesis shows us that atypicality can also be a resource for constructing system justifying myths about dominant groups such as men.

The variability hypothesis justified more than gender inequalities. White Darwinian scientists imagined sex differences to be larger in their own 'racial' group than among the people they colonized, using sex differences as a measure of civilization and progress. Accordingly, gender similarities among non-White people were understood as signs of primitivism and informed the denigration of gender inversion among homosexuals (Somerville, 2000). Elsewhere, I have argued that psychological differences among men that were understood to signify sexual differences were often normalized in the conservative mode of disciplinary power described by Foucault. However differences understood to signify intellectual differences were increasingly understood through a different framework of normativity in which exceptionality was often valued as the optimistic hope for a better future. But that's another story (Author, 2013).

Finally, Shields' critical attention to maternal instinct theories in *Functionalism* was also on the mark. In the mid-1970s Darwinian reasoning returned to psychology after a hiatus of theorizing about instincts, and it often suggested natural immutable limits on the possibilities of gender equality (e.g., Dawkins, 1975). In recent decades, tensions between feminist and Darwinian approaches in psychology have often overstated the 'scientific' nature of evolutionary psychology and the 'political' nature of feminism. It is the rare psychologist, who draws on both traditions, and who sees through this uneven construction. A case in point is Felicia Pratto (1999), who critiqued evolutionary psychology's claims to be less political than feminist psychology, noting that "Steering clear of researching political topics might seem to be more scientific and less political, but in fact it is equally political and less scientific because it obscures power differences."

In recent work, Natasha Bharj and I materialized experimental evidence for the political nature of analogies in evolutionary thinking, drawing on postcolonial feminism to make one operation of power in evolutionary thinking more visible. The term 'harem' is derived from European mis-recognition of Arab societies during the period of colonial expansion considered by Shields (Ahmed, 1992). The term became

an analogy for certain kinds of animal societies among scientists from colonizing nations in the 1930s, and the use of this analogy became more frequent and far ranging in psychologists' evolutionary thinking from the 1970s onward. Research on historical cognition shows that people often confuse historical analogies with historical facts. For example, when presented with analogies between the prohibition era and contemporary drug laws, people commonly misremember analogies drawn from the prohibition era as facts that they have learned about contemporary drug laws (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2002; see also Perrot, Gentner, & Bodenhausen, 2005). Bharj and I (in press) demonstrated a similar effect of reasoning about animal harems. When we presented participants with descriptions of animal societies, described as 'harems' accompanied by colonial analogies, participants mis-remembered the claims about Middle Eastern human societies as scientific claims about animal societies. This study supports the point that evolutionary thinking draws on metaphors drawn from very particular human societies to structure particular understandings of the nature of animal behavior. Such work goes beyond the illusion of neutrality described by Pratto (1999). Of course, our work was also informed both by Stephanie Shields more recent thinking about the Darwinian influence on psychology and the need for intersectionality (Shields, 2008; Shields & Bhatia, 2009).

In closing I want to emphasize that Stephanie Shields' diverse research work and its impact has demonstrated very particularly how critical historicist attention to the mythic functions of psychology is not incompatible with the doing of empirical work in psychology. In other areas of my work, I have tried to engage with substantive problems using multiple approaches. In addition to discursive work on gay brains, I have also been engaged in experimental work demonstrating anti-gay motives behind some heterosexual men's endorsement of the biological theory of sexuality (Author, 2014). Sapphira Thorne, Caroline Catmur and I have examined the lateralized brain to generate new evidence suggesting that androcentric language leads to androcentric visual processing (Thorne, Author, & Catmur, in press). Susanne Bruckmüller and I have examined how explanatory attention adheres to lower status groups – as Foucault's model of disciplinary power suggests it would – and that such explanations have clear consequences for beliefs about those groups' power (Author & Bruckmüller, 2013). As imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I will close by saying that some of us have been led by Stephanie's work to recognize 'that science played handmaiden to social values cannot be denied.' Whether a parallel situation exists in today's study of sex differences (and whether we can do feminist science differently in the 21st century) is open to question.

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