An Exploratory Study of Social Work Values in Hong Kong

by

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Thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology

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for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

November, 1989

Abstract

This report presents the findings of two surveys, one on social work values in Hong Kong and the other on relationship between values and action in social work practice.

It begins with a description of the meaning of social work, profession, value, and action. In this study, social work is defined as a developing profession within the social welfare institution. In social work practice, the social worker draws upon a body of knowledge, screened by a system of values, to produce and reproduce practice principles which monitor his action, in an effort to bring about effective changes either in the person, or in society, or in both.

The social work value system is composed of two subsystems, one consisting of twelve terminal values or end-states of existence and the other consisting of twelve instrumental values or modes of conduct. End-states of existence are further subdivided into an equal number of social values and personal values. Similarly, modes of conduct are subdivided into an equal number of moral values and competence values.

The first survey reveals that democracy, equality, freedom, and love are conceived to be highly preferable among the terminal values, and among the instrumental values, empathy, justice, and respect are conceived to be highly preferable.

The claim that values serve as a guide to action is not well substantiated. In the second survey, findings reveal that democracy, equality, love, and progress are conceived to be highly preferable among the terminal values, and among the instrumental values, honesty, justice, and prudence are conceived to be highly preferable.

When findings of the two surveys are compared, democracy, equality, love, and justice are conceived as highly preferable in both surveys. However, freedom has been replaced by progress in the second survey. Moreover, empathy and respect have been replaced by honesty and prudence.

On the whole, respondents are consistent in the way they rank these values.

Acknowledgment

I would like to begin by acknowledging the support given to me by my supervisors, Mr. Colin Tipton and Mr. Roger Burrows. Without their guidance the possibility of completing this study is extremely doubtful. My acknowledgment also goes to Professor John F. Jones and Professor A. Tropp. The former is instrumental in getting me into the programme in the first place. Professor Tropp, on the other hand, broadens my perspective on values and action.

Special thanks should go to several of my colleagues at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Comments from Dr. W. M. Epstein, Dr. J. J. Lee and Dr. D. Shek, and technical assistance on the analysis of data by Mr. C. K. Cheung are most appreciated.

I am particularly indebted to my colleagues in the social welfare sector. They have provided me with all the information I need for this study by answering my queries and completing the lengthy questionnaire.

I am also indebted to my wife Helen, my son Eugene, and my daughter Marise. They have spent many vacations by themselves while I work on this project at Guildford. Finally, I have to thank Helen again for her continuous encouragement.

To my wife, Helen;
to my son, Eugene; and
to my daughter, Marise
with love

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Section One

Introduction

Chapter One

Overview of the Study

1.1 Introduction

The thought of launching an exploratory study of social work values originates from an observation and an assumption. The observation is obvious to anyone who is involved in the field of social welfare. In Britain and in Australia, in the United States and in Canada, social workers are striving to acquire full professional status. The situation is no different in Hong Kong.

For many years and in many ways, social workers in Hong Kong have pressed for recognition by Government as full professionals on par with doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, lawyers, accountants, engineers, architects, and town planners. The establishment of the Hong Kong Social Workers' Association and the Hong Kong Social Workers' General Union, the introduction of formal training in social work, the decision of Government to limit its recruitment to the professionally trained for social work posts, and the proposal to set up licensing procedures for practising social workers are regarded as decisive steps toward professionalization. Regrettably, in an attempt to meet the demand for social workers, Government began, in the early years of the present decade, to recruit once again non-social-work-trained personnel for social work posts. Even though the Government emphasized that these recruitment exercises would be

no more than an interim measure to ease the problem of manpower shortage, and that the recruits would be provided with proper training at either of the two universities in the first years of their employment, the decision is strongly criticized by trained social workers as a violation of the spirit of this movement.

Is this movement toward professionalization desirable? Understandably, the answers are mixed. One may perhaps argue for the professionalization of social work along the lines Paul Halmos (1970) introduced the personal service professions. Or, one may argue against the professionalization of social work along the lines Ivan Illich (1976) launched his attack on the medical profession. There is no end to this debate. Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this researcher, certainly not in this context and at this point in time, to become involved in such a debate because, whatever the outcome, one can hardly reverse the trend. The professionalization of social work will forge ahead in the foreseeable future. This prompts the researcher to come up with an assumption, that the professionalization of social work is desirable. At the minimum, it provides a direction for the development of social work in Hong Kong in the next decade.

What is professionalization? According to Geoffrey Millerson (1964), professionalization is "the process by which an occupation undergoes transformation to become a profession" (p. 10). In the same context he identified several factors which contributed to success in the process: (1) ability to achieve a

definable basis of background knowledge and practice, plus a crystallization of the activities composing the occupational task; (2) opportunity to acquire knowledge and practice; (3) development of self-consciousness by emerging professionals; and (4) realization and recognition of the occupation as a profession, by those outside the occupation. (pp. 10-13)

Among these factors, the first one highlights the problem of professionalization in social work. "An essential part of professionalization," Millerson noted, "is the separation of the occupation from its milieu, enabling practitioners to profess a distinct speciality." (p. 10) "The essence of separation," he continued, "is the capacity to present new forms of knowledge, or practice." (p. 11) Even though his statement may not be conclusive, it may well serve as a starting point for discussion. In his view, to become a profession, an occupation has to claim expertise in an area of service and to back it up with a body of knowledge and a method of practice. In the case of social work, this has never been successful, either in Hong Kong or elsewhere in the world. The reason for this will become obvious as soon as one begins to trace its emergence in the second half of the nineteenth century and its growth and development in this century.

The emergence of social work in Britain, for instance, was not a planned event. It just happened. It emerged as society's response to the growing concern of destitution and social unrest. The nature of such response was, however, not standardized.

According to Philip Seed (1973), at least three forms of social action could be identified in that period: (1) social action within a system of social administration, (2) organization of private charity, and (3) direct social action. Moreover, he noted that social action could also exist in combined forms in the settlement movement, for instance. (p. 12)

Since the turn of the century, each form of social action took its own course. This resulted in the growth and development of social casework, including medical social work, psychiatric social work, probation work, family welfare, child welfare, and moral welfare (Cormack and McDougall, 1950, p. 11); social group work, including group work with children, adolescents and adults, group work in churches, settlements, and community centres (Kuenstler, 1955, p. 9); and community work, including community work of the direct-service agencies, interorganizational coordination and social planning, and work with community groups (Jones, 1977, p. 173). With such a diversification of interest, the difficulties social work has encountered in its search for knowledge, method, and purpose seem unavoidable.

In the United States, the emergence of social work followed the same path. What characterized its growth and development was its preoccupation with professionalization. Early in 1915, at a meeting of the National Conference on Charities and Corrections, Abraham Flexner, an authority on professional education, addressed the audience on the topic: Is Social Work a Profession? Organizers of the meeting apparently hoped that Flexner would

assure them that social work was, or was about to become, a full-fledged profession. Much to their disappointment, the speaker, using an absolute approach to evaluate professional status, concluded his address by noting that social work had not made it into the professional elite. (p. 20)

Disappointed with the outcome, yet believing that the acquisition of knowledge and method was the lone path to professionalization, social workers devoted great effort, in the first decades of this century, toward the development of a body of knowledge and a method of practice which could be conceived as unique for social work.

As it was mentioned previously, one difficulty confronting social workers of the time was their involvement in a wide variety of activities. In each field of practice, social workers tended to claim functional speciality and emphasize differences in knowledge and method which separated them from social workers in other fields. This led to the formation of the American Association of Hospital Social Workers in 1918, the American Association of Social Workers in 1921, the American Association of Psychiatric Social Workers in 1926, the American Association of Group Workers in 1936, and the Association for the Study of Community Organization in 1946. Not unexpectedly, there were also others who believed that these functional specialities were merely segments within the social work profession. In an attempt to confirm their belief, seventeen executives and board members of six national organizations in the casework field met for two

days in October 1923 in Milford, Pennsylvania. This marked the beginning of the Milford Conference. After many years of regular meetings, the Conference finally produced its report in 1929. (American Association of Social Workers, 1929)

At the Milford Conference and in the report they produced, members concentrated on one question: "Are there sufficient commonalities among the various specialities (of casework) to preserve the idea that all social workers (i.e., caseworkers) are part of one profession?" The answer was in the affirmative. As noted in the report, "the similarities among the various specialities overshadowed their differences and practitioners in the specialities required a common knowledge base and, therefore, common training programmes". (Briar, 1974) The conclusion of this report set the stage for the development of a common knowledge base for social work and substantiated the claim that social work was a single profession.

The search for common knowledge bore fruit in the late nineteen-fifties. Reports published by the Commission on Social Work Practice of the National Association of Social Workers (Bartlett, 1958) and the Curriculum Study of the Council on Social Work Education (Boehm, 1959) were the first ones to describe in great detail the nature of social work, including its knowledge, method, and purpose.

Since the release of these two reports, there was growing recognition that social work should not be dichotomized into

casework and community work, or personal change and social change. Moreover, there was an outcry among social workers to shift the focus of their attention from either the individual or the environment to the interaction between them. These changes led to the emergence of "integrating social work methods" (Specht and Vickery, 1977) in the early nineteen-seventies, including the contribution of Howard Goldstein (1973), Allen Pincus and Anne Minahan (1973), Ruth R. Middleman and Gale Goldberg (1974), Beulah R. Compton and Burt Galaway (1975), Max Siporin (1975), and many others. Regrettably, even with this advancement, there remains, even now, sharp differences of opinion among proponents of various methods on the knowledge base of social work and on the degree of emphasis to be given to changing the person, the environment, or the interaction between them.

In 1974, the Publications Committee of the National Association of Social Workers and the Editorial Board of Social Work decided to stimulate discussion among social workers on the purpose of social work and to identify issues underlying this discussion. Their effort, and the first special issue on conceptual frameworks (NASW, 1977) that was produced as a result of their effort, generated much interest and heated debates. Many pointed to the fact that the problem remained unresolved and in the absence of an agreement on the purpose of social work, they believed that it was impossible to discuss productively the knowledge and method related to its practice. In response to these reactions, the Publications Committee and the Editorial Board decided to convene another group and charge it with the

task of developing a statement of social work purpose and applying it to different practice specialities to determine if there was any consensus that would cut across various practice interests. Again, no agreement could be reached in the second issue on conceptual frameworks. (NASW, 1981)

In view of these conclusions it is no surprise if one hears, within the profession itself, candid statements such as the following: "Maybe social work has no mission!" (NASW, 1977, p. 382) Mainly because of its failure to arrive at any form of agreement as to what constitutes the purpose of social work, some practitioners organize themselves into subgroups, each pursuing its own purpose, thus creating segments within the profession.

Since earlier attempts at integration through the study of knowledge, method, and purpose have failed to produce significant progress, it is essential to look beyond these trio. In the opinion of this researcher, integration can be achieved through an examination of values.

How different is the situation for social work in Hong Kong? There is not much difference, excepting that the emergence of social work in Hong Kong came very much later and it developed at a much faster pace. It emerged shortly after the Second World War as a response to the problem of population explosion and, within a period of four decades, has established itself as an essential service in society.

When Hong Kong was occupied by the Japanese in 1941, about 60 percent its population returned to China to take refuge, leaving the Colony with a population of 600,000. Shortly after the war, most of these people returned to Hong Kong, bringing its population back to the pre-war level of 1.60 million. By 1950, following a change of regime in China, more people came to Hong Kong to take refuge, causing a sharp increase in population to a record of 2.36 million. (Hong Kong Government, 1957, p. 3)

Needless to say, Hong Kong was totally unprepared for such a population increase. It was found wanting in every respect. There was a shortage of land to build houses, schools, hospitals, and clinics for the new immigrants. Even food and drinking water was in short supply. To make the situation worse, the economy of Hong Kong came to a stand still when China became involved in the Korean War of 1951. Jobs were simply unavailable. Confronted with these and many other social problems such as teen-age prostitution and abandoned children, organized charity, spearheaded by the Government, religious organizations, and benevolent societies, began to emerge.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

This is an exploratory study. The central purpose of this study is to make a contribution to the professionalization of social work in Hong Kong by suggesting a more acceptable and culturally compatible definition of social work. To achieve this purpose, the study attempts to accomplish two tasks: (1) to

identify a system of social work values which is conceived as preferable by social workers in Hong Kong, and (2) to explore the relationship between values and action in social work practice. These tasks also require an analysis of the meaning of values and action, and the relation between them.

The study has a secondary purpose. It tries to uncover the potential of this method of inquiry for further research on social work values.

1.3 Significance of the Study

The significance of this study can be approached from two perspectives. It can be approached from its contribution to the professionalization of social work in Hong Kong, and it can also be approached from its contribution to the conceptualization of social work, profession, value, and action, and how these concepts relate to one another.

Hong Kong is a fast growing, rapidly changing, metropolitan city. It is fast growing in population, in economy, in technology, and in the provision of public services. This pace of growth brings other rapid changes. One can often detect, for instance, changes in the landscape of this city. More subtle and yet profound are changes in culture, including beliefs, values, attitudes, and norms. As a city, Hong Kong is metropolitan in terms of the influences it has received, and is still receiving, from countries in the East and the West. All these growth,

changes, and influences have important implications for social work.

In any discussion of social work a concept that is bound to come up is value. Until recently, research and publication on social work values are limited. So far as research is concerned, one can possibly cite the work of Donna L. McLeod and Henry J. Meyer (1967). In their view, each value is seen as a continuum with poles representing contrasting positions held within the society or by some segments of the population. In many cases, they noted, both positions were viewed as preferable by social work. The hypothesis they set out to confirm was that social workers were closer than the rest of the population to the pole they defined as social work value. In the following value dimensions, the first-named poles represent social work values: (1) individual worth vs. system goals, (2) personal liberty vs. societal control, (3) group responsibility vs. individual responsibility, (4) security-satisfaction vs. struggle, suffering, and denial, (5) relativism-pragmatism vs. absolutism-sacredness, (6) innovation-change vs. traditionalism, (7) diversity vs. homogeneity, (8) cultural determinism vs. inherent human nature, (9) interdependence vs. individual autonomy, and (10) individualization vs. stereotyping. (pp. 402-5)

According to the authors, seven of these value dimensions were found to be significantly related to levels of social work training. On the basis of this finding, they concluded that selection and training combined to produce a professional group

distinguishable in terms of certain basic value positions. (p. 407)

So far as literature on social work values is concerned, one can possibly cite the work of Felix P. Biestek (1967), Charles S. Levy (1973), and Noel Timms (1983).

In a pamphlet on values, Biestek listed a number of belief statements and treated them as social work values. Levy adopted this approach and produced another set of beliefs which was, incidentally, quite similar to Biestek's. However, the importance of Levy's work does not rely on the list he produced but on the framework which he developed for organizing values into three groups: (1) value as preferred conceptions of people, (2) value as preferred outcomes for people, and (3) value as preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people. (p. 38) Both of these works have been widely quoted since their appearance in the literature.

There seems to have been a shift in focus since the nineteen-seventies. In his publication, Timms identified three ways in which social work values had been discussed. Firstly, they appeared in the form of generalized accounts of values. (See, for example, Biestek, 1967) Secondly, they were the subjects of essays in which some critical assessment was attempted of a value or a number of values. (See, for example, McDermott, 1975) Thirdly, they were subject to some form of empirical investigation. (See, for example, McLeod and Meyer,

1967) (p. 24)

Timms was highly critical of both the "literature-based approach", i.e., a specification of what social work values should be, and the "empirically-based approach", i.e., a specification of what social work values are. He criticized the literature-based approach for not treating the subject of social work values with sufficient "rigour" and "conceptualization":

"Value" appears frequently in social work literature, but value talk is underdeveloped and conversation about ... social work values has hardly started. This is mainly because it is assumed that everyone knows what values ... are; that is, a value is a value; and that values may be elaborated, but cannot be argued about. (p. 32)

The empirically-based approach to social work values was also criticized for its tendency to compile lists and for its inadequate attention to conceptual analysis of the values it listed. He described such empirical work as "premature in so far as its grasp on 'value' is hesitant and clumsy" (p. 28). In his criticism of McLeod and Meyer he argued that the study lacked "conceptual exploration". For example, he noted that "it is not easy to avoid the judgment that more conceptual preparation would have produced a better result" (p. 30). In another context, Timms (1970) suggested that what was needed was a study of social work values, based on what social workers actually did when faced with a choice between "valued" courses of action, rather than

studies based on what social workers mentioned or listed as being important: "The question to ask is not so much what things, concepts, states of affairs, do social workers value, but how much do they value them?" (p. 120)

Timms is probably fair in his criticism of the literature-based approach and the empirically-based approach and he is certainly right in suggesting that what is needed is a study based on what social workers actually do when faced with a choice between valued courses of action, but his sole reliance on "value talk" is equally inadequate.

Undeniably, value talks are vital to the understanding and practice of social work. However, knowledge as well as practice in the field have indicated that the concept is not easy to comprehend, and those values which have so far been expounded by social workers are not as easy to accept as they appear to be. What account for these difficulties? Timms have mentioned some of them. In the opinion of this researcher, it seems to be a result of some or all of the following:

1. The word value means different things to different people. Not too infrequently, one finds in the social work literature under the rubric of values almost any set of beliefs about man and society, any objective to be accomplished within a short or a long period of time, or any type of behaviour preferred for any reason or for no apparent reason at all. Until the concept of value is clarified, any discussion of these "so-called" social

work values will not be productive.

2. The selection of social work values is based largely on ideologies of the West, namely, Britain and the United States. Dominant values of British and American social work have their roots in religion, psychology, sociology, political science, and human ecology. In religion, the early Christian doctrine places special emphasis on man's relationship with God and holds that to be his goal and source of happiness; the Protestant work ethic says that character is all that matters, that the moral man is the one who works and is independent, and that pleasure is sinful; the Social Darwinists deny God's existence and claim that the fittest survive while the weak perish in a natural evolutionary process that produces the strong individual and society. In psychology, the psychoanalytic view emphasizes man's pathology and irrationality; the humanistic view, on the other hand, emphasizes man's potential for growth and his rationality. In sociology, the consensus theorists stress the co-operative and harmonious elements in social life; the conflict theorists, however, focus on the coercive and divisive elements; the interactionists, unaffected by either, place strong emphasis on the importance of investigating social action from the standpoint of the actors involved and hence the importance of the meanings that actors give to their actions. In political science, the liberal view stresses the importance of man's rationality and his ability to be self-determining and rule-following; the democratic ideal emphasizes the equality of all men and man's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the socialists hold to the

view that man is a social animal defined by his social relationship. Finally, the human ecologists believe that a minimal degree of integration is necessary between the person and various environments in order to maintain and enhance the problem-solving capacities and growth of constituent members in their own habitat. Values derived from these views are sometimes conflicting and often foreign to social work practitioners and students in Hong Kong. Furthermore, in view of their own cultural heritage - an adherence to Confucianism, they often find these values somewhat difficult to understand and to accept.

3. Although there is apparent consensus among social workers on the importance of certain values, this is not always the case even at the most generalized level. Instead, as a result of ideological differences, one often finds that a value and its countervalue co-exist and both seem to enjoy wide acceptance. A pair of values that comes to mind is individual responsibility and group responsibility. Confusion often arises in case situations when both values seem to be relevant, thus leaving the social worker with the impossible task of making rational choices. Furthermore, even though a value may receive general consensus within the profession, justification for the acceptance of and interpretation given to the meaning of this particular value vary. Equality, for instance, is generally accepted as an essential value in social work. However, whether it implies an equality of opportunity or an equality of outcome remains a subject of debate.

4. In social work literature values are often listed individually rather than presented as an organized whole. There is little attempt to establish the relationship between one value and another. There is also little attempt to arrange them in order of preference. What should a social worker do, for instance, when a client's well-being is affected by his own decision? Should the social worker adhere to the value of client self-determination even though the client's right to well-being is being threatened?

5. One often experiences yet tends to ignore the discrepancy between one's personal values and professional values, one's personal values and organizational values, one's personal values and societal values, or one's professional values and societal values. What should a social worker do, for instance, when the profession's preference for change comes into conflict with society's preference for stability. Should the social worker adhere to his professional value or societal value?

These problems need to be addressed in any fruitful discussion of social work value, or values.

Second to values, the discussion of action is also of central importance to the understanding and practice of social work. What is action? What are the determinants of action? It is often claimed that social work is a value-laden profession. This statement seems to imply that once a social worker is socialized into the profession, his action will be guided by

professional values. To what extent is this statement valid? Can the validity of this statement be verified empirically?

The significance of this study can also be approached on the level of conceptual thinking. Similar to many other sociological concepts, the formulation of definitions for social work, profession, value, and action in a clear and unambiguous way has never been easy. Morris L. Cogan (1953), for instance, came up with this conclusion in his attempt to identify some patterns implicit in generally accepted definitions of a profession: "No broad acceptance of any 'authoritative' definition has been observed." (p. 47)

To pursue this a little further, the word profession, for instance, appears to have a wide variety of meanings in popular usage. Millerson (1964) referred to this as a problem of semantic confusion. (pp. 1-3) A brief look at the following dialogue will help to illustrate this point.

"What is your profession?"

"I am a social worker by profession, but I have recently retired from full-time employment, and I am planning to take up voluntary work in the same field."

"I have always wondered: is social work a profession or is it a semi-profession?"

"I would consider it a profession but I don't believe it is recognized as such by the government. Afterall, our starting salary is much lower than that of clinical psychologists."

In the first statement, the word "profession" is used as a polite synonym for anyone of the following words: "job", "occupation", or "vocation". They are often used interchangeably to mean a type of employment. The question, "what is your profession?" may, therefore, be considered by the inquirer as a genteel form of "what is your job?" "what is your occupation?" or "what is your vocation?"

In the second statement, the word "profession", or, more appropriately, "professional", is used as a contrast to the word "volunteer" in service provisions, or "amateur" in sports and leisure time activities. Here, the volunteer or amateur is one who performs certain tasks, on a part-time basis, simply for the intrinsic pleasure obtained from them, and not for any financial reward or profit. The professional, on the other hand, regards the same process as a full-time operation, providing the main income.

In the third statement, a distinction is made between "a profession" and "a semi-profession". This form of semantic confusion comes from the addition of prefixes as in para-profession, semi-profession and sub-profession, or qualifying words, as in marginal profession. The main intention of adding

these prefixes or qualifying words is to derogate attempts by members of an occupation to establish professional status for themselves. Those struggling are often judged to be unworthy of the classification.

Finally, in the last statement, a subjective evaluation is made as to which occupation should be given a professional status, and by whom it is given.

Even among sociologists the word "profession" is used to convey different meanings. George Ritzer (1977), for instance, identified three approaches to defining the concept: (1) the process approach, (2) the structural-functional (or traits) approach, and (3) the power approach. (pp. 41-67)

How should the problem of definition be tackled? This researcher shares with Eliot Freidson (1983) the view that the problem of defining "a profession" or any other concept mentioned previously cannot be resolved by struggling to formulate a single definition which is hoped to gain the consensus of all. In Freidson's view, "the concrete, historical character of the concept and the many perspectives from which it can legitimately be viewed and from which sense can be made of it, preclude the hope of any widely accepted definition of general analytic value". To circumvent the problem, he suggested that "serious writers on the topic should be obliged to display to readers what they have in mind when the word is used - that is, to indicate the definition upon which their exposition is predicated and, for

even greater clarity, examples of the entity they mean to include and those they mean to exclude". (p. 35)

Following Freidson's suggestion, how should one proceed to define the concepts listed above? Anthony Giddens (1982) was of the opinion that: "An understanding of the social world initiated by the contemporary industrialized societies ... can only be achieved by virtue of a threefold exercise of the imagination. These forms of the sociological imagination involve an historical, an anthropological, and a critical sensitivity." (p. 16)

Elaborating on the need for an historical sensitivity, Giddens stated that:

The first effort ... that has to be exercised ... is that of recovering our own immediate past - the "world we have lost". Only by such an effort of the imagination, which ... involves an awareness of history, can we grasp just how differently those in the industrialized societies live today from the way people lived in the relatively recent past. (p. 17)

Relating to the cultivation of an anthropological insight, Giddens pointed out that:

The fostering of an historical sense ... is difficult. But it is perhaps even more challenging to break away from the

belief ... that the modes of life which have developed in the West are somehow superior to those of other cultures The anthropological dimension of the sociological imagination is important because it allows us to appreciate the diversity of modes of human existence which have been followed on this earth. (pp. 22-4)

The exercise of both forms of the sociological imagination made it possible, according to Giddens, "to break free from the straitjacket of thinking only in terms of the type of society we know in the here and now". This made room for the third form of the sociological imagination which concerned the possibilities for the future to emerge. He explained that:

As human beings, we are not condemned to be swept along by forces that have the inevitability of laws of nature. But this means we must be conscious of the alternative futures that are potentially open to us. In its third sense, the sociological imagination fuses with the task of sociology in contributing to the critique of existing forms of society. (p. 26)

These three forms of sociological imagination, when taken together, seem to point the way for defining sociological concepts. In each case, a definition of the concept is formulated only after a brief review of the work of early masters (i.e. historical), a brief overview of the work of contemporary writers (i.e. anthropological), and a critique of their work

(i.e. critical) have been made.

The first concept to be discussed in this report is "social work". What is social work? Is social work a profession? The first question can be approached by considering a series of questions: Is it a movement, social or political? Is it an institution, an occupation, or a profession? Is it an art, a science, or a technology? How is social work defined in terms of the methods and purposes of its practice? These questions have long been in the mind of social workers and have aroused long discussions within the profession. The conclusion in each case seems to be unanimous, and its sentiment has been vividly captured by Scott Briar (1977) in the following statement:

The seemingly inescapable conclusion is that at this time in the history of social work there is not a widespread consensus about the profession's mission and purpose.
(p. 415)

Thus the major purpose of this study is to come up with a definition of social work which is based on an understanding of the meaning of value and an explication of what social work values are.

The second concept to be discussed in this report is "profession". What is a profession? What is the function of the professions in society? Can we find in the professions distinctive characteristics, or attributes, or traits that cannot

be found in the nonprofessions? Is there a path along which each occupation must travel before it can acquire full professional status? What is the meaning of professional power? What is the basis of this power? Is there a set of rules which serves as a guide to professional conduct? Is professional conduct binding for all professionals? What happens if the professional is at the same time an employee of a bureaucratic organization and the two sets of rules happen to be in conflict? Understanding of this concept will lead us to an answer to the second question we have just raised, Is social work a profession?

The concept of "value" has not been given a central place it deserves in sociology. In most introductory textbooks on the subject, the concept is rarely included as a separate chapter. (See, for example, Giddens, 1989) Talcott Parsons is perhaps one of the few early masters who gives value a prominent place in his work. Elaborating on this, Percy S. Cohen (1968) noted that:

The emphasis on fundamental values is the cornerstone of Parsonian theory. The argument behind this ... is as follows: Men's actions are neither random nor simply governed by impulses; quite the contrary, they are orderly in the two senses that they do not result in a war of all against all, nor do they vary unpredictably. These two characteristics of order can only exist if all or most members of a society share certain ultimate values which define their goals and prescribe the permitted means for their attainment. These values introduce order and meaning

into the conduct of the individual and restrict conflict and chaos in a society. (p. 105)

This statement in no way implied that "the fundamental value system so affects all aspects of social life as to ensure that they are completely consistent or compatible with one another". Quite the contrary, Parsons fully acknowledged that "there must be inherent 'strains' in every social system because the requirements of different parts of it are not necessarily compatible with one another". However, he seemed to have "abiding faith in the capacity of the social systems and personality to provide compensating mechanisms to cope with these problems". (Quoted by Cohen, 1968, p. 105)

In view of its importance in introducing order and meaning into the conduct of the individual and restricting conflict and chaos in a society, what explains the lack of enthusiasm among sociologists in the study of value, or values? Answers to this question seem to have centred on three important issues: the meaning of value, the measurement of value, and the relation between value and action.

The situation seems to have improved in recent decades. Reports on the study of values have been produced by Adler (1956), Allport (1931), Catton (1959), Kluckhohn (1951), Kohn (1969), Morris (1956), Pepper (1958), Perry (1926), Rokeach (1973), and many others. Now we are more certain about what it means by value, what is included as value, and how it can be

measured. We are, however, less certain about the extent it can be used to explain and predict human behaviour.

The last concept to be discussed is "action". It is as much a philosophical concept as it is a sociological concept. In sociology, Graham Kinlock (1977) noted that the foundation of any theory, including the theory of action, was its paradigm or model of reality. He added that these paradigms appeared to take one of three major forms: (1) the organic-structure-functional model, (2) the conflict-radical model, and (3) the social-behaviourist-social-psychological model. (p. 5)

In summary, the organic-structure-functional model aims at developing a general theory of society which has as its emphasis the maximization of societal goals and orderly social change. The result is a conceptualization of society as an organic system defined by laws of nature. The foundation of this system is its division of labour, upon which the normative system is based. Moreover, this system is seen as evolving from the traditional toward the modern and industrial, with distinct modifications of its normative structure in the process. This model is best represented by the work of Durkheim and Parsons. (pp. 31-2)

The conflict-radical model also aims at developing a general theory of society, but the purpose is to make use of the theory to analyze conflict and domination within contemporary industrial society. The result is a conceptualization of society as a systemic, evolving system of groups competing for domination and

control of resources. Various social and demographic conditions are seen to define the intensity, duration, and form of social conflict, while the social structure represents the type of domination present in the society at a particular stage of its evolution. This model is best represented by the work of Marx and Weber. (pp. 32-3)

In contrast to the above, the social-behaviourist-social-psychological model aims at developing an understanding of individual as a social product of society and the purpose is to make use of this understanding to analyze social interaction between individuals. The result is a conceptualization of society as located within the individual, as dynamic and emergent through social exchange and interaction, and as discovered through the processes of individual introspection and observation. This model is best represented by the work of Weber, and Blumer. (p. 33)

Each of these models throws light on action. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. However, which of these paradigms should we use in the study of action?

What are the relations of these concepts? To begin with, is social work a profession? Or, more appropriately, where is social work situated along the path which leads to professionalism? What needs to be done if social work is to move further along the professional end of the continuum? In a much quoted article in the social work literature, Ernest Greenwood

(1957) matched social work against five professional attributes and concluded that social work had already acquired full professional status. (pp. 44-55)

This researcher is, however, of the opinion that social work in Hong Kong, same as elsewhere, has not, as yet, acquired full professional status. Based on his understanding of the concept of a profession this researcher contends that if social work is to become a full profession, social workers need to come to some consensus as to what constitutes the profession's authority, its sphere of functional specialty, its body of knowledge, and its code of practice. Undeniably, the task is difficult, but not impossible. It depends, most important of all, on success in identifying a system of values which is acceptable to most of its members.

Secondly, what is the relationship between values and action? More particularly, what is the relationship between social work values and social work action? To what extent is value a predisposition to action. This leads us right back to the purpose of this study.

1.4 Method of the Study

The framework for this study is based on the researcher's conceptual understanding of social work, profession, value, and action. For this reason, four chapters are devoted to discussing the meaning of these concepts.

The study itself is divided into three parts. The first part involves an identification of a cluster of social work values. The second part involves a value survey the objective of which is to transform this cluster of values into a value system. The last part involves a value-action relationship survey the objective of which is to find out if there is any relationship between values and action in social work practice.

To come up with a list of social work values, one can either rely on "what social work values are" or "what social work values should be". Values that are included as social work values are not easy to identify. Over the years there are very few empirical studies on values in social work.

On the other hand, values that should be included as social work values can be obtained from the literature. Levy (1973), for instance, has come up with a highly respectable list of social work values. An alternative is to trace the historical development of social work since its emergence in the mid-nineteenth century. Both of these methods are used in this study. By tracing the historical development of social work, this researcher hopes to identify important dimensions in the developmental process and dominant ideologies associated with each. This provides a framework for the selection of values when one goes through the literature. Moreover, it allows the researcher to include values which may be important to social work but may not have been mentioned by the authors. It also allows him to include values which reflect the local situation.

In view of the uniqueness of Hong Kong, a city where the east meets the west, the set of values so identified must be able to reflect the ideologies of both parts of the world, notably the ideologies of the Christians and the Confucians; the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the Socialists.

Basically, the historical development of social work in Hong Kong follows the path of the British, and in Britain, the following dimensions can be identified:

1. the moral dimension,
2. the organizational dimension,
3. the psychological dimension, and
4. the political dimension.

In each of these dimensions, one type of values seems to predominate, namely, moral values, competence values, personal values, and social values. Based on these four types of values, two sets of values can be obtained. The first set includes twelve terminal values or end-states of existence. The second set includes twelve instrumental values or modes of conduct. Subsequently, each of these values is defined.

To organize these two sets of values into a value system, this researcher adopts the research method Rokeach used in his study of the Nature of Human Values (1973). In his view, the value of an object is one of its properties. The possession of this property by the object, and its magnitude, can be determined

by ranking. Thus the second part of this study involves a rank ordering process. From the lists of values identified in the first part of this research, respondents to the value survey are requested to rank items in each of these lists in order of preference in their capacity as social workers.

The last part of this study involves an exploration of the relationship between values and action in social work practice. This value-action relationship survey attempts to determine if there is any indication that by placing one value on top of another, one will perform the action which reflect one's preference for this value rather than another. To accomplish this purpose, a small number of case situations have been prepared. Since social workers in most situations will act almost routinely, without weighting their value preferences, these case situations are formulated according to issues which normally arouse serious value conflicts in the social worker.

1.5 Summary of the Report

The report is divided into four sections, which are further divided into ten chapters. Immediately following this first section and introductory chapter is Section Two which consists of four chapters on conceptual clarification. In Chapter Two, a sample of social work definitions is presented in order to highlight the difficulty of coming to terms with what social work is. In Chapter Three, a broad overview of the definitions of a profession is conducted. The chapter ends with a proposed

definition of the concept for this particular study. In Chapter Four, the focus is shifted to the concept of value. Based on the work of Rokeach, a slightly modified version of his definition of value is proposed. In the final chapter of this section, attention is focused on what action is and what its determinants are. Based on the work of Giddens, the meaning of action and its relation to value is discussed. This provides the framework for this study.

Section Three consists of four chapters. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of research methodology. Findings of the study are reported in the remaining chapters of this section.

Chapter Ten, the only chapter in the final section, is reserved for summary of findings and concluding remarks.

Section Two

Conceptual Clarification

Chapter Two

What is Social Work?

2.1 Introduction

According to Philip Seed (1973), the term social work was first used in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century "in connection with the activities of people who had a sense of belonging to a movement which aimed at social advance based on disciplined and principled forms of social action" (p. 3). As a social movement, its main concern was "to find more realistic remedies to social problems and to social distress than traditional forms of philanthropy and charity" (p. 3).

In the United States, social work also began as a social movement, struggling for a "cause", which, in the opinion of Max Siporin (1975), was "to abolish the evils of poverty and injustice, to create a more equitable, integrated, and democratic society" (p. 9).

Both of these definitions were based on the assumption that "social problems" and "social distress" could be remedied, and the "evils of poverty and injustice" could be abolished through the institutionalization of social welfare. The mission of social work was, therefore, to humanize the capitalist society, not to transform it.

Written in the last quarter of the twentieth century, Jeffry Galper (1980) expressed an entirely different view. To him, "radical social work" would contribute to "building a movement for the transformation to socialism by its efforts in and through the social services" (p. 10). In this understanding, social work was not connected with a social movement, but with a political movement which had as its mission the transformation of a society from capitalism to socialism.

Very few social workers at this moment in time are committed to the idea of social work as a movement, neither social nor political. The reason for this was ably explained by Porter R. Lee (1929) when he distinguished social work as "cause" and social work as "function". In his own words:

A cause is usually a movement directed toward the elimination of an entrenched evil ... the establishment of a new way of meeting human need or a new opportunity for satisfaction Whether we emphasize the elimination of evil or the establishment of a positive good as the objective of the cause, it seems to be true that once the elimination of the evil is accomplished, once the new positive good is established, interest in it is likely to slacken. The momentum of the cause will never carry over adequately to the subsequent task of making its fruits permanent. The slow [methodically] organized effort needed to make enduring the achievement of the cause calls for different motives, different skill, different machinery. At

the moment of its success, the cause tends to transfer its interest and its responsibility to an administrative unit whose responsibility becomes a function of well-organized community life. (pp. 22-3)

Even though the statement was made more than half-a-century ago, its argument remains sound even today. Siporin (1975), for instance, was of the opinion that, with the institutionalization of social welfare, "social work then became a 'function' of a 'well-organized community', giving 'corporate life' to the idea and ideal of social welfare" (p. 9). Siporin did not mean to imply that social work would no longer continue to speak and fight for the poor and disadvantaged in our society but, concurring with Lee, he contended that social work should "continue to be both a cause and a function" (p. 9).

Siporin was not alone in holding this view. Neil Gilbert, Henry Miller, and Harry Specht (1980), for instance, also referred to social work as a function, "the practice of helping people use their social environment to meet their needs" (p. 11). Similarly, Martin Davies (1985) noted that the major task of social work was "to enable the citizen to retain his independence in the community for as long as possible, and to superintend his movement into or out of institutional care in a way that serves both the client's and the community's long-term interests" (p. 10).

In the very beginning of its existence, social work and

social welfare were regarded as synonyms. Kenneth L. M. Pray (1949), for instance, identified social work as "a normal constructive social instrument ... a necessary part of the structure of a civilized, well-planned society" (pp. 33-4). In this view, social work was equivalent to social welfare and both were defined as a social institution. However, this old equivalence has long been forgotten. Siporin (1975), for instance, claimed that social welfare was the social institution that "encompasses a wide variety of helping occupations and services to meet social needs, beyond the resources naturally provided by family and community groups" (p. 4). Social work, in this view, became one of the occupations within the social welfare institution. Gisela Konopka (1958) went a step further and defined social work as a profession that "presents a unique constellation of value, knowledge, and method" (p. 200). Moreover, Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux (1965) identified social work as a profession, "a group of people with more or less specified training and skills, who occupy key positions, along with other groups, in the provision of welfare services" (p. 17n). Their views were echoed by Gilbert, Miller, and Specht (1980) who claimed that social work had become "the main source of professional personnel to operate the social welfare system" (p. 12).

Instead of being referred to as an institution, an occupation, or a profession, social work was often referred to as an art, a science, or a technology. Mary Richmond (1915), for instance, defined social work as "the art of doing different

things for and with different people by cooperating with them to achieve at one and the same time their own and society's betterment" (pp. 374 f.).

For some social workers, social work as art helps to enhance one's sensitivity, creativity, and critical ability. Elizabeth E. Irvine (1969), for instance, advocated the use of literature to heighten the sensitivity of social workers. She contended that "there is more to be learned about the mind of man from literature than from ... psychology" (p. 192). In another context, Irvine (1975) elaborated on this by claiming that:

Literature (including drama) studies the whole man (not those abstractions: economic man, psychological man, sociological man) and observes him in his natural habitat (not the laboratory or the consulting-room) and in dynamic interaction with his family, his social circle and the wider society in which they exist. Furthermore, this whole man is observed by a whole man, not by that bit of a man contained in the role of social scientist; by an observer using greater empathy than the man in the street, unlike the social scientist, who use less (he may have the capacity, but usually feels obliged to inhibit or disregard it so that it will not contaminate his objectivity). (pp. 197-8)

Lydia Rapoport (1968), on the other hand, noted general similarities between social work and art and concluded that :

Social work, like art, is engaged in problem solving, be it the problem of expression, communication, transformation, or change. Both deal with human materials or human themes and both require an intimate "knowing and contact". Both call for creative and imaginative use of self. Both require a special kind of distance and objectivity. (p. 151)

In the rest of the article, she elaborated on the implications of "creativity in social work".

Much more recently, Hugh England (1986) indicated interest in criticism, one of the key components in the tradition of art. He was of the opinion that:

Criticism in social work, as an art, is integral to practice The social worker is critic in two distinct respects. Initially he is the critic of his client The social worker has to be particularly skilled at the evaluation, or understanding, of his client's meaning and is thus his client's critic. But the worker's subsequent behaviour and communication is his "art", and as this must necessarily be evaluated (to ensure that it serves the best interests of his client), the worker is also critic in the more profound sense that he must evaluate his "art" Criticism then, for both these reasons, is an integral though unrecognized element in the practice of social work. Its proper development will lead directly to the improvement of the general standard of practice. It will also serve a wider

end, for the development of an adequate criticism will make social work "visible" and will thus allow for its much broader understanding. It will be the means to a real exploration and analysis of social work. (p. 119)

Social work has also been described as a science. According to Louise C Johnson and Charles L Schwartz (1988), "its scientific nature can best be illustrated by pointing out that when social workers help people, they employ the problem-solving process, which is an application of scientific principles and methods" (p. 304). Thus the science of social work implies the conscious application of acquired knowledge. Ruth E. Smalley (1967), for instance, defined social work as "the body of knowledge, skill, and ethics, professionally employed in the administration of the social services and in the development of programmes for social welfare" (p. 4).

Charles R. Atherton (1969), however, had a totally different view. He claimed that social work was nothing more than "the technology which has been given the responsibility for the control of dependency" (p. 421). In this case, the knowledge of social work gives way to its skills.

The most popular view must be that social work is both art and science. Louise C. Johnson (1986), for instance, described social work as a creative blending of knowledge, values and skills. (p. 53) The way these components are blended together may be referred to as method. Siporin (1975), for instance, was

of the opinion that social work was "a social institutional method of helping people to prevent and resolve their social problems, to restore and enhance their social functioning" (p. 3).

As "a social institutional method" of helping people, social work has been categorized and defined in a variety of ways. In a recent publication Robert L. Barker (1987) categorized and defined social work according to its field of practice, including forensic social work (p. 58), hospital social work (p. 72), industrial social work (p. 78), international social work (pp. 81-82), medical social work (p. 96), military social work (p. 99), occupational social work (p. 110), police social work (p. 121), psychiatric social work (p. 128), rural social work (p. 141), and school social work (p. 145). He also categorized and defined social work in terms of direct practice (p. 42) and indirect practice (p. 78); macro practice (p. 92), mezzo practice (p. 98), and micro practice (p. 98).

The method of categorization and definition which remains with us even today is by looking at the methods of and approaches to social work practice. These methods of social work practice often include social casework, social group work, and community work. However, since the beginning of the 1970s, there is a growing interest in the unitary method, one that "would provide a common set of principles and concepts which all social workers could use in dealing with social problems as they are manifest in a single individual, a group or a community" (Specht and Vickery,

1977, p. 15).

Within each method of social work practice, one can easily identify a number of practice approaches. In social casework, one often finds the psychosocial approach (Hollis, 1970), the functional approach (Smalley, 1970), and the problem-solving approach (Perlman, 1970). In social group work, one is inclined to include the organizational and environmental approach (Glasser and Garvin, 1977), the interactionist approach (Schwartz, 1977), and the developmental approach (Tropp, 1977). In community work, one can hardly leave out community development, community organization, and social action (Barker, 1987, pp. 29; 29; 151). There is, however, hardly any consensus in the selection of unitary approaches to social work practice. To serve the purpose of this study, the following approaches are included: radical social work (Galper, 1980), clinical social work (Northen, 1982), community social work (NISW, 1982), and essential social work (Davies, 1985).

The uniqueness of social work was identified by Gilbert, Miller, and Specht (1980). In their own words, they stated that:

[There] is no other profession that takes as its central concern the interaction of people with their social environment. Other professionals work with social interactions in particular parts of the social environment But the concern of social workers is with the entire social environment In modern life these different

institutional systems tend to function separately. Most of them are very large and complex. A major concern of social work is with helping people deal effectively with each of these systems as well as linking these systems with one another. (pp. 11-2)

In addition to this unique concern with the entire social environment, social work has become the main source of professional personnel to operate the welfare system Of course, other professionals are employed in this enterprise, too But social work is the primary source of professionals in social welfare. Conversely, although the majority of social workers are employed in different parts of the social welfare system, they work in other institutional systems such as trade unions and educational and medical care agencies, helping to carry out the social welfare functions of these systems. (p. 12)

These, then, are the two features of social work that distinguish it from other professions: it is primarily concerned with enabling people to make full use of their social environment and with the development and functioning of the institution of social welfare. (p. 12)

In concluding this brief review, we can, for the moment, define social work as an occupation within the social welfare institution which aspires to become a profession. However, there is no agreement regarding the nature of social work. Is social

work a "cause" or a "function"? Should social work be considered as "art", "science", or "technology"? If social work is to be considered as a method, how should it be defined? In the next section, we will have a brief overview of some of the definitions which look at social work as a method.

2.2 Approaches to Definition

There are in existence in the social work literature a large number of definitions of social work but, understandably, none of these is able to satisfy all those who claim to be involved in its practice. In this section, only a few of those which look at social work as a method will be presented.

2.2.1 Social work as social casework

In Britain, the term "case-work" was used from the inception of the Charity Organization Society in 1869. Henceforth, it was widely used as the method of providing services to children, families, offenders, patients of general and mental hospitals. Parallel developments could be observed in the United States.

The most widely accepted definition of social casework in the United States in the mid-twentieth century must be the one offered by Swithun Bowers (1949). After reviewing definitions of social casework in his country since 1915, Bowers suggested the following definition:

Social casework is an art in which knowledge of the science of human relations and skill in relationship are used to mobilize capacities in the individual and resources in the community appropriate for better adjustment between the client and all or any part of his total environment. (p. 19)

In Britain, the definition provided in the Younghusband Report was also representative of the thinking of casework practitioners in the first half of the twentieth century:

Casework is a personal service provided by qualified workers for individuals who required skilled assistance in resolving some material, emotional or character problem. It is a disciplined activity which requires a full appreciation of the needs of the client in his family and community setting. The caseworker seeks to perform this service on the basis of mutual trust and in such ways as will strengthen the client's own capacities to deal with his problems and to achieve a better adjustment with his environment. The services required of a caseworker cover many kinds of human need, ranging from relatively simple problems of material assistance to complex personal situations involving emotional disturbance or a character deficit, which may require prolonged assistance and the careful mobilization of resources and of different professional skills. (Ministry of Health & Department of Health for Scotland, 1959, pp. 182-3)

A much more updated definition was provided by Barker (1987) in the Social Work Dictionary:

[Social casework is] the orientation, value system, and type of practice used by professional social workers in which psychosocial, behavioural, and systems concepts are translated into skills designed to help individuals and families solve intrapsychic, interpersonal, socioeconomic, and environmental problems through direct face-to-face relationships. (p. 151)

All these definitions make it perfectly clear that social casework is concerned with social as well as personal factors; with the adjustment of the environment as well as the individual; with mobilizing community resources as well as personal resources. There is also the implicit assumption in the practice of casework that it benefits not only the individual but society as well. The betterment of society, however, follows from the betterment of the individual and casework is concerned primarily with the development and adjustment of the individual rather than with societal arrangements in any general sense.

There are in existence a number of approaches to social casework, including the psychosocial approach, the functional approach, and the problem-solving approach. Each of these approaches has its own emphasis. In the eyes of Florence Hollis (1970), "casework treatment (using the psychosocial approach) is conceptualized as a blend of processes directed as diagnostically

indicated toward modification in the person or his social environment or both, and of the exchanges between them" (pp. 36-7). The functional approach, however, has a different emphasis. Ruth E. Smalley (1970), one of its chief advocates, is of the opinion that social casework is "not a form of social treatment of individuals" but "a method for engaging a client through a relationship process, essentially one to one, in the use of a social service toward his own and the general welfare" (pp. 80-1). Finally, according to Helen H. Perlman (1970), the primary goal of the problem-solving approach is "to help a person cope as effectively as possible with such problems in carrying social tasks and relationships which he now perceives, feels as stressful, and finds insuperable without outside help" (p. 139).

2.2.2 Social work as social group work

A definition of social group work which can satisfy the many different kinds of workers who claim to be taking part in its practice is much more difficult to find. The reason for this was made obvious by Peter Kuenstler (1955) when he stated that "under the heading of Social Group Work in Britain it might be justifiable to include a survey of almost all types of human activity in the country, on the grounds that they are social activities of human beings in groups" (p. 16). Such activities might well include group work with young children, adolescents and adults, group work in industry and in commerce, in hospitals, in churches, in settlements, and in community centres. In this understanding, social group work became "a method which can be

applied consciously and skilfully to particular kinds of social and educational work, so that the purpose of such groups is more successfully achieved" (p. 21).

A more acceptable definition could be found in the Younghusband Report which stated that social group work was a form of social work which was "directed towards giving people a constructive experience of membership in a group so that they may develop further as individuals and be better able to contribute to the life of the community" (Ministry of Health & Department of Health for Scotland, 1959, p. 183).

Social group work was much better developed as a method in the United States than in Britain in the first half of twentieth century. In 1942, Gertrude Wilson emphasized the use of group work in effecting changes in the values of individuals and society as a whole. She believed that "group work was a process through which group life was influenced by a worker who directed the process toward the accomplishment of a social goal conceived in a democratic philosophy" (Quoted by Reid, 1981, p. 143). The functions of social group work were described as "(1) developmental, as it provided for normal social growth; (2) protective or corrective, in that it could be offered to people without groups; and (3) instrumental, in achieving of socially desirable ends" (pp. 143-4).

A few years later, Grace Coyle, while serving as chairperson of a committee of the American Association of Group Workers

(AAGW), issued a statement, Definition of the Function of the Group Worker (1949). This statement was adopted by AAGW and became the official description of the function of the professional group worker. In the statement, Coyle noted that:

The group worker enables various types of groups to function in such a way that both group interaction and programme activities contribute to the growth of the individual and the achievement of desirable social goals.

The objectives of the group worker include provision for personal growth according to individual capacity and need, the adjustment of the individual to other persons, to groups and to society, and the motivation of the individual toward the improvement of society; the recognition by the individual of his own rights, limitations and abilities, as well as his acceptance of the rights, abilities and differences of others. (Quoted by Reid, 1981, p. 146)

Much more recently, social group work was defined by Barker (1987) to read:

[Social group work is] an orientation and method of social work intervention in which small numbers of people who share similar interests or common problems convene regularly and engage in activities designed to achieve their common goals. In contrast to group psychotherapy, the goals of group work are not necessarily the treatment of emotional problems.

The objectives also include exchanging information, developing social and manual skills, changing value orientations, and diverting antisocial behaviours into productive channels. Intervention techniques include, but are not limited to, controlled therapeutic discussions. Some groups also include education and tutoring, sports, arts and crafts, recreational activities, and discussion about such topics as politics, religion, sexuality, values, and goals. (p. 152)

These definitions perhaps give a reasonably concrete idea of social group work. Here too there is the assumption that the activity will result in community betterment but the focus is clearly on the development of the individual and of the group-as-a-whole; the community benefits through the consequent better functioning of individuals and groups.

There are in existence a variety of approaches to social group work, including the organizational and environmental approach, the interactionist approach and the developmental approach. (Middleman and Goldberg, 1985, p. 717) Each of these approaches has its own emphasis. As a spokesman of the organizational and environmental approach, Charles Garvin (1987) is of the opinion that the purpose of a group is to facilitate the socialization or resocialization of the member. Furthermore, he emphasizes that the purpose for which the group is established determines the way the members will respond to their group experience and the way the worker will work with the group. This

approach to group purpose recognizes that the ultimate fulfillment of the purpose will be a result of interactions involving the agency, the worker, the members, as well as others in the environment. (pp. 2-4)

William Schwartz, the initiator of the interactionist approach, draws more strongly than others from systems concepts to portray members, groups, agencies, and other complex environments in interaction with each other and in a constant process of mutual adaptation. The social worker facilitates this process by functioning as a mediator. This approach focuses on the process whereby individuals engage with others to meet mutual needs. (Garvin, 1987, p. 20)

Emanuel Tropp contends that "group self-direction toward a common goal is the most effective group vehicle for the social growth of its members". In the group the individual is helped to achieve growth through participation in establishing and accomplishing the group's goal or purpose. He does not describe group work as "treatment" and its beneficiaries as "abnormal or pathological". Instead, he feels that "all are seen as people who face stressful developmental stages, life situations, challenges, and crises with which they must cope in some way". (Garvin, 1987, p. 21)

2.2.3 Social work as community work

Community work is a form of social work which takes the

quality of the social activities and social relationships of a whole community as its starting point. The community worker may appear under a number of different titles, e.g., community development officer, neighbourhood worker, social development officer, social relations officer, or simply liaison officer. As an occupation, as distinct from a voluntary activity of citizens, it is generally accepted as embracing both direct work with community groups and work at the inter-organizational and planning level. It is undertaken with communities, which may be large or small, and based on geography or community of interest. Its basic concern is to enable their members collectively to overcome problems and improve their conditions of life while at the same time enhancing the sense of common feeling, solidarity and competence of the community.

There are in existence several approaches to community work: community development, community organization, and social action.

According to Noel and Rita Timms (1982), community development started as a post-war response to help and to stimulate people in the under-developed parts of the world to improve their way of life. Such improvement was believed to depend on the active participation of people themselves. Community development has since been identified as one of the interwoven strands of community work. It involves direct, face-to-face action directed towards mobilizing people in a locality or neighbourhood around one or more issues or concerns. (p. 37)

Much more recently, community development is defined as "efforts made by professionals and community residents to enhance the social bonds among members of the community, motivate the citizens for self-help, develop responsible local leadership, and create or revitalize local institutions" (Barker, 1987, p. 29)

Insofar as community organization has been talked about in Britain, it has been in terms of the work of Councils of Social Service, Old People's Welfare Committees, Committees for the Physically Handicapped and similar organizations engaged in the co-ordination, promotion, and development of the work of a number of bodies in a particular field at the local, regional or national level.

However, in the United States, community organization has meant the bringing together of organizations involved in social welfare so as to co-ordinate and develop their capacities in order to meet community needs more adequately. Over time the meaning of the term has broadened to include a wide range of activities including that which is referred to as "community work" in Britain. One of the most elaborate attempts at a comprehensive definition - and certainly one of the most widely quoted - is that of Murray Ross (1967):

Community organization ... is ... a process by which a community identifies its needs and objectives, orders (or ranks) these needs or objectives, develops the confidence and will to work at these needs or objectives, finds the

resources (internal and/or external) to deal with these needs or objectives, takes action in respect to them, and in so doing extends and develops co-operative and collaborative attitudes and practices in the community. (p. 40)

Much more recently, community organization is defined as "an intervention process used by social workers and other professionals to help individuals, groups, and collectives of people with common interests or from the same geographic areas to deal with social problems and to enhance social well-being through planned collective action" (Barker, 1987, p. 29).

In the same publication, social action is described as:

A coordinated effort to achieve institutional change in order to meet a need, solve a social problem, correct an injustice, or enhance the quality of human life. This effort may occur at the initiative and direction of professionals in social welfare, economics, politics, religion, or the military, or it may occur through the efforts of the people who are directly affected by the problems or change. (Barker, 1987, p. 151)

2.2.4 Social work as a unitary approach

In the 1970s, there was a move in the United States toward integrating methods of social work. Social work was no longer seen as dividing into social casework, social group work, and

community work. It was seen as a unitary approach which had as its focus the interaction between individuals and their environment. The National Association of Social Workers (1973), for instance, offered the following definition for social work:

Social work is the professional activity of helping individuals, groups, or communities to enhance or restore their capacity for social functioning and creating societal conditions favorable to that goal.

Social work practice consists of the professional application of social work values, principles, and techniques to one or more of the following ends: helping people to obtain tangible services; providing counseling and psychotherapy with individuals, families and groups; helping communities or groups provide or improve social and health services; and participating in relevant legislative processes.

The practice of social work requires knowledge of human development and behavior; of social, economic, and cultural institutions; and of the interaction of all of these factors. (Quoted in Barker, 1987, p. 154)

Back in England, the British Association of Social Workers also adopted, in 1977, a formal definition of social work. It stated that:

Social work is the purposeful and ethical application of personal skills in interpersonal relationships directed towards enhancing the personal and social functioning of an individual, family, group or neighbourhood, which necessarily involves using evidence obtained from practice to help create a social environment conducive to the well-being of all. (p. 19)

Finally, in China, a definition of social work was recently produced. It described social work as "the management of social welfare services, under the direction of the Party and the Government, mobilizing the resources of the people and people's organizations, for those who have lost or have never acquired the ability to function effectively in the society". Through the use of appropriate measures, social work aimed at "helping them resume a normal social life, maintaining social orders, and safeguarding the stability of essential social institutions". (Shehuixue Gailun, 1985, p. 336, tr.)

Along this same line, Helen Northen (1982), author of *Clinical Social Work*, stated that:

Social work, as a profession with a major responsibility for the quality of human relations, is concerned with the promotion of opportunities for the enhancement of potentials and for the prevention of problems. It has a responsibility also for the remediation of difficulties and conflicts that have developed. (p. 15)

In other words, enhancement, prevention, and remediation are all appropriate functions for social work.

In a recent report published by the National Institute for Social Work (1982), a move toward community social work was advocated. In the report, it noted that:

[Community social work] is concerned both with responding to the existing social care needs of individuals and families and with reducing the number of such problems which arise in the future It rests ... upon a recognition that the majority of social care in England and Wales is provided, not by the statutory or voluntary social services agencies, but by individual citizens who are often linked into informal caring networks. (p. 205)

In comparing these definitions, one can easily identify some commonalities. Charles D. Garvin and Brett A. Seabury (1984) have included the following:

1. The focus of social work practice is upon the way in which the individual seeks to meet needs in the environment and the way in which the environment responds to the needs of the individual.

2. The role of social workers in responding to this relationship between individuals and environments may be fulfilled in several ways:

- a. By reducing or resolving problems that grow out of dysfunctional individual-environmental interactions;
- b. By preventing the emergence of dysfunctional individual-environmental interactions;
- c. By strengthening the potential of people to lead creative and satisfying lives in their environments.

3. The improvement of conditions or resolution of problems related to individual-environmental transactions can be brought about in several ways, such as

- a. By enhancing the problem-solving and developmental capacities of people;
- b. By helping people deal with their environments and develop their creative potential through improving the quality of their associations with the groups of people with whom they are most intimately involved (e.g., their families, friends, neighbours, and fellow workers);
- c. By promoting the responsive, effective, and humane operation of systems that provide people with resources and services;
- d. By linking people with systems that provide them with resources, services, and opportunities. (p. 2)

What is the problem with social work? After reviewing these definitions, one tends to agree with the following statement which describes very succinctly the situation social workers find themselves:

Too much is generally expected of social workers. We load upon them unrealistic expectations It has grown rapidly as the flow of legislation has greatly increased the range and complexity of its work There is confusion about the direction in which they are going and unease about what they should be doing and the way in which they are organized and deployed They operate uneasily on the frontier between what appears to be almost limitless needs on the one hand and an inadequate pool of resources to satisfy those needs on the other. (NISW, 1982, p. vii)

To overcome this problem, some authors have chosen to define social work in the way they want it to be. The Barclay Report, for instance, described social work as counselling and social care planning. (NISW, 1982) On the other hand, Davies (1985) focused on social work as a mechanism for maintaining stability in the society while Galper (1980) perceived social work as an active participant in helping to bring about the transformation from capitalism to socialism. Finally, Northen (1982) chose to retain her interest in clinical practice.

Other authors have chosen to define social work in broader terms. Definitions formulated by the National Association of Social Workers and the British Association of Social Workers are examples of this approach.

Each approach has its merits but neither one is able to satisfy all social workers in the field of social welfare. In

the final section of this chapter, a definition of social work which is based on the second approach is proposed.

2.3 A Proposed Definition

Among the numerous attempts to define social work, the most widely quoted and discussed seems to be the Working Definition of Social Work Practice of the National Association of Social Workers. Published in 1958, the statement stated that:

Social work practice, like the practice of all professions, is recognized by a constellation of value, purpose, sanctions, knowledge, and method. No part alone is characteristic of social work practice nor is any part ... unique to social work. It is the particular content and configuration of this constellation which makes it social work practice and distinguishes it from the practice of other professions. (Bartlett, 1958)

According to the Working Definition, the practice of social work has as its purposes:

1. To assist individuals and groups to identify and resolve or minimize problems arising out of disequilibrium between themselves and their environment.
2. To identify potential areas of disequilibrium between individuals or groups and the environment in order to

prevent the occurrence of disequilibrium.

3. In addition to the curative and preventive aims, to seek out, identify and strengthen the maximum potential in individuals, groups and communities. (Bartlett, 1958)

The major contribution of the Working Definition lies in the Report's stipulation that the practice of social work is recognized by a constellation of five components. Many definitions of social work formulated after this make reference to some or all of these components. The Working Definition is, however, not without limitations.

In a critique of the Working Definition, William E. Gordon (1962) identified three of its limitations. Firstly, the working definition "tells us how to recognize social work practice, but not what social work practice is". Secondly, "the components ... appeared to stand separate and equal to each other, held together only by the assertion that all must be present to some degree for the practice to be considered social work practice". Lastly, and as a direct result of the absence of relationships between components, "the Working Definition does not easily relate itself to other frames of reference or permit ready reduction of further implications and hypotheses for examination". Therefore, in Gordon's view, the working definition "cannot readily serve as a guide for further study and development until its components are functionally related". (pp. 4-5)

In an attempt to define what social work practice is and to identify the hierarchical relationships between its components, Gordon (1962) introduced the idea of practice as the social worker-in-action. His rationale was clearly explained in the following statement.

The idea of practice as worker action not only specifies what social work practice is, but it also specifies the functional relationship of the components to that action. Thus the action is directed toward some purpose, occurs under some sanction, and is under the conscious guidance of knowledge and values, and is patterned to some extent by methods. (p. 5)

Building upon this central idea of worker action, he offered the following definition for social work practice.

Social work practice is interventive action directed to purposes and guided by the values, knowledge, and techniques which are collectively unique, acknowledged by and identified with the social work profession. (p. 11)

Elaborating on this statement, he stated that

While action itself is the stuff of practice, the elements that make it social work practice reside in the purposes for which the action is taken, the value-knowledge-determined perception of the situation toward which action is directed,

and the patterning of action by such techniques as are available to guide it. (p. 12)

He further contended that:

Since purposes are largely set by values and techniques are derived from knowledge, the most obvious implication of this formulation is to place much more emphasis than before on the values and knowledge on which practice (interventive action) is based. (p. 12)

It needs to be pointed out that sanction was not included in this statement and method was replaced by techniques. In explaining his decision to exclude sanction as a basic component, Gordon argued that:

While one might choose to say that interventive action guided by purpose, value, knowledge, and technique is not professional practice unless it is authorized by society and legitimated through law, agency, or professional organization, the action itself cannot be distinguished from unsanctioned action. In other words, sanction classifies one of the conditions under which the action occurs, but it does not influence the action itself. (p. 12)

He also explained his reason for replacing method by techniques by saying that:

Since method seemed so recalcitrant to clarification, the current subcommittee on the Working Definition experimented with two related action-oriented concepts - professional intervention and techniques. Professional intervention is used to refer to the action of the practitioner Techniques when used ... guide the interventive action. (p. 11)

Looking back over the pages, one has to admit that both Bartlett and Gordon have contributed significantly to the understanding of social work practice. By stipulating that social work is recognized by a constellation of five components, Bartlett have successfully laid the foundation. Gordon, by introducing the idea of practice as worker action, has, with equal success, identified the relationships between the components. However, several improvements can still be made. The first improvement involves the basic components that should be included in the definition. The second improvement involves the relations between one component and another. Finally, the third improvement relates to the content of each of these basic components.

What are the basic components of social work? Since social work aspires to become a profession, it seems logical to make reference to the attributes of a profession while determining its basic components. This and the other improvements will be discussed in the next few chapters. In the meantime, it is proposed that Gordon's definition of social work practice be

amended to read as follow:

Social work is an occupation within the social welfare institution which aspires to become a profession. Its practice involves social action directed to purposes and guided by a creative blending of knowledge, values, and techniques, which are collectively unique, acknowledged by and identified with social work.

Chapter Three

What is a Profession?

3.1 Introduction

The emergence of a growing number of professions and professionals has long been accepted by sociologists as a major characteristic of modern industrial societies. Talcott Parsons (1939), for instance, noted that the modern society was a professional society: it was neither capitalistic as was described by Karl Marx, nor bureaucratic, by Max Weber. Paul Halmos (1970) went a step further when he noted that the modern society was becoming a personal service society, i.e., a society of personal service professions. Much more recently, John Goldthorpe (1982) noted the emergence of "the service class", including the professionals, as a characteristic of the modern society. Reasons for the emergence of the professions may be outlined as following:

1. The growth of industry created a demand for highly specialized, theoretical, and technical knowledge, resulting in the development of academic professions such as science and practice professions such as engineering.

2. The expansion of trade and commerce accounted for the demand for financial experts such as accountants and legal experts such as lawyers.

3. The creation of the welfare state stimulated the growth and development of a wide range of personal service professions, including medicine, psychiatry, psychology, and social work.

Alongside with this is an increase in interest in the sociology of the professions. Even though the professions have never been among the core subjects in sociology, a surprisingly large number of early masters in the discipline have included the professions in the discussion of topics that are of interest to them.

Among the early masters Karl Marx had relatively little to say about the professions. This is understandable because, in his theory of society, he looked at capitalism as a structure within society that alienated individuals, particularly labourers. It erected barriers between the labourer and the production process, the product of that process, and other labourers. It even divided the labourer himself. In other words, capitalism had evolved into a two-class system in which a few capitalists owned the production process, the product, and the time of those labourers who worked for them. In his view, the professions were nothing more than instruments of the capitalists to exercise control over the labourers. This view of the professions is particularly devastating for the personal service professions. Employed mainly in the service of the government, which was technically under the control of the capitalists, these helping professions had no alternative but to serve in the interest of the capitalists rather than the

labourers. From a Marxian perspective, therefore, psychiatrists, psychologists, doctors, and social workers served to clamp down on opposition to capitalist exploitation by defining individuals as psychiatric, psychological, medical, or moral problems, and treating them as such. In this way it was argued that attention would be diverted from the real cause of these problems.

Max Weber had a more positive view of the professions. Even though his main interest was not in the professions, he identified its linkage to the Protestant Ethic, Calvinism in particular, and the rise of bureaucratization, rationalization, and capitalism in the Western world. To Weber, the process of professionalization was viewed as occurring largely within bureaucracies. In his view, Calvinism helped to promote the development of a disciplined and methodical organization of conduct, and it was the bureaucratic-professional that best represented this type of behaviour. He saw the priest as an ideal-typical of a bureaucratic-professional that lied on one end of the continuum of professionalism and the sorcerer as an ideal-typical of a non-professional that lied on the opposite end.

Research in the sociology of the professions is, today, largely founded on the contribution of three persons, Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons, both representatives of the organic-structure-functional model, and Everett C. Hughes, a Canadian who was at one time a member of the Chicago School, home of the social-behaviourist-social-psychological model.

Much of the early work looked at the professions from the perspective of structural-functionalism and dealt with their roles within the social structure. This often involved a comparison between business and the professions or, more specifically, between the egoistic motive of businessmen and the altruistic motive of the professionals. Among the structural-functionalists, Emile Durkheim is particularly important in assigning to the professions a distinctively positive role in society.

While Marx hold the view that problems of modern societies were inherent in the social structure, Durkheim believed that social disorders which existed in these societies could be minimized through gradual social reform. In his effort to explain how order was maintained within the social structure, Durkheim contrasted the mechanistic solidarity of pre-industrial societies with the organic solidarity of industrial societies. In the case of pre-industrial societies, unity stemmed, at least in part, from the fact that everyone did essentially the same things. Such a society was characterized by a powerful common morality that played a central role in making it cohesive. As for industrial societies, unity was the result of differences in the tasks performed by individuals. Societies of this type were held together by the fact that people who performed specialized jobs needed the contributions of many other specialists in order to ensure survival. It was this mutual need for specialized work that held modern societies together.

Although Durkheim postulated that organic solidarity was the normal consequence of the division of labour, he also recognized that abnormal forms might develop which would turn the division of labour into a divisive force rather than a cohesive one.

In his view, the anomic form of the division of labour was a real threat to the social structure of his time. It created social conflict by separating interdependent parts of the social structure which had provided the basis for the normal form of organic solidarity. It was in business activity and the economic philosophy of laissez-faire that the problems of anomie could be seen most clearly.

To re-establish this contact he looked to the formation of occupational groups, particularly professional groups. In his view, the formation of professional associations provided the means to facilitate the integration of individual members into occupational groups. Through its control of education and training, these associations were able to establish both professional competence and professional ethics and it was the provision of an ethical codes which accounted for the professions' contribution to the maintenance of social order.

Since the turn of the century, interest in the differences between business and the professions has given way to their similarities. Talcott Parsons, for instance, published an influential paper in 1939 claiming that the similarities between business and the professions were more important than their

differences. In the paper he contended that:

The fact that the professions have reached a uniquely high level of development in the same society which is also characterized by a business economy suggests that the contrast between business and the professions ... is not the whole story. Possibly there are elements common to both areas ... which are at least as important to their functioning as is self-interest to business, disinterestedness to the professions. (pp. 35-6)

These common elements were, in his view, rationality, specificity of function, and universalism. Moreover, in both cases, they sought "success" and "recognition of their success" in their own delimited areas of functional specificity, even though the manner in which success was concretely defined and pursued might differ in each case. (pp. 36-44)

Thus, according to Parsons, professionals were not "altruistic" while businessmen were not "egoistic"; both were simply conforming to the standards deemed appropriate in their specific areas of activity. Moreover, he envisioned businessmen as professionals. To the charge that the professions had become commercialized, he counteracted by saying it was commerce that had become professionalized. (pp. 45-9)

The major alternative to the functionalist view of professionalism is inspired by Everett C. Hughes (1963). In his

view, the word profession originally meant the act of professing. Each profession professed to know better than others the nature of certain matters, and to know better than their clients what ailed them or their affairs. It had come to mean an occupation which one professed to be skilled in and to follow, or a vocation in which professed knowledge of some branch of learning was used in its application to the affairs of others, or in the practice of an art based upon it. (p. 656)

Thus, for Hughes, the search for criteria which defined the professions is quite misconceived. Profession, in his view, was a lay term with no precise meaning. It was nothing more than a symbolic label granted by others to some occupational groups. Perhaps the way to understand what professions meant in our society, Hughes suggested, was to note the ways in which occupations tried to change themselves or their image, or both, in the course of a movement to become professionalized. (p. 658)

Two concepts were important in his thought: licence and mandate. Since the professionals did profess, they asked for the exclusive right to practice, as a vocation, the art which they professed to know, and to give the kind of advice derived from their special lines of knowledge. In other words, they claimed the exclusive right to carry out certain activities which were different from those of others. This formed the basis of license. (p. 656)

If the professionals had any sense of community by virtue of

their shared work experience, they would also claim a mandate to define, for themselves and others, proper conduct in relation to their work, to influence its technical content, styles of delivery and, more crucially, the patterns of public demand and response. (p. 657)

It is important to emphasize that Hughes regarded these features as differences of degree rather than kind, present in all occupations. In consequence, any occupation may acquire similar privileges if it tries to reconstruct its licence and win acceptance of an enlarged mandate.

These early masters left a series of open questions. The one which is of concern to us here is "How are we to know a profession when we see one?"

3.2 Approaches to Definition

Even among sociologists the word "profession" is used to convey different meanings. In this section, three approaches to definition will be discussed: (1) the traits approach, (2) the process approach, and (3) the power approach.

These approaches have one thing in common. They are all interested in defining and delimiting occupations to be considered as professions. Both the traits approach and the process approach offer some very important insights into the sociology of the professions. The former provides us with basic

criteria for distinguishing between the professions and the nonprofessional occupations and the latter attunes us to the stages of development of the professions. The power approach, on the other hand, helps us to understand the dynamics involved in the developmental process.

3.2.1 The traits approach

Much of the literature on the professions since the turn of the century have been devoted to the question of what constitutes a profession. Under the influence of Durkheim, supporters of the traits approach argue that if the professions are different from business and other nonprofessional occupations, they must have in possession a constellation of characteristics which is not possessed by business and nonprofessional occupations. What constitutes this constellation of characteristics which is distinctive of the professions? With this question in mind, the traits supporters begin from the basic assumption that it is possible to draw up a list of fixed criteria for recognizing a profession on which there will be general consensus. These criteria can then be used to distinguish between the professions and other nonprofessional occupations in a relatively clear and unproblematic fashion.

Howard S. Becker (1962) identified the origin of this approach with a paper by Abraham Flexner (p. 87). In this classic work, Flexner (1915) noted that the word profession had been used pretty indiscriminately by almost any occupation other

than business. To rectify the situation, he stressed the need to identify the characteristics of the profession. In his attempt to do so he came up with the following conclusion:

... professions involve essentially intellectual operations with large individual responsibility; they derive their raw material from science and learning; this material they work up to a practical and definite end; they possess an educationally communicable technique; they tend to self-organization; they are becoming increasingly altruistic in motivation. (p. 10)

Subsequently, in his discussion of the professional status of social work, Flexner modified his view by claiming that the single most important criterion of a profession was none of those mentioned above, but the possession of professional spirit. He ended his discussion by saying that:

But after all, what matters most is professional spirit In so far as accepted professions are prosecuted at a mercenary or selfish level, law and medicine are ethically no better than trades. In so far as trades are honestly carried on, they tend to rise towards the professional level. Social work appeals strongly to the humanitarian and spiritual element. It holds out no inducement to the worldly, - neither comfort, glory, nor money. The unselfishly devotion of those who have chosen to give themselves to making the world a fitter place to live in can

fill social work with the professional spirit and thus to some extent lift it above all the distinctions which I have been at such pains to make. In the long run, the first, main and indispensable criterion of a profession will be the possession of professional spirit, and that test social work may, if it will, fully satisfy. (p. 24)

His absolute approach set the tone for discussion of the characteristics which constitute the professions in the first half of this century. He was followed by many others, including A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson (1933), Morris L. Cogan (1953, 1955), William J. Goode (1957, 1960), Ernest Greenwood (1957), Robert K. Merton (1978), Geoffrey Millerson (1964), and George Ritzer (1977, 1986).

According to Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), the term profession clearly implied the existence of a complex of characteristics. The acknowledged professions possessed all or most of these characteristics. They stood at the centre, and all around them on all sides were grouped vocations exhibiting some but not all of these characteristics. In their words:

The ancient professions of law and medicine stand near the centre. The practitioners, by virtue of prolonged and specialized intellectual training, have acquired a technique which enables them to render a specialized service to the community They develop a sense of responsibility for the technique which they manifest in their concern for the

competence and honour of the practitioners as a whole They build up associations, upon which they erect ... machinery for imposing tests of competence and enforcing the observance of certain standards of conduct. Material considerations of income and status are not neglected, but the distinguishing and overruling characteristic is the possession of a technique. It is the existence of specialized intellectual techniques, acquired as the result of prolonged training, which gives rise to professionalism and accounts for its peculiar features.

Cogan (1953) was more concerned with the problem of definition. By drawing upon a wide variety of disciplines such as law, history, philosophy, government, and sociology, he concluded that:

A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of some department of learning or science, and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding. This understanding and these abilities are applied to the vital practical affairs of man. The practices of the profession are modified by knowledge of a generalized nature and by the accumulated wisdom and experience of mankind, which serve to correct the errors of specialism. The profession, serving the vital needs of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the client. (pp. 48-9)

Goode (1957) felt that each profession should be considered as "a community within a community". Thus he was more concerned with "the structural strains and supports between a contained community and the larger society of which it is a part and on which it is dependent" (p. 194). In another context, Goode (1960) adopted a relative approach by suggesting that occupations should be thought of as falling somewhere along a continuum of professionalism, the continuum being made up of characteristics distinctive of the professions. As an occupation moved toward the professional end of the continuum, it acquired more of these characteristics. Moreover, he identified a prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge, and a collectivity or service orientation as the core characteristics from which all others were derived. (p. 903)

In an influential paper, "Attributes of a Profession", Greenwood (1957) expressed the view that all professions seemed to possess the following attributes: (1) a systematic body of theory; (2) professional authority recognized by the clientele; (3) community sanction of this authority; (4) a code of ethics regulating relations of professional persons with clients and colleagues; and (5) a professional culture sustained by formal professional associations. (pp. 44-55)

Merton (1978), however, was of the opinion that the professions could be thought of as rooted in a triad of human values: knowing, the value assigned to systematic knowledge and specialized intellect; doing, the value assigned to trained

capacity and technical skill; and helping, the value embedded in the professional role of getting this conjoint knowledge and skill to work in the disciplined service of others. (pp. 114-5)

In social work literature, Morales and Sheafor (1989) distinguished two models of professionalism: the private model and the public model. In the private model, the individual client contracted directly with the professional for service and in the public model, the professionals operated primarily under the auspices of formal organizations and directed their services to the common good. Law and medicine were listed as examples of the private model while teachers and city planners were listed as examples of the public model. For social work, with its dual focus on person and environment, both the private and the public models of professionalism could apply. (pp. 41-2)

In the same piece of work, they listed autonomy, authority, and responsibility as essential characteristics of the professions. In their view, the possession of autonomy implied that the professionals were free from constraints that might limit their ability to act in the best interest of their clients. In addition, the possession of authority implied that the professional had been granted a monopoly in their field of expertise. In granting this professional authority, society, in essence, gave up the right to judge the competence of these professionals except in extreme cases of incompetent or unethical practice. After relinquishing its right to judge practice, society became vulnerable and rightfully expected the professions

to protect its people from abuses that might accrue from the professional monopoly. In other words, the professions must be accountable to the public that granted them the sanction to perform these services. In order to establish and maintain this professional responsibility, professions developed codes that identified the expected ethical behaviour of practitioners and established mechanisms for policing their membership regarding unethical or incompetent practice. (pp. 38-9)

The first comprehensive review of the traits approach to definition was completed by Millerson (1964). He reviewed the work of no less than twenty-one authors who tried to define the essential characteristics of the professions. Out of a total of twenty-three attributes which were regarded as essential, not a single one was accepted by all the authors. Even so, he concluded that certain attributes were mentioned repeatedly. They were: "(1) A profession involves a skill based on theoretical knowledge. (2) The skill requires training and education. (3) The professional must demonstrate competence by passing a test. (4) Integrity is maintained by adherence to a code of conduct. (5) The service is for the public good. (6) The profession is organized." (p. 4)

Similar attempt was made by Ritzer (1977). He surveyed a variety of previous efforts to delineate the defining characteristics of a profession and ended up with six basic characteristics that were considered to be the most frequently mentioned. In his view, established and new professions had, or

were believed to have, all of these characteristics and to a high degree. Would-be professions might be lacking one or two, and those that they possessed were thought to be less pronounced than in the established or new professions. Nonprofessions, had, or were believed to have, few, if any of these characteristics, and those that they did possess were likely to be of a low degree. In listing these characteristics, the traits supporters generally argued that these were "real" qualities that professions possessed and nonprofessions did not. These characteristics may now be listed as following: "(1) A body of general systematic knowledge that is their exclusive possession. (2) A norm of autonomy that the public and law are bound to respect. (3) A norm of altruism that entitles the profession to special treatment and respect. (4) A norm of authority over clients that the public feels is its duty to obey. (5) A distinctive occupational culture. (6) Recognition by the community and law that the occupation is a profession." (pp. 48-55)

Much debate, going back at least as far as Flexner, has centred around how professions should be defined - which occupations should be called professions, and by what institutional criteria. But while most definitions overlap in the characteristics they include, a number of tallies, including that of Millerson mentioned previously, have demonstrated a persistent lack of consensus about which characteristics are to be emphasized. Explanation for this have been offered by many who are supporters of this approach, including Goode (1960) and Greenwood (1980).

Goode (1960), for instance, pointed out that although there was a great deal of unanimity in the definitions of the traits supporters, there were also continuing disagreement. He explained that:

Occupations may rank high on one of these [core characteristics], but low on the other. Thus, nursing ranks high on the variable of service orientation, but has been unable to demonstrate that its training is more than a lower-level medical education. (p. 903)

Greenwood (1980) called for a dichotomy of professional attributes into the generating or basic and the consequential or derived attributes. He contended that the basic attributes were few and essential while the derived ones were many and varied. Based on this categorization, Greenwood came up with three basic attributes: (1) the cognitive or intellectual component, (2) the normative or service component, and (3) the monopolistic component of professionalism. He added that a profession might rank higher on one attribute than on another. (pp. 263-5)

3.2.2 The process approach

If the professions cannot be defined by a constellation of characteristics recognized as unique to themselves, how can they be defined? Adherents of the process approach turn to the process of professionalization for an answer. Harold L. Wilensky (1964), for instance, asked the following questions:

Can a comparison of the few occupations which are clearly recognized and organized as professions tell us anything about the process of professionalization? Is there an invariant progression of events, a path along which they have all travelled to the promised professional land? Do the less-established and marginal professions display a different pattern? (p. 142)

Carr-Saunders in England is perhaps the first sociologist to look into the process of professionalization (Vollmer and Mills, 1966, p. 2), but it is probably the work of Theodore Caplow which has created the greatest impact. Caplow (1954) believed that there were four essential steps in professionalization, that the steps involved in the process were quite definite, and even the sequence was explicit.

However, Wilensky (1964) was of the opinion that the steps listed by Caplow could only be considered as suggestive. "To establish anything firm here," he said, "we need both detailed social histories of occupations and more systematic comparison of the cases in hand." That was exactly what he did. By summarizing the history of eighteen occupations for which satisfactory information could be obtained, he showed that "only 32 of 126 dates for crucial events in the push toward professionalization deviate from the following order", thus confirming the existence of a typical sequence of events. (pp. 142-5)

Even though Caplow and Wilensky ended up with different number of steps, their conclusions had much in common. Both shared the view that the steps were quite definite and even the sequence was explicit. In their view, these essential steps are:

1. The very first step is to start doing full time the things needs to be done. This implies that a strict reliance on volunteers will not be sufficient. At this early stage the practitioners usually come from other occupations.
2. Next in line is the establishment of training schools. Under the pressure of the new recruits or its clientele, training schools are soon established. The first teachers are usually enthusiastic leaders of a movement or protagonists of some new techniques, or both. If these training schools do not begin within universities, they always eventually seek contact with universities.
3. The third step is the establishment of a professional association. Those pressing for prescribed training and the first ones to go through it tend to engage in much soul-searching work on whether the occupation is a profession, what the professional tasks are, and how to raise the quality of recruits. At this point they may change the name of the occupation. The change in label may function to reduce identification with the previous, less professional occupation. All this is accompanied by a campaign to separate the competent from the incompetent. This involves further definition of essential professional tasks,

the development of internal conflict among practitioners of varying background, and some competition with outsiders who do similar work.

4. The fourth step is the development and promulgation of a code of ethics which asserts the social utility of the occupation, sets up public welfare rationale, and develops rules which serve as further criteria to eliminate the unqualified and unscrupulous, rules to reduce internal competition, and rules to protect clients.

5. The last step is a prolonged political agitation which aims to obtain the support of law for the protection of the job territory and its sustaining code of ethics. Where the area of competence is not clearly exclusive, legal protection of the title will be the aim; where definition of the area of competence is clearer, then mere performance of the act by someone outside the fraternity may be declared a crime. Licensing and certification as weapons in the battle for professional authority are the least important of these events.

In his criticism of the process approach, Ritzer (1977) was of the opinion that it tended to become rather routine. Any occupation which had gone through all these stages would earn the label of a profession. Another problem mentioned by the same author was its tendency to generalize from the past to the present and future. Yet it seems clear enough that occupations that underwent professionalization years ago were involved in a

very different occupational world than those seeking it today. Perhaps the most devastating criticism mentioned was its underestimation of the significance of the political process - in other words, of the power wielded by professions in their drive toward professionalization and the power of opposing forces that must be overcome. (pp. 47-8)

3.2.3 The power approach

The power approach tends to focus on the power needed by an occupation to acquire professional recognition as well as the power such an occupation wields once it has achieved that position. This approach is best represented by the work of Freidson (1970) and Johnson (1972).

Freidson (1983) is highly critical of the process approach. He noted that the outcome of such a position was to avoid entirely any conscious definition while in fact covertly advancing an implicit and unsatisfactorily vague definition of a profession as an occupation that had gained professional status. (pp. 21-2)

What was special about a profession, Freidson (1970) insisted, was that it was an occupation which had assumed a dominant position in a division of labour, so that it gained control over the determination of the substance of its own work. The success of the professions, he continued, was primarily in the hands of society's dominant elites. Thus the would-be

professions must endeavour to convince the elites of their worth, but the elites always had the power to deny their claims. Moreover, the elites could allow a profession's status to lapse, or it could even actively remove it. The profession must, therefore, continue to convince the elite of its worthiness (or at least its harmlessness) if it was to continue to be accorded professional status. (pp. 71-3)

Freidson's contention that the term profession is best understood simply as a description of a certain pattern of occupational control is valuable in alerting us to what is clearly a central professional aspiration. It seems to be able to discriminate effectively between occupation which would generally be accepted as a profession and those which merely aspire to such acceptance. It also embraces the goals which occupations seeking professional status are usually pursuing: a state of enforced monopoly of the task in which they engage; control of entry to the occupational group both in terms of overall number and of individual candidates; control of the length and content of training; and finally, determination of the conditions of work of members of the occupation.

The key weakness of his approach is that he tries to perform the same operation as the traits supporters. Just as Flexner thought he had found an essential characteristic in "professional spirit", so Freidson believed he had found one in "professional autonomy". He derived this attribute from his data and turned it into a postulate for identifying other professions in the same

way as the traits supporters.

For Johnson (1972) professionalism is a peculiar type of occupational control, social closure, for instance, rather than an expression of the inherent nature of particular occupations. Thus, in his view, professionalism should not be referred to as the status of an occupation, but should be referred to as a means of controlling an occupation. Likewise, professionalization should be seen as a historically specific process which some occupations had undergone at a particular time, rather than a process which all occupations must undergo because of their essential qualities. (p. 45)

What then is the future of the professions? According to Johnson (1982), professionalism was an important occupational strategy for collective mobility during the nineteenth century when there was a minimum of government involvement in the labour market. Since the turn of the century, however, this function had largely been taken up by state-managed bureaucratic organizations and state-approved labour unions. Consequently, he concluded that professionalism was less relevant than in the past as an occupational strategy for collective mobility. (p. 121)

John Goldthorpe (1982) holds a different view. He referred to the rise of "the service class", an idea originated with Karl Renner (1953), as a development within the advanced societies of the West. Borrowing from Renner, he explained that the service class comprised three main elements: employees in public service

(including civil servants and other officials); employees in private economic service (including business administrators, managers, and technical experts); and employees in social services (including "distributive agents of welfare"). He went on to say that "while these groupings do not share in the ownership of the means of production, they are still to be distinguished from the working class in that the labour they perform is non-productive: they are not themselves a source of surplus value but, rather, a charge on the surplus value which is extracted, directly or indirectly, from the working class" (p. 167). He added that there was a basic difference between the "service relationship" and that of employer to wage worker. The former relationship, in contrast with the latter, necessarily involved an important measure of trust. Moreover, he explained that:

[The] requirement for trust in the employment relationship derives from two main exigencies that an employer, or employing organization, may face: first, that which arises when authority must be delegated; and second, that which arises when specialist knowledge and expertise must be drawn upon. For what in both these cases is implied is that social control within the organization must be weakened or diffused; it can no longer be exerted directly and in a detailed fashion from a single source. Those employees to whom authority is delegated or to whom responsibility for specialist functions is assigned are thereby given some legitimate area of autonomy and discretion. And it must

then ... be a matter of trust that they will act ... in ways that are consistent with organizational goals and values. In other words, how well these employees perform from the standpoint of the organization will in crucial respects depend on the degree of their moral commitment to the organization, rather than on the efficacy of "external" sanctions and rewards. (p. 168)

In view of what has been described, what is the relationship between the state and the professions? Johnson (1982) was of the opinion that "state intervention, implying as it does the existence of some external, repressive public authority, has the consequence of transforming professionals into functionaries and their associations into outposts of corporatist organization or branches of the ideological state apparatus" (p. 187). Moreover, he added that "the developing relationship of the professions to the state helped to define the limits and potentialities of state powers, functions and capacities ... " (p. 207).

In conclusion, he suggested the following modification of conventional analyses of the professions.

[The] concept professionalization can only refer to a process toward partial autonomy, being limited to specific areas of independent action which are defined by an occupation's relationship to the state; area of autonomy which vary from time to time and place to place. Professionalization, where it occurs, is indicative of a

particular form of articulation between the state and those occupations which have been of particular significance in the state's historical formation. As the state and the professions and their relations have been transformed over time, so the areas of partial autonomy enjoyed by the professions themselves change and are refocused (p. 207)

3.3 A Proposed Definition

Based on our understanding of the traits approach, the process approach and the power approach, we can now propose a definition of the concept:

a profession is an occupation which has been granted, by significant others in society, a status and, along with it, the power to deliver services and to control its work in a delimited area of human activity, after having undergone a developmental process whereby it succeeded in leading significant others to believe that it has acquired a high degree of a constellation of characteristics society has come to accept as distinctive of a profession.

The proposed definition has incorporated the perspectives of both the functionalist and the symbolic interactionist. It has also taken into consideration the contributions of the traits approach, the process approach, and the power approach. However, since no agreement has been reached among the traits supporters

as to what constitutes the characteristics of a profession, the characteristics that have so far been identified have not been listed in the definition. Moreover, since no agreement has been reached among adherents of the process approach as to what steps should be included in the developmental process, the steps that have so far been identified have not been listed either. Nevertheless, the existence of professional attributes is assumed and the perception of professionalization as a developmental process with clearly delineated steps is recognized. This allows supporters of the traits approach to continue with their work in identifying distinctive characteristics of the professions and those of the process approach, in delineating historical steps in the professionalization of established professions or occupations which are struggling to acquire the status. This also allows them to make changes through adding to or deleting from their lists. Changes are made necessary when new professions are being accepted or old professions are being re-examined. Even though the influence of power has not been given a place as central as advocates of the power approach would like it to be, its importance is reflected in the definition.

There is a need for further elaboration on some of the ideas expressed in this definition. A profession is, first of all, an occupation. Even though the word profession was used in a more restricted sense to mean a learned vocation in 1541, its meaning has been generalized, since 1576, to indicate "any calling or occupation by which a person habitually earns his living". (Cogan, 1953, p. 34) The person may either be employed or self-

employed to engage in a delimited area of human activity.

Secondly, a profession is an occupation which has been granted, by significant others in society, a status and, along with it, the power to deliver services and to control its work in a delimited area of human activity. This statement reflects the viewpoint of the power advocates. While the traits advocates, Greenwood (1957), for instance, treated community sanction as one of the characteristics that served to differentiate occupations in terms of their degree of professionalism, it assumes a far more central position among the power advocates.

What is the nature of power? Power, in our definition, encompasses monopoly, autonomy, and authority. Hughes (1958), for instance, contended that profession was nothing but "a symbolic label for a desired status" (p. 44). The same was expressed by Becker (1962) who argued that profession should be viewed as "an honorific symbol" (p. 93). Moreover, the status or symbol brings to the profession "a monopoly" (Greenwood, 1957, p. 12) and "a legitimate, organized autonomy" (Freidson, 1970, p. 71). According to Freidson (1970), this monopoly and autonomy included the exclusive right to provide services and to control its work, i.e., the right to determine who could legitimately do its work and how the work should be done. (p. 72) This may not be enough in the case of social work. Since social work is responsible for the allocation of community resources, power in the case of social work should also include the authority to allocate resources as it sees appropriate. Undoubtedly, the

power of the profession is not without limit, particularly in view of the relationship between the state and the profession mentioned above. Its function is necessarily confined to those specific areas within which the profession has been educated. Greenwood (1957), for instance, expressed the view that the possession of knowledge and skill pertinent to the profession imparts to the professional worker a sense of authority. "The professional," he noted, "cannot prescribe guides of facets of the client's life where his theoretical competence does not apply." "To venture such prescriptions," he warned, "is to invade a province wherein he himself is a layman, and, hence, to violate the authority of another professional group." The profession claims authority over the content of work by virtue of its expertise and it claims authority over the terms of work by virtue of its ethicality, or service orientation. Its claim to authority becomes invalid when its content of work is not confined to those specific areas within which it has been educated or, when its terms of work is inconsistent with its code of conduct. (pp. 44-55)

The profession's status is not seized from society. It attains and maintains its prestigious position by virtue of the protection and patronage of some elite segments within society which has been persuaded that there is some special value in its work. Its position is thus secured by the political and economic influence of the elite which sponsors it. However, if its work eventually diverges from that expected by the elite, it may have difficulty surviving. Its status may be allowed to lapse or may

even be taken away. It is, therefore, essential for survival that the dominant elite remains convinced of the positive value, or at least the harmlessness, of the profession's work, so that it continues to protect the profession from encroachment. (Freidson, 1970, p. 73)

Thirdly, the profession has undergone a developmental process. This idea is advocated by supporters of the process approach which has as its focus a series of historical stages through which an occupation must go en route to becoming a profession. However, in view of the absence of consensus at this period in time, this researcher tends to adopt the view that the exact number of steps and the proper sequence of these steps are not nearly as important as the idea of professionalization as a process.

In any attempt to explain the development of the social position and influence of a particular occupation, Douglas Klegon (1978) felt that an exploration of both internal and external dynamics were essential. He went on to say that:

The internal dynamic consists of efforts of practitioners to raise their status, define services which they perceive only they can perform properly, and to achieve and maintain autonomy and influence. This is seen in the attempt of many occupations to claim professional status by announcing that they are trustworthy, have a code of ethics, a professional association, and perform importance services which only they

are qualified to do, and, therefore, are deserving of autonomy and prestige.

[The external] dynamic ... involves relating professional organization and control to other institutional forces and arrangements of power.

One consequence of focusing on wider social forces is that the utility of an historical perspective becomes apparent Adopting an historical perspective allows one to examine the interplay of various forces in the development of the modern professional form of occupational control.

Adopting an historical approach is not, however, sufficient for understanding the external dynamic of professionalization. It is also necessary to consider occupational resources - to investigate the possible sources of power which can result in an occupation gaining and maintaining the expanded social significance of a profession. (pp. 268-72)

Finally, the profession has succeeded in leading significant others to believe that it has acquired a high degree of a constellation of characteristics society has come to accept as distinctive of a profession. This idea is advocated by supporters of the traits approach which has as its focus the development of a constellation of characteristics which are used

to differentiate the professions from other nonprofessional occupations.

In listing the characteristics of the professions, this researcher shares the view of Becker (1962) who noted that:

we are not concerned with the characteristics of existing occupational organizations themselves but with conventional beliefs as to what those characteristics ought to be. In other words, we want to know what people have in mind when they say an occupation is a profession, or that it is not a profession. Although people disagree as to what occupations are "really" professions and quibble over just which characteristics are "really" professional, I shall argue that beneath these surface disagreements we can find substantial agreement on a set of interconnected characteristics which symbolize a morally praiseworthy kind of occupational organization. (p. 93)

This researcher is also conscious of the view of Ritzer (1977) who noted that:

The vast majority of occupational sociologists subscribe to the notion that there are degrees of professionalization rather than a simple dichotomy between professions and nonprofessions. That is, all occupations can be placed on a continuum ranging from the nonprofessions on one end to the established professions on the other. The idea of a

continuum grows out of the focus on social change among those who operate from either a process or power perspective. By viewing professionalization in this way they are able to study how and why an occupation moves up or down the scale. Those who favour the process approach tend to be concerned with how an occupation moves, especially what historical stages it needs to navigate en route to the professional end of the continuum. The power supporters are more concerned with why an occupation moves up or down; they focus on the power needed to move up, and the loss of it that causes an occupation to slip down.

The place of an occupation on the professional continuum is determined by how many professional characteristics it has, or is believed to have (whether or not it "really" has them), and to what degree it possesses, or is believed to possess, each of them. (pp. 43-4)

In drawing up a list of professional characteristics, this researcher makes reference to the work of Flexner (1915), Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), Parsons (1939), Cogan (1953), Goode (1957, 1960), Greenwood (1957, 1980), Millerson (1964), Ritzer (1977), and Merton (1978).

In his view, in addition to the power to deliver services, to control its work, and to allocate resources, there are four essential characteristics a profession must have in possession or must have convinced the public that it possesses them. These

characteristics are: (1) a statement of purpose, (2) a body of knowledge, (3) a code of conduct, and (4) a culture.

The first major characteristic a profession must have in possession is a statement of purpose. In other words, to be recognized as a profession, an occupation has to carve out an area of service which it can claim sole responsibility and, following that, to obtain legal sanction from the community to become the sole provider of such service. This characteristic of a profession has been described by Greenwood as the monopolistic component of professionalism.

Another major characteristic a profession must have in possession is a body of knowledge. This characteristic has been referred to by Greenwood (1980) as the cognitive or intellectual component of professionalism. In his view, the main difference between a professional and a nonprofessional occupation lies in the former's possession of a set of skills which is supported by a body of theory. Acquisition of the professional skill, therefore, requires a prior or simultaneous mastery of the theory underlying that skill. In other words, the expertise of the professional is grounded in a body of theory which is constantly replenished with concepts and data derived from disputation and research, and mastery of which requires higher education that is carefully planned and intellectually demanding.

Similar views have been expressed by Merton (1978). In his view, the professions can be thought of as rooted in a triad of

human values: knowing, doing, and helping. The value of knowing can be interpreted as the importance the professions give to theoretically and empirically derived knowledge that is not widely distributed among the population at large. The value of doing, on the other hand, can be referred to as the importance of trained capacity and technical skill employed by the professions in coping with paramount problems in their clients' life.

The optimal base of professional knowledge is, therefore, a combination of intellectual knowing and practical doing, some of which is explicit, some implicit. The theoretical aspects of professional knowledge and tacit elements in both intellectual and practical knowing combine to make long training necessary and to persuade the public of the mystery of the craft. Those in professions argue that nonprofessional occupations do not require such an elaborate system of training because their knowledge base is less general, less systematic, and derivatively, less complex and less important to the functioning of society.

The third characteristic a profession must have in possession is a regulative code of ethics. This characteristic has also been referred to as the collectivity orientation or the normative or service component of professionalism.

Before elaborating on the regulative code of ethics, it seems essential to begin with a discussion of professional conduct. What is professional conduct? According to Millerson (1964), professional conduct can be divided into parts: first,

the separation into Professional Practice and Professional Ethics; secondly, the breakdown of Professional Ethics into Rules and Etiquette.

1. Professional Practice relates to the adoption of schedules of uniform professional fees and charges, standard forms of contract, regulation of competition for projects.

2. Professional Ethics are concerned with moral directives, which guide the relationship between the professional and others. They are designed to distinguish right from wrong action. Professional ethics are composed of Rules and Etiquette. Rules are obligatory customs, which may be implicit or explicit codes enforced by a recognized authority. Etiquette is a loose form of permissive conventions observed generally, but not enforced by any central authority, though a breach can lead to censure by colleagues. (p. 149)

Of all the conduct included in the professional code of ethics, the one that is mostly frequently mentioned is altruism.

Durkheim, to begin with, emphasized the importance of altruism which, in the eyes of Flexner, became a genuine professional spirit, i.e., an unselfish devotion to give themselves to making the world a fitter place to live in. Their emphasis on altruism was echoed by Cogan, Ritzer and Merton. Others, including Carr-Saunders and Wilson, Goode, Greenwood and

Millerson also incorporated this attribute in the professional code of conduct.

To accomplish all its functions the profession has often relied on the development of formal as well as informal organizations within the profession. The formal organizations that help to create a distinctive culture are the professional association, the training institutions, and the organizations in which professionals work.

This brings us to the last characteristic - culture. Culture consists of beliefs, values, attitudes, and norms held by members of a society and its constituent groups and organizations. Its contents can be dissected into two categories. First, culture consists of practical ideas about the world which enable people to adapt to their environment and solve the problems they confront. In the case of social work it includes knowledge about how to conduct interviews, write reports, and compile statistics. Second, culture consists of norms, rules, codes of conduct, and values that focus upon human conduct and guide the relationships that exist between people. In the case of social work it includes the proper ways of relating to clients, colleagues, and the public. What is and is not acceptable is defined by culture.

The idea of a professional culture has been expanded by Goode (1960). He treated a profession as a community because he felt that the members were bound by a common identity; it was

terminal in the sense that once in it very few would leave; its members shared common values, its roles were defined and were the same for all members; within the community there was a common language; it had power over its members; its limits were reasonably clear; and it controlled the selection of professional trainees, and through its training processes it sent these recruits through an adult socialization process.

He added that many of the traits that made the professions sociologically interesting grew from the dimension of community. Typically a profession, through its association and its members, controlled admission to training and required far more education from its trainees than the containing community demanded of them. Training in a profession was mainly concerned with transmitting its culture to the neophyte through formal training schools or informal devices such as sponsorship. Such long training was assumed to be necessary in order to learn the science and technique essential to the practice of the professions.

From what has been discussed above, it seems obvious that the question Is Social Work a Profession? is somewhat misconceived. Unquestionably social work has in possession, to a certain extent, the characteristics of a profession. However, it would not be appropriate to claim that social work is already a full-fledged profession. What can be said is that social work aspires to become a full-fledged profession and it is moving in that direction. In other words, social work is a developing profession.

What are the components of social work? Since a profession is expected to have in possession, in addition to the power to deliver services and to control its work, the following attributes: (1) a statement of purpose; (2) a body of knowledge; (3) a code of ethics; and (4) a culture, it seems reasonable to include these as the basic components of social work.

Chapter Four

What is a Value?

4.1 Introduction

The word "value" means different things to different people. It may be taken to mean that which is acquired by any object of any interest (Perry, 1926, p. 185), that aspect of things whereby they are cared about (Lee, 1949, p. 147), and that which is considered good or bad (Pepper, 1958, p. 7).

Ralph B. Perry (1926), for instance, defined value as that which was acquired by any object of any interest. Elaborating on this, he said,

It is characteristic of the living mind to be for some things and against others To be "for" or "against" is to view with favour or disfavour It implies ... a tendency to create or conserve, or an opposite tendency to prevent or destroy. This duality appears in many forms, such as liking and disliking ... or seeking and avoiding. It is to this ... state, act, attitude or disposition of favour or disfavour, to which we propose to give the name of "interest" That which is an object of interest is ... invested with value. Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it; just as anything whatever becomes a target when anyone

whosoever aims at it. (p. 185)

In the way it is used, value refers to an object.

In a slightly different way, Harold N. Lee (1949) noted that value was that aspect of things whereby they were cared about. In other words, value refers to the property of an object. However, he added that,

Man knows things. He also cares about them. Things happen, and sometimes he cares [about] what happens: he feels that it is of some importance That aspect of things whereby they are cared about is their value. My caring for something and the value of that something are the obverse and reverse of the same state of affairs. The thing that is cared about is valued. That which is valued is valuable; that is, it has value. (p. 147)

Stephen C. Pepper (1958) believed that the word value could be dispensed with even though he would not recommended it, because he felt that it would be safer to keep them equated with the various selective systems than floating loose where ingenious men might note their freedom from attachment and proceed to hypostatize facts for them to refer to. In line with this thinking, he enlisted in the field of value a wide spectrum of values: (1) affective values, (2) conative-achievement values, (3) prudential values, (4) character values, (5) social values, (6) cultural values, and (7) survival values. (pp. 668-73) When

required, he would define value as anything good or bad and include as value such things as:

pleasures and pains; desires, wants, and purposes; satisfactions and frustrations; preferences; utility, means, conditions, and instruments; correctness and incorrectness; integration and disintegration; character, vitality, self-realization; health; survival, evolutionary fitness; adjustability; individual freedom, social solidarity; law, duty, conscience; virtues, ideals, norms; progress; righteousness and sin; beauty and ugliness; truth and error; reality and unreality. (p. 7)

In ordinary speech, the word value can be used in the noun sense, designating a property or a characteristic of an object; or in the verb sense, designating an act. Lee, Perry, and Pepper, for instance, used value as a noun. John Dewey, however, used it as a verb. Elaborating on this, Lee (1957) noted that:

To Dewey ... the verb sense seems to be basic. He holds the meaning of "value" to be closely connected with some or several of the following words: prizing, desiring, holding dear, or liking, taking interest in, enjoying, or appraising. (p. 180)

Economists have also drawn our attention to the distinction between "the value of things" and "the values of individuals and societies". In their view, the word value, used in the sense of

the value of things, implied the exchange or market value of a commodity. In welfare economics, the same word appeared to refer more to the values of individuals and societies, to their preferences or tastes. (Baier, 1969, pp. 36-41)

The first sociological definition of value appeared in *The Polish Peasant* where Thomas and Znaniecki (1921) noted that "by a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity" (p. 21). The content of a social value could be sensual or imaginary, or it could be partly sensual and partly imaginary. Its meaning became explicit only when it was considered in connection with human actions.

For Talcott Parsons, values were seen neither as objects nor as properties of objects: they were ideas which influenced human choice. As defined, values were seen as "those moral beliefs to which people appealed for the ultimate rationales of action" (Spates, 1983, p. 28).

Similarly, Gordon W. Allport noted that a value was a belief upon which a man acted by preference. This definition acknowledged choice in man and moved the concept of value to the centre of life and its aspirations.

In his study on *Social Class and Parental Values*, Melvin L. Kohn (1969) conceived of value in a different way. He conceived

of it as "standards of desirability - criteria of preference".
(p. 18)

As an illustration of the diversity of its meaning Pat Duffy Hutcheon (1972) noted that value had been used as norms, cultural ideals, assessments of action, beliefs, objects, value orientations, behaviour probabilities, and generalized attitudes.
(pp. 174-7)

4.2 Approaches to Definition

Three approaches to defining values will be discussed in this section, and one in the next. All of these definitions have one thing in common: they all make reference to value as something preferred or preferable; desired or desirable.

4.2.1 Charles Morris

In one of the most influential study on values, Charles Morris (1956) distinguished three ways in which the term was commonly employed.

In his view, the term "operative value" was usually employed to refer to the tendencies or dispositions of man to prefer one kind of object rather than another. All men, for instance, prefer living in affluence rather than in poverty. Reference to value in this case is simply a way of referring to the actual direction of preferential behaviour toward one kind of object

rather than another. Elaborating on this, he noted that:

At times, the term "value" is employed to refer to the tendencies or dispositions of living beings to prefer one kind of object rather than another Thus if a person is shown pairs of paintings one after another and is asked to select in each pair the paintings he likes better, it may turn out that the selected paintings have in common a number of features which differentiate them from the rejected paintings. On this basis it may be said, for instance, that the person values paintings with contrasting colours, vigorous action, and open spaces, and the hypothesis may be hazarded that he in general values contrasts, strength, and spaciousness. Reference to "value" in such cases is simply a way of referring to the actual direction of preferential behaviour toward one kind of object rather than another. Such values may be called operative values. (p. 10)

On the other hand, the use of the term "conceived value" was often restricted to those cases of preferential behaviour directed by "an anticipation or foresight of the outcome" of such behaviour. A conceived value thus involves preference for a symbolically indicated object. Again, he noted that:

The term "value" is often restricted to those cases of preferential behaviour directed by "an anticipation or foresight of the outcome" of such behaviour. Thus a drug addict may repeatedly take a certain drug and yet firmly

believe that it is preferable not to be a drug addict. He anticipates the outcome of not using drugs, in virtue of this anticipation approves the state of not being an addict, and conceives this as desirable or preferable. In contrast to operative values, such values may be called conceived values. A conceived value thus involves preference for a symbolically indicated object. (pp. 10-1)

Finally, the term "object value" was often concerned with what was preferable (or "desirable") regardless of whether it was in fact preferred or conceived as preferable. The emphasis is upon the properties of the object. He explained that:

A third employment of the term "value" is concerned with what is preferable (or "desirable") regardless of whether it is in fact preferred or conceived as preferable. Thus a person with diabetes seeks advice from a dietitian as to the preferable diet for diabetics and for himself in particular The diet that the dietitian judges to be preferable may not coincide with the foods preferred by either the diabetic or the dietitian, and the judgment of the dietitian may itself be mistaken. Value here is not characterized in terms of what is in fact preferred but in terms of what in fact is preferrable if the patient prefers to live rather than to die. Since the stress is upon the properties of the object, such values may be called object values. (pp. 11-2)

It is important to note that all of these three common

usages are explicated with respect to some form of the term "prefer": value as the preferred, value as a conception of the preferable, and value as the preferable. The main contrast is between preferred and preferable (desired and desirable, valued and valuable, esteemed and estimable). (p. 12)

Operative values, as far as Morris is concerned, can be found through a study of preferential behaviour. On the other hand, what is conceived to be preferable can be studied through the symbols employed in preferential behaviour and the preferential behaviour directed toward symbols. In effect, then, operative values are operationally defined as factors to be found through an analysis of preferences among non-symbolic desiderata whereas conceived values are operationally defined as factors to be found through an analysis of preferences among symbolic desiderata. Operative values are, however, not operationally defined, perhaps implying that they cannot be studied empirically. (p. 12)

4.2.2 Clyde Kluckhohn

Another important definition of value is offered by Clyde Kluckhohn (1951) who defined it as "a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action" (p. 395). In this understanding, affective (i.e., desirable), cognitive (i.e., conception), and conative (i.e., selection) elements are all

essential to this notion of value. Moreover, since his use of the phrase "conception of the desirable" is well received and widely discussed, it deserves further elaboration. To him:

A value is not just a preference but is a preference which is felt and/or considered to be justified Even if a value remains implicit, behaviour with reference to this conception indicates an undertone of the desirable - not just the desired. The desirable is what it is felt or thought proper to want. It is what an actor or group of actors desire - and believe they "ought" or "should" desire - for the individual or a plurality of individuals. This means that an element, though never an exclusive element, of the cognitive is always involved; and hence the word conception was deliberately included in the definition. (pp. 395-6)

4.2.3 Franz Adler

Frank Adler's consideration of values is based on his criticism of Kluckhohn. His major concern is the measurement of values. According to Kluckhohn, one should restrict the use of value to something combining the characteristics of Morris' conceived values and object values. But if object values could not be found empirically, how could one hope to study, Adler asked, by the method of science, values so conceived?

To circumvent this difficulty, Adler (1956) began by

distinguishing four types of values: (1) values which are considered as absolutes (Type A); (2) values which are considered as being in the object (Type B); (3) values which are seen as located in man (Type C); and (4) values which are equated with actions (Type D). (p. 272)

Absolutes, according to Adler, whether pure as in Type A, or combined with Types B and C, were not accessible to sense perception and, consequently, were not suited to study by methods of natural science. He explained that the statement was not about their existence or non-existence. It only stated that reliable knowledge about them was impossible; faith, intuition, and speculation being the only possible approaches. (pp. 272-3)

Included as Type B values are objects which are of need to someone, whether this need be conscious or unconscious. In other words, values of this type were seen as arising in the object where and when desire or need pointed to it. Unfortunately, the capacity of an object to satisfy needs could hardly be observed before the needs were expressed and satisfied. Moreover, the object itself could not indicate all the needs it might be able to satisfy. Forgotten needs or undiscovered ones, for instance, could not be observed in the object and used as a basis for assessing its value. Thus a value should be seen as something outside the person that came into existence by the value-giving activity inside the person. This led to the conclusion that the observation of objects for the discovery of values was futile and the person should be taken as the proper observational target.

(pp. 273-4)

Type C locates values within the person. Instead of defining values as the object of esteem as in Type B, they were described here as "the esteem which we attach to the valuables capable of satisfying desires". Viewed as located or at least originated within the person, individually or collectively, Adler contended that values became internal behaviour and, hence, were not directly accessible to observation other than introspection. As such, they were said to precede action and to guide it; they might be wholly or partially the cause of action. Thus the values in an object could be discovered only by the way the object was being acted upon and the needs, interests, attitudes, meanings, wishes, volitions, norms - in short, the valuations of individuals, singly or in the aggregate - could be known only from their actions. This led to the conclusion that action was the only empirically knowable aspect of value. (pp. 273-6)

Type D values, in practice, equate "value" with "action". According to Adler, this equivalence was supported by, but not dependent on, the assumption that whatever a person did was what he wanted to do most under the given circumstances at the given moment. What he did not do he either positively wanted not done or did not want it done strongly enough to do it at the time and under conditions as they were. (p. 276)

4.3 An Approach by Milton Rokeach (1973)

Belief is the fundamental building block in Rokeach's concept of values. According to him, a belief is a simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or does, capable of being preceded by the phrase "I believe that"

More specifically, a belief represents the information one has about an object. The object may be a person, a family, a group of people, an organization, a community, a society, or a country. It may be a career, a sport, a game, a pet, a car, a pen, or an event. The object may also be something more abstract, including life, religion, or politics. To take a step further, a belief links an object to one or more attributes. For example, a person may think that a social worker is a Christian, that she is always kind-hearted, and that friendliness is an important attribute of a social worker. The object in the first two instances is the social worker, and in the third instance, the object is friendliness. The attributes the person links with the objects are a Christian, kind-hearted, and an important attribute of a social worker.

Based on its content, three kinds of beliefs have been identified. The first kind of belief may be called a descriptive or existential belief. In this kind of belief, the information one has about an object may be true or false, correct or incorrect. Knowledge is a belief of this kind. As an

illustration, the belief that a social worker is a Christian can easily be proved as true or false, correct or incorrect. This belief is, therefore, a descriptive or existential belief.

The second kind of belief may be called an evaluative belief. In this kind of belief, the object is evaluated and described as good or bad. The belief that the social worker is always kind-hearted is an example of an evaluative belief. The truth of this belief statement can hardly be proved. It is purely a matter of personal judgment. Most of what social workers have identified as values are beliefs of this kind.

The third kind of belief may be called a prescriptive or exhortatory belief. In this kind of belief, a course of action, a mode of conduct, or a state of existence for an object is advocated. As an illustration, the belief that friendliness is an important attribute of a social worker is a prescriptive or exhortatory belief. In this example, the truth of the belief statement is relatively unimportant. Moreover, friendliness is not only evaluated as important, its practice is also advocated. Values, in Rokeach's view, belong to this kind of beliefs.

How is a belief formed? At the simplest level, a belief is formed on the basis of direct observation. As an example, through observation, a person may come to believe that the social worker he is meeting is a young woman, tall and slim. This is an example of a descriptive or existential belief. Since the validity of one's own sense is rarely questioned, descriptive

beliefs such as this one is, at least initially, held with maximal certainty.

A belief is also formed on the basis of information received from outside sources. As an illustration, a person may read a book on social casework and come to belief that a social worker works only with individuals and families. Beliefs formed by accepting the information provided by an outside source may be referred to as informational beliefs. Although direct observation of an object-attribute relation will usually lead to the formation of a descriptive belief, outside information that links an object to an attribute may or may not lead to the formation of an information belief. Many factors determine the degree to which information provided by an outside source will be accepted.

Many of our beliefs are formed neither on the basis of direct experience with the object of the belief nor by way of accepting information from outside sources. Instead, we often acquire beliefs by way of various inference processes. As an illustration, through interacting with a social worker, one may arrive at certain beliefs about such unobservable characteristics or dispositions as the social worker's integrity, temperament, and ability. Beliefs that go beyond directly observable events may be called inferential beliefs.

Inferential beliefs are usually based on prior descriptive beliefs. Thus the descriptive belief formed on the basis of

observation that "the social worker always smiles" produces the inference that "the social worker is always friendly". It should be clear, however, that inferential beliefs need not be based on descriptive beliefs but may be formed on the basis of prior inferences. Thus the inferential belief that "the social worker is always friendly" may lead to yet another inference, that "the social worker is always helpful". It is worth noting that the distinction between descriptive and inferential beliefs is somewhat arbitrary. As a matter of fact, it is possible to view beliefs as representing a continuum from descriptive to inferential. At the descriptive end of the continuum, a person's beliefs are directly tied to the stimulus situation, and at the inferential end, beliefs are formed on the basis of these stimuli as well as residues of the person's past experiences; the continuum may be seen as involving minimal to maximal use of such experiential residues.

In conclusion, on the basis of direct observation or information received from outside sources or by way of various inferential processes, a person learns or forms a number of beliefs about an object. In other words, he associates the object with various attributes. In like manner, he forms beliefs about himself, about other people, about institutions, behaviours, and events.

What is a belief system? The total number of beliefs a grown-up person possesses is large. By the time one reaches adulthood, one has tens and possibly hundreds of beliefs

concerning what is or is not true and beautiful and good about the society in which one lives. It is inconceivable that these countless beliefs would be retained in an unorganized, chaotic state within one's mind. Rather, it must be assumed that one's beliefs become somehow organized into architectural systems having desirable and measurable structural properties which, in turn, have observable behavioural consequences.

Based on this understanding, a belief system may be defined as having represented within it, in some organized psychological but not necessarily logical form, each and every one of a person's countless beliefs about physical and social reality. By definition, a person does not allow beliefs to exist outside the belief system.

A belief system represents, therefore, the total universe of a person's beliefs about the physical world, the social world, and the self. The totality of a person's beliefs serves as the informational base that ultimately determines his values, norms, attitudes, intentions, and behaviours.

Based on the way beliefs are formed and their place in the belief system, another method of distinguishing beliefs has been formulated. These beliefs are:

1. Type A: Primitive beliefs, 100 percent consensus;
2. Type B: Primitive beliefs, zero consenses;
3. Type C: Nonprimitive, authority beliefs;

4. Type D: Nonprimitive, derived beliefs; and
5. Type E: Primitive, inconsequential beliefs.

According to Rokeach, the formation of one's belief system begins very early in one's life. Most central in one's belief system are primitive beliefs of either Type A or Type B. These beliefs are learned by direct encounter with the object of belief. In the case of Type A beliefs, they are reinforced by a unanimous social consensus among all of one's referent persons and groups. On the other hand, in the case of Type B beliefs, there are no referent persons or groups outside the self who could controvert such beliefs. Through adverse experiences, some primitive beliefs may be formed in which external support is abandoned altogether. Since the validity of one's observation is rarely questioned, both types beliefs are psychologically incontrovertible. Elaborating on this, Rokeach noted that:

Type A beliefs are psychologically incontrovertible because they are rarely, if ever, experienced as subjects of controversy and therefore have an axiomatic, taken-for-granted character. It is as if the believer says to himself: "I believe, and everyone else who could know believes it too"

[Type B] Beliefs that are not shared with others are ... impervious to persuasion or argument by others. Even though such beliefs may sometimes become a subject of controversy, they are psychologically incontrovertible. In

this second kind of primitive belief, it is as if the believer says: "I belief, but no one else could know. It therefore does not matter what others believe."

Nonprimitive beliefs of Type C and Type D seem to serve the purpose of helping the person to round out his picture of the world, realistically and rationally to the extent possible, defensively and irrationally to the extent necessary. Type C beliefs are conceived to develop out of Type A beliefs and to be in a functional relationship with them. On the other hand, Type D beliefs are conceived to develop out of Type C beliefs because believing in the credibility of a particular authority implies an acceptance of other beliefs perceived to be emanate from such authority. According to Rokeach, by eliminating the same taken-for-granted character of primitive beliefs, one can learn to accept differences of opinion and controversy concerning one's beliefs. Thus, while important and generally resistant to change, Type C and Type D beliefs are, nevertheless, conjectured to be less important and easier to change than Type A and B beliefs.

Type E beliefs seem to represent more or less arbitrary matters of taste. According to Rokeach, this type of beliefs are incontrovertible because they originate in direct experience with the object of belief but their maintenance does not necessarily require social consensus. This is consistent with the oft-heard cliché: "There is no arguing over matters of taste." Like other beliefs, they may be intensely held. Matters of taste are,

nevertheless, considered to be inconsequential because they have few or no connections with other beliefs. If changed, they have few or no connections or consequences for maintaining other beliefs.

In summary, a person's total belief system includes inconsequential beliefs, derived beliefs, pre-ideological beliefs about specific authority, and pre-ideological primitive beliefs, socially shared or unshared, about the nature of the physical world, society, and the self. All such beliefs are assumed to be formed and developed very early in the life of a child. They are undoubtedly learned in the context of interactions with parents. As the child grows older, he learns that there are certain beliefs that virtually all others believe, other beliefs that are true for him even though no one else believes them, other important beliefs about which men differ, and other beliefs that are arbitrary matters of taste. Taken together, the total belief system may be seen as an organization of beliefs varying in depth, formed as a result of living in nature and in society, designed to help a person maintain, insofar as possible, a sense of ego and group identity, stable and continuous over time - an identity that is a part of, and simultaneously apart from, a stable physical and social environment.

How can one decide which ones of a person's countless beliefs are central or important and which one are less so? Obviously all these beliefs do not play an equally prominent role within a person's belief system; nor do they play an equally

prominent role in determining his behaviour. Rokeach begins by delineating three simple assumptions: (1) not all beliefs are equally important to the individual: beliefs vary along a central peripheral dimension; (2) the more central a belief, the more it will resist change; and (3) the more central the belief changed, the more widespread the repercussions in the rest of the belief system.

Rokeach also defines importance solely in terms of connectedness: the more a given belief is functionally connected or in communication with other beliefs, the more implications and consequences it has for other beliefs and, therefore, the more central the belief. Moreover, he proposes the following four defining assumptions or criteria of connectedness: (1) existential versus nonexistential beliefs, (2) shared versus unshared beliefs about existence and self-identity, (3) derived versus underived beliefs, and (4) beliefs concerning and not concerning matters of taste.

In summary, (1) beliefs directly concerning one's own existence and identity in the physical and social world are assumed to have more functional connections and consequences for other beliefs than those with less directly concern one's existence and identity; (2) beliefs that are shared with others are assumed to have more functional connections and consequences for other beliefs than those not shared with others; (3) derived beliefs are assumed to have fewer functional connections and consequences for other beliefs than the beliefs from which they

are derived; and (4) beliefs which represent more or less arbitrary matters of taste are assumed to have relatively fewer functional connections and consequences for other beliefs than beliefs which do not represent arbitrary matters of taste.

In presenting his version of the nature of human values, Rokeach begins by asserting that any conception of the nature of human values, if it is to be scientifically fruitful, should satisfy the following criteria:

1. it should be intuitively appealing yet capable of operational definition;
2. it should clearly distinguish the value concept from other concepts with which it might be confused - such concepts as belief, attitude, intention, and behaviour - and yet it should be systematically related to such concepts;
3. it should avoid circular terms that are themselves undefined, such terms as "ought", "should" or "conceptions of the desirable";
4. it should, moreover, represent a value-free approach to the study of human values; that is, an approach that would enable independent investigators to replicate one another's empirical findings and conclusions despite differences in values.

Based on these criteria, Rokeach proceeds to explain what it means to say that a person has a value or a value system.

"A value," according to Rokeach, "is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence."

"A value system," he continues, "is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance."

According to the definition, a value is enduring. If values are completely stable, individual and social change would be impossible. On the other hand, if values are completely unstable, continuity of human personality and society would be impossible. Thus, any conception of human values, if it is to be fruitful, must be able to account for the enduring character of values as well as for their changing character.

It is suggested that the enduring quality of values arises mainly from the fact that they are initially taught and learned in isolation from other values in an absolute, all-or-none manner. We are not taught that it is desirable, for example, to be just a little bit honest or cooperative, or to strive for just a little bit of freedom or comfort. Nor are we taught that such modes of conduct or end-states of existence are sometimes desirable and sometimes not. It is the isolated and thus the

absolute learning of values that more or less guarantees their endurance and stability.

Paradoxically, however, there is also a relative quality of values that must be made explicit if we are to come to grips with the problem of value change. "It is the rare and limiting case," Robin Williams (1968) noted, "if and when a person's behaviour is guided over a considerable period of time by one and only one value". "More often," he continued, "particular acts or sequences of acts are steered by multiple and changing clusters of values." (p. 287) As a child matures, he is increasingly likely to encounter social situations in which several values rather than one value may come into competition with one another, requiring a weighing of one value against another - a decision as to which value is the more important. In this particular situation, is it better, for instance, to seek freedom or comfort, to act honestly or cooperatively? Gradually, through experience and a process of maturation, we all learn to integrate the isolated, absolute values we have been taught in this or that context into a hierarchically organized system, wherein each value is ordered in priority or importance relative to other values. Such a relative conception of values enables us to define change as a reordering of priorities and, at the same time, to see the total value system as relatively stable over time. It is stable enough to reflect the fact of sameness and continuity of a unique personality socialized within a given culture and society, yet unstable enough to permit rearrangements of value priorities as a result of changes in culture, society,

and personal experience.

A value is a belief. Three types of beliefs have previously been distinguished: descriptive or existential beliefs, those capable of being true or false; evaluative beliefs, wherein the object of belief is judged to be good or bad; and prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs, wherein some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or undesirable. A value is a belief of the third kind - a prescriptive or proscriptive belief.

A value refers to a mode of conduct or end-state of existence. When we say that a person has a value, we may have in mind either his beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct or desirable end-states of existence. We will refer to these two kinds of values as instrumental and terminal values. This distinction between means- and ends-values has been recognized by some philosophers, anthropologists, and psychologists. But others have concentrated their attention more or less exclusively on one or the other kind of value.

The distinction between the two kinds of values - instrumental and terminal - is an important one that we cannot afford to ignore either in our theoretical thinking or in our attempts to measure values. For one thing, the total number of terminal values is not necessarily the same as the total number of instrumental values. For another, there is a functional relationship between instrumental and terminal values that cannot be ignored.

Moreover, Rokeach distinguishes two kinds of terminal values or end-states of existence: personal and social. He says that:

While there are no doubt many ways of classifying terminal values, one a priori classification that deserved to be singled out for special mentioning is that the terminal values may be self-centred or society-centred, intrapersonal or interpersonal in focus. Such end-states as salvation and peace of mind, for instance, are intrapersonal while world peace and brotherhood are interpersonal. (pp. 7-8)

In other words, personal values are terminal values or end-states of existence that are self-centred while social values are terminal values or end-states of existence that are society-centred.

He also distinguishes two kinds of instrumental values or modes of conduct: moral values and competence values. He says that:

... moral values refer only to certain kind of instrumental values, to those that have an interpersonal focus which when violated arouse pangs of conscience or feelings of guilt for wrongdoing. Other instrumental values, those that may be called competence or self-actualization values, have a personal rather than interpersonal focus and do not seem to be especially concerned with morality. Their violation leads to feelings of shame about personal inadequacy rather

than feelings of guilt about wrongdoing. Thus, behaving honestly and responsibly leads one to feel that he is behaving morally, whereas behaving logically, intelligently or imaginatively leads one to feel that he is behaving competently. (p. 8)

A value is a preference as well as a "conception of the preferable". A good deal has been made of the distinction between the "desirable" and the "merely desired". A value, as Kluckhohn defines it, is a "conception of the desirable", and not something "merely desired". This view of the nature of values suffers from the fact that it is extremely difficult to define "desirable". We are no better off and no further along talking about "conceptions of the desirable" than talking about values. More important, in Rokeach's view, is that a conception of the "desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action" turns out, upon closer analysis, to represent a definable preference for something to something else. The something is a specific mode of behaviour or end-state of existence; the something else is an opposite, converse, or contrary mode or end-state. Two mutually exclusive modes of behaviour or end-states are compared with one another - for example, responsible and irresponsible behaviour, or states of peace and war; one of the two is distinctly preferable to the other. Moreover, the person who prefers one believes that same one to be consensually preferred. A "conception of the desirable" thus seems to be nothing more than a special kind of preference - a preference for one mode of behaviour over an

opposite mode, or a preference for one end-state over an opposite end-state. Other kinds of preferences that do not implicate modes of behaviour or end-states of existence, for instance, preferences for certain kinds of foods, would not qualify as "conceptions of the desirable".

There is also another sense in which a value represents a specific preference. A person prefers a particular mode or end-state not only when he compares it with its opposite but also when he compares it with other values within his value system. He prefers a particular mode or end-state to other mode or end-state that are lower down in his value hierarchy.

A value is a conception of something that is personally or socially preferable. If a person's values represent his "conceptions of the desirable" the question arises desirable for whom? for himself? for others? When a person tells us about his values, it cannot be assumed that he necessarily intends them to apply equally to himself and to others. Consider, for example, the meaning of that familiar expression: "Children should be seen and not heard." Translated into the language of values, this statement apparently means to the person asserting it: "I believe it is desirable for children but not for adults to behave in certain ways." A person who informs us about his values may (or may not) intend to apply them differentially to young and old, men and women, blacks and whites, rich and poor, and so on.

Indeed, one of the most interesting properties that values

seem to have is that they can be employed with extraordinary versatility in everyday life. They may be shared or not shared and thus employed as single or double (or even triple) standards. They may be intended to apply equally to oneself and to others, to oneself but not to others, to others but not to oneself, to oneself more than to others, or to others more than to oneself. We know very little indeed about the conditions under which values might be so diversely employed. We may speculate, for example, that competitive conditions will encourage the employment of values as double standards, whereas cooperation will encourage their employment as single standards.

We encounter values at varying levels of the social system. We may encounter individual values, group values, and societal values. Professional values are one type of group values.

According to Rokeach, if individual values are socially shared cognitive representations of personal needs and the means of satisfying them, then group values are socially shared cognitive representations of group goals and demands, and societal values are socially shared cognitive representations of societal goals and demands.

In most societies overt value conflicts are relatively infrequent. This may be explained by the fact that most people and most groups, most of the time, accept the same generalized values, though they may arrange them differently, interpret them in different ways, and accept them with varying degrees of

intensity.

However, the identical societal value is often given various interpretations by different groups, just as group values are given private interpretations by different individuals. This process of individualization sometimes makes it appear that professional groups hold professionally distinctive values when in fact they subscribe to the same societal values and individuals hold personally distinctive values when in fact they subscribe to the same group values. Talcott Parsons observes that "every subsystem has a value system of its own which is a differentiated and specialized version of the general value system, limited by the level and function of the subsystem in the whole". Problems and conflict arise when the value orientation of one level is inconsistent with that of the next higher level. For example, the youth culture, though different from the general adult culture, did not pose any problem so long as the values of teenagers were consistent with those of adult society. But when teens accepted and acted according to values which ran counter to those of the adult community, there was immediate concern about the generation gap, about juvenile delinquency, and about the crisis in child-parent relationships.

Besides, individual behaviour is not always consistent with societal values, with group values, or even with a person's own personal values. Values act as screens against which behaviour preferences are filtered. Even though there is a tendency toward behaviour that is consistent with values held, an individual's

behaviour does not always follow his value orientations. People do "wrong" even when they know what is "right". Juvenile delinquency experts have noted that juvenile offenders are rarely ignorant of the societal values which proscribe delinquent behaviour. They most often admit that their behaviour is inconsistent even with their own values. Various explanations for these inconsistencies have been offered. Some have pointed to irresistible impulses and threads of infantilism as explanations. Others have suggested that lack of access to the means to achieve socially desirable goals is a cause for this inconsistency. Social workers tend to consider both internal (psychosocial) and external (environmental) factors in trying to understand people whose values and behaviours are inconsistent. But far more important than any discrepancy is the fact that, by and large, there is a consistency between values and behaviours. Even criminals and deviants behave most of the time in ways consistent with societal values.

Differences in individual values and group values do not just happen but usually develop in response to different life experiences. Melvin Kohn's research showed how work requirements influence the values which guide parental child-rearing activities. Since middle-class jobs usually demands a great deal of self-direction, child-rearing patterns of middle-class parents generally are based on values which stress autonomy and self-direction. Working-class parents, on the other hand, follow more authoritarian child-rearing practices since their work experience is generally with job that demand strict adherence to rules and

instructions.

4.4 Proposed Definitions

A modified version of Rokeach's definitions can now be presented. It involves a shift in emphasis in the meaning of value. Instead of focusing on value as a belief, it is here defined as a property, i.e., an end-state of existence or a mode of conduct.

A value is a mode of conduct or end-state of existence which is believed to be personally and socially more preferable than most modes of conduct or end-states of existence.

A value system is an organization of modes of conduct and end-states of existence which is believed to be personally or socially preferable, along a continuum of relative preference.

Based on this modified version, definitions for social work value and social work value system are presented as following:

A social work value is a mode of conduct or end-state of existence which is believed to be professionally and socially more preferable than most modes of conduct or end-states of existence.

A social work value system is an organization of modes of

conduct and end-states of existence which is believed to be professionally and socially preferable, along a continuum of relative preference.

This modified version of Rokeach's definitions has several advantages over others and it also has important implications for social work practice.

1. In formulating his definition of values, Rokeach postulated five assumptions: (1) the total number of values that a person possesses is relatively small; (2) all men everywhere possess the same values to different degrees; (3) values are organized into value systems; (4) the antecedents of human values can be traced to culture, society and its institutions, and personality; and (5) the consequences of human values will be manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider worth investigating and understanding. (p. 3)

Of these assumptions the first three are particularly relevant to this study. Each one of them has practical implications. Elaborating on the first assumption, Rokeach noted that "we estimate that the total number of terminal values that a grown person possesses is about a dozen and a half and that the total number of instrumental values is several times this number, perhaps five or six dozen " (p. 11). Should this assumption be accepted, the tasks of identifying these values one by one and measuring them would be considerably easier.

In relation to the second assumption, Rokeach noted that all men everywhere possessed the same values but to different degrees because they tended to accept the same generalized values even though they arranged them differently, interpreted them in different ways, and accepted them with varying degree of intensity. Should this assumption be accepted, then the task of comparing different groups of people would be considerably easier also. (p. 4)

Finally, in relation to the third assumption, Rokeach noted that "after a value is learned it becomes integrated somehow into an organized system of values wherein each value is ordered in priority with respect to other values". "Such a relative conception of values," Rokeach continued, "enables us to define change as a reordering of priorities and, at the same time, to see the total value system as relatively stable over time" (p. 11). Should this assumption be accepted, then the task of comparing long-term value changes would be feasible.

2. The definition of value so formulated represents a value-free approach to the study of values. This is particularly important in the case of social work in Hong Kong. In itself, social work is already rooted in a wide variety of ideologies: moral, psychological, social, and political. The cultural heritage of social workers in Hong Kong complicates the issue. Fortunately, Rokeach's definition has already made allowance for such diversity.

3. The definition of value so formulated provides a link with value as it is discussed in the social work literature.

Firstly, the use of values as beliefs which influences human choice is not unheard of in the social work literature. Ernest Greenwood (1958), for instance, noted that "the social values of a professional group are its basic and fundamental beliefs, the unquestioned premises upon which its very existence rests" (p. 15). Along this line of thinking, Harriett M. Bartlett (1958) produced a number of beliefs and treated each as a social work value. There are many others beside her who adopted this line of thinking, including Werner W. Boehm (1959), Felix P. Biestek (1967), and Morton Teicher (1967). However, Rokeach's definition and the modified version of his definition, have at least two advantages over that of Greenwood's. In the case of Greenwood, the relationship between beliefs and values is only loosely defined whereas in the case of Rokeach, the relationship is more clearly specified. More specifically, Rokeach's definition specifies the link between values as end-states of existence and social work purposes, and between values as modes of conduct and social work ethics.

Secondly, defining a value as a preference for something is not unfamiliar to social workers. In developing a scheme for organizing social work values, Charles S. Levy (1973) identified three levels of values, including: (1) values as preferred conception of people, (2) values as preferred outcomes for people, and (3) values as preferred instrumentalities for dealing

with people. (p. 38)

Based on Rokeach's definition, a preferred conception of people is a belief of the second kind, a belief upon which values are selected and, hence, should not be considered as a value. On the other hand, a preferred outcome for people is, for Rokeach, the equivalent of a preferred end-state of existence whereas a preferred instrumentality for dealing with people is the equivalent of a preferred mode of conduct. Again, Rokeach's definition has an advantage over that of Levy's. By defining a value as a preference for one end-state of existence or mode of conduct over that of another, we discover a way to resolve many problems relating to the study of social work values.

To begin with, since any preference for values is relative, one can have a preference for a number of values, each to a different degree. Hence, the selection of social work values from a wide variety of ideologies, even conflicting ideologies, poses no serious problem. What is needed is an extra effort to interpret and to justify the inclusion of each according to the ideology from which it is selected. What is also needed is an effort to determine the relationship between one value and another by ranking them in order of preference among the practitioners as a collectivity. In other words, what is more important for the profession is not to obtain a cluster of values but to formulate a value system. Rokeach's third assumption about the nature of human values has already made provision for this.

An important question may be raised at this point. Since social work values are, in fact, selected from a wide variety of ideologies, does it imply that the number of social work values is necessarily large? This is certainly not the case. Following Rokeach's first two assumptions about the nature of human values, it seems perfectly clear that the total number of values that social work possesses is relatively small since all ideologies tend to accept the same generalized values even though these ideologies arrange them differently, interpret them in different ways, and accept them with varying degrees of intensity.

Thirdly, even though a number of valuable publications on ethical decision making are presently available (e.g., Reamer, 1982, Rhodes, 1986, and Loewenberg and Dolgoff, 1988), none of these have come up with a satisfactory solution to discrepancies between one value system and another. What one can do with the proposed definition of a value system is, however, to highlight the discrepancies which exist between one value system and the other, e.g., between one's personal value system and professional value system. Becoming aware of the discrepancies is a step that should not be taken lightly. It is the very first step toward ethical decision making and is, therefore, one step closer to the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory solution.

4. The definition of value so formulated clearly distinguishes the value concept from other concepts with which it might be confused and yet it is systematically related to such concepts.

Culture is often described as consisting of beliefs, values, norms, and attitudes. Based on the work of Milton Rokeach, culture may be described as a system of beliefs which is held by members of a group. In the case of social work, the content of this system of beliefs include (1) preferred conception of people, (2) preferred outcomes for people, and (3) preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people.

According to our definition, a value is not a belief but is a mode of conduct or an end-state of existence which is believed to be preferable. It is derived from our beliefs about the preferred conception of people, the preferred outcomes for people, and the preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people. Since it is something which is personally or socially preferred, it cannot be proved as true or false.

Knowledge, on the other hand, belongs to the type of belief which Rokeach called descriptive or existential beliefs. It is at least potentially provable. It is used to explain and to conceptualize our conception of people, of the outcomes for people, and of the instrumentalities for dealing with people.

According to Rokeach, values and social norms can be distinguished in three different ways: (1) a value may refer to a mode of conduct or end-state of existence whereas a social norm refers only to a mode of conduct; (2) a value transcends specific situations; in contrast, a social norm is a prescription or proscription to behave in a specific way in specific situation;

and (3) a value is more personal and internal, whereas a norm is consensual and external to the person.

Finally, an attitude refers to an organization of several beliefs around a specific object or situation.

Chapter Five

What is Action?

5.1 Introduction

Action is a philosophical as much as a sociological concept. In an introduction to his work, Alan R. White (1968) noted that:

Philosophers sometimes use "do", "action", and "act" indifferently, but in ordinary language these are words of decreasing scope. Not everything one does, much less everything one is accountable for, is an action or an act. (p. 1)

Do, so far as White is concerned, is much broader in scope than both action and act. It may be used as an auxiliary in, for example, "How do you define action?" It may also be used as a stand-in for other verbs in, for example, "If anyone wants to use do, action, and act indifferently, let him do so." Both as an auxiliary and a stand-in for other verbs, do seems to have unlimited scope. (p. 1)

Action is more restricted in usage than do. It is normally used to point to a contrast between a state of movement and a state of quiescence, i.e., between activity and inactivity. It is also used to indicate a contrast between the quiescent state of the thinker and the overt movements of the man of action. In

other words, action is used to distinguish itself from inaction.
(pp. 1-2)

Lastly, to act is to take action, to cause something to happen. (p. 2) In other words, an act is the taking of action. To distinguish between act and action, Anthony Giddens (1979) noted that action "does not refer to a series of discrete acts combined together, but to a continuous flow of conduct" (p. 55).

Among sociologists, many assume that the concept of action is necessarily related to intention, i.e., it must refer to purposive behaviour. However, there are exceptions.

Max Weber, for instance, distinguished four types of action, some rational or intentional and others affectual or traditional: (1) rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends; (2) rational orientation to an absolute value; (3) affectual orientation; and (4) traditional orientation.

Action, in his opinion, is zweckrational or rationally oriented to a system of discrete individual ends when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighted. This involves rational consideration of (1) alternative means to the end, (2) the relations of the end to other prospective results of employment of any given means, and (3) the relative importance of different possible ends. Professional action falls within this category.

In contrast, action is *wertrational* or rationally oriented to an absolute value when the goal is an end which is valued in itself, and not as a means to some other goal. In other words, there is no way of assessing the efficacy of the means in this type of action. All kinds of movements - political, religious, or social - involve action belonging to this category.

Traditionally oriented action consists in doing what has been done in the past without considering alternatives. This type of action is often irrational because both means and goals are not carefully weighted by the actor. However, it lies very close to the borderline of meaningfully oriented action because it is very often guided by automatic reaction to habitual stimuli. The bulk of everyday action to which people have become habitually accustomed approaches this type.

Finally, action is affectually oriented if it is governed largely by a need to express some emotion. At one extreme, affectual action is reflexive and to cry as a reaction to some loss is an example of this type. The action has no goal other than the expression of the emotion. At the other extreme, where some means are chosen, almost deliberately, to achieve some emotional state, affectual action comes close to the borderline of meaningfully oriented action.

Similarly, Pareto distinguished two types of action: logical action and non-logical action. Logical action, according to Pareto, involves the use of empirical knowledge and valid

inference in choosing means to the attainment of ends. Even though economic conduct in a market economy, for instance, is close to this ideal, most others are remote from it. Thus most actions are non-logical. Elaborating on this Pareto explained that most actions were non-logical because sentiments, affects, and blind faith played a great part in determining the course of action and in inhibiting the use of empirically testable assumptions and logical calculations.

On the other hand, Giddens (1976) noted that the most mundane forms of day-to-day conduct could quite properly be called intentional. He explained that "for action to be purposive, the actor does not have to be capable of formulating the knowledge he applies as an abstract proposition, nor does it have to be the case that such 'knowledge' is valid". He added that "it is mistaken to presume ... that only those types of act can be called purposive of which actors themselves tend to ask for explanations in their everyday lives". "If we are not inclined to ask about it," he continued, "this is certainly not because it makes no sense to pose such a question, but because we already know, or assume that we know, what his purpose is".

Talcott Parsons (1951) is particularly interested in one type of action - social action. So far as he is concerned, an action is social when one or more of the following conditions are fulfilled:

1. the situation of the actor includes other actors whose

presence is taken into account when the action is performed;

2. the situation is such that these others possess facilities, objects or characteristics which enable them in some way to influence the conduct of the actor;

3. the actor shares with these others certain sets of expectations and, possibly certain values, beliefs and symbols. (pp. 3-30 and 47-158)

These conditions are often present in the practice of social work in varying degrees and in varying proportions. In other words, social work practice often involves social action.

5.2 Approaches to the Study of Action

As it is mentioned in the introductory chapter, Graham Kinloch (1977) noted that, in sociology, paradigms of reality appeared to take one of three major forms: (1) the organic-structure-functional model, represented by the work of Durkheim and Parsons, (2) the conflict-radical model, represented by the work of Marx and Weber, and (3) the social-behaviourist-social-psychological model, represented by the work of Weber and Blumer.

5.2.1 Emile Durkheim

Durkheim is of the opinion that all human interactions give rise to expectations of patterns of conduct. As persons interact

with others they tend to develop common ways of perceiving, feeling, evaluating, and acting. These new patterns of behaviour lead to the emergence of expectations and constraints on how persons should or ought to behave. In other words, as a result of social interaction, there emerges a "collective consciousness" which in turn constrains those in interaction and obliges them to behave in particular ways. In saying this, he makes the assumption that for any group of people to live together co-operatively, they must have some basic common agreements on what their priorities are as a group, and on how they ought to behave to each other and arrange their relationships. This, ultimately, leads to the conclusion that all aspects of the social structure, including institutions, are founded upon the society's normative system.

5.2.2 Talcott Parsons

According to Parsons, social interaction occurs when any one actor (ego) needs or wishes to take account of the actions of another actor (alter). If the interaction between ego and alter is on a regular basis, then certain mutual expectations will emerge: each party will seek to predict what the other will do, and, at the same time, each will be obliged to adjust his conduct somewhat in order to meet with the other's expectations. In other words, ego will modify his expectations of alter's conduct in order to predict it successfully, while alter will modify his conduct in order to meet with ego's expectations. The pattern of mutual expectations which gradually emerges becomes a norm, or

set of norms, which both ego and alter accept as binding upon themselves and as defining the particular conditions of their interactions. The specific privileges, rights, duties, obligations and disabilities which are imposed upon each party to the interaction by their acceptance of norms define their roles in relation to one another.

Moreover, Parsons argues that the emergence and acceptance of norms is not usually a mere ad hoc affairs in which each party minutely weighs the advantages and disadvantages of any particular set of norms. For, he insists, each party enjoys a number of secondary benefits from the relationship, or the circumstances of it, which motivates him to maintain it in its ongoing form. Firstly, each party develops a vested interest in the stability of the relationship as such: in other words, rather than shops about incessantly for the most advantageous arrangements, each party will settle for the relationship which exists, for it is at least predictable. Secondly, each party develops a desire or even a need to please the other and to obtain recognition from the other for meeting his expectations: in other words, each party tries to obtain some kind of gratification from the interaction process as such, and also seeks to provide this gratification for the other. Thus the process of interaction creates, nourishes, and sustains in each actor the need to continue to participate in the relationship. Interaction provides and sustains the motivation in each actor to adhere to the norms. It also provides a mechanism of control for deterring or limiting deviation from the norms; for each

participant needs both reciprocation in kind as well as approval for conformity.

The process of interaction between ego and alter can, according to Parsons, be used as a microcosm of social systems; for all such interaction contain the elements of which social systems consist. These elements are shared systems of belief, sentiment and values; and culturally standardized criteria of technical, aesthetic and moral evaluation. Thus, different elements in the system of values and other ideas in society are seen to be derived from the conditions of social action and interaction.

Following Durkheim, Parsons also considers the value system of a society to be one of its essential characteristics. Parsons, however, elaborates on Durkheim's more general statements and incorporated into his own theoretical analysis consideration of the relationship between norms specific to a particular situation and the general value system of a society. He suggests that the social system can be seen as consisting of individual members of society who perform different activities, or play a variety of roles, within the general framework of the societal division of labour. From this activity there develops a network of concrete, or "situation specific" norms which in practice regulate the performance of the roles and define the obligations and prohibitions, the "dos" and "don'ts", for each social activity. Thus the norms prescribe appropriate concrete behaviours.

5.2.3 Karl Marx

Marx offers a theory of society which is based on his image of the basic nature of human beings. He believes that people are basically productive; that is, in order to survive people need to work in, and with, nature. In so doing they produce the food, clothing, tools, shelter, and other necessities that permit them to live. Their productivity is a perfectly natural way by which they express basic creative impulses. Furthermore, these impulses are expressed in concert with other people; in other words, people are inherently social. They need to work together in order to produce what they need to survive.

Throughout history this natural process has been subverted, at first by the mean conditions of primitive society and later by a variety of structural arrangements erected by societies in the course of history. In various ways these structures interfere with the natural productive process. However, it is in capitalist society that this breakdown is most acute.

His major aim is to analyze the relationship between life conditions (i.e., society's economic substructure) and "ideas" (i.e., society's normative superstructure) on an ongoing and changing basis through society's historical development. Such an interactive relationship is basic to his thought as he analyzes the corruption of "natural man" to "alienated man" through industrialization and capitalist exploitation. The ideological aim behind his theorizing, then, is the retransformation of

society into a state in which "natural man" rather than "alienated man" would be resynthesized with his natural and social environments.

As far as action is concerned, Marx uses a highly simplified model of what may be called instrumental rationalism; that is, he assumes that men have certain goals and that, if circumstances permit, they will use any means available in the pursuit of these. He tends to treat the social actor as a living calculator of tactics and strategies. He does this, not because of his contempt for man, but because he considers that the analysis of all or most social systems, particularly the analysis of capitalism, calls for this approach. Capitalism according to Marx, more than any other system, encourages instrumentality. (Cohen, 1968, p. 79)

Marx does not deny that men have emotional needs, and that they have values. But he considers that the direction of emotional expression is, for social purposes, governed by the practical considerations of those who are in the position to influence social sentiments. And values are largely the expression of the same class whose interests are dominant in society. (Cohen, 1968, p. 80)

5.2.4 Max Weber

Weber defines sociology as a "science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to

arrive at a causal explanation of its cause and effects". Implicit in this definition is a number of key elements: the attempt to interpret or understand; a focus on social action; and the attempt to develop causal explanations of these phenomena. Weber is thus preoccupied with the scientific understanding of social behaviour as sociology's central concern. Accordingly, he focuses on the objective understanding of social values in historical context and attempts to assess their sociological impact on society.

To Weber, action or conduct must be subjectively meaningful. Social action is meaningful to the actor when it assumes subjective meaning as well as taking "account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented". Moreover, to understand the conduct of others one must observe not only what they do but know what meaning they attach to their actions. (Cohen, 1968, p. 81)

Social action is viewed as varying in its level of rationality. Thus Weber delineates four types of social action, varying from least to most rational: (a) traditionally oriented social action; (b) affectually oriented social action; (c) rational orientation toward an absolute value; and (d) rational orientation toward a system of individual ends. Such a typology, according to Weber, is neither exclusive nor exhaustive, rather, it represents a continuum of types of social orientations ranging from cultures with low individualism and high traditional control to those with high individualism and low traditionalism.

He further elaborates this typology by delineating the kinds of legitimacy, relationships, associations, corporate groups, and control inherent within each orientation. Within the traditional, legitimacy is based on religious attitudes, solidarity relationships are communal, association is compulsory, corporate groups are political, and control is based on discipline. The affectual, on the other hand, is founded on affectual loyalty and is communal; in it, association is voluntary, corporate groups are revolutionary, and control is based on power. The rational orientation defined by absolute values is legitimized in terms of these values; in it, relationships are associative, association is compulsory, corporate groups are hierocratic, and control is based on discipline. Finally, the rational orientation based on individual ends is founded on self-interest, associative relationships, compulsory association, and political corporate groups; it is controlled on the basis of power. Thus different types of society or social actions are based on differing types of values or levels of rationality, i.e., the extent to which behaviour is defined by individual or group interests.

The evolution of more rational forms of social action, according to Weber, stems from the process of competition, which results in the "selection of those of superior personal qualities". Such competition alternates between peaceful and violent types as well as between traditional and charismatic values; it is influenced by the kind of opportunity structure that is inherent in the society concerned.

Finally, Weber viewed rationality as resulting in a particular kind of bureaucratic type or structure in which social action is closely defined by an elaborate system of roles, norms, and sanctions. At this point in its evolution, society is highly controlled, organized, and impersonal (bureaucratic) in response to the need for economic efficiency with industrialization.

To summarize, Weber was primarily concerned with understanding the meaning of social action; he attempted to delineate the relationship between types of social action and the kinds of social structures that are based on them as society in general moves from the traditional to the modern or rational in the wake of industrialization and the influence of the Protestant ethic. Society, reacting to the process of social selection through competition, was viewed as becoming more rational or bureaucratic as higher levels of industrialization increased the need for efficiency. In general, Weber was concerned with the relationship between individual values and the social structure.

5.2.5 Herbert Blumer

Blumer is concerned with "the interpretive process by means of which human beings, individually and collectively, act in human society". Such a model conceptualizes society as a system of interpretive processes governing behaviour.

Originating largely with Weber, the central idea of a symbolic interactionist approach to action is that the

sociologist should proceed by seeking to "understand" those he studies. He should attempt to look upon the world in the same way that they do, should seek to appreciate how the world looks to them. He should, additionally, seek to grasp the ideas, beliefs, motives, and goals which move people to act. Knowing how things appear to people and what sorts of thoughts, impulses and wants those people have, the sociologist will be able to see that they act as they do because they are seeking to realize their ends and desires as best they can in the face of circumstances as they see them. This emphasis upon "understanding" the social factor has resulted in this approach being known as *verstehende* (or understanding) sociology.

Symbolic interactionism views society as people interacting with one another. Sometimes interaction is predictable and routine, recreating familiar patterns of behaviour. At other times, people interact in unfamiliar settings, responding to changing circumstances - as, for example, when people face natural disasters. Whatever the context, the symbolic interactionist's image of society emphasizes social interaction.

Human conduct is formed as people confront objects, events, or other people, interpret them in symbolic terms, and then decide upon a course of action. In this process, meaning is everything. People must interpret the meaning of others' acts in order to respond appropriately to them. At the same time, it is the very capacity to interpret that makes the human world so much more fluid and flexible than the worlds inhabited by other

animals. Because we respond to the world by interpreting the meanings of things rather than reacting immediately and directly, we can act more imaginatively and creatively. Our symbols give us the capacity to anticipate the future (although not necessarily accurately), to imagine alternative courses of action, and to escape some of the chains that bind other animals to immediate response to their environments. We are able to think, to contemplate the future, to imagine how others will respond to our actions, and to decide between one course of action and another.

The influence of society upon the individual is solid and powerful, but it is by no means total or irresistible. Society shapes the human beings who are its members and whose actions keep it going, but this process of shaping, called socialization, is by no means perfect. It creates people with the capacity to choose otherwise - to rebel, to resist, to innovate. Each mind does not become a duplicate of every other mind, nor are the interests and goals of individuals defined completely by society. As we have pointed out, human needs are individual, but they are met through cooperative activity. The human capacity to choose among alternative courses of action means that sometimes people will choose acts that secure their own goals at the expense of other people. And, finally, symbols are themselves expansive and creative. Language gives human beings the capacity to say things that have never been said before and to invent new realities by inventing new symbols. Moreover, human beings do not respond automatically or habitually to symbols, but must interpret them

before conduct can occur.

As a result, human beings have some degrees of freedom. Their relationships with one another are not mechanically governed by society, but depend upon choice and voluntary conduct. Human society continues to exist because human beings decide to act as they do. This is not to deny that group life has a powerful constraining influence on individuals. Language itself restricts the choices people can make, for they cannot do what they cannot conceive. And the unequal distribution of resources means that some people have the capacity to exact from others the behaviour they desire. Society constrains in this sense because people constrain one another. Even so, at bottom the perpetuation of human society and its influence over people rests upon the consciously construed acts of its members.

In conclusion, each of these models throws light on society. Each has strengths and weaknesses, illuminating some aspects of social life while leaving others in relative darkness. Thus, the organic-structure-functional model calls attention to the connections among social institutions and emphasizes the ways in which society constrains individual actions. The conflict-radical model stresses that social institutions are not as benign as they may appear, that society seethes with self-interest, power, and conflict. And finally, the social-behaviourist-social-psychological model introduces the concept of meaning, emphasizing that human conduct, above all else, is meaningful - that where people cannot find or create meaning as they interact

with one another, they are paralyzed.

But each of these models also has limitations. In focusing on society as a network of constraining institutions, adherents to the organic-structure-functional model can easily lose sight of the fact that these institutions continue to exist only because people act. By treating social facts as things, these sociologists may forget that society is an abstraction, not a material thing or an acting organism. By focusing on power and conflict, on the other hand, adherents of the conflict-radical model are tempted to interpret everything in these terms, forgetting that people often engage in cooperative activity. Conflict is an important part of social life, but it is not everything. For their part, adherents to the social-behaviourist-social-psychological model always stress that people act on the basis of their interpretations of reality, often credit individuals with more freedom than they actually have, thus ignoring the many ways in which behaviour is shaped and limited by social forces.

5.3 An Approach by Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984)

Giddens' main concern is that of connecting a notion of human action with structural explanation in social analysis. The making of such a connection, he argues, demands the following: "a theory of the human agent, or of the subject; an account of the conditions and consequences of action; and an interpretation of 'structures' as somehow embroiled in both of those conditions and

consequences" (Giddens, 1979, p. 49).

In his own words, "the theory of structuration begins from an absence: the lack of a theory of action in the social sciences" (1979, p. 2). Action and structure, in his view, "normally appear in both the sociological and philosophical literature as antinomies" (1979, p. 49). To get around this problem of antinomy, Giddens noted that:

The basic domain of study of the social sciences is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. (1984, p. 2)

In other words, Giddens is of the opinion that neither the subject (i.e. the human agent) nor the object (i.e. the society or social institutions) should be regarded as having primacy. Each is constituted in and through social practices. Thus Giddens regards social practices as the crucial mediating moment between the voluntaristic and deterministic types of theory: the dualism of the individual and society, or subject and object. In place of this dualism, as a single conceptual move, the theory of structuration substitutes the central notion of the duality of structure.

By duality of structure, he means the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices. Human social activities, according to Giddens, like some self-

reproducing items in nature, are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible.

What is meant by structure? As conceptualized in structuration theory, "structure" is defined as "rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems" but having only a "virtual existence". In other words, structure, as rules and resources, is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of social practices. Rules and resources are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but are thereby also reconstituted through such interaction. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and "exists" in the generating moments of this constitution. (1979, pp. 4-5) It is thus the mode in which the relation between moment and totality expresses itself in social reproduction. The importance of this relation of moment and totality for social theory cannot be exaggerated, since it involves a dialectic of presence and absence which ties the most minor or trivial forms of social action to the structural properties of the overall society. (1979, p. 71)

It is fundamental to understand that, when Giddens speaks of structure as rules or resources, Giddens does not imply that we can profitably study either rules or resources as aggregates of isolated precepts or capabilities. Rules can only be grasped in

the context of the historical development of social totalities, as recursively implicated in practices. The point is important in a twofold sense. (a) There is not a singular relation between "an activity" and "a rule", as is sometimes suggested or implied by appeal to statements like "the rule governing the Queen's move" in chess. Activities or practices are brought into being in the context of overlapping and connected sets of rules, given coherence by their involvement in the constitution of social systems in the movement of time. (b) Rules cannot be exhaustively described or analysed in terms of their own content, as prescriptions, prohibitions, etc.: precisely because, apart from those circumstances where a relevant lexicon exists, rules and practices only exist in conjunction with one another. (1979, p. 65)

The connections between structure, system, and structuration need to be clarified. Social systems are systems of social interaction; as such they involve the situated activities of human subjects. Understood in its broadest sense, social system refers to reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, organized as regular social practices. In other words, it refers to "the patterning of social relations across time-space, understood as reproduced practices", "a relationship in which changes in one or more component parts initiate changes in other component parts, and these changes, in turn, produce changes in the parts in which the original changes occurred". The smallest type of social system is dyadic.

Structuration refers to "the structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure". (1984, p. 376) It also refers to conditions governing the continuity or transformation of structures, and therefore the reproduction of systems. To study the structuration of a social system is to study the ways in which that system, via the application of generative rules and resources, and in the context of unintended outcomes, is produced and reproduced in interaction. (1979, pp. 65-6)

The theory of structuration begins from the concepts of the production and reproduction of society. That is to say, social interaction is regarded as everywhere and in all circumstances a contingent accomplishment of actors and as a skilled production which is sustained under conditions of the reflexive rationalization of action. The purposive component of human action has no counterpart in nature, since the teleology of human conduct is carried on within the context of a reflexive awareness of reasons that is intimately and integrally interwoven with "moral responsibility" for activity.

What is meant by action? As it is used by Giddens, action or agency does not refer to a series of discrete acts combined together, but to a continuous flow of conduct. In other words, action involves a "stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world".. (1979, p. 55)

According to Giddens, "action" includes all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be either overt or purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a situation, or of deliberately refraining from such intervention, or passively acquiescing in the situation. Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course.

Based on this understanding, an actor is that which causes something to happen. In other words, to attribute or ascribe an act or action to someone or something is to call him or it the actor or the cause of what is brought about.

What is the nature of action or agency? It has frequently been supposed that human agency can be defined only in terms of intentions. That is to say, for an item of behaviour to count as action, whoever perpetrates it must intend to do so, or else the behaviour in question is just a reactive response.

However, agency, as far as Giddens is concerned, refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place. In other words, agency concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the agent could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted otherwise: either

positively in terms of attempted intervention in the process of "events in the world", or negatively in terms of forbearance. (1979, pp. 55-6) Whatever happened would not have happened if that individual had not intervened. In this understanding, an individual is the author of many things he does not intend to do, and may not want to bring about, but none the less do. Conversely, there may be circumstances in which the individual intends to achieve something, and does achieve it, although not directly through his agency. Take the example of the spilled coffee. Supposing an individual, A, were a malicious spirit and played a practical joke by placing the cup on a saucer at such an angle that, when picked up, it would be very likely to spill. Individual B picks up the coffee, and it duly spills over. It would be right to say that what A did brought the incident about, or at least contributed to its coming about. But A did not spill the coffee; B did. Individual B, who did not intend to spill the coffee, spilled the coffee; individual A, who did intend that the coffee should be spilled, did not spill it. (1984, p. 9)

Capability must not be identified with the ability of agents to make "decisions". If it refers to circumstances in which individuals consciously confront a range of potential alternatives of conduct, making some choice among those alternatives, "decision-making" is no more than a sub-category of capability in general. Capability, the possibility of "doing otherwise", is generally exercised as a routine, tacit feature of everyday behaviour.

Agency also refers to "knowledgeability". As a leading theorem of the theory of structuration, Giddens advanced the following: every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member. Failure to acknowledge this, in his view, is a basic insufficiency of functionalism and structuralism alike; and it is as true of Parsons's "action frame of reference" as it is of other varieties of functionalist thought.

"Knowledgeability", as far as Giddens is concerned is "everything which actors know (believe) about the circumstances of their action and that of others, drawn upon in the production and reproduction of that action, including tacit as well as discursively available knowledge" (1984, p. 375).

It is a basic mistake to equate the knowledgeability of agents with what is known "consciously", where this means what can be "held in mind" in a conscious way.

There are various modes in which such knowledge may figure in practical social conduct. In the stratification model, i.e., an interpretation of the human agent or actor, Giddens (1984) stresses three "layers" of cognition or motivation: discursive consciousness, practical consciousness, and the unconscious. (Figure 5.1)

Figure 5.1 A Schematic Presentation of
The Stratification Model of Consciousness

Discursive consciousness, as far as Giddens is concerned, is "what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action; awareness which has a discursive form" (p. 374). The distinctive feature of human action, as compared with the conduct of the animals, rests with the "accountability" of human action. The notion of accountability is a highly important one. It means that the accounts which actors are able to offer of their conduct are drawn upon the same stocks of knowledge which are drawn upon in the very production and reproduction of their action. The "giving of accounts" - or "supplying of reasons" - for action refers to the discursive capabilities and inclinations of actions, and by no means exhausts the connections between "stocks of knowledge" and action. What actors are "able to say" about their activities is by no means all that they "know" about them.

Practical consciousness, on the other hand, is defined as "what actors know (believe) about social conditions, including

especially the conditions of their own action, but cannot express discursively" (p. 375). The knowledgeability involved in practical consciousness conforms generally to the Wittgensteinian notion of "knowing a rule" or "knowing how to go on".

The differences between practical consciousness, as tacit stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the constitution of social activity, and "discursive consciousness", involving knowledge which actors are able to express on the level of discourse are important. All actors have some degree of discursive penetration of the social systems to whose constitution they contribute. (1979, p. 5)

The study of day-to-day life is integral to analysis of the reproduction of institutionalized practices.

Routine, psychologically linked to the minimizing of unconscious sources of anxiety, is the predominant form of day-to-day activity.

The term "day-to-day" encapsulates exactly the routinized character which social life has as it stretches across time-space. The repetitiveness of activities which are undertaken in like manner day after day is the material grounding of the recursive nature of social life.

Routinization is defined as "the habitual, taken-for-granted character of the vast bulk of the activities of day-to-day social

life; the prevalence of familiar styles and forms of conduct, both supporting and supported by a sense of ontological security." (1984, p. 376) Routinization is vital to the psychological mechanisms whereby a sense of trust or ontological security is sustained in the daily activities of social life. Carried primarily in practical consciousness, routine derives a wedge between the potentially explosive content of the unconscious and the reflexive monitoring of action which agents display. (1984, xxiii)

The notion of practical consciousness is fundamental to structuration theory. It is that characteristic of the human agent or subject to which structuralism has been particularly blind. Only in phenomenology and ethnomethodology, within sociological traditions, do we find detailed and subtle treatments of the nature of practical consciousness. Between discursive and practical consciousness there is no bar; there are only the differences between what can be said and what is characteristically simply done. However, there are barriers, centred principally upon repression, between discursive consciousness and the unconscious.

While competent actors can nearly always report discursively about their intentions in, and reasons for, acting as they do, they cannot necessarily do so of their motives. Unconscious motivation is a significant feature of human conduct.

There seems no reason to deny that knowledge exists on the

level of the unconscious. Indeed, a case can be made to the effect that the mobilization of unconscious desire normally involves unconscious cognitive elements. (p. 375)

The knowledgeability of human agents, in given historical circumstances, is always bounded by the unacknowledged conditions of action on "one side", and its unintended consequences on the other. Figure 5.2 portrays a "stratification model" of action.

Figure 5.2 A Schematic Presentation of
The Stratification Model of Action

What Giddens calls a stratification model of the acting self involves treating the reflexive monitoring, rationalization and motivation of action as embedded sets of processes.

The reflexive monitoring of action refers to "the purposive, or intentional, character of human behaviour, considered within the flow of activity of the agent; action is not a string of discrete acts, involving an aggregate of intentions, but a

continuous process" (1984, p. 376). Note that "intentionality" is emphasized in this statement. Such intentionality is a routine feature of human conduct, and does not imply that actors have definite goals consciously held in mind during the course of their activities. When lay actors inquire about each other's intentions in respect of particular acts, they abstract from a continuing process of routine monitoring whereby they relate their activity to one another and to the object-world. The distinctive feature about the reflexive monitoring of human actors is the accountability of human action.

The reflexive monitoring of activity is a chronic feature of everyday action and involves the conduct not just of the individual but also of others. That is to say, actors not only monitor continuously the flow of their activities and expect others to do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they move.

The reflexive monitoring of behaviour operates against the background of the rationalization of action - by which Giddens means "the capability competent actors have of 'keeping in touch' with the grounds of what they do, as they do it, such that if asked by others, they can supply reasons for their activities" (1984, p. 376). In another context, Giddens said:

By the rationalization of action, I mean that actors - also routinely and for the most part without fuss - maintain a continuing "theoretical understanding" of the grounds of

their activity. As I have mentioned, having such an understanding should not be equated with the discursive giving of reasons for particular items of conduct, nor even with the capability of specifying such reasons discursively. However, it is expected by competent agents of others - and is the main criterion of competence applied in day-to-day conduct - that actors will usually be able to explain most of what they do, if asked.

The rationalization of action, as a chronic feature of daily conduct, is a normal characteristic of the behaviour of competent social agents, and is indeed the main basis upon which their "competence" is adjudged by others. This does not mean that reasons can be linked as directly with norms or conventions as some philosophers have claimed or implied. Reasons do not just include the citing of or the appeal to norms: to suppose that such is the case actually draws the philosophy of action back towards the Parsonian action frame of reference, since conduct then becomes driven by "internalized" normative imperatives. (1979, p. 57)

The reasons actors supply discursively for their conduct in the course of practical queries, in the context of daily social life, stand in a relation of some tension to the rationalization of action as actually embodied within the stream of conduct of the agent. The least interesting or consequential aspect of this concerns the possibilities of deliberate dissimulation that exist: where an actor claims to have acted for reasons that he

was not in fact guided by. More important are the grey areas of practical consciousness that exist in the relation between the rationalization of action and actor's stocks of knowledge; and between the rationalization of action and the unconscious. The stocks of knowledge, in Schutz's terms, or what Giddens calls the mutual knowledge employed by actors in the production of social encounters, are not usually known to those actors in an explicitly codified form; the practical character of such knowledge conforms to the Wittgensteinian formulation of knowing a rule. The accounts actors are able to provide of their reasons are bounded, or subject to various degrees of possible articulation, in respect of tacitly employed mutual knowledge. The giving of reasons in day-to-day activity, which is closely associated with the moral accountability of action, is inevitably caught up in, and expressive of, the demands and the conflicts entailed within social encounters. But the articulation of accounts as reasons is also influenced by unconscious elements of motivation. This involves possibilities of rationalization in the Freudian sense, as the dislocating effects of the unconscious upon conscious processes of rational accounting. (1979, pp. 57-8)

Reflexive monitoring and rationalization of action have to be distinguished from motivation. If reasons refer to the grounds of action, motives refer to the wants which prompt it. However, motivation is not as directly bound up with the continuity of action as are its reflexive monitoring or rationalization. Motivation refers to potential for action

rather than to the mode in which action is chronically carried on by the agent. Motives tend to have a direct purchase on action only in relatively unusual circumstances, situations which in some way break with the routine. For the most part motives supply overall plans or programmes within which a range of conduct is enacted. Much of our day-to-day conduct is not directly motivated.

Motivational components of action, which Giddens takes to refer to the organization of an actor's wants, straddle conscious and unconscious aspects of cognition and emotion. The whole weight of psychoanalytic theory suggests that motivation has an internal hierarchy of its own. Giddens argues that a conception of the unconscious is essential to social theory, even if the resultant schema he develops departs in some ways from classical Freudian views. But the unconscious, of course, can only be explored in relation to the conscious: to the reflexive monitoring and rationalization of conduct, grounded in practical consciousness. (1979, p. 58)

A theory of motivation is crucial because it supplies the conceptual links between the rationalization of action and the framework of convention as embodied in institutions. But a theory of motivation also has to relate to the unacknowledged conditions of action: in respect of unconscious motives, operating or "outside" the range of the self-understanding of the agent. The unconscious comprises only one set of such conditions, which have to be connected to those represented on

the other side of the diagram: the unintended consequences of action. (1979, p. 59)

It is the specifically reflexive form of the knowledgeability of human agents that is most deeply involved in the recursive ordering of social practices. Continuity of practices presumes reflexivity, but reflexivity in turn is possible only because of the continuity of practices that makes them distinctively "the same" across space and time. "Reflexivity" hence should be understood not merely as "self-consciousness" but as the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life. To be a human being is to be a purposive agent, who both has reasons for his or her activities and is able, if asked, to elaborate discursively upon those reasons (including lying about them). But terms such as "purpose" or "intention", "reason", "motive" and so on have to be treated with caution, since their usage in the philosophical literature has very often been associated with a hermeneutical voluntarism, and because they extricate human action from the contextuality of time-space. Human action occurs as a *duree*, a continuous flow of conduct, as does cognition. Purposive action is not composed of an aggregate or series of separate intentions, reasons and motives. Thus it is useful to speak of reflexivity as grounded in the continuous monitoring of action which human beings display and expect others to display. The reflexive monitoring of action depends upon rationalization, understood here as a process rather than a state and as inherently involved in the competence of agents. An ontology of time-space as constitutive of social practices is

basic to the conception of structuration, which begins from temporality and thus, in one sense, "history".

Let us now give more concrete form to the duality of structure in interaction, following on from what has been outlined above. The dimensions of the duality of structure are portrayed in Figure 5.3. Human actors are not only able to monitor their activities and those of others in the regularity of day-to-day conduct; they are also able to "monitor that monitoring" in discursive consciousness.

Figure 5.3 A Schematic Presentation of the Dimensions of the Duality of Structure

All processes of the structuration (production and reproduction) of systems of social interaction involve three elements: the communication of meaning, the exercise of power, and the evaluative judgement of conduct. The three terms on the top line refer to analytically distinguishable aspects of structure. Structure as signification involves semantic rules; as domination, unequally distributed resources; and as legitimation, moral or evaluative rules. Rules and resources are

properties of communities or collectivities rather than of actors. Hence the terms interpretative scheme, facility and norm are used to refer to the knowledge and capabilities which actors are able to call upon in the production of interaction.

What Giddens calls here the "modalities" of structuration represent the central dimensions of the duality of structure in the constitution of interaction. (1979, p. 81) They serve to clarify the main dimensions of the duality of structure in interaction, relating the knowledgeable capacities of agents to structural features.

The modalities of structuration are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but at the same time are the media of the reproduction of the structural components of systems of interaction.

"Interpretative schemes" are the modes of typification incorporated within actors' stocks of knowledge, applied reflexively in the sustaining of communication. The stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the production and reproduction of interaction are the same as those whereby they are able to make accounts, offer reasons, etc. (1984, p. 29)

The normative constitution of interaction may be treated as the actualization of rights and the enactment of obligations. (1979, p. 86)

The distinction between interpretative schemes, as concerning the communication of meaning, and norms, as concerning the sanctioning of conduct, can be clarified by considering Winch's discussion of rule-following in his *Idea of a Social Science*. According to Winch, "rule-following" conduct can be identified with "meaningful action". The criterion of behaviour which is rule-following is to be found in whether one can ask of that behaviour if there is a "right" and "wrong" way of doing it. Now this conflates two senses of rule-following or, rather, two aspects of rules that are implicated in the production of social practices; that relating to the constitution of meaning, and that relating to sanctions involved in social conduct. There are right and wrong ways of using words in a language, a matter which concerns those aspects of rules involved in the constitution of meaning; and there are right and wrong modes of conduct in respect of the normative sanctions implicated in interaction. Although it is important to separate them out conceptually, these two senses of right and wrong always intersect in the actual constitution of social practices. Thus "correct" language use is always sanctioned; while the relevance of sanctions to conduct other than speech is inevitably connected with the identification of that conduct on the plane of meaning. (1979, p. 82)

Rules have two aspects to them, and it is essential to distinguish these conceptually. Rules relate on the one hand to the constitution of meaning, and on the other to the sanctioning of modes of social conduct.

It is not enough just to stress the need in social theory to relate the constitution and communication of meaning to normative sanctions; each of these has in turn to be linked to power transactions. This is so in the twofold sense indicated by the term duality of structure. Power is expressed in the capabilities of actors to make certain "accounts count" and to enact or resist sanctioning processes; but these capabilities draw upon modes of domination structured into social systems. (1979, p. 83)

The idea of "accountability" in everyday English gives cogent expression to the intersection of interpretative schemes and norms. To be "accountable for one's activities is both to explicate the reasons for them and to supply the normative grounds whereby they may be "justified". Normative components of interaction always centre upon relations between the rights and obligations "expected" of those participating in a range of interaction contexts. Formal codes of conduct, as, for example, those enshrined in law, usually express some sort of claimed symmetry between the rights and obligations, the one being the justification of the other. But no such symmetry necessarily exists in practice, a phenomenon which it is important to emphasize, since both the "normative functionalism" of Parsons and the "structuralist Marxism" of Althusser exaggerates the degree to which normative obligations are "internalized" by members of societies. Neither standpoint incorporates a theory of action which recognizes human beings as knowledgeable agents, reflexively monitoring the flow of interaction with one another.

When social systems are conceived of primarily from the point of view of the "social object", the emphasis comes to be placed upon the pervasive influence of a normatively co-ordinated legitimate order as an overall determinant or "programmer" of social conduct. Such a perspective masks the fact that the normative elements of social systems are contingent claims which have to be sustained and "made to count" through effective mobilization of sanctions in the contexts of actual encounters. Normative sanctions express structural asymmetries of domination, and the relations of those nominally subject to them may be of various sorts other than expressions of the commitments those norms supposedly engender. (1984, p. 30)

Among the many interpretations of power in social and political theory, two main perspectives appear. One is that power is best conceptualised as the capability of an actor to achieve his or her will, even at the expense of that of others who might resist him - the sort of definition employed by Weber among many other authors. The second is that power should be seen as a property of the collectivity: Parson's concept of power, for instance, belongs to this latter category. Giddens claims, however, that neither of these modes of conceiving power is appropriate in isolation; and that we should connect them together as features of the duality of structure. He treats power not as a state of affairs, but a capability, and resources as the "bases" or "vehicles" of power, comprising structures of domination, drawn upon by parties to interaction and reproduced through the duality of structure. Power is generated by definite

forms of domination in a parallel way to the involvement of rules with social practices: and, indeed, as an integral element or aspect of those practices. (Giddens, 1979, p. 69)

Domination depends upon the mobilization of two distinguishable types of resources. Allocative resources refer to capabilities - or, more accurately, to forms of transformative capacity - generating command over objects, goods or material phenomena. Authoritative resources refer to types of transformative capacity generating command over persons or actors.

What is the logical connection between action and power? Although the ramifications of the issue are complex, the basic relation involved can easily be pointed to. To be able to "act otherwise" means being able to intervene in the world, or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs. This presumes that to be an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. Action depends upon the capability of the individual to "make a difference" to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to "make a difference", that is, to exercise some sort of power. (1984, p. 14)

"Institutional analysis" refers to "social analysis which

places in suspension the skills and awareness of actors, treating institutions as chronically reproduced rules and resources" (1984, p. 375). "Analysis of strategic conduct" refers to "social analysis which places in suspension institutions as socially reproduced, concentrated upon how actors reflexively monitor what they do: how actors draw upon rules and resources in the constitution of interaction" (1984, p. 373).

5.4 Implications for Social Work

After having defined profession, value, and action, we are now prepared to revise our definition of social work.

Social work is a developing profession within the social welfare institution. In social work practice, the social worker draws upon a body of knowledge, screened by a system of values, to produce and reproduce practice principles which monitor his action in an effort to bring about effective changes either in the person, or in society, or in both.

Several of the phrases mentioned in the definition need elaboration. Firstly, social work is a developing profession within the social welfare institution. What is a profession? What does it take to become a profession? By adopting a traits approach to the study of professions, the researcher argues that to become a full profession, social work has to acquire a status and, along with it, the power to deliver services and to control

its work in the field of social welfare. Moreover, social work has to have in possession (1) a statement of purpose, (2) a body of knowledge, (3) a code of ethics, and (4) a system of values.

Secondly, in social work practice, the social worker draws upon a body of knowledge. So far as Giddens is concerned, action does not depend on the social worker's intentionality. It depends on his capability and knowledgeability.

The social worker's intentionality refers to the intentions he has in actions. This is what is often referred to as purposive action. However, there are possibilities that one may do things one does not intend to do and may bring about changes one does not intend to bring about. Conversely, one may intend to achieve something but fails in his effort or one may achieve what he intends to achieve although not through his effort. Both of these situations are unavoidable. This may explain why Giddens insists that social interaction does not depend on one's intentions. But intentionality is crucial in professional action. In the theory of structuration, intentionality is a characteristic of action which is reflexively monitored.

The social worker's capability refers to the fact that he could, at any phase in the process, have acted otherwise. One's ability to act otherwise is not unfamiliar to social work. In the case of social work, it is often referred to as one's ability to be self-determining.

The social worker's knowledgeability refers to everything he knows or believes about the persons who are involved in the interaction and the environment in which it takes place. In other words, his body of knowledge includes all categories of beliefs which Rokeach have identified: descriptive beliefs, evaluative beliefs, and prescriptive beliefs. It includes knowledge which he knows and is able to explain as well as knowledge which he knows but is unable to explain. In the case of social work, it includes knowledge obtained during training and in one's life experience. Furthermore, knowledge obtained during training includes theory, method, skills, values, code of ethics, resources, and purposes.

It should be noted that the body of knowledge employed by the actor in the production of social interaction are not usually known to the actor in an explicitly codified form. The accounts the actor is able to provide of his reasons are bounded, or subject to various degrees of possible articulation, in respect of tacitly employed mutual knowledge. The giving of reasons of day-to-day activity, which is closely associated with the moral accountability of action, is inevitably caught up in, and expressive of, the demands and the conflicts entailed within social encounters.

What is action? According to Giddens, action does not refer to a series of discrete acts combined together, but to a continuous flow of conduct. Moreover, action includes all forms of human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual

attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be either overt or purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a situation, or of deliberate refraining from such intervention, or passively acquiescing in the situation. Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual, it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course.

Thirdly, the practice of social work involves the production of rules and resources, i.e., practice principles, during the process. Based on the theory of structuration, all social interactions are affected by these three elements: (1) the communication of meaning, (2) the exercise of power, and (3) the evaluative judgment of conduct. These three elements, or modalities, are also known respectively as (1) the interpretative scheme, (2) the facility, and (3) the norm.

In the production and reproduction of social interaction, the social worker draws upon his body of knowledge, which includes all that he knows about the situation in which the social interaction is taking place, to produce rules and resources to regulate the production and reproduction of social interaction. Rules refer to (1) what is to be done and how it is to be done and (2) what justifies both of these. In other words, rules depend on knowledge which tells us what is to be done and how it is to be done and code of ethics which gives us the justification for our activities. Resources, on the other hand,

refer to facility or authority, including (1) command over persons and (2) command over resources.

The social worker's ability to communicate the meaning of his action depends very much on his stocks of knowledge, including empirical knowledge as well as practice wisdom in the field of social work. The evaluative judgment of his conduct, on the other hand, depends very much on his capability in the actualization of rights and the enactment of obligations, i.e., to accomplish his task and to abide by the code of ethics issued by the profession.

It is not enough just to stress the need in social work practice to relate the communication of meaning to normative sanctions; each of these has in turn to be linked to the exercise of power. Power is expressed in the capabilities of actors to make certain "accounts count" and to enact or resist sanctioning processes; but these capabilities draw upon modes of domination structured into social systems.

To be accountable for one's activities is both to explicate the reasons for them and to supply the normative grounds whereby they may be justified.

Domination depends upon the mobilization of two distinguishable types of resources. Allocative resources refer to capabilities - or, more accurately, to forms of transformative capacity - generating command over objects, goods or material

phenomena. Authoritative resources refer to types of transformative capacity generating command over persons or actors.

In the case of social work, allocative resources refer to the social worker's capability to mobilize the resources of his agency and that of the society to help the client in meeting his needs. Authoritative resources refer to the social worker's capability to mobilize the client, significant others in his life, and members of the society to help the client in tackling his problems.

It is important to note that according to the theory of structuration, these rules and resources do not exist before the interaction. They are produced during the interaction and reproduced in the process.

Fourthly, in social work practice, the production of rules and resources is screened by a system of values. This is not mentioned in the theory of structuration. However, what affects the choice of alternatives? It is this researcher's contention that it is the social worker's values. In social interaction, the social worker draws upon his stock of knowledge to formulate questions on what is to be done, how it is to be done, what human resources are to be drawn upon to make it happen, what material resources are to be drawn upon to make it happen. The social worker also draws upon his stock of knowledge to formulate possible solutions. The question this researcher has in mind is:

what enables the social worker to come up with a decision on which solution to choose? It is the researcher's contention that the social worker's value system screens through all these alternatives to help him to come to a decision.

In this understanding, values as they are taught in training form part of the social worker's body of knowledge. They have no bearing on his action. However, when the social worker draws upon this stock of knowledge in the process of interaction to produce rules and resources, values are put into operation to help in the screening process. It is then and only then that values serves as a guide to action. They guide the social worker in the selection among alternatives.

In our application of the theory of structuration, we restrict ourselves to an analysis of strategic conduct which refers to "social analysis which places in suspension institutions as socially reproduced, concentrated upon how actors reflexively monitor what they do: how actors draw upon rules and resources in the constitution of interaction".

Section Three

Methodology and Findings

Chapter Six

Research Methodology

6.1 Introduction

To reiterate, the study attempts to accomplish two tasks: (1) to identify a system of social work values which is conceived as preferable by social workers in Hong Kong, and (2) to explore the relationship between values and action in social work practice.

The study is divided into three parts. The first two parts relate to the first objective and the third part relates to the second. In the first part of this study which involves an extensive literature search, a cluster of social work values is identified and the meaning of each value is briefly defined. In the second part of this study which involves a value survey, an attempt is made to transform this cluster of values into a value system. The last part involves a second survey. It explores the relationship between values and action.

6.2 Identification of Values

To identify social work values which are conceived as preferable, one has to distinguish between what are, and what should be included as social work values. In social work literature one often finds that the author begins by specifying a

value or a group of values and then makes an attempt to justify his inclusion of such value or values. In other words, the author specifies what social work values should be. Much less frequently, social workers also attempt to find out what social work values are through the use of empirical studies.

This researcher finds the use of both methods helpful in the identification of social work values. To come up with a list of values which should be included as social work values, this researcher begins by tracing the development of the profession since its emergence in the mid-nineteenth century. Through this historical review, the researcher is able to identify four important dimensions in social work practice, including:

1. the moral dimension,
2. the organizational dimension,
3. the psychological dimension, and
4. the political dimension.

In each dimension, one type of values seems to predominate: moral values in the moral dimension of social work, competence values in the organizational dimension, personal values in the psychological dimension, and social values in the political dimension. These four groups of values fit in tightly with the categorizations in our definition of values, thus providing us with an excellent framework upon which social work values can be identified.

The next step is to look for these values. In social work literature, social work values often appear as beliefs: beliefs about conceptions of people, preferred outcomes for people, and preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people. Values which can satisfy the criteria specified in our definition are limited to a very small number, including, for instance, authenticity, empathy, and respect. Hence, to look for these values, the researcher has to conduct an extensive literature search the scope of which extends far beyond social work. For moral values, the researcher looks into the literature on Christian virtues as well as Confucian virtues since both Christianity and Confucianism have exerted great influence on social workers in Hong Kong. As far as competence values are concerned, the researcher turns to the literature on leadership and the professional bureaucrat. At a time when accountability is a major issue in social work, it is hard to ignore the qualities demanded of a leader or a professional-bureaucrat. For personal values, the researcher finds the humanistic psychology of Abraham Maslow extremely helpful. His work on the hierarchy of human needs is familiar to most social workers. Finally, for social values, the researcher re-examines the literature on ideologies of social welfare and social work.

Through this extensive literature search, a total of twenty-four values is finally chosen. There are two major reasons for deciding on this number. The first major reason may be explained in terms of practicality. Rokeach (1973) came up with a total of thirty-six values in his study of values. To this researcher,

thirty-six is a large number. Even if the values are divided into two groups, there remains eighteen in each group. It may be manageable if all that is required of the respondents is to rank these values as in the Value Survey. However, there is more to be done in the Value-Action Relationship Survey. With twelve values in each group, there is already a need for twelve case situations. If the number in each group is increased to eighteen, the number of case situations will have to be increased to thirty. This will increase, to a significant extent, the amount of work that is required in data collection and analysis.

The second major reason may be explained in terms of reliability. With as many as eighteen values in each group, our respondents will experience great difficulty in ranking them accurately. In the opinion of this researcher, twelve is a more acceptable number. After all, even with twelve values in each group, the time it takes to complete the questionnaire is about an hour. A questionnaire which requires a longer period to complete will probably discourage our respondents from completing it in the first place. This will have an ill effect on the response rate.

After the values of social work have been identified, each is defined according to the category it has been chosen to represent. This, undoubtedly, will create some discomfort among the respondents. Yet this can hardly be avoided since many of these values can be interpreted in more than one way.

Based on the values so identified, two lists of values are produced, one on terminal values or end-states of existence, and the other on instrumental values or modes of conduct. Each of these lists consists of 12 values and they are arranged alphabetically. (See Appendix E)

6.3 The Surveys

In the chapter on values, it was concluded that Rokeach's approach to the study of values should be adopted for use in this study. In his view, the value of anything can be appraised.

Appraisal is a type of ordering which is based on the magnitude of properties possessed by things. One can, for instance, order people on the basis of height, weight, strength, or speed. The main difference is that in an appraisal, the criterion for ordering is based on an evaluative property, not an evaluatively neutral one. A property can be evaluative or non-evaluative. It is evaluative if it is selected on the basis of a feature wanted in the person rather than simply found in him, whether wanted or not. Thus when we order ordinary people according to the speed at which they can run, speed is a non-evaluative property. But when we order runners in this way, speed becomes a wanted feature in the person and is, therefore, an evaluative property. The ordering of runners according to the speed they can run is an appraisal. The person who can run faster than another is a better runner.

There are two important types of appraisals: ranking and grading. Teachers, for example, appraise their students by ranking them, grading them, or both.

In grading, the entries are ordered by reference to pre-existing places arranged in a hierarchy. These places may be named A, B, C, D, and E, for instance. Hence, at least conceptually, one can grade a single student. A student's grade establishes his place in a fixed hierarchy, not in one determined by the performances of his current competitors.

Ranking, on the other hand, consists in assigning to each of a given set of students a place in a hierarchical list of places. These places may be named first, second, third, fourth, and onwards. As can be seen, each place has an identifiable position within the list. The assigning of a student to a place in the list is carried out on the basis of the greater or lesser extent to which the student can satisfy a given set of criteria. Each ranking is, therefore, a self-contained competition in which all the students are compared with one another in respect of that set of criteria, and a place is then assigned to each of the students. Since the competition is self-contained, the place assigned to a student in one competition carries no implication about how that student would fare in another competition using the same criteria but ranking different students. Each student can be ranked, i.e., assigned a place in the list, only as part of a complete allocation of places to all students. The position assigned to each depends on the position assigned to every other.

It makes no sense to rank a single student. If Smith ranked tenth in a course in 1988, nothing follows about what his rank would be in the same course and for the same work in 1989. But if he had a B grade in 1988, then he should also get a B grade for the same work in 1989. Moreover, if Jones had an A grade in that same course in 1989, then this implies that if Smith were in his class in 1989, Smith would be ranked below him.

The measuring instrument used in this survey is a questionnaire (see Appendix E) which consists of two lists each of which contains twelve values. Each of these values is followed by a short statement describing the meaning of this value.

The Value-Action Relationship Survey is an attempt to substantiate the claim that values serve as a guide to action in social work practice. To accomplish this task, a total of twelve case situations have been prepared. Since social workers in most situations will act almost routinely, without weighting their value preferences, these case situations have been carefully selected so that each is related to an issue which normally would arouse a conflict of values in the social worker. A number of publications on ethical dilemmas in social work practice have been referred to while formulating these case situations. (See, for example, Loewenberg and Dolgoff, 1988; Reamer, 1982; and Rhodes, 1986)

The questionnaire for the two surveys begins with a letter

(Appendix B) and the rest is divided into three sections. In the letter, the purpose of the study is explained and respondents are requested to assist by completing the questionnaire. The first section of this questionnaire begins with a short introduction on how this section is to be completed. This is followed by a sample and twelve case situations. Each case situation is carefully worded in order to highlight the conflict of values. After the presentation of each case situation, the respondent is asked to respond to a short statement relating to the worker's action. The respondent is requested to respond by indicating his agreement or disagreement with the action specified in the statement. He is then asked to rank six given values in order of importance in helping him arrive at the decision.

Twenty-four values have been identified: twelve end-states of existence and twelve modes of conduct. Each of these groups is further subdivided into four subgroups. When the subgroups of end-states of existence are combined in twos, we have a total of six combinations and, therefore, we need a total of six case situations, one for each of these combinations. Similarly, when the subgroups of modes of conduct are combined in twos, we have another six combinations and, therefore, another six case situations. This helps to explain our decision to have twelve values in each list and twelve case situations for the Value-Action Relationship Survey.

It is important to point out that the division of social values, personal values, competence values, and moral values into

subgroups is only arbitrary. This is particularly so in the case of moral values which have been divided into moral virtues and moral principles.

The second section of the questionnaire consists of two lists of values. The first includes twelve end-states of existence which are arranged alphabetically and each value is followed with a short definition. The second list includes twelve modes of conduct. Again, these values are arranged alphabetically and each value is followed with a short definition. Respondents are asked to rank values in each of these lists separately in order of preference, in the capacity of social workers.

These two lists are placed after the twelve case situations purposely so that the rank ordering of values in case situations will not be affected by the rank ordering of values when case situations are not specified.

Finally, in the last section of the questionnaire, respondents are asked to provide information about themselves. These personal particulars are identical with those requested of them in The Social Welfare Manpower Planning System: Report No. 1 (1988). This is done on purpose because it allows for comparison and it is also felt that the respondents are more willing to comply with our request for these personal particulars.

After completing the first draft of the questionnaire, a

pilot study was launched in November, 1988. Questionnaires were distributed to staff members of the Department of Social Work of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Based on the returned questionnaires, minor amendments were made. The actual study was launched in February, 1989.

The use of mailed questionnaire is chosen after having consulted the Social Welfare Department and the Hong Kong Social Workers' Association.

6.4 The Population

A major purpose of the research is to identify a system of values which is conceived to be preferable among social workers. Hence, it is appropriate that the research population covers all practitioners in the field of social work.

Who are the social work practitioners? In a recent report published by the Joint Committee on Social Welfare Manpower Planning System Social Welfare Department of the Hong Kong Government and the Hong Kong Council of Social Service (1988), social work personnel who were engaged in posts, which required social work training, in the Social Welfare Department, in voluntary agencies, and in local social work training institutes were included as social work practitioners. These same criteria are used in this research.

Based on the same report, it was found that the total number

of social welfare organizations in Hong Kong (as at 30th September, 1987) was 252 and the total number of social work practitioners was approximately 3,500.

Among these social welfare organizations, 17 did not respond to the survey, but it was ascertained that they employed few social workers on their staff. Information obtained from the remaining 235 revealed that 94 of them had no social workers on their staff, 92 had a social work staff of 1 and 10, 18 had a staff of 11 to 20, 7 had a staff of 21 to 30, and the rest, 24 of them, had a staff of more than 30.

The following findings are based on information supplied by the respondents.

Sex. Out of a total of 3,275 social workers, 1,908 (58.3%) were female.

Age. 2,105 (64.3%) were found to be below the age of 35.

Length of Service in Social Work. 1,234 (37.7%) were found to have worked for less than five years; 941 (28.7%) were found to have worked between five to ten years; 900 (27.5%) were found to have worked between ten to twenty years; and 200 (6.1%) were found to have worked for over twenty years.

Highest Qualification Attained. 1,361 (41.6%) were found to be degree-trained; 1,159 (35.4%) were found to be non-degree

trained; and 755 (23.0%) were found to be untrained.

Rank of Position Occupied. 1,576 (48.1%) were found to be in the officer rank, i.e., the career ladder for graduate social workers; 1,585 (48.4%) were found to be in the rank of assistants, i.e., the career ladder for diploma holders; and 114 (3.5%) were found to be involved in education and training.

Nature of Job. The nature of job refers to the social worker's primary functions. Out of a total of 3,275 , 2,360 (72.1%) were found to be working in the frontline; 496 (15.1%) were in supervisory positions; 288 (8.8%) were in administrative positions; and 131 (4.0%) were in education and training.

Area of Service. 966 (29.5%) were found to be involved in working with young people; 706 (21.6%) were found to be working with families; 334 (10.2%) were found to be working with offenders and drug abusers; 324 (9.9%) were found to be engaged in community development. The rest were found to be engaged in various types of work.

6.5 The Sample

Since the value surveys pertain to social work values, all members of the social work profession are included in the survey. To obtain a sampling frame, letters were sent to agencies asking them for the names of their social work staff. (See Appendix A) Most agencies complied with the request. Others who refused

chose to provide us with codes instead of names. More than 3,000 names (or codes) were obtained out of a total of approximately 3,500.

With this sampling frame, sampling procedures proved to be simple. After assigning a number to each of the social workers, a sample of 360 was chosen with the help of random numbers obtained from the table of random numbers. Unfortunately, among these 360, only 195 completed and returned the questionnaire. This represents a response rate of slightly above 50 percent. The major reason for this low response rate is the high staff turnover rate among social workers in Hong Kong. In view of political uncertainty, a significant portion of our social workers are leaving each day either to Canada or to Australia. This not only results in social workers leaving the colony, but it also results in social workers changing jobs from one agency to another. Moreover, in view of the fact that a significant percentage of the social workers are known by codes only, the hope of locating who they are and where they are prove to be extremely difficult. A second reason for this low response rate is the tendency of social workers to shy away from research of this nature. It requires them to give a lot of thinking about their own values which they do not usually do under normal circumstances.

Nevertheless, this sample of 195 is quite representative of the study population. A comparison of the population and the study sample revealed little significant difference between these

two groups. The only exception is the rank of position occupied which showed a difference significant at .043 level. (Tables 6.1 to 6.12) To facilitate comparison, many of the categories in the personal attributes are combined. Sex is divided into "Male" and "Female"; age, "35-" and "35+"; length of service, "10-" and "10+"; highest qualification attained, "Degree-trained" and "Non-degree or Untrained"; rank of position occupied, "Officer" and "Assistant"; nature of job, "Frontline" and "Supervisory"; and finally, area of service, "Rehabilitation", "Family", and "Community and Youth". (Figure 6.1)

Figure 6.1 A Schematic Presentation of Breakdown of Personal Attributes

Personal Attributes	Categories	
Sex	Male	Female
Age	35-	35+
Length of Service in Social Welfare	10-	10+
Highest Qualification Attained	Degree-trained	Non-degree or Untrained
Rank of Position Occupied	Officer	Assistant
Nature of Job	Frontline	Supervisory
Area of Service	Rehabilitation	Family
	Community and Youth	

Table 6.1 A Comparison of Population and Sample by Sex

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
Male	1,367	41.7	90	46.2
Female	1,908	58.3	105	53.8
Total	3,275	100.0	195	100.0
Chi-square		D.F.	Significance	
1,591		1	.207	

Table 6.2 A Comparison of Population and Sample by Age

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
20-34	2,105	64.3	130	66.7
35 & above	1,170	35.7	65	33.3
Total	3,275	100.0	195	100.0
Chi-square		D.F.	Significance	
.476		1	.490	

Table 6.3 A Comparison of Population and Sample by
Length of Service

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
5 yrs or below	1,234	37.7	81	41.5
5 - 10 yrs	941	28.7	47	24.1
10 - 15 yrs	554	16.9	35	17.9
15 - 20 yrs	346	10.6	17	8.7
over 20 yrs	200	6.1	14	7.2
Other			1	0.5
Total	3,275	100.0	195	99.9

Table 6.4 A Comparison of Population and Sample by
Length of Service (Combined Categories)

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
Less than 10 yrs	2,175	66.4	128	66.0
Over 10 yrs	1,100	33.6	66	34.0
Total	3,275	100.0	194	100.0

Chi-square	D.F.	Significance
.015	1	.901

Table 6.5 A Comparison of Population and Sample by Highest Qualification Attained

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
Degree-trained	1,361	41.6	86	44.1
Non-degree-trained	1,159	35.4	80	41.0
Untrained	755	23.0	26	13.3
Other			3	1.5
Total	3,275	100.0	195	99.9

Table 6.6 A Comparison of Population and Sample by Highest Qualification Attained (Combined Categories)

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
Degree-trained	1,361	41.6	86	44.8
Non-degree or Untrained	1,914	58.4	106	55.2
Total	3,275	100.0	192	100.0
Chi-square		D.F.	Significance	
.805		1	.370	

Table 6.7 A Comparison of Population and Sample by Rank of Position Occupied

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
SWO & above	368	11.2	22	11.3
ASWO	1,208	36.9	76	39.0
SSWA & SWA	1,585	48.4	86	44.1
Lecturer & Field Instructor	114	3.5	10	5.1
Other			1	0.5
Total	3,275	100.0	195	100.0

Table 6.8 A Comparison of Population and Sample by Rank of Position Occupied (Combined Categories)

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
ASWO & above	1,690	51.6	108	55.7
SSWA & SWA	1,585	48.4	86	44.3
Total	3,275	100.0	194	100.0
Chi-square		D.F.	Significance	
4.106		1	.043	

Table 6.9 A Comparison of Population and Sample by
Nature of Job

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
Frontline	2,360	72.1	144	73.8
Supervisory	496	15.1	25	12.8
Administration	288	8.8	12	6.2
Training	131	4.0	12	6.2
Other			2	1.0
Total	3,275	100.0	195	100.0

Table 6.10 A Comparison of Population and Sample by
Nature of Job (Combined Categories)

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
Frontline	2,360	72.1	144	74.6
Supervisory	915	27.9	49	25.4
Total	2,375	100.0	193	100.0
	Chi-square	D.F.	Significance	
	.605	1	.437	

Table 6.11 A Comparison of Population and Sample by
Area of Service

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
Offenders/ drug abusers	334	10.2	18	9.2
Family welfare	706	21.6	40	20.5
Elderly	199	6.1	13	6.7
Community development	324	9.9	12	6.2
Young people	966	29.5	64	32.8
Rehabilitation	245	7.5	13	6.7
Medical social service	168	5.1	11	5.6
Training	145	4.4	11	5.6
Central administration	185	5.6	3	1.5
Others	3	0.1	10	5.1
Total	3,275	100.0	195	99.9

Table 6.12 A Comparison of Population and Sample by
Area of Service (Combined Categories)

	Population		Sample	
	No.	%	No.	%
Rehabilitation	778	26.4	44	25.7
Family Service	874	29.7	51	29.8
Community & Youth	1,290	43.8	76	44.4
Total	2,942	99.9	171	99.9

Chi-square	D.F.	Significance
.046	2	.977

6.6 Method of Data Analysis

Since data obtained in these surveys are either nominal or ordinal, nonparametric statistical tests are used in most situations.

In describing the population and the sample, frequency distribution and percentages are used, and in comparing these two groups, chi-square test is used. According to Sidney Siegel and N. John Castellan, Jr. (1988), the chi-square test assesses the degree of correspondence between the observed and expected observations in each category. From the null hypothesis we may

deduce what the expected frequencies are. The chi-square technique gives the probability that the observed frequencies could have been sampled from a population with the given expected values. (p. 45)

In describing the rank ordering of values, this researcher begins with frequency distribution, mean, median, and mode for each of the twenty-four values. Following this, one is tempted to ask if the respondents are consistent in the way they ranked these values. To answer this query, the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is used. According to Siegel and Castellan (1988), this measurement is particularly useful in studies of interjudge reliability. (p. 262)

To compare if subgroups of the sample have the same pattern of rank ordering, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for two independent samples and the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance for k independent subgroups are used.

When at least ordinal measurement has been achieved for the variables being studied, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test may be used to test whether two independent groups have been drawn from the same population. This is one of the most powerful of the nonparametric tests, and it is a very useful alternative to the parametric t test when the researcher wishes to avoid the t test's assumptions or when the measurement in the research is weaker than interval scaling. (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, pp. 128-9)

The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks is an extremely useful test for deciding whether k independent samples are from different populations. Sample values almost invariably differ somewhat, and the question is whether the differences among the sample signify genuine population differences or whether they represent merely the kind of variations that are to be expected among random samples from the same population. The Kruskal-Wallis technique tests the null hypothesis that the k samples come from the same population or from identical population with the same median. (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p. 206)

How significantly different is the rank ordering of these values? To answer this question, values are compared in twos by the use of Sign test.

According to Siegel and Castellan (1988), the sign test gets its name from the fact that it is based upon the direction of differences between two measures rather than quantitative measures as its data. It is particularly useful for research in which quantitative measurements is impossible or infeasible, but in which it is possible to determine, for each pair of observations, which is the "greater" (in some sense). (p. 80)

Are the values related to one another in any way in the rankings? To answer this question, the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient is used.

The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient is a measure of association between two variables which requires that both variables be measured in at least an ordinal scale so that the objects or individuals under study may be ranked in two ordered series. (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p. 235)

In describing the ranking of values in the twelve cases, frequency distribution, mean, median, and mode are again used. The same is done for the sample as well as the subgroups. On top of this, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance are used to compare the ranking of the subgroups. Consistency within each of these groups is measured by the use of the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance.

Finally, a comparison is made between the ranking of values in the Values Survey and the Value-Action Relationship Survey. This is to be done by the use of the t-test of means.

6.7 Limitations of the Research

The research has three limitations. First, the validity of the measuring instrument, i.e., the questionnaire, is not tested. Since this is an exploratory study in itself, the set of values so identified have not been subjected to validity test. However, an effort has been made to consult my colleagues on the appropriateness of including the values and the case situations. The pilot study has also shed some light on this.

Secondly, control groups have not been used. As an alternative, the study sample is divided into subgroups and findings between subgroups are compared to test for reliability.

Finally, the response rate is low. As it is explained, the major reason for the low response is the political uncertainty in Hong Kong. Many social workers left the colony during the period of when the study was in progress. Another major reason for low response is the nature of the research itself. It seems to social workers that values are to be accepted, not challenged.

Chapter Seven

Identification of Social Work Values

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to identify a cluster of values, twenty-four in all, which is conceived to be preferable for social workers in Hong Kong. As it is defined in Chapter Four, values are of two types: terminal values or end-states of existence, and instrumental values or modes of conduct. The former can be divided into social values and personal values. The latter, on the other hand, can be divided into moral values and competence values.

To accomplish this purpose, three tasks need to be accomplished. The first involves a review of the historical development of social work. This helps to identify important dimensions in social work which, in turn, helps to provide a framework for the selection of values. The second task involves an extensive literature search, including an examination of values (or beliefs) and purposes of social work, characteristics of professional helpers and the professional relationship, and the professional code of ethics. This provides a pool of values from which one can select those which are conceived to be preferable for social workers. The final task involves an attempt to come up with brief explanatory statements for each of these values.

7.2 Dimensions of Social Work

Although the development of social work seems to vary from one country to another, there are four dimensions which can be found in all countries. For the sake of convenience, the British experience is used as an illustration. These four dimensions are: (1) the moral dimension, (2) the organizational dimension, (3) the psychological dimension, and (4) the political dimension.

7.2.1 The moral dimension

Up until the Victorian era, destitutes were divided into two groups: the deserving and the undeserving. The first group, including the sick, the disabled, the widows, the orphans, and the thrifty old, was considered to be deserving because they suffered from what could be described as an Act of God. The second group, including offenders against the law, unmarried mothers, vagrants, the unemployed, and the old without savings, was considered to be undeserving because they suffered from what could be described as a defective moral will. The first group was deserving of charity and personal service. The second group was undeserving because kind treatment might lead to dependence and increase in its number. Care of the deserving was the responsibility of private charity whereas care of the undeserving was the responsibility of the State. It is from this group of private philanthropists, the work they did, and the principles they held, that we can identify influences which ultimately lead to the particular characteristics of social work we have today.

Private charity in the Victorian era may be represented by the work of the Charitable Organization Society in London. By organizing charitable relief according to certain well-defined principles, the Charity Organization Society hoped to introduce order into the chaos of charity organizations and to reduce the incidences of pauperism. By offering charity and personal service to the deserving, the same organization aimed at reducing unnecessary expenditure, and strengthening the moral will of the individual. In this view, true charity should make an effort to encourage independence, strengthen character, and preserve the family as the fundamental unit of society. It had a strong moral undertone.

What could have been the ideological base of private charity in those days? Could it be attributed to the influence of the religious doctrine of John Calvin, more commonly known in social work literature as the Protestant Ethic?

While most religions emphasized the importance of life in the next world, Calvinism made the individual focus his attention on life in this world. The starting point of its argument was the doctrine of predestination.

The Calvinist admitted that God was both omnipotent and omniscient. God knew from the very beginning of the individual's life whether he would be saved. In other words, the individual's ultimate fate was predestined and there was nothing he could do in his lifetime to achieve salvation or to avert damnation.

Hence, unlike Roman Catholicism, the individual could not achieve salvation by doing good works and truly repenting his sins, and unlike Lutheranism, the individual could not avert damnation by faith alone.

They avoided the despair of hopelessness, however, by arguing that the chosen one would lead a pure and fruitful life. If an individual prospered in his work, if he led a virtuous life, if he avoided worldly temptations, and if he practised his religion conscientiously, then it was very likely that he would be chosen. For, the Calvinists contended, why should God allow the unworthy to prosper?

Influenced by the religious doctrine of John Calvin, private philanthropists in the Victorian era pledged to lead a virtuous life and made it their job to help the poor and the needy to learn this same way of life. Thus the success of private charity in those days depended largely on the personal qualities of the giver and not the receiver. This may help to explain why the personal qualities of the giver deserve special attention. These qualities represent values upon which private charity was administered in that era. Moreover, in line with our definition of values, they represent moral values in the framework we have developed. Furthermore, since private charity had the Protestant ethic as its ideological foundation, it seems logical to look for these personal qualities in the virtues of Christian living. In addition, since Hong Kong is a Chinese society, it is also necessary to look for these qualities in the teachings of

Confucius.

What are perceived as the virtues of Christian living? In one of his work, Ralph Ranieri (1983) came up with a list of ten basic virtues in Christian living, namely, simplicity, courage, humility, hope, loyalty, discipline, honesty, temperance, justice, and prudence. This list proves to be extremely helpful. In fact, half of them have been included as moral values.

According to Ranieri, simplicity is oneness. "When an individual is simple," he noted, "there is one reason for that person's existence, one motive for his or her actions, one goal toward which that person tends." (p. 7) In the case of social work, this is equivalent to the service orientation - a commitment to serve in the interest of clients.

To this same author, courage "is the ability to do the right thing when we are afraid or timid about doing it" (p. 13). Humility, on the other hand, is considered a virtue of strength rather than a virtue of weakness. "Humble persons," he noted, "seek the truth about themselves and their world, and, because of their humility, they can accept what they find." (p. 18) Both of these virtues are included by Alan Keith-Lucas (1972) in his book on Giving and Taking Help.

In Ranieri's view hope is nothing more than the ability to look forward to something. (p. 24) "If we could develop the habit of thinking more positively," he said, "we would increase

our sense of hope." (p. 28) Loyalty, on the other hand, is a free choice. "A loyal person remains faithful to commitments," he added, "even when things are more difficult than anticipated." (p. 30) Moreover, discipline is referred to as the training to strengthen moral character. "Freedom," he noted, "has limits and responsibilities attached to it." (p. 37) "Only those who are disciplined," he added, "will recognize the limits of their freedom and the responsibilities it requires of them." (p. 37) Honesty, to Ranieri, means telling the truth as well as seeking the truth. (p. 43) "If we want to develop a sense of honesty," he continued, "... we must start by being honest with ourselves." (p. 46)

Temperance is the equivalent of moderation. Elaborating on this, Ranieri noted that "when we enjoy something without overindulging or without giving it more time or importance than it truly deserves, then we are temperate." (p. 49) Justice, on the other hand, is a demand that "all be treated with respect and concern" (p. 55). Finally, to be prudent is to have the ability "to use our reason in such a way that it enriches not only our own lives but the lives of others" (p. 60).

What are considered as virtues among the Confucians? The most important virtues which Confucius preached must be benevolence, wisdom, and courage. (The Confucius Hall of Hong Kong, 1986) Confucius once said, "The way of the gentleman has three aspects of which I am incapable: with benevolence, there is no worry, with wisdom, there is no delusion, with courage, there

is no fear." Undoubtedly, he was being modest when he said this. In another context, he explained that the way to cultivate the person was to be fond of learning so as to gain wisdom, to practice with vigour so as to achieve benevolence, and to possess the feeling of shame so as to have courage. Of the three, benevolence was considered to be the most important, and so it was said that the aim of wisdom is to know benevolence; and courage, to practice it.

When asked to elaborate on the way to achieve benevolence, Confucius said, "Love your fellow men." In other words, benevolence is another word for love. This idea of benevolence is not foreign to the Christians or the social workers.

7.2.2 The organizational dimension

There are two aspects of the organizational dimension: the bureaucratization of social work and the professionalization of social work. The bureaucratization of social work may be attributed to the expansion of state social welfare services which ultimately led to the formation of large social service departments in the mid-twentieth century.

Soon after the end of the Second World War, Britain and other major industrialized countries of the West had already developed comprehensive systems of social security, public housing, free or subsidized education, health, and personal social services. Even though the nature and scope of existing

services and programmes differ considerably in these countries, some common themes are universal. Bill Jordan (1984), for instance, identified the following:

1. social workers are involved in the business of helping poor people get sufficient benefits to live on, by advocating or negotiating for them;
2. social workers are involved in issues about child neglect and abuse, and about juvenile delinquency and its appropriate treatment;
3. social workers tend to be concerned with issues of child health, disability and handicap and the care of the elderly; and also with the welfare of patients in mental and general hospitals;
4. social workers tend to be involved in the work of the criminal courts and the divorce courts; and with providing a welfare service in prisons; and
5. social workers tend to be involved in the problems of relationships between the state and informal, neighbourhood and community organizations, and between the state and its citizens. (pp. 6-7)

In other words, Jordan was of the opinion that:

Social work ... tends to be concerned with ... people who, for whatever reason, do not seem to "get by" on the standard ration of health care, education, housing provision or social security benefits which is available. Either they have special difficulties, or they reject what is offered, or they just do not "fit in" with the systems that are supposed to meet their needs. (p. 7)

Based on this understanding, Jordan contended that:

Social work can only be properly understood as a direct product of the social and economic structures of these nations [As] state employees in such societies, most social workers have clear legal duties to keep under control certain sections of the population which are seen as potentially subversive or threatening to the interests of the ruling class. (p. 7)

Beginning in the 1950s and increasingly in the 1960s, social workers in state agencies, with legal powers and duties, began to grow in numbers, while their counterparts in voluntary organizations declined. As it was noted by Martin Davies (1985),

The practice of social work takes place almost wholly as a result of either statutory legislation or policy decisions taken by politicians in central or local government. The functions of the social worker and the focus of his work are not self-selected, but are politically sanctioned and

authorized by the agency which employs him. To point that out may beg as many questions as it answers, but it does at least indicate the source of social work's legitimacy, and emphasizes that social workers are not, and can never be, a law unto themselves. (p. 10)

By the mid-1960s there was strong pressure to reorganize the local authority services. Critics drew attention to poor co-ordination between the various departments, both in planning and in their dealings with particular cases. The Seebohm Committee was appointed for this particular purpose. It recommended the setting up of social services departments which were in actuality, an amalgamation of children's welfare, mental health, education welfare, child guidance and the home help services.

Since the emergence of large social services departments, social welfare became increasingly a public responsibility and it began to take on more and more statutory functions. As a result of these developments, there was an outcry from the public for accountability. Increasingly, governmental units and private funding sources required that the effectiveness of service programmes be measured, and gradually, programmes which were found to be ineffective were being phased out. This demand for accountability highlights the importance of competence values in social work practice. However, this should not be taken to imply that moral values are no longer important. What it does imply is that competence values are at least as important as moral values and should, therefore, be included in the social work values

system.

Coupled with the bureaucratization of social work is its march towards professionalization. As a result of the Seebohm reorganization, the number of professional social workers in social services departments grew dramatically. This led to the formation of the British Association of Social Workers. More importantly, as Joan Cooper (1987) suggested, "they provide and guard the dominant ethic in these bureaucratic systems" (p. 59). "Without an ethical code," she continued, "it would be dangerous for social workers to exercise the powers, vested in their agencies, which permit them to intervene in the delicate relationship between state and citizen" (p. 59). In this way, the professional association echoes the demand for accountability.

What are considered as competence values in social work practice? Since social work is accountable to sponsors as well as users, competence values should reflect sponsors' demand for efficiency as well as users' demand for quality service. This leads to the subdivision of competence values into institutional values and professional values. Whereas the former responds to sponsors' demand for efficiency, the latter responds to users' demand for quality service.

7.2.3 The psychological dimension

The influence of Sigmund Freud found its way into social

work in the early years of the twentieth century when people began to question the moral basis of social work. According to Bill Jordan (1984),

Freud showed that the human heart was not an open book, and that people could not (even with goodwill and good faith) give an accurate account of the motives, still less the moral principles, which determined their actions. They were, in fact, driven by dark and irrational forces within them These instinctual drives ... were universal, and hence as much a part of the helper's psyche as that of the client. (pp. 42-3)

Freud's work forced the early social workers to re-examine their views on the important principle of self-determination. The reason for this was carefully explained by the same author who noted that:

For the Victorians, client self-determination was an absolute standard. People must be free to choose their own destinies, to make what they would of their lives by their own decisions. By the 1920s this principle had been considerably modified Self-determination became a psychological aim rather than an overriding principle. Work should be aimed at helping [to] "free" people from the irrational psychological forces or cultural blinkers that limited their capacities for true choice In the meantime, they should be to some extent protected from the

consequences of their decisions, and to some extent reminded of or forced to recognize their duties to others and to society. So the notion of client self-determination came to mean that clients should be allowed to make choices, but only ones they were deemed capable of making "sound" choices - sound by the standards of their social workers. (p. 49)

This change of view called for the development of a new, clinical approach to social work. Most individuals who became social workers in the mid-twentieth century did so for religious or humanitarian reasons. Lacking the moral underpinnings of the Victorians, they found in the psychological approach a refurbished model of perfect friendship, "a kind, enabling, uncensorious rationale for their relationships, with seemingly exciting opportunities for liberating latent or crushed human potential" (p. 56). It was also "an approach which accorded readily with the socially conservative spirit of the 1950s" (p. 56).

This refurbished model of perfect friendship was, however, not found in Freudian psychology. It was found in the person-centred approach of Carl R. Rogers and the humanistic psychology of Abraham Maslow. Freudian psychology provided us with an understanding of human pathology and how individuals could be helped. Maslow (1987), however, researched into the growth potential of the most successful human beings and came up with a description of the healthy personality and a hierarchy of their basic needs. In other words, Maslow was not interested in how

one should behave. Instead, he was more interested in what one could achieve, if given the opportunity. Hence, his hierarchy of needs serves as a useful guide for the selection of personal end-states of existence, i.e., personal values. To summarize, these needs include:

1. The physiological needs, i.e., basic goods, including those aspects of well-being which are the necessary preconditions of the performance of any and all actions (e.g., life, health, food shelter, mental equilibrium).
2. The safety needs, i.e., security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, anxiety, and chaos; need for structure, order, law, and limits; strength in the protector; and so on.
3. The belongingness and love needs, i.e., giving and receiving affection.
4. The esteem needs, i.e., a need or desire for a stable, firmly based, usually high evaluation of oneself, for self-respect or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others; the desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery and competence, confidence in the face of the world, and independence and freedom; the desire for reputation or prestige, status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention, importance, dignity, or appreciation.

5. The self-actualization needs, i.e., the need or desire for self fulfilment, namely, the tendency to become what one is potentially. (pp. 15-23)

7.2.4 The political dimension

The influence of Karl Marx found its way into social work at about the same time as Freudian psychology. While Freud led one to question one's motive behind private charity, Marx led one to question the motive behind the benign society. In the words of Jordan (1984),

Marx's work attacked the "social organism" model of society and the notion of harmonious economic progress. He revealed the hidden exploitation in capitalist relations of production, and showed how it required entrepreneurs to extract more and more unpaid labour from workers, to allow the accumulation of privately-owned means of production. The capitalist bourgeoisie and the industrial proletariat were thus classes with irreconcilable interests, and economic development could only produce a society in which these conflicts became more and more apparent. (p. 43)

One of the commonest complaints against contemporary social workers, as far as Jordan is concerned, is that they are too political. He elaborated his point by stating that "this complaint usually stems from social workers' efforts to draw attention to the plight of particular groups within their local

communities, or to the consequences of their agencies' policies" (p. 109). He added that "such actions offend people who think that social workers should be occupied in implementing policies without question - pacifying and socializing angry minorities, not stirring them to protest" (p. 109). In other words, "social workers should be seen to be officials who are outside or above politics, rather than protagonists in political conflict" (p. 109).

In total disagreement, Jordan contended that it was the duty of social workers to raise issues about the role of the state, and the relationships between officials and citizens because they formed part of the agenda of "every encounter with their clients, and every discussion with their employers" (p. 109).

This actually happened in the early years of the 1970s. Many social workers were reluctant to be seen as caseworkers; they were reluctant to accept the responsibility of keeping the socially disadvantaged groups in their place, "ensuring that they do not come to expect or demand more than the state is willing to give them, or undermine the smooth functioning of economic and social life" (p. 7), or "contributing to the 'legitimation' (i.e., making more politically acceptable) of regimes which consolidate the power of the wealthy and systematically deny the claims of the poor" (p. 8). They were keener on aspects of the job - welfare rights advocacy, provision of material resources and services - which seemed to be encouraging their clients to push the system harder, to raise their expectations, and to

require change. They also criticized and protested about their own conditions of work, and the way the departments operated. They joined trade unions, and emphasized their common links with welfare workers in other public services, who occupied similar roles. In other words, they chose to redefine social work and its purpose from a socialist, rather than a capitalist perspective.

The politicization of social work did not end with the emergence of the socialist alternative. Since the Conservatives returned to power in the 1979 election, we began to see the emergence of some groups who had an interest in maintaining the stance of detached professional neutrality. Martin Davies (1985), for instance, noted that:

In so far as there are common elements in social work, they are best described by the general notion of maintenance: society maintaining itself in a relatively stable state by making provision for and managing people in positions of severe weakness, stress or vulnerability; and society maintaining its own members by virtue of social work's respect for the client, optimism for the future, and faith in the essential, or at least potential unity of society.
(p. 4)

His comment is based on the assumption that the practice of social work takes place almost wholly as a result of either statutory legislation or policy decisions taken by politicians in

central or local government. The functions of the social worker and the focus of his work are not self-selected, but are politically sanctioned and authorised by the agency which employs him. In other words, in view of the source of social work's legitimacy, social workers are not, and can never be, a law unto themselves. (p. 10) The caring, the counselling, the facilitating, the gatekeeping, the controlling, the preventive strategy all are designed to serve equally the interests of the state and the client. When those interests conflict, it becomes a matter for law and justice or politics. The social worker starts and ends with the assumption that synchronization and synthesis are possible - even in an imperfect world.

Davies is certainly not alone in maintaining a conservative stance. Cooper (1987), for instance, noted that:

Although social work has always articulated its perceptions of social need and been associated with social reform, it claims neither the knowledge nor the role to reform society politically or economically. To claim such a role would be impractical, diversionary and a desertion of the essential function of responding to people undergoing social stress. (p. 63)

Patrick Minford (1987) was even more forceful when he contended that what really matters is the view of the typical British. In his words:

Ultimately they will decide what is done. What professionals, such as economists or social workers, have a duty to do is to advise their fellow nationals about the most efficient ways to achieve what they want. Such professional advisers should not let their preferences intrude; though they are of course free as citizens to try to persuade others to share their preferences, they should try to separate that activity from their activity as professional advisers. (p. 71)

What could have been the ideological base of the political dimension in social work? Could it be attributed to the political ideologies of the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the Socialists? Central to the ideological differences is their conception of the outcome of society. In other words, they are concerned with social values, a subgroup within end-states of existence.

7.3 Values in Social Work Literature

Within the social work profession, Charles S. Levy (1973) is particularly noted for his work on the Value Base of Social Work. It is, therefore, appropriate to use this work as a starting point for discussion. In his view, social work values may be conceived along three basic dimensions which would account for the major value orientations which are - or ought to be - shared by all social workers and related by them to all elements of their professional practice. These are: (1) values as preferred

conceptions of people, (2) values as preferred outcomes for people, and (3) values as preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people.

In introducing the first basic dimension, Levy noted that "social workers share - or ought to share - a common conception of man, a conception which orders their responses to people, their regard for people, and their concern for people".

Relating to the second basic dimension, Levy is of the opinion that if values are to constitute a comprehensible and communicable base of social work, it has to be related to what is optimally or minimally envisaged for all men and women, not necessarily because it is demonstrably better or more effective for some particular purpose, but because it is "right" - that is, because it is something to which social workers must regard themselves as committed. Self-realization, self-actualization, the equalization of opportunities for all regardless of cultural or social impediments and constructions - all of these and other outcomes may be elaborated as ends which all social workers may be presumed to share. The positions of social workers should be quite predictable on the basis of these elaborated values - certainly in their professional capacities whether in relation to clients or in collective association with fellow social workers.

Finally, the third basic dimension, according to Levy, deals with the way in which social workers would agree that people ought to be treated, either in practice or in general. This

value context is also likely to conflict with cultural and subcultural premises. Social workers, for example, are expected to treat people as equals and as autonomous even, at times, at the expense of a more practical alternative for the clients themselves - as in the choice between sustaining clients' dependence in order to attain a more practical outcome for them, and facilitating clients' independence though it may lead them down the primrose or some equivalent path.

How clients and others are to be treated becomes, in this value context, not something that necessarily works better than other things, but rather something that social workers might concede to be "right" and hence an obligation or commitment of social workers. The concept of participatory democracy, for example, has generated considerable conflict among social workers as well as others.

As it is expected, social workers believe that all people should be treated with respect and dignity, should have maximum opportunity to determine the direction of their lives, should be urged and helped to interact with other people to build a society responsive to the needs of everyone, and should be recognized as unique individuals rather than put into stereotypes because of some particular characteristic or life experience. Methods of social work practice reflect this. Many of these instrumental values are presented in the professional codes of ethics.

As it is mentioned previously, preferred conceptions of

people are not considered as values in our definition of the term. They are merely beliefs upon which values are derived. On the other hand, preferred outcomes for people may be considered as the equivalent of terminal values and preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people may be considered as the equivalent of instrumental values.

What are the preferred conceptions of man? In the opinion of this researcher, there are four conceptions of man which are conceived as preferable in social work practice. First of all, practically all social workers believe, as Levy does, in the inherent dignity and worth of the individual. The British Association of Social Workers (1977), for instance, included this in its code of ethics, saying that "basic to the profession of social work is the recognition of the value and dignity of every human being irrespective of origin, status, sex, age, belief or contribution to society". This belief is echoed by Dean H. Hepworth and Jo Ann Larsen (1986) when they noted that "all human beings have intrinsic worth, irrespective of their past or present behaviour, beliefs, lifestyle, race, or status in life." As for Helen Northen (1982), she is of the opinion that social workers believe, first and foremost, in the inherent dignity and worth of the individual. In her own words, she stated that "people have worth and dignity simply because they are human beings" (p. 27). In other words, the acceptance of this belief is unconditional.

Secondly, closely linked to this belief is the equally

important belief in the uniqueness of the individual. Charles Zastrow (1989), for instance, is of the opinion that the value to which the social work profession most frequently lays claim to is that of individualization. In his own words, he noted that:

Every human being is unique in a variety of ways - value system, personality, goals in life, financial resources, emotional and physical strengths, personal concerns, past experiences, peer pressures, emotional reactions, self-identity, family relationships, and deviant behavioural patterns.

What is meant by individualization? Felix P. Biestek (1961) explained that:

Individualization is the recognition and understanding of each client's unique qualities and the differential use of principles and methods in assisting each toward a better adjustment. Individualization is based upon the right of human beings to be individuals and to be treated not just as a human being but as this human being with his personal differences. (p. 25)

The practical implication of this belief is underscored by Hepworth and Larsen (1986). They noted that:

To affirm the uniqueness of another person, social workers must not only be committed to the value just discussed but

must also enter the other person's world, endeavouring to understand how that person experiences life, including thoughts, feelings, world view, daily stresses, joys, hopes, longings, disappointments, hurts, and all of the myriad facts of human experience. Only through attempting to walk in the shoes of another person can the social worker gain a full appreciation of the rich and complex individuality of that person.

Thirdly, a belief in individual worth and dignity also leads social workers to believe that every individual has the capacity to grow and change and to develop solutions to his difficulties. Biestek (1967), for instance, noted that:

Social workers believe that man has an innate thrust and an obligation toward the realization of his potentials. Each person is endowed by nature with potentialities and powers ... in the physiological, intellectual, emotional, social, esthetic, and spiritual areas, and a drive toward change which can make life more fulfilling. In other words, each person has the capacity to grow and change and to see and develop solutions to his difficulties, as well as the right and capacity to exercise free choice responsibly.

This belief is also supported by Martin Davies (1985) when he stated that:

Most social workers would recognize and support Julian

Huxley's assertion (1961) that "existence can be improved, that vast untapped possibilities can be increasingly realised, that greater fulfilment can replace frustration"; they might disagree on the kinds of effort required of the social worker to activate the client's and society's potential, but a fundamental belief in the capacity of man to improve his own circumstances without necessarily doing so at the expense of others is central to the social worker's philosophy of practice. (p. 4)

Finally, practically all social workers contribute to the belief that there is interdependence between individuals in this society and that they have social responsibility for one another. In emphasizing this, Northen (1982) noted that:

People are not in complete control of their lives; neither are they simply the victims of external circumstances. They are neither dependent nor independent beings. Rather, they are interdependent one upon another for survival and for fulfillment of their needs. They interact with other people and with the social and political institutions of the society in which they live; they both influence and are influenced by others. Mutual responsibility supplants the concepts of rugged individualism. A person is and should be an interacting member of society, both giving to, and receiving benefits from, others to the extent of his capacities and the opportunities that are available to him. (p. 28)

What are the preferred outcomes for people? Based on the preferred conceptions of man outlined above, an essential attribute of a "good" society must be the realization of the full potential of each individual and the assumption of his social responsibility through active participation in society. In other words, each person has the right to self-fulfillment, deriving from his inherent capacity and thrust toward that goal. Each person also has the obligation, as a member of society to seek ways of self-fulfillment that contribute to the common good. Similarly, society has the obligation to facilitate the self-fulfillment of the individual and the right to enrichment through the contribution of its individual members.

However, for the harmonious development of his potential every person requires socially provided and socially safeguarded opportunities for satisfying his basic needs in the physical, psychological, economic, cultural, esthetic, and spiritual realms. Therefore, to permit both self-realization and contribution to society by the individual, social organization must make available socially sanctioned and socially provided devices for needs satisfaction as wide in range, variety, and quality as the general welfare allows.

In other words, people should have access to the resources they need to accomplish life tasks, alleviate distress, and realize their own aspirations and values. In addition, people should have equal opportunity to participate in the molding of society. This implies that society must provide resources and

services to help people meet their needs and to avoid such problems as hunger, inadequate education, discrimination, illness without care, and inadequate housing.

How can social work make a contribution to making these preferred outcomes for people a reality? Opinions in relation to this question are divided among social workers. Clinical social work (1982), for instance, is concerned with the provision of a wide spectrum of services which has as its responsibility the promotion of opportunities for the enhancement of potentials and for the prevention of problems. It has a responsibility also for the remediation of difficulties and conflicts that have developed. Hence, direct services to individuals and families may be developmental, preventive, or remedial in nature. (p. 15)

Along the same line of thinking, the overall objectives of social work are described by Hepworth and Larsen (1986) as following:

1. to enhance the capacity of individuals, groups, or communities for social functioning and to improve the quality of life for everyone by working toward the enhancement of the social and physical environment
2. to reduce client's fears and inhibitions or to help them gain interpersonal skills (resources) to reduce the mismatch between their clients' needs and environmental resources.

3. to promote social justice, for if resources and opportunities are to be available to all members of society, laws, governmental policies, and social programmes must assure equal access of citizens to resources and opportunities.

Davies (1985) is, however, more pragmatic. In *The Essential Social Worker*, he commented that:

Contemporary social work is not overwhelmingly concerned with treatment in a quasi-medical or psychotherapeutic sense. There is a strong emphasis on counselling and verbal support, but there is also a clear recognition of the responsibilities that society invests in the social worker to operate on its behalf in a preventive or restrictive fashion. A major task is to enable the citizen to retain his independence in the community for as long as possible, and to superintend his movement into or out of institutional care in a way that serves both the client's and the community's long-term interests. (p. 10)

If Davies has limited the focus of social work attention, community social work has certainly broadened it. The *Barclay Report* (1982) begins with this comment:

Too much is generally expected of social workers. We load upon them unrealistic expectations and we then complain when they do not live up to them. Social work is a relatively

young profession. It has grown rapidly as the flow of legislation has greatly increased the range and complexity of its work. In order to cope with demands which Parliament has imposed on social service authorities, large departments have grown up in which social workers find it difficult to come to terms with the complex pressures which surround them. There is confusion about the direction in which they are going and unease about what they should be doing and the way in which they are organized and deployed. When things go wrong the media have tended to blame them because it is assumed that their job is to care for people so as to prevent troubles arising. They operate uneasily on the frontier between what appears to be almost limitless needs on the one hand and an inadequate pool of resources to satisfy those needs on the other. (p. vii)

To prevent this from happening, the Report contended that if social needs of citizens were to be met in the last years of the twentieth century, the personal social services must develop a close working partnership with citizens focusing more closely on the community and its strengths. In its view, a move towards community social work was the start of such a development. (p. 198)

To clarify its point, the Report added that:

The individual or family with problems is and remains the primary concern of personal social services agencies and the

amelioration or prevention of individual or family problems is and remains the reason for their existence; but the focus will be upon individuals and families in the communities or social networks of which they are part.

Thus for community social workers, a social problem is no longer located in an individual person, or individual social unit such as a family, but in the patterns of relationship which define the social situation of that individual. (p. 20)

To justify its viewpoint, the Report contended that:

Sharing social caring is a way both of promoting better care and more care in the community and of distributing the burden of caring for the disadvantaged more fairly. At present, as we have noted, it often falls most heavily upon close relatives. A partnership can also allow services to be provided in ways which contribute to the feelings of self-respect and well-being of those who receive them, as well as using scarce and expensive resources to their best effect. (pp. 202-3)

Finally, Jeffry Galper (1980) comes up with a radically different approach. In his view, radical social work is social work that contributes to building a movement for the transformation to socialism by its efforts in and through the social services. This definition of radical social work takes into account the fact that radical social workers are both

radicals and social workers. Their political commitments are socialist and their specific occupational category is social worker. According to this definition those who practice radical social work are those who struggle for socialism from their position within the social services. They identify social work clearly within a concern for the development of a socialist movement, building toward the creation of a socialist society.

What are the purposes of social work? Based on what we have discussed about the preferred conceptions of outcomes for people, we can identify the following purposes:

1. to improve the quality of life for everyone by working toward the enhancement of the social and physical environment;
2. to contribute to building a movement for the transformation to socialism by its efforts in and through the social services;
3. to promote social justice by ensuring that resources and opportunities are available to all members of society;
4. to enhance the capacity of individuals, groups, or communities for social functioning;
5. to support and strengthen the informal networks, to care for the carers;

6. to reduce client's fears and inhibitions or to help them gain interpersonal skills (resources) to reduce the mismatch between their clients' needs and environmental resources; and

7. to enable the client to retain his independence in the community for as long as possible, and to superintend his movement into or out of institutional care in a way that serves both the client's and the community's long-term interest.

These purposes include a wide spectrum of services to safeguard the continuation of the existing system, to help develop a better system, and to enhance the capacity of individuals, groups, and communities for the satisfaction of their survival needs and growth needs.

What are the preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people? In social work literature one can find these values embedded in the discussion of the characteristics of the helping person and the helping relationship.

In *The Casework Relationship*, for instance, Felix P. Biestek (1957) noted that "there is a pattern of basic emotions and attitudes that are common, in varying degrees of intensity, to all people who need help, however temporarily, from others." (p. 14) Based on these basic emotions and attitudes, he came up with a list of seven principles of action or qualities of a good

relationship. These qualities are: (1) individualization, (2) purposeful expression of feelings, (3) controlled emotional involvement, (4) acceptance, (5) non-judgmental attitude, (6) client self-determination, and (7) confidentiality. (p. 17) These principles have been widely quoted in the social work literature ever since its first appearance.

Another important source on the characteristics of a helping relationship comes from the work of Carl R. Rogers, Robert R. Carkhuff and his colleagues. Rogers has long postulated that there are three conditions that must be present in order for a climate to be growth-promoting: genuineness, unconditional positive regard, and empathic understanding. Moreover, this postulate has been confirmed at a later stage by Carkhuff and his colleagues. In their view, empathy, genuineness, and respect (i.e., unconditional positive regard) are among the critical ingredients of effective interpersonal relationship.

The work of Alan Keith-Lucas (1972) on Giving and Taking Help is another important source. According to Keith-Lucas, the characteristics of a helping person include courage and humility.

Finally, Davies (1985) is of the opinion that for all trainees and for the majority of serving social workers, there are basic essentials that have to be aspired to and achieved. They are: (1) warmth, (2) efficiency, (3) sensitivity, (4) persuasiveness, (5) empathy, (6) awareness, (7) knowledge, (8) practicality, and (9) genuineness. (p. 186)

After going through the characteristics of a helping person and of a helping relationship, what values can be obtained?

The most important value in social work must be "respect for persons". Respect for person is basically a value highly regarded in Western Society as a whole and social work is not alone in considering it to be an overriding commitment. Elaborating on this, Northen (1982) noted that:

Each person should be accepted as he is and treated as a whole person in a process of development. He should be treated with respect, in spite of his likenesses or differences in relation to other individuals and population groups. He should have freedom to express himself without fear of negative sanctions. He should have the right to privacy; information given by or about him should be treated with confidence or given to others only with his informed consent. (pp. 27-8)

Furthermore, she added that:

Social justice is a person's due. Since all people are worthy, social justice is due each one. Everyone should have the right to civil liberties and equality of opportunity without discrimination because of race, ethnicity, social class, religion, age, or sex. A person should have access to resources that are essential to meet his basic needs, not only for survival, but also for the

development of his potential. He has a right to make his own decisions and to participate in making group decisions, within the limits imposed by his particular culture and status and with regard to the rights of others. (p. 28)

However, she cautioned that:

The right to self-determination is not absolute. It needs to be reinterpreted to encompass certain rights of families and other social networks which, in many cultures, take precedence over rights of individuals to make certain decisions There is a delicate balance between individual and group welfare. (p. 28)

The ideal characteristics of a client-worker relationship, according to Northen, are accurate empathy, nonpossessive warmth or acceptance, and genuineness (pp. 97-8). Many other helping professionals with different theoretical orientations also agree about the importance of these qualities. Hepworth and Larsen (1986), for instance, noted that:

As they perform their responsibilities, social workers should affirm the dignity and self-worth of those whom they serve. Universally accepted among the helping professions, this value embodies several related concepts, which have been variously denoted as unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1957), nonpossessive warmth (Truax, 1963), acceptance (Biestek, 1957), nonjudgmental attitude (Biestek,

1957), and respect (Gazda, et. al., 1973; Hammond, et. al., 1977).

In other words, a number of values can be derived from the value of respect, including acceptance, empathy, genuineness, and the nonjudgmental attitude.

7.4 Values Selected for the Surveys

The values of social work can now be listed. They are divided into the following groups:

7.4.1 Social values

The first group of values we have to discuss is social values, a subgroup within the end-states of existence. It refers to one's conception of a good society. It relates to the "social" purposes of social work. At the present stage of its development, with less than ten years before the lease expires in 1997, Hong Kong is confronted with a choice between maintaining the status quo or moving towards a more democratic society. It is therefore essential to include values which reflect both of these positions: a more conservative, individualistic orientation and a more radical, collectivistic orientation. In the case of the first position, named conservative values, we have included freedom, peace, and progress. In the case of the second position, named socialist values, we have included democracy, equality, and fraternity.

The idea of democracy must have sunk deep in the mind of the people in Hong Kong since the massacre in Beijing on June 4, 1989. In this study, democracy is used to represent democratic autonomy. Justification for democratic autonomy is based on the principle that individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others. (Held, 1987, p. 290) For the purpose of this study, democracy is defined as a sense of involvement, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to take part in the governing process which affects them.

Equality is used in this study to represent circumstantial equality, i.e., equality of all the external circumstances under which human beings live and act and whatever factors impinge upon their conduct and their welfare. There are two types of circumstantial equality or inequality: equality or inequality of condition, and equality or inequality of opportunity. The equalities to which we are all entitled, by virtue of being human, are equalities of condition - of status, treatment, and opportunity. (Adler, 1981, pp. 155-173) For the purpose of this study, equality is defined as a sense of fairness, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to equal treatment and an equal share of societal resources.

Fraternity is the least defined of the socialist values. According to Bernard Crick (1987), fraternity must involve, "firstly, common tasks and activities, and secondly an exultant recognition of diversity of character" (p. 100). Elaborating on this, he claims that fraternity is an attitude of mind and one associated with activity. It arises from people actually working together towards common ends. If we are to experience genuine fraternity we must take each other as we find each other. Fraternity must accept all people as they are. By all means seek to involve them in common tasks; and to influence them; but then seek neither to condemn their inadequacy, nor be jealous of their superiority, not avoid being influenced ourselves. Fraternity is here defined as a sense of brotherhood, resulting from society's commitment to promote mutual help and social responsibility.

The idea of freedom is not new to social workers in Hong Kong. According to Isaiah Berlin (1958), two concepts of freedom or liberty can be identified: positive freedom and negative freedom. In his view, the negative sense of freedom is involved in the answer to the question "What is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?" (pp. 121-122) On the other hand, the positive sense of freedom is involved in the answer to the question "What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?" (p. 122) In this study, none of these definitions will be used. Instead, the idea of circumstantial freedom is adopted for use in this

study. According to Mortimer J. Adler (1958), there are three types of freedom: circumstantial freedom, acquired freedom, and natural freedom. (p. 107) Our circumstantial freedom consists in our being able, under favourable circumstances, to act as we wishes for our own individual good as we see it. Our acquired freedom consists in our being able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as we ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature. Our natural freedom consists in our being able, by a power inherent in human nature, to change our own character creatively by deciding for ourselves what we shall do or shall become. (p. 606) In another context, Adler (1981) produced another definition for circumstantial freedom, saying that our circumstantial freedom consists in our being able to do as we please - our ability to carry out in overt action the decisions we have reached, to do as we wish for our individual good as we see it, rightly or wrongly. (pp. 140-154) Based on this understanding, freedom is here defined as a sense of autonomy, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to live or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly.

Stability and progress have been included as the preconditions for success in the Sino-British agreement. It is, therefore, pertinent to include both in this study. Peace can be defined negatively as the absence of war and the threat of war, and positively as the presence of a sense of social harmony. For the purpose of this study, peace is defined as a sense of social harmony, resulting from society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain order and stability, and to enforce law. Progress, on

the other hand, is defined as a sense of development, resulting from society's commitment to improve the quality of life of everyone in society.

7.4.2 Personal values

The importance of personal values may be attributed to the psychological dimension of social work. It relates to the "personal" purposes of social work. Since the beginning of social work training in Hong Kong, Freudian psychology and humanistic psychology form an essential component of the social work curriculum. Under such an influence, the importance of Maslow can hardly be underestimated. Besides, personal values are clearly related to the satisfaction of human needs. Thus, based on his work, two types of values have been selected: (1) survival values, including comfort, love, and security, and (2) self-actualizing values, including happiness, power, and pride.

Comfort is an extension of the physiological needs which appear in the hierarchy of needs developed by Maslow. According to Maslow, physiological needs are the needs for food, water, air, sleep, and sex. Their satisfaction is essential for survival. (Schultz, 1977, p. 62) Charlotte Towle (1965), a prominent social work educator, noted the need to be well fed, properly clothed, and adequately housed as a basis for both physical and mental health. (p. 48) Much more recently, Frederic C. Reamer (1982) also noted that the possession of basic goods (for example, life, health, food, shelter, mental equilibrium) is

the necessary preconditions of the performance of any and all actions. (p. 71) For the purpose of this study, the term comfort is preferred and is defined as a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from one's possession of basic goods essential for quality living.

Love is derived from Maslow's belonging and love needs. According to Maslow, "we may join a group or club, assuming its values and characteristics or wearing its uniform in order to feel a sense of belonging", and "we satisfy our love needs by establishing an intimate, caring relationship with another person, or with people in general". He added that "in these relationships it is just as important to give love as to receive it". (p. 63) Similarly, Towle noted "the child's security depends wholly on being loved and cared for by adults so that the wish to be cared for is the central issue of his life". (p. 50) For the purpose of this study, love is defined as a feeling of being accepted, deriving from one's ability to give affection to and receive affection from significant others in one's life.

Security is derived from the safety needs which appeared in Maslow's hierarchy of human needs. According to Maslow, these include needs for security, stability, protection, order, and freedom from fear and anxiety. He believed that we all need some degree of routine and predictability and that uncertainty is difficult to tolerate. (Schultz, 1977, p. 62) These needs are also considered to be essential by Towle. She noted that "the most basic impulse in any organism is the impulse to survive",

and "the need to feel secure - that is, safe as an assurance of survival - is fundamental". (p. 49) As far as Reamer is concerned, security is one of the basic goods. (p. 71) For the purpose of this study, security is defined a feeling of inner harmony, deriving from the absence of fear of death and violence and undertainty of future.

Happiness is derived from Maslow's need for self-actualization. According to Maslow, self-actualization is defined as the supreme development and use of all our abilities, the fulfillment of all our qualities and capacities. In other words, we have become what we have the potential to become. (p. 64) For the purpose of this study, happiness is the term used to represent self-actualization. It is defined as a feeling of contentment, deriving from one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one hopes to obtain, or achieve.

Power and pride are derived from Maslow's esteem needs. Maslow distinguished two types of esteem needs: esteem derived from others and self-esteem. When we feel a sense of internal or self-esteem, we are confident and secure in ourselves; we feel worthy and adequate. When we lack self-esteem we feel inferior, discouraged, and helpless in dealing with life. In order to have a genuine sense of self-esteem, we must know ourselves well and be able to assess objectively our virtues and weaknesses. We cannot esteem ourselves if we do not know who and what we are. (pp. 63-64) For the purpose of this study, power is the term used to represent self-esteem. It is defined as a feeling of

self in control, deriving from one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's resources to cope with one's problems.

Esteem from others is primary; apparently it is difficult for us to think well of ourselves unless we are assured that others think well of us. Externally derived esteem can be based on reputation, admiration, status, fame, prestige, or social success, all characteristics of how others think of us and react to us. There are many ways of getting others to esteem us; we can display our wealth and importance through the kind of car we drive, the neighbourhood we live in, our style of dress, or in admirable and competent behaviour. (p. 63) For the purpose of this study, pride is the term used to represent this esteem from other. It is defined as a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving from society's and significant other's recognition of one's contribution to work, family, and society.

7.4.3 Moral values

The importance of moral values may be attributed to the moral dimension in social work. Even in Hong Kong, before the professionalization and bureaucratization of social work, the responsibility for service delivery falls upon the shoulder of dedicated persons whose devote their life to serving the people in need. What motivates them in the endeavour must be nothing other than their moral conscience which has its roots either in Christianity or in Confucian teachings.

It is extremely difficult to distinguish Christian values from Confucian values. Many of these values can be included in both categories. Instead, for the purpose of this study, moral values are divided into two groups: (1) moral virtues, including benevolence, courage, and prudence, (2) moral principles, including honesty, justice, and loyalty.

Benevolence is defined as having a compassion for the suffering of others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, forgiving, and accepting. It is considered as equivalent to the concept of acceptance. According to Biestek (1961),

Acceptance is a principle of action wherein the caseworker perceives and deals with the client as he really is, including his strengths and weaknesses, his congenial and uncongenial qualities, his positive and negative feelings, his constructive and destructive attitudes and behaviour, maintaining all the while a sense of the client's innate dignity and personal worth. (p. 72)

As a client moves toward being able to accept his own experience, he also moves toward the acceptance of the experience of others. He values and appreciates both his own experience and that of others for what it is. To quote Maslow regarding his self-actualizing individuals: "One does not complain about water because it is wet, nor about rocks because they are hard As the child looks out upon the world with wide uncritical and innocent eyes, simply noting and observing what is the case,

without either arguing the matter or demanding that it be otherwise, so does the self-actualizing person look upon human nature both in himself and in others."

A benevolent person has a deep desire to increase people's freedom of choice and control over their own lives. A deep desire to increase the ability of people to choose for themselves and to control their own lives is an absolutely essential quality of a helping person. Effective helping relationships simply cannot be created and sustained without this desire. Basically, the desire is a commitment to oneself rather than to others because it must be our desire, be related to us, and be a commitment to ourselves. It is this commitment that gives one the courage to know oneself and the willingness to risk oneself in the service of others.

Courage is defined as a readiness to take a stand on controversies. It requires one to take risks, to withstand criticism and to endure danger or hardship. According to Alan Keith-Lucas (1972), the social worker needs the courage to confront clients with the reality of their problems, to risk failure in pursuing his objectives, to cope with unpredictable situations, and to face criticism and blame for one's actions. It takes great courage - not the courage of the unaware and insensitive but the courage of the person who is thoroughly aware yet does what one knows needs to be done - to take risks with oneself and others that social work relationships inevitably demand. Workers must be willing to assume the risks of failing

to help, of becoming involved in difficult, emotionally charged situations that they do not know how to handle, of having their comfortable world and ways of operating upset, of being blamed and abused, of being constantly involved in the unpredictable, and perhaps of being physically threatened. "It is only the person who can be afraid and not be afraid of this fear who is in a position to help." (Keith-Lucas, 1972, p. 100)

Prudence is here defined as a disposition to act cautiously. It requires one to be broadminded and to exercise judgment based on knowledge and consultation. Prudence can be discussed in relation to the nonjudgmental attitude. According to Biestek (1961),

The nonjudgmental attitude is a quality of the casework relationship; it is based on a conviction that the casework function excludes assigning guilt or innocence, or degree of client responsibility for causation of the problems or needs, but does include making evaluative judgments about the attitudes, standards, or actions of the client; the attitude, which involves both thought and feeling elements, is transmitted to the client. (p. 90)

Honesty is here defined as a commitment to truthfulness in dealing with others. It requires one to seek and tell the truth. According to Ranieri, if we want to develop a sense of honesty, we must start by being honest with ourselves. This value can be discussed in relation to truth-telling and promise-keeping, and

the concept of confidentiality.

Justice is here defined as a disposition to act with fairness. It requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is right and what is wrong. According to Ranieri (1983), justice demanded that all be treated with respect and concern. In order to live a life of justice, we must first develop an awareness of the rights of others. This means that we will have to keep an open mind. There are many people who suffer in our society, and it is easy to fall into the trap of passing judgment on them. But as social workers we are supposed to be concerned about providing all people with their rights, and not be making judgments. Working for justice requires a certain amount of humility. There is so much to do in this world in terms of justice that we can actually try to do too much. We cannot do everything, and we have to admit that. We will be more effective if we attempt a task that we can handle, instead of trying to go off into a hundred different directions all at once and wearing ourselves out as a result. Justice can be discussed in relation to the problem of ethical dilemmas.

According to Josiah Royce (1924), loyalty refers to "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause" (pp. 16-17). In addition, he added that:

A man is loyal when, first, he has some cause to which he is loyal; when, secondly, he willingly and thoroughly devotes himself to this cause; and when, thirdly, he expresses his

devotion in some sustained and practical way, by acting steadily in the service of his cause. (p. 17)

Even though the definition of loyalty is written in 1924, it is still helpful for the purpose of this study. In the case of social work, we require our practitioners to retain the service orientation which has remained with us, and with other helping professions, for almost a century. Loyalty is thus defined in this study as a commitment to serve in the interest of others. It requires one to remain faithful to one's promises.

7.4.4 Competence values

The importance of competence values may be attributed to the rapid expansion and bureaucratization of social work in Hong Kong since the early nineteen-seventies. This makes it possible for social work to shift its focus from remedial services to services which are preventive and developmental in nature. This implies that the recipients of social services are no longer restricted to low-income families. For services such as family counselling, family life education, and school social work, the recipients often come from average income families. Since the need for many of these services are not as pressing as it used to be, the public begins to question the effectiveness of such services and the necessity of finding them on a long-term basis. In response to this demand for accountability, the social work profession has no alternative but to increase its competence to satisfy the demand of funding bodies and recipients of services.

Competence values may be subdivided into two categories: professional values and institutional values. There seems to be general consensus so far as professional competence is concerned. As for values representing institutional competence, they are rarely mentioned in the social work literature. Davies (1985) is perhaps one of the few who has included efficiency, persuasiveness, and practicality as essential attributes of a social worker. (p. 186) However, in a close examination of the Barclay Report (1982), it is discovered that institutional competence can be organized around the concept of partnership. The meaning of partnership will be discussed later in relation to the term cooperation. For the time being, it is sufficient to point out that in this study, ambition, cooperation, and leadership has been included to represent values in this group. Briefly stated, ambition relates to a quest for successful completion of a case; cooperation is linked to the effective functioning of a team formed within an organization or by members of different organizations; leadership refers to one's ability to influence other's behaviour towards the attainment of a goal.

Authenticity is here defined as an absence of pretence. It requires one to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one's self and consistent in one's thought and action. It has often been discussed in relation to many other concepts, including congruence, genuineness, self-awareness, self-confidence, self-knowledge, self-love, and self-respect. What it really means to be authentic is to be sensitive to one's own internal workings, to be involved with oneself and one's needs, thoughts,

commitments, and values, yet to be able to stand back enough from oneself to question the meaning of what is going on. This implies that the helping person must take a helping attitude toward oneself as well as toward others. There are other qualities associated with the ones already mentioned. Self-love and love of others, self-respect and respect for others, self-confidence and confidence in others, acceptance of self and acceptance of others, faith in self and faith in others develop together or not at all. So the capacity to observe self probably requires the ability to care deeply about oneself and one's goals, to respect and to believe in oneself, and yet to be able to stand back and observe oneself as an important piece of complex activity of helping.

Rogers explains this clearly. He noted that:

"To be that self which one truly is" implies that the individual moves toward living in an open, friendly, close relationship to his own experience. This does not occur easily. Maslow, in his study of what he calls self-actualizing people, has noted this same characteristic. Speaking of these people, he says, "Their ease of penetration to reality, their closer approach to an animal-like or child-like acceptance and spontaneity imply a superior awareness of their own impulses, their own desires, opinions, and subjective reactions in general. This greater openness to what goes on within is associated with a similar openness to experiences of external reality. Maslow might

be speaking of client I have known when he says, "self-actualized people have a wonderful capacity to appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy, however, stale these experiences may be for other people.

Empathy is here defined as a capacity to perceive and communicate, accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of clients and the meaning of those feelings.

Our method of sharing ourselves completely with others are awkward and imperfect even when we are committed to that sharing. For troubled people the ability to share themselves and their situation is incredibly more difficult because of all their feelings about their problems and about themselves as people with problems, and because of the threat of the unknown in the helping process. Therefore, the worker who would help needs a capacity for feeling and sensing - for knowing in internal ways - the inner state of others without specific clues. This quality probably depends on one's ability to observe even small movements and changes in others and to make almost instantaneous inferences from them, to put oneself into the feeling and thinking of others, and to avoid stereotypes. It is probably closely related to one's capacity to be open to the new and to one's readiness for change.

Respect is here defined as a willingness to recognize other's right to self-determination, confidentiality and privacy,

and ability to be rule-following.

Respect for persons is an expression of value at a high level of abstraction, but within social work it is best regarded as an attempt to sum up the more specific attitudes and principles which social workers hold. Stated more fully the principle is: "Persons ought to be respected as ends." The questions therefore arises as to what it is about a person that demands respect, and what is the nature of the respect which is demanded. It could be argued that there are two human capacities which above all others demand respect because they are of the very essence of human personality - the capacities to be self-determining, or to be able to choose and carry out one's chosen actions, and to be able to formulate and follow rules or general social norms.

In other words, the attitude of respect is that which it is morally appropriate to adopt towards persons conceived as self-determining and rule-following beings. To respect a person as a self-determining being is to assist him in the pursuit of the actions and policies which he desires to implement, or to try to remove the impediments, social, personal, or economic, to the realization of his aspirations. To respect a person as a rule-following being involves a more complex social awareness. It involves, first of all, the awareness that someone else may hold values or standards which differ from one's own, and that while it may be morally acceptable to use rational argument to try to get him to change his mind on these, it is morally wrong, an

affront to his dignity as a person, to try to undermine his beliefs by non-rational means, such as the exercise of power, ridicule or the like. Secondly, to respect a person as a rule-following being involves showing an awareness that certain rules or values apply to all alike, social workers and clients, and that however much a social worker may sympathise with a client's problems or wish to aid him in certain purposes, he morally cannot do so at the expense of the social norms which apply to all. To sum up, we can say that respect is an attitude the ingredients of which are active sympathy with another person's aims and also awareness of his and of those of society at large, and that this attitude is morally appropriate if we regard persons as essentially self-determining and rule-following beings.

Social workers believe that clients have the right to express their own opinions and to act upon them, as long as by so doing clients do not infringe upon the rights of others. There are four points that should be made in operationalizing the principle of client self-determination.

First, self-determination implies that clients should be made aware that there are alternatives for resolving the personal or social problems they face. Self-determination involves having clients make decisions; that is, making a choice selected from several courses of action. If there is only one course of action, there is no choice and therefore clients would not have the right of self-determination.

Second, self-determination means that the client, not the worker, is the chief problem solver. Workers need to recognize that it is the client who owns the problem, and therefore has the chief responsibility to resolve the problem.

Third, self-determination does not prohibit or restrict social workers from offering an opinion or making a suggestion. In fact, social workers have an obligation to share their viewpoints with clients.

Fourth, client self-determination is possible and should be encouraged even in areas where the social worker has the additional function to protect society.

Another way in which social workers convey respect and affirm the worth of clients is by preserving the confidentiality of private information disclosed by the client during the course of the helping process. Confidentiality is the implicit or explicit agreement between a professional and a client to maintain the private nature of information about the client. An absolute implementation of this principle means that disclosures made to the professional will not be shared with anyone else, except when authorized by the client in writing or required by law. Confidentiality is vital to the helping process for practical, ethical, and legal reasons, and practitioners must therefore be knowledgeable about the various facets of this critical value. (p. 67)

According to Alan C. Kerckhoff (1974), the term ambition refers to "one's willingness to work to achieve goals" (p. 4). Moreover, he added that "ambition involves more than a wish for a desirable goal; it requires that the individual believe he has a reasonable prospect of attaining it" (p. 5). Although some goals may be highly desirable in the eyes of others, for the purpose of this study, the goal of the social worker is to be competent in service devlivery, thus enabling him to be effective in helping, to advance in knowledge, and to gain promotion. With these goals in mind, ambition is here defined as a commitment to work, to be productive, and to advance in knowledge and position. It requires dedication and hard work.

Cooperation is defined as a willingness to work as a member of the team and to pursuit the team's goals. It requires one to be rule-following.

The term cooperation is closely related to partnership. In the Barclay Report (1982), it was stated that community social work depends upon an attitude of mind in all social workers which regards members of the public as partners in the provision of care. Members of the Working Party believe that clients, relations, neighbours and volunteers become partners with the social worker in developing and providing social care networks.

Partnership is a key element in community social work. The identification of needs, resources, methods, priorities and a plan of action will all come through these reciprocal

relationships. This partnership goes beyond consultation to shared decision making based on a recognition of who can offer what to the resolution of social problems. Accountability and responsibility for work also needs to be shared within these relationships.

According to John P. Kotter (1988), the term "leadership" is used in two basic ways in everyday conversation:

1. to refer to the process of moving a group (or groups) of people in some direction through (mostly) noncoercive means, and
2. to refer to people who are in roles where leadership (the first definition) is expected. (p. 16)

In normal conversation, the second definition is most common. In this study, however, the word is used in the first sense, as a process (not a group of people). More particularly, leadership is here defined as an ability to solicit support from others. It requires one to be persuasive and to be able to exercise one's power and authority when necessary.

Leadership has always been, and probably always will be, an important factor in human affairs. But recently the need for leadership in social work has grown considerably more than most people realize. Two fundamental shifts in the social welfare sector are responsible: (1) the increasing complexity of social

welfare, and (2) the demand for accountability.

It is important to point out that the division of values into subgroups is only arbitrary. Many values can be included in more than one categories. Besides, one or more of the subgroups may not be relevant in the local context. Social values, for instance, can be divided into conservative values, socialist values, and liberal values. However, for the purpose of this study, it seems helpful to begin with two groups, thus leaving out liberal values as a subgroup. In conclusion, values which have been selected to represent social work values are listed as following (Figure 7.1):

Figure 7.1 A Schematic Presentation of Social Work Values

End-States of Existence		Modes of Conduct	
Social Values	Personal Values	Moral Values	Competence Values
Socialist Values	Survival Values	Moral Virtues	Professional Values
Democracy	Comfort	Benevolence	Authenticity
Equality	Love	Courage	Empathy
Fraternity	Security	Prudence	Respect
Conservative Values	Self-Actualizing Values	Moral Principles	Institutional Values
Freedom	Happiness	Honesty	Ambition
Peace	Power	Justice	Cooperation
Progress	Pride	Loyalty	Leadership

Chapter Eight

The Value Survey

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, findings of the Value Survey are reported and analyzed. The purpose of this first survey is to organize social work values which have been identified in the previous chapter into a social work value system.

Through the use of mailed questionnaires, respondents to this survey were provided with two lists each consisting of twelve values and were asked to rank values in each of these lists separately according to their own preference, in the capacity of social workers. More specifically, the instruction was to put "1" next to the value which was considered as first in preference, "2" next to the value which was second in preference, "3" next to the value which was third in preference, and continue with this process until all twelve had been ranked.

The report is divided into two sections one relating to end-states of existence and the other relating to modes of conduct. In each section, the report begins with a description of the degree of preference of each of the end-states of existence and modes of conduct. Ranks between one and four are described as "highly preferable"; ranks between five and eight, "moderately preferable"; and ranks between nine and twelve, "least

preferable". To facilitate comparison, ranks have been treated as if they belong to an interval scale. This allows the researcher to compile a "mean ranking" for each value by computing an arithmetic mean for the ranks each received from the respondents and to assign to each value a "composite rank" by arranging the values in order of magnitude of their mean rankings.

To determine the reliability of this method of rank ordering, the study sample is divided into subgroups according to selected personal attributes, namely, sex, age, length of service in social welfare, highest qualification attained, rank of position occupied, nature of job, and area of service. For easy comparison, sex is divided into "Male" and "Female"; age, "35-" and "35+"; length of service, "10-" and "10+"; highest qualification attained, "Degree-trained" and "Non-degree or Untrained"; rank of position occupied, "Officer" and "Assistant"; nature of job, "Frontline" and "Supervisory"; and area of service, "Rehabilitation", "Family", and "Community and Youth".

Moreover, to determine if difference in the rank ordering of values between subgroups is statistically significant, the t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are employed in case if the attribute is divided into two sub-groups. In the case of area of service where it is divided into three subgroups, the analysis of variance and the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Analysis of Variance are used. Moreover, since results of the t-test and the analysis of variance are found to be similar to those of the Wilcoxon-Mann-

Whitney test and the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Analysis of Variance, the t-test and the analysis of variance will not be reported.

Furthermore, to determine, for each pair of values, which one is more preferable, i.e., which one has a higher ranking, the Sign Test is employed and, to determine if this pattern of rank ordering is consistent among the respondents, the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) is employed. Finally, to measure the association between each pair of values, the Spearman Rank-order Correlation Coefficient (r/s) is employed and, to discover if certain values cluster together to form factors, factor analysis is performed.

8.2 Rank Ordering of End-States of Existence

Findings of the Value Survey indicate that the rank ordering of terminal values or end-states of existence, in descending order of preference, is as followng: EQUALITY, LOVE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, PEACE, PROGRESS, HAPPINESS, SECURITY, PRIDE, FRATERNITY, COMFORT, and POWER.

To examine this order of preference more carefully, we begin by looking at the frequency distribution. In Table 8.1, values have been arranged in columns and ranks, in rows. Both of them have also been arranged in descending order of preference. Frequency in this context refers to the number of respondents who has assigned a particular rank to a particular value. There are, for instance, 56 respondents who considered equality as first in

preference. In addition, another 33 respondents considered this same value as second in preference. There is, however, only one respondent who considered equality as last in preference and none who considered it as second last in preference.

Table 8.1 Frequency Distribution of End-States of Existence According to Ranks (N = 195)

RANK	EQU	LOV	FRE	DEM	PEA	PRO	HAP	SEC	PRI	FRA	COM	POW
1	56	50	18	16	7	11	6	11	7	3	10	0
2	33	28	22	31	17	11	14	12	8	8	5	6
3	21	19	31	30	14	8	15	15	11	12	8	11
4	23	20	26	22	10	19	16	10	15	12	10	12
5	13	12	24	17	19	18	19	11	21	13	15	13
6	14	19	10	18	19	14	12	16	21	34	8	10
7	16	13	25	10	17	16	11	26	12	17	19	13
8	8	10	11	13	25	22	21	16	19	14	22	14
9	5	11	9	11	18	23	28	19	17	20	16	18
10	5	11	12	9	13	29	19	23	13	18	21	22
11	0	1	4	14	21	15	24	14	24	21	27	30
12	1	1	3	4	15	9	10	22	27	23	34	46

Raw data have always been confusing. There is nothing much we can get by reading through them. We can probably see, with some clarity, that there are large numbers in the upper left hand corner as well as the lower right hand corner of the table. We can also see small numbers in the lower left hand corner as well

as the upper right hand corner. To make these numbers more revealing, we turn to Table 8.2. In this table, all frequencies in Table 8.1 have been converted to the nearest tens. Approximately, 10 in this table represents 5 percent of the respondents; 20, 10 percent; 30, 15 percent; 40, 20 percent; 50, 25 percents; and, finally, 60, 30 percent.

Table 8.2 Frequency Distribution of End-States of
Existence (Corrected to the Nearest Tens)
According to Ranks (N = 195)

RANK	EQU	LOV	FRE	DEM	PEA	PRO	HAP	SEC	PRI	FRA	COM	POW
1	60	50	20	20	10	10	10	10	10	0	10	0
2	30	30	20	30	20	10	10	10	10	10	0	10
3	20	20	30	30	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
4	20	20	30	20	10	20	20	10	10	10	10	10
5	10	10	20	20	20	20	20	10	20	10	10	10
6	10	20	10	20	20	10	10	20	20	30	10	10
7	20	10	20	10	20	20	10	30	10	20	20	10
8	10	10	10	10	20	20	20	20	20	10	20	10
9	0	10	10	10	20	20	30	20	20	20	20	20
10	0	10	10	10	10	30	20	20	10	20	20	20
11	0	0	0	10	20	10	20	10	20	20	30	30
12	0	0	0	0	10	10	10	20	30	20	30	50

In Table 8.2 we can see a pattern emerging. There is strong agreement among the respondents in their strong preference for equality, love, freedom, and democracy, and their low preference for pride, fraternity, comfort, and power. In the case of equality, for instance, almost 30 percent of the respondents considered it as first in preference, and another 15 percent considered it as second in preference. However, very few of the respondents considered it as low in preference. On the other hand, in the case of power, approximately 25 percent of the respondents considered it as last in preference, and another 15 percent considered it as second last in preference, but none considered it as first in preference.

To examine this frequency distribution more closely, we turn to Table 8.3 and Table 8.4 which provide summaries of the frequency distribution in terms of mean rankings, median rankings, modes, and degrees of preference.

In this survey, democracy, equality, and fraternity have been chosen to represent socialist values. How are these values ranked in the Value Survey? Findings indicate that equality ranks first, democracy ranks fourth, and fraternity ranks tenth in the survey. Among the respondents, 68.2 percent considered equality as "highly preferable". Another 26.2 percent considered it to be "moderately preferable", and a meagre 5.6 percent considered it to be "least preferable". This produces a mean ranking of 3.6. In the case democracy, 50.8 percent of the respondents considered it as "highly preferable", 29.7 percent

considered it to be "moderately preferable", and 19.5 percent considered it as "least preferable". This results in a mean ranking of 5.2. Finally, in the case of fraternity, 17.9 percent of the respondents considered it as "highly preferable", 40.0 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", and 42.0 percent considered it as "least preferable". This produces a mean ranking of 7.5.

Table 8.3 Composite Rank, Mean Ranking, Median Ranking, and Mode of End-States of Existence (N = 195)

Value	Rank	Mean	Median	Mode
EQUALITY	1	3.636	3.0	1.0
LOVE	2	4.205	4.0	1.0
FREEDOM	3	5.041	5.0	3.0
DEMOCRACY	4	5.200	4.0	2.0
PEACE	5	6.944	7.0	8.0
PROGRESS	6	7.000	8.0	10.0
HAPPINESS	7	7.082	8.0	9.0
SECURITY	8	7.179	7.0	7.0
PRIDE	9	7.456	8.0	12.0
FRATERNITY	10	7.538	7.0	6.0
COMFORT	11	8.077	9.0	12.0
POWER	12	8.641	10.0	12.0

Table 8.4 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking and Composite Rank of End-States of Existence (N = 195)

	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1-4) (in %)	Moderately Preferable (Ranks 5-8) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 9-12) (in %)	Mean	Rank
EQUALITY	68.2	26.2	5.6	3.6	1
LOVE	60.0	27.7	12.3	4.2	2
FREEDOM	49.7	35.9	14.4	5.0	3
DEMOCRACY	50.8	29.7	19.5	5.2	4
PEACE	24.6	41.0	34.4	6.9	5
PROGRESS	25.1	35.9	39.0	7.0	6
HAPPINESS	26.2	32.3	41.5	7.1	7
SECURITY	24.6	35.4	40.0	7.2	8
PRIDE	21.0	37.4	41.5	7.5	9
FRATERNITY	17.9	40.0	42.0	7.5	10
COMFORT	16.9	32.8	50.3	8.1	11
POWER	14.9	25.6	59.5	8.6	12

How are the conservative values ranked in the Value Survey? Findings indicate that freedom, peace, and progress rank third, fifth, and sixth respectively. In actual figures, almost half of the respondents (49.7 percent) considered freedom as "highly preferable", another one-third (35.9 percent) considered it as "moderately preferable", thus leaving those who considered it as "least preferable" to stand at 14.4 percent. This produces a

mean ranking of 5.0. For peace, it seems important to note that only 7 respondents considered this value as first in preference. This may help to explain why the number of respondents who considered it as "highly preferable" was limited to no more than 24.6 percent. On the other hand, those who considered it to be "moderately preferable" and "least preferable" turned out to be 41.0 percent and 34.4 percent respectively. This results in a mean ranking of 6.9, very much lower than that of freedom. The rank ordering of progress is found to be similar to that of peace. A total of 25.1 percent of the respondents considered this value as "highly preferable", 35.9 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", and 39.0 percent considered it as "least preferable". This produces a mean ranking of 7.0, slightly behind that of peace.

What about the survival values? How are they ranked in the Value Survey? Findings indicate that love occupies the second, security the eighth, and comfort the eleventh position on the list of end-states of existence. Among the respondents, 60 percent considered love as "highly preferable", 27.7 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", and 12.3 percent considered it as "least preferable". This produces a mean ranking of 4.2. In the case of security, the number of respondents who considered this value as "highly preferable" was reduced to slightly less than one-quarter (24.6 percent). On the other hand, the number of respondents who considered it as "moderately preferable" and "least preferable" increased to 35.4 percent and 40.0 percent respectively. This results in a mean

ranking of 7.2. Finally, in the case of comfort, it may be of interest to point out that as many as 10 respondents considered this value as first in preference. However, among all the respondents, only 6.9 percent considered it as "highly preferable". Not unexpectedly, the number of respondents who considered it as "moderately preferable" and "least preferable" turned out to be much higher, 32.8 percent, and 50.3 percent respectively. This produces a mean ranking of 8.1.

The last subgroup of terminal values is known as the self-actualizing values. Findings reveal that happiness occupies the seventh, pride the ninth, and power the last position on the list. For happiness, it may be of interest to note that only 6 respondents considered this value as first in preference. Among the respondents, about one-quarter (26.2 percent) considered it as "highly preferable", another one-third (32.3 percent) considered it as "moderately preferable", and the remaining 41.5 percent considered it as "least preferable". This results in a mean ranking of 7.1. For pride, about one-fifth of the respondents (21.0 percent) considered it as "highly preferable", 37.4 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", and 41.5 percent considered it as "least preferable". The mean ranking for this value is 7.5. Finally, in the case of power, only a small percentage (14.9 percent) of the respondents considered it as "highly preferable", another 25.6 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", but well over half (59.5 percent) considered it as "least preferable". Its mean ranking is 8.6.

How do these subgroups compare with one another in terms of mean rankings? To answer this question, we have to do some simple arithmetic. We average the mean rankings of values in each subgroup to obtain a "mean of mean rankings". In the case of socialist values, it turns out to be 5.4. As for conservative values, it is 6.3. Similarly, the "mean of mean rankings" for survival values is 6.5 and for self-actualizing values, it is 7.7. In other words, as a group, social values are conceived to be more preferable than personal values. Besides, socialist values are conceived to be most preferable while self-actualizing values are conceived to be least preferable. (Table 8.5)

Table 8.5 A Compilation of Mean of ~~Mean~~ Rankings of Subgroups in End-States of Existence

Socialist Values		Conservative Values		Survival Values		Self- Actualizing Values	
DEM	5.2	FRE	5.0	COM	8.1	HAP	7.1
EQU	3.6	PEA	6.9	LOV	4.2	POW	8.6
FRA	7.5	PRO	7.0	SEC	7.2	PRI	7.5
SUM	16.3	SUM	18.9	SUM	19.5	SUM	23.2
MEAN	5.4	MEAN	6.3	MEAN	6.5	MEANS	7.7

To shed some light on the reliability of the rank ordering of values, the study sample is divided into subgroups according to selected personal attributes. When subgroups of each attribute are subject to the t-test of means and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of ranks in the case of two subgroups, or subject to the analysis of variance and the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in the case of three subgroups, the results are statistically insignificant in most of the cases. (Table 8.6)

As far as end-states of existence are concerned, social workers of the opposite sex are similar in the way they rank the values. Difference in the rank ordering of values between "Male" and "Female" is found to be statistically insignificant for most values. The only exception is pride where the difference is small and is statistically significant at .048 level only. Further analyses reveal that "Female" showed a slightly stronger preference for pride than "Male".

Age is an entirely different matter. Difference in the rank ordering of values for "35-" and "35+" can be observed in three terminal values: freedom, peace, and fraternity. However, difference in the case of freedom is relatively small and is statistically significant at .049 level only. Difference in the rank ordering of values is much greater for peace and fraternity. They are found to be statistically significant at .030 and .024 level respectively.

Table 8.6 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Ranks and Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA of End-States of Existence According to Breakdown of Personal Attributes++

	Sex	Age	Length of Service	Highest Quali. Attained	Rank of Position	Nature of Job	Area of Service+
EQUALITY	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
LOVE	*	*	*	.041	.038	*	*
FREEDOM	*	.049	*	*	*	*	*
DEMOCRACY	*	*	*	.017	.016	*	.002
PEACE	*	.030	.009	*	*	*	*
PROGRESS	*	*	*	*	*	*	.008
HAPPINESS	*	*	*	*	*	*	.048
SECURITY	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
PRIDE	.048	*	*	*	*	*	*
FRATERNITY	*	.024	.022	*	*	*	*
COMFORT	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
POWER	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

Notes: + In the case of area of service, three subgroups are involved. Hence, the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA is used. In all other cases, two subgroups are involved. Hence, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Ranks is used.

++ When the level of significance is $\leq .05$, the actual significance level is reported. However, when it is $> .05$ it is represented by *.

As it is expected, subgroups divided according to length of service shows a remarkably similar pattern. Difference in the rank ordering of values for "10-" and "10+" can be observed in peace and fraternity. They are found to be statistically significant at .009 and .022 level respectively.

Further analyses indicate that the "35-" and "10-" groups showed a stronger preference for fraternity whereas the "35+" and "10+" groups showed a stronger preference for freedom and peace.

In terms of highest qualification attained, difference in the rank ordering of values can be observed in love and democracy. They are statistically significant at .041 and .017 level respectively.

Again, there is remarkable resemblance between highest qualification attained and rank of position occupied. Difference in the rank ordering of values can again be observed in love and democracy. They are found to be significant at .038 and .016 level respectively.

In addition, further analyses reveal that the "Degree-trained" and "Officer" groups showed a stronger preference for love whereas the "Non-degree or Untrained" and "Assistant" groups showed a stronger preference for democracy.

As for the nature of job, no significant difference in the rank ordering of values can be detected in all values. Quite the

contrary, in the case of area of service, differences are statistically significant at .002 level for democracy, .008 level for progress, and .048 for happiness. Social workers in "Rehabilitation" and "Community and Youth" showed a stronger preference for democracy than their counterparts in "Family"; the reverse is found to be true for happiness. Finally, social workers in "Family" and "Community and Youth" showed a stronger preference for progress than their counterparts in "Rehabilitation".

Looking at Table 8.6 from another angle, we discover that the pattern of rank ordering is highly consistent for comfort, equality, power, and security. Differences in the rank ordering of these values are found to be statistically insignificant when the study sample is divided according to each of the personal attributes.

As for freedom, happiness, and pride, the pattern of rank ordering can also be considered as highly consistent. Differences in the rank ordering of values are found to be no more than marginally significant in statistical terms. However, the pattern of rank ordering is somewhat inconsistent for democracy and fraternity, love, peace and progress.

How do values compare with one another in terms of their rank ordering? When pairs of values are treated with the Sign Test, it becomes clear that the end-states of existence can be divided into three subgroups in terms of rank ordering. (Table

8.7)

Table 8.7 Significance of Sign Test for
End-States of Existence

	EQU	LOV	FRE	DEM	PEA	PRO	HAP	SEC	PRI	FRA	COM	POW
EQU		*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
LOV			*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
FRE				*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
DEM					+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
PEA						*	*	*	*	*	+	+
PRO							*	+	*	*	+	+
HAP								*	*	*	+	+
SEC									*	*	+	+
PRI										*	*	+
FRA											*	+
COM												*
POW												

Note: + Difference is significant at < .05 level.

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level.

To begin with, equality, love, freedom, and democracy clearly belong to one group. Findings indicate that these end-states of existence are significantly different from all other end-states of existence. Within the group, however, equality is not significantly different from love but is significantly different from freedom and democracy. Similarly, love is not

different from equality above it or freedom below it, but is different from democracy. In a similar pattern, freedom is not different from love above it or democracy below it, but is different from equality. Finally, democracy is not different from freedom but is different from both equality and love. In other words, end-state of existences within the group are not always different from one another, but are always different from end-states of existence which are not included in this group.

What are some of the characteristics of this group of values? Firstly, values in this group come from three subgroups: democracy and equality from socialist values, freedom from conservative values; and love from survival values. None of these values is from self-actualizing values. Secondly, values in this group are conceived as highly preferable by the respondents. Their mean rankings range from 3.6 to 5.2; their median rankings range from 3 to 5; and their modes range 1 to 3. Thirdly, even though equality and love are clearly more preferable than freedom and democracy, it is almost impossible to distinguish equality from love, or freedom from democracy in terms of their degree of preference.

The second group includes peace, progress, happiness, security, pride, and faternity. With very few exceptions, no significant difference can be observed between one end-state of existence and another within the same group but significant difference can be observed between values in this group and values not belonging to this group. One exception relates to

progress and security. Both of these values are within this group but difference between them are statistically significant. Besides, differences between pride and comfort as well as fraternity and comfort are not statistically significant.

What are some of the characteristics of this group? Firstly, values in this group come from all four subgroups: fraternity from socialist values; peace and progress from conservative values; security from survival values; and happiness and pride from self-actualizing values. Secondly, values in this group are conceived to be moderately preferable by the respondents. Their mean rankings have a small range, from 6.9 to 7.5; their median rankings range from 7 to 8; and their modes range from 6 to 12. Thirdly, it is almost impossible to distinguish one value from another in this group in terms of degree of preference.

The third group includes comfort and power. However, the place of comfort is somewhat unclear. Even though comfort is significantly different from peace and progress, happiness and security, it is not significantly different from pride and fraternity in the second group. Besides, it is also different from power.

What are some of the characteristics of values in this group? Firstly, values in this group come from two subgroups: comfort from survival values and power from self-actualizing values. Both of these belong to personal values. Secondly, both

are conceived as least preferable by the respondents. Their mean rankings range from 8.0 to 8.6; their median rankings range from 9 to 10; and both have a mode of 12.

To determine interrater reliability, the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) is employed. In the case of end-states of existence, the degree of concordance among the respondents is highly significant. (Table 8.8) In other words, the respondents are highly consistent in the way they ranked the end-states of existence.

Table 8.8 Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) of
End-States of Existence

No. of Cases	W	Chi-square	D.F.	Significance
195	.193	413.987	11	.000

How do the values asociate with one another as a subgroup? And how do the subgroups associate with one another? To answer these questions, the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient is employed. (Table 8.9) In the case of socialist values, findings indicate that equality is positively associated with both democracy and fraternity but democracy is not associated with fraternity. In the case of conservative values, the only significant correlation is between freedom and progress. These two values are negatively associated. No meaningful association can be detected among survival values. Quite the contrary, all

self-actualizing values are significantly associated with one another.

Table 8.9 Significance of Spearman Correlation Coefficient
 for End-States of Existence

	DEM	EQU	FRA	FRE	PEA	PRO	COM	LOV	SEC	HAP	POW	PRI
DEM		+	*	+	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-
EQU			+	+	*	*	-	-	-	-	*	*
FRA				*	*	*	-	-	-	-	*	-
FRE					*	-	-	-	-	*	*	-
PEA						*	-	*	*	*	-	-
PRO							-	-	*	-	*	-
COM								*	*	+	-	*
LOV									*	+	*	*
SEC										*	-	*
HAP											-	-
POW												+
PRI												

Note: + Correlation is positive and significant at
 < .05 level.
 - Correlation is ngative and significant at
 < .05 level.
 * Differnece is not significant at < .05 level.

Between subgroups, socialist values are negatively associated with survival values in all combinations, and with self-actualizing values in most combinations. However, other than freedom which is found to be positively associated, socialist values are not significantly associated with conservative values. Similarly, conservative values are negatively associated with survival values and self-actualizing values in most combinations. As for the association between survival values and self-actualizing values, results are mixed. Happiness is positively associated with love and comfort while power is negatively associated with security and comfort. Other combinations are not found to be significantly associated.

To determine if the end-states of existence group together in clusters, they are subject to factor analysis. (Table 8.10)

Findings indicate that the end-states of existence group into three clusters. In the first cluster, love, comfort, and happiness are negatively associated with fraternity and progress. In the second cluster, democracy, equality and freedom are negatively correlated with security. Finally, in the third cluster, pride and power are negatively associated with peace. On the whole, social values are found to be positively associated with one another but negatively associated with personal values.

Table 8.10 Factor Analysis of End-States of Existence

Values	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
DEMOCRACY		.63792	
EQUALITY		.64460	
FRATERNITY	.47428		
FREEDOM		.62775	
PEACE			.66477
PROGRESS	.59083		
LOVE	-.48378		
SECURITY		-.54103	
COMFORT	-.58253		
HAPPINESS	-.75637		
PRIDE			-.65026
POWER			-.75299

In concluding this section, it may be of interest to note that social values occupy five of the six top positions on the list, leaving the second position to love which is a personal value. In other words, social workers have much stronger preference for social values than for personal values. As it is expected, the most preferred values for social workers in Hong Kong include democracy, equality, and freedom. These three values form a closely knitted cluster with security. This reflects, on the one hand, the concern of our social workers for the coming of 1997 when Hong Kong is scheduled to return to China. On the other hand, this reflects that social workers in

Hong Kong are neither conservatives nor socialists. It may be more appropriate to say that they are liberals in the sense that they would like to see the creation of a society which allows more democracy, equality, and freedom. However, there seems to be a smaller group of more conservative social workers who prefer peace and progress. Even though these values are found to be less preferable than the important trio, their influence can hardly be underestimated. In fact, they occupy the fifth and the sixth positions on the list. Somewhat surprisingly, with the exception of love, personal values are not considered as highly preferable. Does this imply that social workers see the creation of a "better" society as a prerequisite for personal survival and personal growth? This relates to the purpose of social work and will be taken up again in the final chapter.

8.3 Rank Ordering of the Modes of Conduct

Findings of the Value Survey indicate that the rank ordering of instrumental values or modes of conduct, in descending order of preference, is as following: RESPECT, JUSTICE, EMPATHY, HONESTY, AUTHENTICITY, PRUDENCE, LOYALTY, BENEVOLENCE, COURAGE, COOPERATION, LEADERSHIP, and AMBITION.

To examine this order of preference more carefully, we follow the same procedure as we did in the rank ordering of end-states of existence. In Table 8.11, we have a description of the frequency distribution of the end-states of existence according to ranks. To make^s these frequencies more revealing, they have

been converted to the nearest tens in Table 8.12. In Table 8.13, a summary of this frequency distribution is presented in terms of mean rankings, median rankings, and modes. In addition, a summary of the frequency distribution is also presented in terms of degrees of preference in Table 8.14.

Table 8.11 Frequency Distribution of Modes of Conduct
 According to Ranks (N = 195)

RANK	RES	JUS	EMP	HON	AUT	PRU	LOY	BEN	COU	COO	LEA	AMB
1	35	44	43	17	17	5	5	12	4	3	2	8
2	35	30	33	19	16	17	14	14	7	4	5	1
3	32	23	33	20	24	15	18	12	8	4	4	2
4	29	18	20	24	16	21	17	14	16	10	6	4
5	18	25	12	16	12	25	17	23	18	14	8	7
6	15	16	7	18	32	22	16	9	23	15	10	11
7	13	16	8	20	19	19	15	16	25	16	10	18
8	6	7	7	22	13	29	25	15	28	23	14	6
9	5	6	11	14	16	10	22	21	20	32	24	15
10	4	6	8	8	12	8	17	20	21	38	28	25
11	0	3	8	13	14	13	19	13	18	24	41	29
12	3	1	5	4	4	11	10	26	7	12	43	69

Table 8.12 Frequency Distribution of Modes of Conduct
(Corrected to the Nearest Tens)
According to Ranks (N = 195)

RANK	RES	JUS	EMP	HON	AUT	PRU	LOY	BEN	COU	COO	LEA	AMB
1	30	40	40	20	20	0	0	10	0	0	0	10
2	30	30	30	20	20	20	10	10	10	0	0	0
3	30	20	30	20	20	10	20	10	10	0	0	0
4	30	20	20	20	20	20	20	10	20	10	10	0
5	20	20	10	20	10	20	20	20	20	10	10	10
6	10	20	10	20	30	20	20	10	20	10	10	10
7	10	20	10	20	20	20	10	20	20	20	10	20
8	10	10	10	20	10	30	20	10	30	20	10	10
9	0	10	10	10	20	10	20	20	20	30	20	10
10	0	10	10	10	10	10	20	20	20	40	30	20
11	0	0	10	10	10	10	20	10	20	20	40	30
12	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	30	10	10	40	70

How are the moral virtues ranked in the Value Survey? Findings indicate that prudence occupies the sixth, benevolence the eighth, and courage the ninth position on the list.

It may be of interest to note that even though prudence was conceived to be the most preferred of the moral virtues, the position it occupies is relatively low. In actual figures, no more than one-third of the respondents (29.7 percent) considered this value as "highly preferable", but almost half (48.7 percent)

considered it as "moderately preferable", thus leaving those who considered it as "least preferable" to stand at 21.5 percent. This produces a mean ranking of 6.3.

Table 8.13 Composite Rank, Mean Ranking, Median Ranking, and Mode of Modes of Conduct (N = 195)

Value	Rank	Mean	Median	Mode
RESPECT	1	3.882	3.0	1.0
JUSTICE	2	4.067	4.0	1.0
EMPATHY	3	4.251	3.0	1.0
HONESTY	4	5.703	6.0	4.0
AUTHENTICITY	5	5.846	6.0	6.0
PRUDENCE	6	6.333	6.0	8.0
LOYALTY	7	6.862	7.0	8.0
BENEVOLENCE	8	7.062	7.0	12.0
COURAGE	9	7.205	7.0	8.0
COOPERATION	10	8.179	9.0	10.0
LEADERSHIP	11	9.195	10.0	12.0
AMBITION	12	9.431	11.0	12.0

In the case of benevolence, the number of respondents who considered it as "highly preferable" was reduced to a little over one-quarter (26.7 percent). Moreover, those who considered it as "moderately preferable" were also reduced to 32.3 percent. On the other hand, those who considered it as "least preferable" were increased to as much as 41.0 percent. This results in a

mean ranking of 7.1, much lower than that of prudence.

Table 8.14 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking and Composite
Rank of Modes of Conduct (N = 195)

	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1-4) (in %)	Moderately Preferable (Ranks 5-8) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 9-12) (in %)	Mean	Rank
RESPECT	67.2	26.7	6.1	3.9	1
JUSTICE	59.0	32.8	8.2	4.1	2
EMPATHY	66.2	17.4	16.4	4.3	3
HONESTY	41.0	39.0	20.0	5.7	4
AUTHENTICITY	37.4	39.0	23.6	5.8	5
PRUDENCE	29.7	48.7	21.5	6.3	6
LOYALTY	27.7	37.4	34.9	6.9	7
BENEVOLENCE	26.7	32.3	41.0	7.1	8
COURAGE	17.9	48.2	33.8	7.2	9
COOPERATION	10.8	34.9	54.4	8.2	10
LEADERSHIP	8.7	21.5	69.7	9.2	11
AMBITION	7.7	2.15	70.8	9.4	12

Finally, among the respondents, 17.9 percent considered courage as highly preferable, 48.2 percent considered it as moderately preferable, and 33.8 percent considered it as least preferable. Its mean ranking is 7.2, very close to that of benevolence.

How are the moral principles ranked in this Value Survey? Findings indicate that they are considered to be much more preferable than moral virtues: justice is second, honesty is fourth, and loyalty is seventh on the list. In actual figures, almost three-fifths of the respondents (59.0 percent) considered justice as "highly preferable". In addition, another one-third (32.8 percent) considered it as "moderately preferable". This leaves the number of respondents who considered it as "least preferable" to stand at 8.2 percent. This produces a mean ranking of 4.1, much higher than any of the moral virtues. In the case of honesty, a little over two-fifths of the respondents (41.0 percent) considered it as "highly preferable". The number of respondents who considered it as "moderately preferable" was almost the same, 39.0 percent. This implied that the number of respondents who considered it as "least preferable" was limited to 20.0 percent. It has a mean ranking of 5.7. Finally, about one-quarter of the respondents (27.7 percent) considered loyalty as "highly preferable", 37.4 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", and 34.9 percent considered it as "least preferable". This results in a mean ranking of 6.9, far below that of honesty and justice.

We can turn now to the institutional values. Values included in this subgroup are ambition, cooperation, and leadership. They occupy the last three positions on the list. Only about one-tenth (10.8 percent) of the respondents considered cooperation as "highly preferable", about one-third (34.9 percent) considered it as "moderately preferable", and the

remaining 54.4 percent considered it as "least preferable". This produces a mean ranking of 8.2. As for leadership, less than one-tenth (8.7 percent) considered this value as "highly preferable", slightly over one-fifth (21.5 percent) considered it as "moderately preferable", and well over two-thirds (69.7 percent) considered it as "least preferable". This results in a mean ranking of 9.2. Finally, only a small percentage (7.7 percent) of the respondents considered ambition as "highly preferable". Another 21.5 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", but, again, well over two-thirds (70.8 percent) considered it as "least preferable". It has a mean ranking of 9.4.

The last subgroup is the professional values, including respect, empathy, and authenticity. They appear first, third, and fifth on the list of modes of conduct. Among the respondents, over two-thirds (67.2 percent) considered respect as "highly preferable", 26.7 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", and a meagre 6.1 percent considered it as "least preferable". This results in a mean ranking of 3.9. As for empathy, the number of respondents who considered this value as "highly preferable" was approximately the same (66.2 percent). Besides, the number of respondents who considered it as "moderately preferable" and "least preferable" was 17.4 percent and 16.4 percent respectively. This produces a mean ranking of 4.3. Finally, the number of respondents who considered authenticity as "highly preferable", "moderately preferable", and "least preferable" turned out to be 37.4 percent, 39.0 percent,

and 23.6 percent respectively. This results in a mean ranking of 5.8.

How do these subgroups compared with one another in terms of the mean of mean rankings? In the case of moral virtues, it turns out to be 6.9. As for moral principles, it is 5.6. Similarly, the mean of mean rankings for institutional values is 8.9 and for professional values, 4.7. In other words, moral values tend to be moderately preferred whereas preference for competence values tends to be more extreme. On the one hand, professional values are considered as most preferable, yet, on the other hand, institutional values are considered as least preferable. (Table 8.15)

Table 8.15 A Compilation of Mean of Mean Rankings of Subgroups in Modes of Conduct

Moral Virtues		Moral Principles		Institutional Values		Professional Values	
BEN	7.1	HON	5.7	AMB	9.4	AUT	5.8
COU	7.2	JUS	4.1	COO	8.2	EMP	4.3
PRU	6.3	LOY	6.9	LEA	9.2	RES	3.9
SUM	20.6	SUM	16.7	SUM	26.8	SUM	14.0
MEAN	6.9	MEAN	5.6	MEAN	8.9	MEANS	4.7

To shed some light on the reliability of the ranking of

values, the study sample is divided into subgroups according to certain personal attributes. When subgroups of each attribute are treated with the t-test of means and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of ranks in the case of two subgroups, or treated with the analysis of variance and the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA in the case of three subgroups, the results are found to be statistically significant in many of the cases. (Table 8.16)

As far as modes of conduct are concerned, social workers of the opposite sex do exhibit significant difference in the way they rank justice, empathy, prudence, courage, and leadership. Further analyses reveal that "Male" showed a stronger preference for justice while "Female" showed a stronger preference for empathy, prudence, and courage.

In the case of age, difference in the rank ordering of values between "35-" and "35+" can be observed in empathy, prudence, and leadership.

As is expected, subgroups divided according to length of service shows a remarkably similar pattern. Difference in the rank ordering of values between "10-" and "10+" can again be observed in empathy, prudence, leadership, and ambition. However, in the case of ambition, difference is small and is significant at .048 level only.

Table 8.16 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Ranks and Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA of Modes of Conduct According to Breakdown of Personal Attributes++

	Sex	Age	Length of Service	Highest Quali. Attained	Rank of Position	Nature of Job	Area of Service+
RESPECT	*	*	*	.005	*	*	*
JUSTICE	.003	*	*	*	*	*	*
EMPATHY	.001	.002	.020	.042	*	*	*
HONESTY	*	*	*	*	.014	.029	.035
AUTHENTICITY	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
PRUDENCE	.017	.013	.005	*	*	.006	.018
LOYALTY	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
BENEVOLENCE	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
COURAGE	.032	*	*	*	*	*	*
COOPERATION	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
LEADERSHIP	.023	.000	.000	*	*	*	*
AMBITION	*	*	.048	*	*	*	*

Notes: + In the case of area of service, three subgroups are involved. Hence, the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA is used. In all other cases, two subgroups are involved. Hence, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Ranks is used.

++ When the level of significance is $< \text{ or } = .05$, the actual significance level is reported. However, when it is $> .05$ it is represented by *.

Briefly, findings indicate that the "35-" and "10-" groups showed a stronger preference for empathy and prudence whereas the "35+" and "10+" groups found leadership and ambition more preferable.

In terms of highest qualification attained, difference in the rank ordering of values can be observed in respect and empathy. Findings indicate that "Degree-trained" found empathy more preferable than "Non-degree or Untrained" whereas the reverse was found to be the case for respect.

Surprisingly, there is little resemblance between highest qualification attained and rank of position occupied. In the case of rank of position occupied, difference can only be detected in honesty. Moreover, findings reveal that "Officer" has a stronger preference for honesty than "Assistant".

As for the nature of job, significant difference in the rank ordering of values can be detected in honesty and prudence. Further analyses reveal that "Frontline" showed a stronger preference for prudence whereas "Supervisory" showed a stronger preference for honesty.

Significant difference in the rank ordering of values in relation to honesty and prudence can also be detected in the case of area of service. Findings reveal that social workers in "Rehabilitation" found honesty more preferable than their counterparts in "Family" and in "Community and Youth" whereas the

reverse was found to be the case for prudence.

Looking at Table 8.16 from another angle, we discovered that the pattern of rank ordering is highly consistent in the case of benevolence, loyalty, authenticity, and cooperation. Differences in the rank ordering of values are statistically insignificant when the study sample are divided according to each of the personal attributes.

In the case of ambition, the pattern of rank ordering can also be described as highly consistent. Difference in the rank ordering of values when the respondents are divided according to length of service is no more than marginally significant in statistical terms.

On the contrary, the pattern of rank ordering is somewhat inconsistent in the case of courage, justice, and respect and highly inconsistent in the case prudence, honesty, empathy, and leadership.

How do the values compare with one another in terms of their rank ordering? When pairs of values are treated with the Sign Test it becomes clear that the modes of conduct can be divided into four subgroups into terms of rank ordering. (Table 8.17) To begin with, respect, justice, and empathy clearly belong to one group. Findings indicate that these modes of conduct are significantly different from all other modes of conduct. Within the group, however, no significant difference can be found.

Table 8.17 Significance of Sign Test for Modes of Conduct

	RES	JUS	EMP	HON	AUT	PRU	LOY	BEN	COU	COO	LEA	AMB
RES		*	*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
JUS			*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
EMP				+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
HON					*	*	+	+	+	+	+	+
AUT						*	+	+	+	+	+	+
PRU							*	+	+	+	+	+
LOY								*	*	+	+	+
BEN									*	+	+	+
COU										+	+	+
COO											+	+
LEA												+
AMB												

Note: + Diffeerence is significant at < .05 level.

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level.

What are some of the characteristics of this group of values? Firstly, values in this group come from two subgroups: justice from moral principles and empathy and respect from professional values. None of these values is from either moral virtues or institutional values. Secondly, values in this group are conceived to be highly preferable by the respondents. Their mean rankings range from 3.9 to 4.3; their mean rankings range from 3 to 4; and all of them have a mode of 1. Thirdly, it is almost impossible to distinguish one from the other in terms of

their degree of preference.

Similarly, honesty, authenticity, and prudence clearly belong to another group. With the exception of prudence which is not significantly different from loyalty, this group shows the same pattern as that of the previous group. Findings reveal that these modes of conduct are significantly different from all other modes of conduct. Again, within the group, no significant difference can be found.

What are some of the characteristics of this group of values? Firstly, values in this group come from three subgroups: prudence from moral virtues; honesty from moral principles; and authenticity is the last of the professional values. So far, none of the values are from institutional values. Secondly, values in this group are conceived as moderately preferable by the respondents. Their mean rankings range from 5.7 to 6.3; the median rankings of all of these values are 6; and their modes range from 4 to 8. Thirdly, it is almost impossible to distinguish one from the other in terms of their degree of preference.

Loyalty, benevolence, and courage form the third group which demonstrates exactly the same pattern as that of the second group. As is mentioned, loyalty provides the only exception.

What are some of the characteristics of this group of values? Firstly, all values in this group come from moral

values: benevolence and courage from moral virtues, and loyalty from moral principles. Secondly, values in this group can also be described as moderately preferable. Their mean rankings range from 6.9 to 7.2; the median rankings of all of these values are 7; and their modes range from 8 to 12. Thirdly, it is again almost impossible to distinguish one from the other in terms of their degree of preference.

Finally, findings indicate that each of the remaining modes of conduct, namely, cooperation, leadership, and ambition, are statistically different from all other modes of conduct. Even though we consider them as a group, each may also be considered as a group in itself.

What are some of the characteristics of this group of values? Firstly, all values in this group belong to the same subgroup of values: institutional values. Secondly, values in this group are conceived as least preferable by the respondents. Their mean rankings range from 8.2 to 9.4; their median rankings range from 9 to 11; and their modes range from 10 to 12. Thirdly, cooperation is conceived to be more preferable than both leadership and ambition, but it is almost impossible to distinguish leadership from ambition in terms of their degree of preference.

To determine interrater reliability, the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) is employed. In the case of modes of conduct, the degree of concordance among the respondents is highly

significant. (Table 8.18) In other words, the respondents are highly consistent in the way they ranked the modes of conduct.

Table 8.18 Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) of Modes of Conduct

No. of Cases	W	Chi-square	D.F.	Significance
195	.270	578.061	11	.000

How do these values asociate with one another other as a subgroup? And how do the subgroups associate with one another? To answer these questions, the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient has been employed. (Table 8.19) For moral virtues, benevolence is found to be negatively associated with both courage and prudence, but courage and prudence are not associated with each other. In the case of moral principles, the only meaningful association is found between honesty and justice. The two are positively associated. No meaningful association can be detected either among institutional values or professional values.

Between the subgroups, meaningful association can be detected between moral principles and professional values. The two groups are negatively associated in most combinations. Meaningful association can also be detected between professional values and institutional values; moral virtues and institutional values; and moral virtues and moral principles. In all cases, the groups are found to be negatively associated. No other

association can be detected.

8.19 Significance of Spearman Correlation Coefficient for
 Modes of Conduct

	BEN	COU	PRU	HON	JUS	LOY	AUT	EMP	RES	AMB	COO	LEA
BEN		-	-	*	-	-	*	+	*	-	*	-
COU			*	*	*	-	*	*	-	*	-	*
PRU				-	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	*
HON					+	*	-	-	*	-	*	*
JUS						*	-	-	-	*	*	*
LOY							-	-	*	*	*	-
AUT								*	*	*	*	-
EMP									*	-	-	-
RES										*	*	-
AMB											*	*
COO												*
LEA												

Note: + Correlation is positive and significant at
 < .05 level.

- Correlation is ngative and significant at
 < .05 level.

* Differnece is not significant at < .05 level.

In an attempt to determine if certain values do group together to form clusters, the modes of conduct are subject to factor analysis. Findings indicate that three clusters can be

isolated. (Table 8.20) Included in the first cluster are five values. Benevolence, empathy and respect are found to be negatively associated with ambition and leadership. In the second cluster of four values, honesty, justice, and loyalty are found to be negatively correlated with authenticity. Finally, in the third cluster of three values, courage and prudence are found to be negatively associated with cooperation. On the whole, social values are positively associated with one another but negatively associated with personal values.

Table 8.20 Factor Analysis of Modes of Conduct

Values	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
BENEVOLENCE	-.61413		
COURAGE			-.41880
PRUDENCE			-.70700
HONESTY		.71892	
LOYALTY		.50715	
JUSTICE		.57013	
AUTHENTICITY		-.58200	
EMPATHY	-.60720		
RESPECT	-.28212		
AMBITION	.52649		
COOPERATION			.68246
LEADERSHIP	.70882		

In concluding this section, it may be of interest to note

that the first six positions on the list are occupied by one moral virtues, two moral principles, and three professional values. Somewhat unhappily, institutional values have received little attention. They occupy the last three positions. This will undoubtedly have effect on the profession's attempt to become accountable. On the other hand, just as it is expected, the three most preferred values in social work: authenticity, empathy, and respect, stand out very clearly. Together they represent the corner stones of the profession. Almost equally as important are the moral principles which guide human behaviour. However, benevolence is somewhat disappointing. Where is our feeling of compassion for the sufferings of our clients? This relates to the profession's code of ethics and we will return to this in the last chapter.

Chapter Nine

The Value-Action Relationship Survey

9.1 Introduction

The purpose of this second survey is to examine the relationship between values and action. Respondents to the survey were given twelve case situations. Following the presentation of each case situation, respondents were asked to respond to a short statement and to rank a group of values according to their preference, in the capacity of social workers. The instruction was to indicate agreement or disagreement with the action specified in the statement and to put 1 next to the value which was conceived to be the most important one, 2 next to the value which was conceived to be second in importance, and 3 next to the value which was conceived to be third in importance in guiding them to their decisions. Remaining values should not be numbered.

In coding, it was discovered that there were five different patterns in the way respondents completed this section of the questionnaire.

1. Instructions were closely followed and the first three values were numbered 1, 2, and 3. When this happened, each of the remaining values received a rank of 5 which was, in effect, the average of 4, 5, and 6.

2. Instructions were only partly followed and the first two values were numbered 1 and 2. When this happened, each of the remaining values received a rank of 4.5, which was, in effect, the average of 3, 4, 5, and 6.

3. Instructions were only partly followed and the first value was numbered 1. When this happened, each of the remaining values received a rank of 4, which was, in effect, the average of 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

4. Instructions were only partly followed and all the values were numbered, from 1 to 6. When this happened, the first three, from 1 to 3, were retained, and the last three, from 4 to 6, received a rank of 5.

5. Instructions were not followed and none of the values was numbered. When this happened, the case was considered invalid and was, therefore, discarded.

This chapter describes the case situations individually. It describes the first case situation in great detail and, for the remaining case situations, the findings are summarized. In each case situation, the report begins with a description of the degree of preference of values when the case situation is, and is not specified. (See, for example, Table 9.1.1 and 9.1.2) It follows with a comparison of their mean rankings and composite rank orderings in these two situations. (See, for example, Table 9.1.1, 9.1.2 and 9.1.3) The assumption is that if values guide

action, there is little change in their mean rankings and composite rank orderings even after the case situation is specified. Theoretically, mean rankings may range from a high of 1.0 to a low of 5.0, with an average of 3.5.

Mean rankings of values before the case situation is specified are obtained by undergoing the following procedures:

1. Values which appear in the case situation are extracted from the list of values in the Value Survey,
2. Ranks which have been assigned to these values in the Value Survey are rearranged in order of magnitude, and
3. Ranks of 1, 2, 3, and 5 are reassigned to these values according to the rearranged order.

In the Value Survey, one respondent, for instance, assigned to ambition, cooperation, leadership, authenticity, empathy, and respect ranks of 11, 7, 12, 5, 4, and 2 respectively. After going through these procedures, reassigned ranks for these values become 5, 5, 5, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. This new set of rankings can now be used for analysis and comparison.

In each case situation, the report ends with a comparison of the mean rankings of those who agreed and those who disagreed with the statement. (See, for example, Table 9.1.4)

This chapter also describes the case situations as a totality. It begins with a description of mean rankings of values before and when case situations are specified. (See, for example, Table 9.6.5 and 9.6.6) It follows with a comparison of their mean rankings in these two situations. (See, for example, Table 9.6.7)

Also included in this chapter is a description of the correlation between composite rank orderings of values when the case situation is, and is not specified. (See, for example, Table 9.6.8)

Finally, the report includes a brief description of inter-rater reliability in each of these case situations. (See, for example, Table 9.6.9)

9.2 Rank Ordering of Modes of Conduct in Case Situations

9.2.1 Case Situation No. 1

The scenario: You supervise a unit of eight social workers. Annie is by far the most experienced and the most capable one among them. In appreciation of her work, you have recently submitted a strong recommendation to the administration to support her bid for promotion.

Last week Annie was out all week on sick leave. She returned to work earlier this week bringing with her a note from

her doctor confirming her illness. In the meantime your cousin had been on a trip to Malaysia all of last week. When you had dinner with her yesterday, she told you all about the trip and showed you the photos of the interesting people she had met on the trip. Annie was among them.

When you confronted Annie this morning, she readily admitted her fault, apologized for her dishonesty, and promised that she would not repeat the same mistake ever again.

The statement: In view of Annie's excellent performance in the past, you forgive her for her dishonesty and take no further action.

The values: Benevolence, courage, and prudence; honesty, justice, and loyalty.

The issue: This is clearly a case where the moral principle of honesty is being violated. However, does it imply that the social worker who has violated this important principle must be deprived of her prospect for promotion in spite of her excellent performance in the past? To highlight this important issue, the researcher purposely come up with the statement mentioned above. The intention is to find out whether there is any value in this group which is conceived to be more preferable than honesty. Can it be benevolence? courage? justice? loyalty? or prudence?

Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not

specified, justice is by far the most preferred value in this group. This conclusion is supported by the fact that more than one-third of the respondents (35.6 percent) considered this value as "most preferable". Moreover, about four-fifths of the respondents (79.4 percent) included this value in the category labelled "highly preferable" (i.e., ranks 1 to 3). This results in a mean ranking of 2.4. (Table 9.1.1)

Table 9.1.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 1
When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
BEN	17.5	41.2	58.8	3.7	4
COU	7.7	32.0	68.0	4.1	6
PRU	11.3	49.0	51.0	3.6	3
HON	20.1	59.8	40.2	3.2	2
JUS	35.6	79.4	20.6	2.4	1
LOY	7.7	38.7	61.3	3.9	5

Second on the list is honesty which has a mean ranking of 3.2. Even so, about one-fifth of the respondents (20.1 percent) included this value as "most preferable" and almost three-fifths (59.8 percent) included it as "highly preferable".

The four remaining values are close to one another. Prudence is third with a mean ranking of 3.6, benevolence is fourth with a mean ranking of 3.7, loyalty is fifth with a mean ranking of 3.9, and courage comes last with a mean ranking of 4.1. Among the respondents, 41.2 percent included benevolence, 32.0 percent included courage, 49.0 percent included prudence, and 38.7 percent included loyalty as "highly preferable".

When the case situation is specified, honesty replaces justice to become the most preferred value in the group. In actual figures, 41.8 percent of the respondents considered honesty as "most preferable" and 83.0 percent included it in the category of "highly preferable". These represent a sharp increase in its degree of preference and give it a mean ranking of 2.3. In other words, about two-fifths of the respondents feel that since Annie has violated the important principle of honesty, she should be deprived of the opportunity for promotion. (Table 9.1.2)

Moreover, findings indicate that justice is almost as important as honesty in this case situation. Even though only 32.0 percent of the respondents selected justice as the most preferred value, as much as 82.0 percent included it as "highly preferable". These give justice a mean ranking of 2.4, just below that of honesty. In other words, about one-third of the respondents feel that one's decision should not be based on honesty, it should be based on what is right and proper to do.

Table 9.1.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 1 When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
BEN	9.3	18.6	81.4	4.4	6
COU	4.6	23.7	76.3	4.3	5
PRU	6.7	33.0	67.0	4.1	4
HON	41.8	83.0	17.0	2.3	1
JUS	32.0	82.0	18.0	2.4	2
LOY	5.7	57.2	42.8	3.5	3

Third on the list is loyalty. Among the respondents, only 5.7 percent considered this value as "most preferable", but as much as 57.2 percent included it as "highly preferable". These produces a mean ranking of 3.5, very much lower than both honesty and justice.

In the case of moral virtues, they occupy the last three places on the list. Among the respondents, 9.3 percent selected benevolence, but only 4.6 percent selected courage, and 6.7 percent selected prudence as the most preferred value in helping them come to their decisions. Moreover, 18.6 percent included benevolence, 23.7 percent included courage, and 33.0 percent

included prudence in the category of "highly preferable". In comparison, prudence is fourth with a mean ranking of 4.1, courage is fifth with a mean ranking of 4.3, and benevolence is last with a mean ranking of 4.4. Their mean rankings are low and very close to one another.

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.

What observations can be made from the degree of preference of values in this case situation? One, with the exception of justice, differences in the mean rankings of values when the case situation is, and is not specified, are found to be statistically significant for all other values. Moreover, without any exception, there are changes in the composite rank orderings of values.

As it is expected, difference in mean ranking is most significant in the case of honesty. When the case situation is not specified, the mean ranking of this value is 3.2. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 2.3. This produces a positive difference of 0.9. Besides, as a result of this improvement, its composite rank moves up from the second to occupy the first position on the list. (Table 9.1.3)

Quite the contrary, difference in mean ranking is found to be statistically insignificant in the case of justice. In both situations, justice has a mean ranking of 2.4. Its composite rank slips, however, from the first to the second position when the case situation is specified.

Table 9.1.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
T-test of Values in Case No. 1

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
BEN	3.732	4.410	-.678	+
COU	4.103	4.343	-.240	++
PRU	3.608	4.064	-.456	+
HON	3.201	2.253	.948	+
JUS	2.438	2.387	.051	*
LOY	3.912	3.544	.368	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at $< .05$ level.

+ Difference is significant at $< .01$ level.

* Difference is not significant at $< .05$ level.

Changes in mean rankings and composite rank orderings can also be observed in other values. When the case situation is not specified, loyalty is fifth with a mean ranking of 3.9. However, when the case situation is specified, it ranks third with a mean ranking of 3.5. There is a positive difference of 0.4.

Similarly, when the case situation is not specified, prudence is third with a mean ranking of 3.6, benevolence is fourth with a mean ranking of 3.7, and courage is sixth with a mean ranking of 4.1. However, when the case situation is specified, prudence is fourth with a mean ranking of 4.1, courage

is fifth with a mean ranking of 4.3, and benevolence is sixth with a mean rankings of 4.4. This indicates a negative difference of 0.7 for benevolence, 0.2 for courage, and 0.5 for prudence.

It may be of interest to note that, in this case situation, positive differences can be observed in all moral principles and negative differences can be observed in all moral virtues.

Two, changes in mean rankings and composite rank orderings of values seem to be a result of greater preference given to honesty when the case situation is specified. This is expected because this case situation highlights the importance of this moral principle. However, the importance of justice has not been underrated. In the first place, its mean ranking remains more or less the same before and when the situation is specified. Besides, even though its composite rank slips from the first to the second position when the case situation is specified, difference in mean rankings between honesty and justice is only minimal.

Among the respondents, 41 agreed but 153 disagreed with the short statement following the presentation of the case situation. With the exception of loyalty, differences in mean rankings between these two groups of respondents are found to be significant for all other values. (Table 9.1.4)

Table 9.1.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement in Case No. 1

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
BEN	2.707	4.866	-2.159	+
COU	3.707	4.513	-0.806	+
PRU	3.439	4.232	-0.793	+
HON	3.390	1.948	1.442	+
JUS	4.122	1.922	2.200	+
LOY	3.634	3.520	0.114	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at $< .05$ level.

+ Difference is significant at $< .01$ level.

* Difference is not significant at $< .05$ level.

For those who agreed to forgive Annie for her dishonesty and take no further action, the most preferred value is benevolence. It has a mean ranking of 4.4 for all respondents but for those who agreed, its mean ranking turns out to be 2.7. On the other hand, among the respondents who disagreed with the statement, the two most preferred values are honesty and justice. Honesty has a mean ranking of 2.3 for all respondents and 1.9 for those who agreed. Similarly, justice has a mean ranking of 2.4 for all respondents and 1.9 again for those who agreed.

9.2.2 Case Situation No. 2

The scenario: Beth, a client of yours, is an eight-year-old girl, the youngest of four children in the family. She has been a resident in a home for the mentally retarded for the last three years. According to the assessment she is trainable.

Both of Beth's parents are employed. They visit her about once a month. For the past year she has also spent one weekend a month at home. Her home visits have been successful. Both Beth and her family look forward to these monthly visits.

Beth is now ready to return to her family. She is excited about the idea. In a meeting with Beth's parents you explain to them about the home's recommendation and inform them about community resources which can be obtained in the neighbourhood where they live. However, Beth's parents refuse to consider the recommendation. They are happy with the present arrangement and they feel that it would be too much of a strain on the family if Beth is to live at home again.

The statement: In view of the parents' objection, you postpone the plan for Beth's discharge.

The values: Ambition, cooperation, and leadership; authenticity, empathy, and respect.

The issue: This is clearly a case when professional values come

into conflict with institutional values. As social workers we are obliged to serve in the interest of our clients and in the interest of the institution. But whose interest comes first? Besides, how much does the recommendation of the treatment team count? Is it our duty to implement the recommendation of the treatment team in which we participate as a member?

Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case situation is, or is not specified, empathy and respect are found to be "highly preferable". (Tables 9.2.1 and 9.2.2)

Table 9.2.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 2 When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AMB	4.2	18.8	81.2	4.5	6
COO	4.7	26.6	73.4	4.3	4
LEA	3.6	20.8	79.2	4.5	5
AUT	14.6	66.1	33.9	3.2	3
EMP	37.5	80.2	19.8	2.4	2
RES	35.4	87.5	12.5	2.2	1

Table 9.2.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 2 When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AMB	3.6	12.0	88.0	4.6	6
COO	13.5	51.6	48.4	3.6	3
LEA	3.1	23.4	76.6	4.4	5
AUT	13.5	48.4	51.6	3.6	4
EMP	38.5	85.9	14.1	2.2	1
RES	27.6	76.0	24.0	2.6	2

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.

Differences in the mean ranking of values when the case situation is, and is not specified, are found to be statistically significant for authenticity, cooperation and respect. Not unexpectedly, the value which emerges from a position of relative insignificance to a position of relative importance is cooperation. Findings indicate that when the case situation is not specified, it ranks fourth with a mean ranking of 4.3. However, when the case situation is specified, it ranks third with a mean ranking of 3.6. This produces a difference of 0.75. (Table 9.2.3)

In the case of respect, it ranks first with a mean ranking of 2.2 when the case situation is not specified. However, when the case situation is specified, its composite rank slips from the first to the second position and its mean ranking becomes 2.6. A negative difference of 0.4 can be observed. As for authenticity, a negative difference of 0.4 is again observed when the case situation is specified. At the same time, its composite rank slips from the third to the fourth position.

Table 9.2.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
 T-test of Values in Case No. 2

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
AMB	4.479	4.643	-.164	*
COO	4.313	3.555	.758	+
LEA	4.464	4.352	.112	*
AUT	3.208	3.635	-.427	+
EMP	2.359	2.211	.148	*
RES	2.177	2.604	-.427	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level.
 + Difference is significant at < .01 level.
 * Difference is not significant at < .05 level.

Among the respondents, 120 agreed but 72 disagreed with the short statement following the presentation of the case situation.

With the exception of cooperation, differences in the mean ranking of values between these two groups of respondents are significant for all other values. Difference is most significant in the case of respect. Among those who agreed to postpone the plan for Beth's discharge, the mean ranking for respect is 2.2. On the other hand, among those who disagreed, the mean ranking for respect is reduced to 3.2. A negative difference of 1.0 is noted. The same applies to empathy. A difference of 0.8 is noted when mean rankings of these two groups are compared. (Table 9.2.4)

Table 9.2.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement in Case No. 2

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
AMB	4.788	4.403	0.385	+
COO	3.546	3.570	-0.024	*
LEA	4.563	4.000	0.563	+
AUT	3.967	3.083	0.884	+
EMP	1.913	2.708	-0.795	+
RES	2.225	3.236	-1.011	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level
 + Difference is significant at < .01 level
 * Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.3 Case Situation No. 3

The scenario: Calvin, a sixteen-year-old student, has a spinal problem as a result of an injury suffered about a year ago. He has been receiving constant and painful treatments since the day he was injured.

Recently Calvin confided to you, a medical social worker at the hospital in which he is receiving treatment, that he had decided to commit suicide. The reason he wants to put an end to his life is that his widowed father wants to remarry and he feels that he is in the way. Besides, he feels that the pain is becoming more and more intolerable.

Calvin does not want anyone, not even his father, to know about his decision. He asked you for help in finding a foolproof way to end his life.

The statement: In view of Calvin's medical condition, you comply with his request.

The values: Benevolence, courage, and prudence; authenticity, empathy, and respect.

The issue: This is obviously a case when professional values come into serious conflict with moral virtues. As social workers we are obliged to understand the pains and sufferings our clients are going through in their lives and to respect their decisions

when it comes to how their lives are to be lived. Yet, we are also obliged to protect our clients in case of danger and to act rationally and cautiously in their best interest. What action, in this case, is in the best interest of Calvin?

Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not specified, both empathy and respect are considered as "most preferable". However, the composite rank ordering of values changes dramatically when the case situation is specified. Prudence and courage become the most preferred values. (Tables 9.3.1 and 9.3.2)

Table 9.3.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 3 When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AUT	12.4	46.9	53.1	3.7	3
EMP	32.5	74.7	25.3	2.6	2
RES	29.9	78.4	21.6	2.6	1
BEN	9.8	32.5	67.5	4.0	5
COU	5.2	25.8	74.2	4.3	6
PRU	10.3	41.8	58.2	3.8	4

Table 9.3.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 3 When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AUT	12.4	43.8	56.2	3.7	4
EMP	17.5	58.8	41.2	3.3	3
RES	2.6	23.7	76.3	4.4	6
BEN	5.6	29.4	70.6	4.2	5
COU	26.8	62.9	37.1	3.0	2
PRU	35.1	79.9	20.1	2.4	1

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. With the exception of authenticity and benevolence, difference in the mean ranking of values when the case situation is, and is not specified, are found to be statistically significant for all other values. Moreover, such differences are found to be exceptionally high for courage, prudence, and respect. (Table 9.3.3)

When the case situation is not spcified, respect ranks first with a mean ranking of 2.6. However, when the case situation is specified, it ranks sixth with a mean ranking of 4.4. A difference of 1.8 can be recorded. The reverse is found to be

true for courage and prudence. When the case situation is not specified, prudence ranks fourth with a mean ranking of 3.8 and courage ranks sixth with a mean ranking of 4.3. However, when the case situation is specified, prudence becomes first with a mean ranking of 2.4. A difference of 1.4 is noted. Similarly, courage becomes second with a mean ranking of 3.0. This results in a difference of 1.3. Does this imply that when the question of life is at stake, we, as social workers, would turn paternalistic and begin to take away our clients' right to self-determination?

Table 9.3.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
 T-test of Values in Case No. 3

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
AUT	3.665	3.745	-.080	*
EMP	2.613	3.286	-.673	+
RES	2.572	4.389	-1.817	+
BEN	4.046	4.198	-.152	*
COU	4.304	3.010	1.294	+
PRU	3.804	2.371	1.433	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level.
 + Difference is significant at < .01 level.
 * Difference is not significant at < .05 level.

The general feeling of the respondents is that Calvin's suicidal attempt should not be supported. Among the respondents, only 3 agreed to comply with Calvin's request. This may help to explain why differences in mean rankings are found to be statistically insignificant for all values, excepting respect. (Table 9.3.4)

Table 9.3.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement in Case No. 3

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
AUT	5.000	3.725	1.275	*
EMP	3.000	3.291	-0.291	*
RES	1.667	4.432	-2.765	+
BEN	3.667	4.207	-0.540	*
COU	4.333	2.990	1.343	*
PRU	3.333	2.356	0.977	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level

+ Difference is significant at < .01 level

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.4 Case Situation No. 4

The scenario: After marrying for eight years, Mrs. Chan divorced Mr. Chan and obtained custody of their child, May. However, six months after the divorce, Mrs. Chan was informed that her husband had remarried and was planning to appeal to court for the child's custody. Disturbed by the information Mrs. Chan approached a family service agency and requested for counseling service.

In a series of four weekly interviews Mrs. Chan brought up a number of issues, including her reaction to the divorce, her feeling of loneliness and her fear of losing May. She was especially concerned about her inability to cope with her daughter's temper tantrums. She also talked about various ways of handling her frustrations, including the use of physical restraint.

This morning, you received a phone call from a social worker at the Social Welfare Department. She mentioned that she was preparing a report on the Chans for the custodial hearing. She requested for information about your interviews with Mrs. Chan. In her view, Mrs. Chan was incapable of raising May properly.

The statement: In view of Mrs. Chan's present condition you refuse to release information about your interviews with her.

The values: Benevolence, courage, and prudence; ambition, cooperation, and leadership.

The issue: We have here a case when moral values come into conflict with competence values. In social work, we place a strong emphasis on collaboration with other helping professions. Should we, therefore, share our information about Mrs. Chan with our colleague in the hope that a realistic plan can be worked out for the child? Or, 'should we' keep the information to ourselves in order to protect the interest of Mrs. Chan?

Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case situation is, or is not specified, prudence is by far the most preferred value in this group. (Tables 9.4.1 and 9.4.2)

Table 9.4.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 4 When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AMB	5.7	25.0	75.0	4.3	6
COO	11.5	47.9	52.1	3.6	4
LEA	7.3	26.6	73.4	4.2	5
BEN	26.0	59.9	40.1	3.1	2
COU	15.6	64.1	35.9	3.1	3
PRU	33.9	76.6	23.4	2.6	1

Table 9.4.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 4 When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AMB	4.2	16.7	83.3	4.5	6
COO	24.0	58.9	41.1	3.1	2
LEA	3.6	20.3	79.7	4.4	5
BEN	11.5	45.8	51.2	3.7	4
COU	7.3	57.8	42.2	3.4	3
PRU	49.5	92.2	7.8	1.8	1

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.

With the exception of ambition and leadership, differences in the mean ranking of values when the case situation is, and is not specified, are found to be statistically significant for all other values. Difference is most significant in the case of prudence. When the case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 2.6. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 1.8. A difference of 0.75 is observed. Not unexpectedly, cooperation emerges again from a position of relative insignificance to a position of relative importance. When the case situation is not specified, it ranks fourth with a mean ranking of 3.6. However, when the case

situation is specified, it moves up to the second position with a mean ranking becomes 3.1. (Table 9.4.3)

Table 9.4.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
T-test of Values in Case No. 4

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
AMB	4.297	4.469	-.172	*
COO	3.646	3.138	.508	+
LEA	4.229	4.409	-.180	*
BEN	3.115	3.688	-.573	+
COU	3.135	3.448	-.313	++
PRU	2.578	1.849	.729	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level.
+ Difference is significant at < .01 level.
* Difference is not significant at < .05 level.

Among the respondents, 77 agreed not to release information about interviews with Mrs. Chan. 115, however, disagreed. Among those who agreed, benevolence is often considered as the most preferred value alongside with prudence. On the other hand, among those who disagreed, cooperation is the most preferred value alongside with prudence. (Table 9.4.4)

Table 9.4.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement in Case No. 4

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
AMB	4.344	4.552	-0.208	*
COO	4.370	2.313	2.057	+
LEA	4.357	4.444	-0.087	*
BEN	3.084	4.091	-1.007	+
COU	3.110	3.674	-0.564	+
PRU	1.734	1.926	-0.192	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level

+ Difference is significant at < .01 level

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.5 Case Situation No. 5

The scenario: You are the social worker in charge of the Big Brothers Programme which has proved to be extremely successful and is serving 100 young boys. Among the Big Brothers, you are particularly impressed by the performance of Edward who has been a big brother for seven months.

One afternoon Edward mentioned that there was one problem he wanted to share with you in straight confidence. You assured him of your belief in the principle of confidentiality.

Edward explained that he was originally unaware of the programme's formal policy against accepting homosexuals as big brothers. Now that he knew he felt it obligated to inform you that he had been a homosexual for five years. He added that he would like very much to remain as a big brother, at least for Tommy, because their relationship was strong and seemed to be beneficial to both. He assured you that his homosexuality would not get in the way of this relationship.

The statement: In view of Edward's homosexuality you ask him to resign as a volunteer of the Big Brothers Programme.

The values: Honesty, justice, and loyalty; authenticity, empathy, and respect.

The issue: We have here a case where morality comes into conflict

with professional values. Undoubtedly, homosexuality is totally unacceptable in the local context. The agency's policy is a true reflection of society's attitude towards the homosexuals. However, should the interest of Edward and Tommy be taken into consideration?

Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not specified, empathy, justice, and respect are conceived to be more preferable. When the case situation is specified, however, honesty, justice, and respect are conceived to be more preferable. (Tables 9.5.1 and 9.5.2)

Table 9.5.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 5 When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AUT	11.9	39.7	60.3	3.9	5
EMP	28.9	64.9	35.1	2.9	1
RES	20.1	66.0	34.0	3.0	2
HON	9.8	39.7	60.3	3.9	4
JUS	25.8	62.4	37.6	3.0	3
LOY	3.6	27.3	72.7	4.3	6

Table 9.5.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 5 When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AUT	14.4	45.4	54.6	3.7	4
EMP	7.7	35.6	64.4	4.0	6
RES	24.7	57.7	42.3	3.2	2
HON	18.6	52.1	47.9	3.4	3
JUS	25.3	61.9	38.1	3.0	1
LOY	9.3	45.4	54.6	3.8	5

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.

Differences in the mean ranking of values when the case situation is, and is not specified, are found to be statistically significant for empathy, honesty, and loyalty. Difference is found to be greatest in the case of empathy. When the case situation is not specified, it ranks first with a mean ranking of 2.9. However, when the case situation is specified, it ranks sixth with a mean ranking of 4.0. A difference of 1.1 can be recorded. (Table 9.5.3)

Differences are found to be much smaller for honesty and loyalty. When the case situation is not specified, honesty has a

mean ranking of 3.9 and loyalty has a mean ranking of 4.3. However, when the case situation is specified, their mean rankings turn out to be 3.4 and 3.8 respectively, a difference of 0.5 in both cases.

Table 9.5.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
T-test of Values in Case No. 5

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
AUT	3.861	3.665	.196	*
EMP	2.902	4.000	-1.098	+
RES	3.021	3.193	-.172	*
HON	3.876	3.366	.510	+
JUS	3.046	3.010	.036	*
LOY	4.294	3.766	.528	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level.
+ Difference is significant at < .01 level.
* Difference is not significant at < .05 level.

Among the respondents, 100 agreed to ask Edward to resign as a Big Brother and 94 disagreed. For those who agreed, honesty and justice are considered to be more preferable. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, respect is considered to be more preferable. (Table 9.5.4)

Table 9.5.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement in Case No. 5

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
AUT	3.485	3.856	-0.371	*
EMP	4.485	3.484	1.001	+
RES	4.055	2.277	1.778	+
HON	2.945	3.814	-0.869	+
JUS	2.420	3.638	-1.218	+
LOY	3.610	3.931	-0.321	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at $< .05$ level

+ Difference is significant at $< .01$ level

* Difference is not significant at $< .05$ level

9.2.6 Case Situation No. 6

The scenario: Flora Lee is a fifteen-year-old girl but is functioning at the intellectual level of an eleven-year-old. One evening, Mrs. Lee noticed swelling in her daughter's abdomen. She took Flora to see Dr. Wong who explained to Flora that the swelling in her stomach was due to an infection and, because of that, she would have to go to a hospital at a later stage to have the problem corrected.

Later, in the absence of Flora, Dr. Wong informed Mrs. Lee that her daughter was already five months pregnant. He suggested that Flora should not be told about her pregnancy. He was concerned about confusing and distressing Flora and felt that it was in her best interest not to be informed. He also suggested that Mrs. Lee should contact Social Welfare Department to arrange to have Flora's baby adopted.

In your meeting with Mrs. Lee she expressed her ambivalence toward both of Dr. Wong's suggestions. She would like to have a second opinion from you.

The statement: In view of Flora's limited intelligence you advise Mrs. Lee not to tell Flora about her pregnancy.

The values: Honesty, justice, and loyalty; and ambition, cooperation, and leadership.

The issue: This case situation highlights the conflict between client's right to know and social workers' obligation to protect them from being harmed. Moreover, the issue of partnership is brought back again in this case situation. As a member of the treatment team, are we obliged to follow the recommendation of the team? Do we have the duty to persuade our clients to accept the recommendation?

Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case situation is, or is not specified, honesty and justice are considered as "highly preferable". (Table 9.6.1 and 9.6.2)

Table 9.6.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 6 When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AMB	7.3	18.3	81.7	4.4	6
COO	4.7	34.6	65.4	4.1	4
LEA	4.2	20.9	79.1	4.4	5
HON	25.7	78.5	21.5	2.6	2
JUS	45.5	90.1	9.9	2.0	1
LOY	12.6	57.6	42.4	3.4	3

Table 9.6.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 6 When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
AMB	3.1	15.2	84.8	4.5	6
COO	8.9	31.4	68.6	4.1	4
LEA	3.7	24.1	75.9	4.3	5
HON	36.6	76.4	23.6	2.4	2
JUS	39.3	83.8	16.2	2.2	1
LOY	8.4	62.3	37.7	3.4	3

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.
 With the exception of justice, difference in the rank ordering of values is not significant for any other values. Even in the case of justice, the difference is found to be very small, 0.2.
 (Table 9.6.3)

Table 9.6.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
T-test of Values in Case No. 6

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
AMB	4.445	4.531	-.086	*
COO	4.115	4.079	.036	*
LEA	4.435	4.322	.113	*
HON	2.628	2.435	.193	*
JUS	1.979	2.236	-.257	++
LOY	3.398	3.398	.000	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at $< .05$ level.

+ Difference is significant at $< .05$ level.

* Difference is not significant at $< .05$ level.

The general feeling of the respondents seems to be that Flora should be told about her pregnancy. Among the respondents, only 31 agreed to advise Mrs. Lee not to inform Flora. For those who agreed, cooperation and loyalty are considered to be more preferable. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, honesty and justice are conceived to be more preferable. (Table 9.6.4)

Table 9.6.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
AMB	3.936	4.647	-0.711	+
COO	2.468	4.391	-1.923	+
LEA	3.694	4.444	-0.750	+
HON	4.436	2.047	2.389	+
JUS	3.532	1.984	1.548	+
LOY	2.936	3.488	-0.552	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level

+ Difference is significant at < .01 level

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.7 Summary of Findings

Figures from Table 9.6.5 indicate that when case situations are not specified, justice, empathy, and respect are conceived as highly preferable. The means of their mean rankings are 2.5, 2.6, and 2.6 respectively. In each and every case situation, their mean rankings have never fallen below 3.0.

Immediately following this important trio we can find honesty and prudence. The mean of their mean rankings are 3.2

and 3.3 respectively. Further down the list we can find a cluster of five values, including benevolence, authenticity, courage, loyalty, and cooperation. All of these values can be considered as moderately preferable. The mean of their mean rankings are 3.6, 3.6, 3.8, 3.9, and 4.0 respectively. Finally, we can find two values which can be considered as least preferable: ambition and leadership. The means of their mean rankings are the same, 4.4.

Table 9.6.5 Mean Rankings of Modes of Conduct
 When Case Situations Are Not Specified

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6	Mean Rank	
BEN	3.7		4.0	3.1			3.6	6
COU	4.1		4.3	3.1			3.8	8
PRU	3.6		3.8	2.6			3.3	5
HON	3.2				3.9	2.6	3.2	4
JUS	2.4				3.0	2.0	2.5	1
LOY	3.9				4.3	3.4	3.9	9
AMB		4.5		4.3		4.4	4.4	11
COO		4.3		3.6		4.1	4.0	10
LEA		4.5		4.2		4.4	4.4	11
AUT		3.2	3.7		3.9		3.6	6
EMP		2.4	2.6		2.9		2.6	2
RES		2.2	2.6		3.0		2.6	2

When case situations are specified, however, the degree of

preference of these values changes to a certain extent. Figures from Table 9.6.6 indicate that justice, honesty, and prudence are conceived as highly preferable. The means of their mean rankings are 2.5, 2.7, and 2.8 respectively. In other words, empathy and respect have been replaced by honesty and prudence.

Table 9.6.6 Mean Rankings of Modes of Conduct
 When Case Situations Are Specified

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6	Mean Rank
BEN	4.4		4.2	3.7		4.1	10
COU	4.3		3.0	3.4		3.6	6
PRU	4.1		2.4	1.8		2.8	3
HON	2.3				3.4	2.4	2
JUS	2.4				3.0	2.2	1
LOY	3.5				3.8	3.4	6
AMB		4.6		4.5		4.5	12
COO		3.6		3.1		4.1	6
LEA		4.4		4.5		4.3	11
AUT		3.6	3.7		3.7		9
EMP		2.2	3.3		4.0		4
RES		2.6	4.4		3.2		5

Incidentally, empathy and respect have not fallen too far behind. As a matter of fact, they are found tracing honesty and prudence in the fourth and the fifth positions. The means of their mean rankings turn out to be 3.2 and 3.4 respectively.

Both of these values can also be considered as highly preferable.

Further down the list we have a cluster of five values, namely, courage, loyalty, cooperation, authenticity, and benevolence. All of these values can be considered as moderately preferable. The means of their mean rankings are found to be 3.6, 3.6, 3.6, 3.7, and 4.0 respectively. Finally, we can find two values which can be considered as least preferable: leadership and ambition. The means of their mean rankings are 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.

By comparing these two tables, we conclude that the following modes of conduct are conceived as highly preferable among social workers: empathy, honesty, justice, prudence, and respect. Furthermore, we note that the following modes of conduct are conceived as moderately preferable: authenticity, benevolence, cooperation, courage, and loyalty. Finally, we also note that the following modes of conduct are conceived as least preferable: ambition and leadership.

The claim that values serve as a guide to action is not well substantiated. By referring to Table 9.6.7, we can observed that with the exception of Case No. 6, difference of mean rankings is found to be statistically significant for some modes of conduct in all other cases. Differences are found to be the greatest in Case No. 3. We can observe from the same table that the degree of preference for courage, prudence, honesty, and cooperation increases significantly when the case situations are specified.

Quite the contrary, the degree of preference for benevolence, empathy, and respect decreases significantly when the case situations are specified. There is little change, however, for justice, loyalty, ambition, leadership, and authenticity.

Table 9.6.7 Difference in Mean Rankings of
Modes of Conduct

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6
BEN	-0.7		*	-0.6		
COU	*		1.3	*		
PRU	-0.5		1.4	0.7		
HON	0.9				0.5	*
JUS	*				*	*
LOY	*				0.5	*
AMB		*		*		*
COO		0.8		0.5		*
LEA		*		*		*
AUT		-0.4	*		*	
EMP		*	-0.7		-1.1	
RES		-0.4	-1.8		*	

Note: * Difference is not significant at < .01 level.

When the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient is computed for each value in each case situation, it is observed that significant correlation can be found in 30 out of 36

incidences. In two case situations, significant correlation can be found in all six values. In three case situations, significant correlation can be found in five values. In just one case situation, significant correlation can be found in only three values. (Table 9.6.8)

Table 9.6.8 Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient
of Modes of Conduct

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6
BEN	*		++	+		
COU	+		*	+		
PRU	*		+	+		
HON	+				*	+
JUS	+				+	+
LOY	*				+	+
AMB		*		+		+
COO		+		+		+
LEA		+		+		+
AUT		++	++		+	
EMP		+	+		+	
RES		+	+		+	

Note: ++ Correlation is significant at < .05 level.
+ Correlation is significant at < .01 level.
* Correlation is not significant at < .05 level.

Looking at the table from another perspective, it is observed that significant correlation can be found in all three case situations for six modes of conduct: justice, cooperation, leadership, authenticity, empathy, and respect. Moreover, significant correlation can be found in two case situations for the remaining values: benevolence, courage, prudence, honesty, loyalty, and ambition.

When the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is computed for each case situation, it is found that the coefficient is highly significant in four case situations, moderately significant in Case No. 3, and marginally significant in Case No. 5. (Table 9.8.9)

Table 9.6.9 Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W)
According to Case Situations

Case Situation No.	No. of Cases	W	Chi-Square	D.F.	Level of Significance
1	194	.302	293.117	5	.000
2	192	.293	281.220	5	.000
3	194	.188	181.922	5	.000
4	192	.307	294.313	5	.000
5	194	.045	43.980	5	.000
6	191	.315	301.049	5	.000

In other words, respondents are found to be highly consistent in their pattern of rank ordering in four cases, moderately consistent in one case, and minimally consistent in the remaining case.

9.3 Rank Ordering of End-States of Existence in Case Situations

9.3.1 Case Situation No. 7

The scenario: You are the superintendent of a residential training institution for boys with behavioural problems. It is located not too far away from private homes. Over the past years there had been many incidents of burglary in these private homes some of which were committed by boys living in the Hostel.

About a week ago, you received a letter from the Government explaining that the site for the hostel would have to be reclaimed for the purpose of redevelopment into private homes. In return, you would be offered a site in a more remote area where a brand new hostel could be built.

At the staff meeting, most staff resented the idea. They were of the opinion that the decision for reprovisioning was undemocratic. It favoured private developers and residents of private homes in the neighbourhood but it ignored their interest and the interest of boys living in the hostel. They proposed that the Government's offer be rejected.

The statement: In view of the reasons given by your staff, you refuse to accept the Government's offer.

The values: Democracy, equality, and fraternity; freedom, peace, and progress.

The issue: This is clearly a case of conflict of interest. Whose interest is paramount: private developers and residents of private homes, or the children? Undoubtedly, the interest of the children will be affected by the reprovisioning because, unavoidably, they will be isolated from the mainstream of life in the centre of the city. On the other hand, the feeling of security of life and of investment will definitely be enhanced as a result of the reprovisioning. Should social workers think in terms of the interest of the clients they serve, or in the interest of the public at large?

Degree of preference of values. Irrepective of whether the case situation is, or is not specified, equality and democracy are considered as "highly preferable". Freedom, on the other hand, is no longer considered as "highly preferable" when the case situation is specified. (Table 9.7.1 and 9.7.2)

Table 9.7.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 7
When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
DEM	13.9	65.5	34.5	3.2	2
EQU	40.2	82.0	18.0	2.3	1
FRA	5.2	27.3	72.7	4.3	6
FRE	17.0	59.8	40.2	3.2	3
PEA	12.9	33.0	67.0	4.0	4
PRO	10.8	32.5	67.5	4.0	5

Table 9.7.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 7
When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
DEM	27.3	67.0	33.0	2.8	2
EQU	35.1	77.8	22.2	2.4	1
FRA	8.8	40.7	59.3	3.9	4
FRE	6.2	34.5	65.5	4.1	6
PEA	11.3	29.4	70.6	4.1	5
PRO	11.3	49.0	51.0	3.6	3

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.

Difference is most significant in the case of freedom. When the case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 3.2. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking turns out to be 4.1, a difference of 0.9. Differences are also significant for democracy, fraternity, and progress, but such differences tend to be small when compared with that of freedom.

(Table 9.7.3)

Table 9.7.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
T-test of Values in Case No. 7

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
DEM	3.186	2.840	.346	++
EQU	2.284	2.420	-.136	*
FRA	4.268	3.894	.374	+
FRE	3.232	4.111	-.879	+
PEA	3.995	4.106	-.111	*
PRO	4.036	3.629	.407	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at $< .05$ level.

+ Difference is significant at $< .01$ level.

* Difference is not significant at $< .05$ level.

Among the respondents, 112 agreed to refuse to accept the Government's offer while 82 disagreed. For those who agreed, democracy and equality are considered as more preferable. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, peace and progress are considered as more preferable. (Table 9.7.4)

Table 9.7.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
DEM	2.089	3.866	-1.777	+
EQU	1.857	3.189	-1.332	+
FRA	4.071	3.652	0.419	++
FRE	3.920	4.372	-0.452	++
PEA	4.893	3.031	1.862	+
PRO	4.170	2.890	1.280	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level

+ Difference is significant at < .01 level

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.8 Case Situation No. 8

The scenario: Mr. and Mrs. Hung were happily married for sixty-two years. Until about a year ago, both of them managed to maintain good health. However, during the week before his eighty-first birthday, Mr. Hung suffered a severe stroke. Since then he was unable to walk without being held, could no longer read or understand conversations, was incontinent, and had considerable difficulty expressing himself clearly.

After several weeks you informed Mrs. Hung that the hospital had done about all it could to help her husband and that a decision would need to be made about his future care. In response, Mrs. Hung said that she could not bear the thought of having someone else care for her husband and that she would like to try to care for him herself. She realized that it might be very hard for her to provide such care in view of her advanced age.

The statement: In view of Mrs. Hung's determination you support her plan and prepare her for what caring for her husband might entail.

The values: Comfort, love, and security; happiness, power, and pride.

The issue: This is clearly a case which involves personal choice of well-being. Mrs. Hung is determined to sacrifice her survival

values in order to satisfy her self-actualizing values. Her ambition may not be materialised. She may experience a lot of difficulty in trying to care for her husband. Should we discourage her from doing this?

Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case situation is, or is not specified, love is conceived to be by far the most preferred value within the group. When the case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 2.1. When the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 1.9. (Table 9.8.1 and 9.8.2)

Table 9.8.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 8
When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
COM	8.8	37.8	62.2	4.0	5
LOV	47.7	85.5	14.5	2.1	1
SEC	15.0	47.2	52.8	3.6	3
HAP	9.3	52.8	47.2	3.6	2
POW	6.7	30.6	69.4	4.1	6
PRI	12.4	46.1	53.9	3.7	4

Table 9.8.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 8
When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
COM	4.1	32.6	67.4	4.2	6
LOV	59.6	84.5	15.5	1.9	1
SEC	10.9	43.5	56.5	3.7	3
HAP	8.3	54.4	45.6	3.5	2
POW	8.3	41.5	58.5	3.8	4
PRI	8.3	41.5	58.5	3.8	5

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.
With the exception of power, difference in the mean ranking of values is not found to be significant for any other values. Even in the case of power, the difference is only 0.3. (Table 9.8.3)

Table 9.8.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
T-test of Values in Case No. 8

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
COM	3.959	4.150	-.191	*
LOV	2.088	1.948	.140	*
SEC	3.570	3.738	-.168	*
HAP	3.560	3.503	.057	*
POW	4.145	3.829	.316	+
PRI	3.679	3.832	-.153	*

Note: + Difference is significant at $< .01$ level.

* Difference is not significant at $< .05$ level.

The general feeling of the respondents seems to be that Mrs. Hung's plan should be supported. Among the respondents, only 28 disagreed with the action specified in the statement. For those who agreed, love is considered as the most preferred value. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, power and security are considered as more preferable. (Table 9.8.4)

Table 9.8.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
COM	4.209	3.804	0.405	*
LOV	1.703	3.393	-1.690	+
SEC	3.955	2.464	1.491	+
HAP	3.367	4.304	-0.937	+
POW	3.973	2.982	0.991	+
PRI	3.794	4.054	-0.260	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level
+ Difference is significant at < .01 level
* Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.9 Case Situation No. 9

The scenario: Mr. Ip was placed in a mental hospital about two years ago for killing and wounding several young children. According to the medical staff of the hospital, they have done all that is possible to help him recover. In their view, Mr. Ip is now ready to be released to a halfway house for discharged mental patients where he can learn to readapt himself to life in the family and the society.

You are the superintendent of the halfway house. In a way you share the view of the medical staff and you believe that the halfway house will be able to give him support that is most needed at this stage of his life. However, in view of Mr. Ip's violent behaviour which led to his admission, you can foretell the residents' reluctance in accepting him into the halfway house. You can also predict the society's reaction to the halfway house once its people learn about his presence.

The statement: In view of the threat which Mr. Ip may bring to the halfway house, you refuse to admit him.

The values: Freedom, peace, and progress; comfort, love, and security.

The issue: This is clearly a case which involves a conflict of interest between Mr. Ip, residents of the halfway house, and the public at large. Whose interest is paramount? If we refuse to

admit Mr. Ip into the halfway house, his chance of full recovery will definitely be affected. If we admit him we may have to face the resistance of the residents and the public. Besides, without their support, Mr. Ip may not be able to benefit from the programme.

Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not specified, both love and freedom are conceived to be highly preferable. However, when the case situation is specified, progress and love becomes the most preferred values. (Table 9.9.1 and 9.9.2)

Table 9.9.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 9
When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
COM		26.9	73.1	4.2	6
LOV		78.2	21.8	2.4	1
SEC		37.8	62.2	3.9	5
FRE		68.9	31.1	2.9	2
PEA		45.1	54.9	3.8	3
PRO		43.0	57.0	3.8	4

Table 9.9.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 9
When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
COM	1.6	26.9	73.1	4.3	6
LOV	29.5	65.3	34.7	2.9	2
SEC	10.4	36.8	63.2	3.9	4
FRE	17.6	60.6	39.4	3.2	3
PEA	9.8	29.0	71.0	4.1	5
PRO	31.1	74.6	25.4	2.6	1

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.
Not unexpectedly, the value which emerges from a position of relative insignificance to a position of relative importance is progress. Findings indicate that when the case situation is not specified, progress has a mean ranking of 3.8. When the case situation is specified, however, its mean ranking becomes 2.6. A difference of 1.15 is observed. Differences are also significant for love, freedom, and peace, but such differences are small compared with that of progress. (Table 9.3.3)

Table 9.9.3 Differences in Mean Rankings and
T-test of Values in Case No. 9

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
COM	4.228	4.290	-.062	*
LOV	2.440	2.878	-.438	+
SEC	3.938	3.915	.023	*
FRE	2.865	3.194	-.329	++
PEA	3.762	4.101	-.339	+
PRO	3.767	2.622	1.145	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at $< .05$ level.
+ Difference is significant at $< .01$ level.
* Difference is not significant at $< .05$ level.

The general feeling of the respondents seems to be that Mr. Ip should not be refused admission to the half-way house. Among the respondents, only 38 agreed that Mr. Ip should be refused admission. For those who agreed, peace and security are considered as more preferable. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, love and progress are considered as more preferable.
(Table 9.9.4)

Table 9.9.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
COM	4.421	4.258	0.163	*
LOV	4.382	2.510	1.872	+
SEC	2.092	4.361	-2.269	+
FRE	4.303	2.923	1.380	+
PEA	2.066	4.600	-2.534	+
PRO	3.737	2.348	1.389	+

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level

+ Difference is significant at < .01 level

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.10 Case No. 10

The scenario: Residential institutions of the voluntary sector had been planning for the past twelve months to remove some children under their care to small group homes in areas which traditionally had high rates of referrals to them. It is believed that this move will be able to provide the children with better care and will enable them to participate more in the life of the community.

After several months of hard work, you succeeded in setting up the first small group home in a public housing estate. However, a week before the small group home was to begin operation, you found yourself besieged with telephone calls from residents who were outraged about its opening in their community. You responded to most of the calls by explaining the reason for this move. You also assured each caller that the children being referred were carefully selected and would not pose a significant threat to the surrounding community. Even so, you received a signed petition early this morning, protesting the opening of the small group home in their community.

The statement: In view of this petition you postpone the date of opening of the small group home.

The values: Freedom, peace, and progress; happiness, power, and pride.

The issue: This is again a case of conflict of interest between the clients we serve and the public at large. Issues which have been brought up in previous cases emerge again in this case situation.

Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not specified, freedom is conceived to be by far the most preferred value in this group. However, when the case situation is specified, progress turns out to be by far the most preferred value. (Table 9.10.1 and 9.10.2)

Table 9.10.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 10 When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
FRE	37.5	75.5	24.5	2.5	1
PEA	16.1	56.8	43.2	3.4	2
PRO	14.6	46.9	53.1	3.6	4
HAP	16.1	48.4	51.6	3.5	3
POW	4.7	28.6	71.4	4.2	6
PRI	10.9	43.8	56.2	3.8	5

Table 9.10.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 10 When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
FRE	24.5	63.0	37.0	3.0	2
PEA	27.1	47.9	52.1	3.4	3
PRO	32.3	79.7	20.3	2.5	1
HAP	4.2	30.2	69.8	4.2	6
POW	7.8	43.2	56.8	3.8	4
PRI	4.2	31.8	68.2	4.2	5

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. Progress emerges once again from a position of relative insignificance to a position of relative importance in this case situation. When the case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 3.6. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 2.5. A difference of 1.1 is observed. Differences are also significant for freedom, happiness, power, and pride, but such differences are small when compared with that of progress. (Table 9.10.3)

Table 9.10.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
T-test of Values in Case No. 10

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
FRE	2.526	2.995	-.469	+
PEA	3.385	3.383	.002	*
PRO	3.609	2.477	1.132	+
HAP	3.521	4.203	-.682	+
POW	4.178	3.792	.386	+
PRI	3.760	4.151	-.391	+

Note: + Difference is significant at $< .01$ level.

* Difference is not significant at $< .05$ level.

Ambng the respondents, 75 agreed that the date of opening of the half-way house should be postponed, but 116 disagreed. This may be taken to imply that the opinions of the respondents are divided. For those who agreed, peace is considered as the most preferred value. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, freedom and progress are considered as the most preferred values. (Table 9.10.4)

Table 9.10.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
FRE	3.733	2.500	1.233	+
PEA	1.587	4.530	-2.943	+
PRO	3.193	2.017	1.176	+
HAP	4.113	4.254	-0.141	*
POW	4.033	3.660	0.373	*
PRI	4.340	4.039	0.301	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level

+ Difference is significant at < .01 level

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.11 Case Situation No. 11

The scenario: You are a young, promising social worker from a low-income family. You also serve as a member of the district board. With the support of your colleagues at the district board, you have been able to stimulate great interest in community care for the elderly and the handicapped.

Early this week, you were approached by the executive director of your agency who informed you that you would be transferred to the headquarter to take up administrative duties. This meant that you would be given a promotion and, along with it, a substantial increase in salary. In view of the nature of work, this also meant that you would have no time to serve in the district board.

The statment: You accept the promotion and cease serving as a member of the district board.

The values: Democracy, equality, and fraternity; comfort, love, and security.

The issue: This is again a case involving a conflict of interest. In this case, however, the public's interest is in conflict with personal interest. What should a social worker do under this condition? Should a social worker forego one's career prospect in pursuit of one's commitment for a better society?

Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not specified, both equality and love are conceived as "highly preferable". However, when the case situation is specified, comfort, democracy, and equality are conceived as more preferable. (Table 9.11.1 and 9.11.2)

Table 9.11.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 11
When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
COM	5.8	24.3	75.7	4.3	6
LOV	35.4	68.8	31.2	2.7	2
SEC	9.5	35.4	64.6	4.0	4
DEM	10.6	61.9	38.1	3.2	3
EQU	34.9	79.9	20.1	2.4	1
FRA	3.7	29.6	70.4	4.3	5

Table 9.11.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 11 When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
COM	26.5	59.3	40.7	3.1	1
LOV	11.1	39.2	60.8	3.8	5
SEC	10.6	33.3	66.7	3.9	6
DEM	21.2	55.6	44.4	3.2	2
EQU	13.2	57.7	42.3	3.3	3
FRA	17.5	49.7	50.3	3.5	4

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.
 It seems important to point out that in this case situation, differences in the mean ranking of certain values when the case situation is, and is not specified, are found to be exceptionally high. Difference is greatest in the case of comfort. When the case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 4.3. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 3.1, a difference of 1.2.

Difference is also great in the case of love. When the case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 2.7. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking

turns out to be 3.8, a difference of 1.1. Difference is found to be almost equally as great in the case of equality. When the case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 2.4. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 3.3, a difference of 0.9.

Finally, difference is found to be not much smaller in the case of fraternity. When the case situation is not specified, the mean ranking of fraternity is 4.3. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 3.5, a difference of 0.8. (Table 9.11.3)

Table 9.11.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
 T-test of Values in Case No. 11

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
COM	4.318	3.124	1.194	+
LOV	2.730	3.839	-1.109	+
SEC	4.011	3.958	.053	*
DEM	3.249	3.241	.008	*
EQU	2.434	3.349	-.915	+
FRA	4.259	3.489	.770	+

Note: + Difference is significant at < .01 level.
 * Difference is not significant at < .05 level.

Among the respondents, 109 agreed that the promotion should be accepted. On the other hand, 80 disagreed. It may be taken to imply that the opinions of the respondents are divided. For those who agreed, equality and security are considered as more preferable. However, for those who disagreed, democracy and fraternity are considered as more preferable. (Table 9.11.4)

Table 9.11.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed with the Statement

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
AUT	5.000	3.725	1.275	*
EMP	3.000	3.291	-0.291	*
RES	1.667	4.432	-2.765	+
BEN	3.667	4.207	-0.540	*
COU	4.333	2.990	1.343	*
PRU	3.333	2.356	0.977	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level
 + Difference is significant at < .01 level
 * Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.2.12 Case Situation No. 12

The scenario: As a community worker you have devoted great effort in developing indigenous leaders in the community where you work.

In the forthcoming by-election for a member of the district board, you have been approached by both of the candidates. You are personally more impressed by the performance of Mr. Lee who has instigated quite a number of worthwhile projects in the community. In your opinion, Mr. Lee has the ability and the commitment to serve in the interest of the neighbourhood. Moreover, Mr. Lee has openly indicated his plan to make his work at the district board a lifelong career.

Comparing with Mr. Lee, Mr. Leung seems to have neither of Mr. Lee's strengths but he has the support of most indigenous leaders in the community. They find him more sociable and more compliant. They have, in fact, pledge support for Mr. Leung and requested you to do the same.

The statement: In view of Mr. Leung's popularity among the indigenous leaders, you pledged support for him.

The values: Democracy, equality, and fraternity; happiness, power, and pride.

The issue: This interesting case involves a conflict between personal judgment and judgment of the community. In ordinary

situations, social workers as individuals are entitled to personal judgment and are encouraged to standby one's own judgment. In this case, however, social workers also have the responsibility to standby the judgment made by members of the community, particularly when it relates to the interest of the community. What should a social worker do?

Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case situation is, or is not specified, democracy and equality are conceived to be "highly preferable". (Table 9.12.1 and 9.12.2)

Table 9.12.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 12 When Case Situation Is Not Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
DEM	15.2	66.5	33.5	3.0	2
EQU	48.2	86.9	13.1	2.1	1
FRA	6.3	37.7	62.3	4.0	5
HAP	16.2	43.5	56.5	3.7	3
POW	3.7	25.7	74.3	4.3	6
PRI	10.5	39.8	60.2	3.9	4

Table 9.12.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 12
When Case Situation Is Specified

	Most Preferable (Rank 1) (in %)	Highly Preferable (Ranks 1 - 3) (in %)	Least Preferable (Ranks 4 - 5) (in %)	Mean	Rank
DEM	39.8	83.2	16.8	2.2	1
EQU	34.6	83.8	16.2	2.2	2
FRA	5.6	35.6	64.4	4.0	5
HAP	3.1	20.4	79.6	4.5	6
POW	9.4	36.1	63.9	4.0	3
PRI	7.3	35.6	64.4	4.0	4

Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values.
 Is there any difference in the rank ordering of values in these two situations, i.e., when the case situation is, and is not specified?

Difference is greatest in the case of democracy. When the case situation is not specified, the mean ranking of democracy is 3.0. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 2.2, a difference of 0.8.

Difference is just as great in the case of happiness. When the case situation is not specified, the mean ranking of

happiness is 3.7. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 4.5, again a difference of 0.8. (Table 9.12.3)

Table 9.12.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and
 T-test of Values in Case No. 12

	Mean of 1st Survey	Mean of 2nd Survey	Difference	Significance
DEM	3.000	2.217	.783	+
EQU	2.079	2.220	-.121	*
FRA	4.042	4.042	.000	*
HAP	3.696	4.482	-.786	+
POW	4.319	4.005	.314	++
PRI	3.864	4.034	-.170	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level.
 + Difference is significant at < .01 level.
 * Difference is not significant at < .05 level.

The general feeling of the respondents seems to be that the worker should abide by one's own preference. Among the respondents, only 20 agreed to pledge support for the candidate selected by the indigenous leaders. For those who agreed, democracy is considered as the most preferred value. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, equality is considered as the most preferred value alongside with democracy. (Table

9.12.4)

Table 9.12.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed
with the Statement

	Mean Ranking of the Agreed	Mean Ranking of the Disagreed	Difference	Significance
DEM	2.150	2.225	-0.075	*
EQU	3.250	2.099	1.151	+
FRA	3.200	4.140	-0.940	+
HAP	4.700	4.456	0.244	*
POW	3.500	4.064	-0.564	*
PRI	4.200	4.015	0.185	*

Note: ++ Difference is significant at < .05 level

+ Difference is significant at < .01 level

* Difference is not significant at < .05 level

9.3.7 Summary of Findings

Figures from Table 9.12.5 indicate that when case situations are not specified, equality, and love are conceived to be highly preferable. The means of their mean rankings are 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. In each and every case situation, their mean rankings have never fallen below 2.7.

Table 9.12.5 Mean Ranking of End-States of Existence
When Case Situations Are Not Specified

	Case 7	Case 8	Case 9	Case 10	Case 11	Case 12	Mean	Rank
DEM	3.2				3.2	3.0	3.1	4
EQU	2.3				2.4	2.1	2.3	1
FRA	4.3				4.3	4.0	4.2	11
FRE	3.2		2.9	2.5			2.9	3
PEA	4.0		3.8	3.4			3.7	6
PRO	4.0		3.8	3.6			3.8	8
COM		4.0	4.2		4.3		4.2	11
LOV		2.1	2.4		2.7		2.4	2
SEC		3.6	3.9		4.0		3.8	8
HAP		3.6		3.5		3.7	3.6	5
POW		4.1		4.2		4.3	4.2	11
PRI		3.7		3.8		3.9	3.8	8

Immediately following this pair of values we have freedom and democracy which can also be described as highly preferable. The means of their mean rankings are 2.9 and 3.1 respectively. In each and every case situation, their mean rankings have never fallen below 3.2.

Further down the list we can find a cluster of five values, including happiness, peace, progress, security, and pride all of which can be described as moderately preferable. The mean of their mean rankings are 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.8, and 3.8 respectively.

Finally, we have a group of three values, fraternity, comfort, and power. They can be described as least preferable. All of them have a mean ranking of 4.2.

When case situations are specified, equality, democracy, love, and progress can be described as highly preferable. The mean of their mean rankings are found to be 2.3, 2.4, 2.9, and 2.9 respectively. In this case, freedom has been replaced by progress. (Table 9.12.6)

Table 9.12.6 Mean Rankings of End-States of Existence
 When Case Situations Are Specified

	Case 7	Case 8	Case 9	Case 10	Case 11	Case 12	Mean	Rank
DEM	2.8				3.2	2.2	2.7	2
EQU	2.4				3.3	2.2	2.6	1
FRA	3.9				3.5	4.0	3.8	6
FRE	4.1		3.2	3.0			3.4	5
PEA	4.1		4.1	3.4			3.9	9.8
PRO	3.6		2.6	2.5			2.9	3
COM		4.2	4.3		3.1		3.9	9.8
LOV		1.9	2.9		3.8		2.9	3
SEC		3.7	3.9		3.9		3.8	6
HAP		3.5		4.2		4.5	4.1	12
POW		3.8		3.8		4.0	3.9	9.8
PRI		3.8		4.2		4.0	4.0	11

Incidentally, freedom is not too far behind. It occupies the fifth position with a mean of mean ranking of 3.4. It may also be considered as highly preferable.

Further down the list we have a cluster of seven values, including security and fraternity, peace, comfort, and power, pride and happiness. Their mean rankings are 3.8, 3.8, 3.9, 3.9, 3.9, 4.0, and 4.1 respectively.

By comparing these two tables we conclude that the following end-states of existence are conceived as highly preferable among social workers: democracy, equality, freedom, progress, and love. Furthermore, we note that the following end-states of existence are conceived as moderately preferable: happiness, peace, pride, and security. Finally, we also note that the following end-states of existence are conceived as least preferable: comfort, fraternity, and power.

Again, the claim that values serve as a guide to action is not well substantiated. By referring to Table 9.12.7, we can observe that difference in mean rankings is found to be statistically significant for one or more end-states of existence in all case situations. Differences are found to be the greatest in Case No. 11. We can observe from the same table that the degree of preference for democracy, fraternity, progress, comfort, and power increases significantly when the case situations are specified. Quite the contrary, the degree of preference for equality, freedom, love, and happiness decreases

significantly when the case situations are specified. There is little change, however, for peace, security, and pride.

Table 9.12.7 Difference in Mean Rankings of
End-States of Existence

	Case 7	Case 8	Case 9	Case 10	Case 11	Case 12
DEM	*				*	0.8
EQU	*				-0.9	*
FRA	0.4				0.8	*
FRE	-0.9		*	-0.5		
PEA	*		-0.3	*		
PRO	0.4		1.2	1.1		
COM		*	*		1.2	
LOV		*	-0.5		-1.1	
SEC		*	*		*	
HAP		*		-0.7		-0.8
POW		0.3		0.4		*
PRI		*		-0.4		*

* Different is not significant at < .01 level.

When the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient is computed for each value in each case-situation, it is observed that significant correlation can be found in 31 out of 36 incidences. In three case situations, significant correlation can be found in all six values. In one case situation,

significant correlation can be found in five values. Finally, in two case situations, significant correlation can be found in four values. (Table 9.12.8)

Table 9.12.8 Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient
of End-States of Existence

	Case 7	Case 8	Case 9	Case 10	Case 11	Case 12
DEM	*				*	++
EQU	+				++	+
FRA	++				+	+
FRE	+		+	+		
PEA	+		++	+		
PRO	+		+	+		
COM		++	+		++	
LOV		+	+		++	
SEC		+	+		*	
HAP		+		+		*
POW		+		+		+
PRI		+		++		*

- ++ Correlation is significant at < .05 level.
- + Correlation is significant at < .01 level.
- * Correlation is not significant at < .05 level.

Looking at the table from another perspective, it is observed that significant correlation can be found in all three

case situations for most end-states of existence. However, significant correlation can be found in two case situations for security, happiness, and pride, and in only one case situation for democracy.

When the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is computed for each case situation, it is found that the coefficient is highly significant in one case situation, moderately significant in four case situations, and minimally significant in one case situation. (Table 9.12.9)

Table 9.12.9 Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W)
According to Cases No. 7 to No. 12

Case Situation No.	No. of Cases	W	Chi-Square	D.F.	Level of Significance
7	194	.163	157.877	5	.000
8	193	.202	194.412	5	.000
9	193	.158	152.357	5	.000
10	192	.151	145.135	5	.000
11	189	.036	34.253	5	.000
12	191	.332	316.743	5	.000

Section Four

Conclusion

Chapter Ten

Summary and Implications of Findings

10.1 Introduction

In this final chapter, the purpose is to raise questions and to draw conclusions from the research findings. The questions that must be raised and answered can be generalized as including: (1) What is the significance of this study? (2) What has been achieved? (3) What implications do the research findings have on social work, social work education, and research on values?

What is the significance of this study? To reiterate, the central purpose of this study is to suggest a definition of social work which is socially more acceptable and culturally more compatible. To accomplish this, this researcher began with an attempt to identify a cluster of social work values, to formulate a social work value system, and to establish a relationship between value and action in social work practice.

Very briefly, the first chapter of this report began with the observation that social work was striving to acquire a professional status. It was followed by the assumption that the professionalization of social work was not undesirable. The validity of this assumption has not been discussed thus far but it will be discussed later on in this chapter. Also included in the first chapter was a description of the major problem

confronting social work in its struggle for professionalization - the problem of definition.

Relating to this, the second chapter was devoted to a discussion of the problem. As a result of the breadth of its services and diversity of its methods, social work has experienced great difficulty in creating a clear image for itself. This has also proved to be detrimental in its effort to gain recognition as a profession.

The most widely quoted definition in the social work literature is probably the Working Definition of Social Work Practice. Published in 1958, Harriett M. Bartlett noted that social work practice could be recognized by a constellation of five components - value, purpose, sanction, knowledge, and method. She added that none of these components was, by itself, unique to social work or characteristic of social work practice but, when taken as a whole, social work practice could be recognized by the particular content and configuration of these components. (p. 5)

The major contribution of the Working Definition lies in its stipulation that the practice of social work is recognized by a constellation of five components. Many definitions formulated after this have made reference to these components. Needless to say, the Working Definition has its limitations.

In a critique of the Working Definition, William E. Gordon

(1962) identified three of its limitations. The one most relevant to this study noted that "the components ... appeared to stand separate and equal to each other, held together only by the assertion that all must be present to some degree for the practice to be considered social work practice" (pp. 4-5). Thus, in his opinion, the Working Definition "cannot readily serve as a guide for further study and development until its components are functionally related" (p. 5). As a solution, he suggested that since "purposes are largely set by values and techniques are derived from knowledge" (p. 12), much more emphasis than before should be placed on the values and knowledge on which practice was based. This suggestion is well received but insofar as the functional relationship between knowledge and values is concerned, he has offered no solution.

In concluding the discussion, this researcher noted that improvements could still be made in relation to the following:

(1) What are the basic components of social work practice and what is the justification for their inclusion?

(2) What is the functional relationship of these components to one another and to action in social work practice?

(3) What are the contents of these components?

What are the basic components of social work practice and what is the justification for their inclusion? Since social work

is striving to acquire a professional status and it is assumed that its professionalization is not undesirable, the basic components of social work should not be determined without specific reference to the characteristics of a profession. Following a thorough review of three contemporary approaches to the study of professions in Chapter Three, this researcher noted that if social work was to become a profession, it had to undergo a long process, trying to accomplish the following tasks: to obtain the power to deliver services and to control its work, and to acquire the essential characteristics of a profession, namely, (1) a statement of purpose, (2) a body of knowledge, (3) a system of values, and (4) a code of conduct. Consequently, he included these four characteristics as the basic components of social work practice.

What is the functional relationship of these components to one another and to action in social work practice? What are the contents of these components? One major strength of Gordon's definition of social work is his assertion that purposes are largely set by values and techniques are derived from knowledge. However, there is no indication of the relationship between values and knowledge. Insofar as this researcher is concerned, values are functionally related not only to purposes but also to the other components. Following from this, he postulated that (1) if the meaning of value in relation to action were clarified, the functional relationship of these components to one another and to action in social work practice would be more obvious, and (2) if the contents of social work values were determined, the

contents of the other components would also come to surface. Thus in Chapters Four and Five, an attempt was made to clarify the meaning of value and action and to suggest their functional relationship with the other components. Subsequently, in three consecutive chapters - Chapters Seven to Nine - an effort was made to identify a cluster of social work values, to formulate a social work value system, and to explain how this value system could be used to determine the contents of the other components.

10.2 Summary of Findings

1. A cluster of twenty-four values has been identified. In the social work literature, one often hears the claim that the most important characteristic of social work is its diversity. Quite the contrary, social work values are often treated as if they are homogeneous. Many social workers seem to hold on to the belief that social work values are derived from one single dimension. Socialist social workers, for instance, tend to have a stronger preference for liberty, equality, and fraternity; clinical social workers, on the other hand, tend to prefer authenticity, empathy, and respect; and social work administrators tend to advocate for effort, effectiveness, and efficiency. However, this is not necessarily the case. In this study, values were found to emerge from four dimensions: (1) the moral dimension, (2) the organizational dimension, (3) the psychological dimension, and (4) the political dimension. Moreover, these dimensions seemed to correspond well with the subdivisions which appeared in the work of Milton Rokeach on the Nature of Human Values (1973).

According to Rokeach, values could be divided into end-states of existence and modes of conduct. Furthermore, the end-states of existence could be subdivided into social values (cf. the social dimension) and personal values (cf. the psychological dimension) whereas the modes of conduct could be subdivided into moral values (cf. the moral dimension) and competence values (cf. the organizational dimension). These subdivisions gave this researcher the freedom to choose from a wide spectrum of values.

With these subdivisions in mind, this researcher ended up with the following selections:

- (1) social values - democracy, equality, fraternity, freedom, peace, and progress;
- (2) personal values - comfort, happiness, love, power, pride, and security;
- (3) moral values - benevolence, courage, honesty, justice, loyalty, and prudence; and
- (4) competence values - ambition, authenticity, cooperation, empathy, leadership, and respect.

Unavoidably, many will question the rationale for the inclusion of these values and the exclusion of all others. While admitting that the validity of these choices has not been tested, this researcher is prepared to defend his position by claiming that all these values have been carefully chosen through an extensive literature search and they represent values which, in his opinion, should be given high preference.

Many of these chosen values are, in fact, familiar to social workers because they often appear in the social work literature. However, there are also others which have rarely been mentioned. Insofar as this researcher is concerned, these values - ambition, cooperation, and leadership - are as important as the others. At this moment in time, when social workers around the world are striving for professionalism, they must maintain an acceptable standard of professional practice. This can only be achieved through an emphasis on competence in their work. Unfortunately, the importance of these competence values is often underestimated.

2. The degree of preference of the end-states of existence has been found to appear as following:

- (1) highly preferable - democracy, equality, freedom, love, and progress;
- (2) moderately preferable - happiness, peace, pride, and security; and
- (3) least preferable - comfort, fraternity, and power.

Similarly, the degree of preference of the modes of conduct has been found to appear as following:

- (1) highly preferable - empathy, honesty, justice, prudence and respect;
- (2) moderately preferable - authenticity, benevolence, co-operation, courage, and loyalty; and

(3) least preferable - ambition and leadership.

The original intention of the value surveys was to organize these values into a social work value system. The social work value system consists of two subsystems: the end-states of existence and the modes of conduct. Each of these subsystems consists of twelve values which, theoretically, can be arranged in order of preference as conceived by the social workers. In reality, however, the composite rankings of some of these values were so close to one another that all attempts to prove that one value was more preferable than another were found to be unsubstantiated. It seemed more appropriate, therefore, to place values with similar composite rankings in a group and, according to the degree of preference of these values, labelled them as highly preferable, moderately preferable, or least preferable.

In what way can the formation of these groups of values be explained? From the researcher's point of view, it is a reflection of the lack of consensus among social workers as to the order of preference of these values. In the social work literature, values are often listed in groups. There is little discussion of the relative importance of these values. As a consequence, values which are listed as a group tend to be conceived as of equal importance. Empathy and respect, for instance, are often mentioned together. Both have been rated as highly preferable. Similarly, benevolence and courage often appear alongside one another. Again, both have been rated as moderately preferable. For the moment, we may have to accept

this as a reality but the situation needs to be improved and improvement can be made as soon as social workers begin to discuss the relative importance of these values.

How do the research findings affect the idea of a social work value system? In spite of the difficulty mentioned above, the idea of a social work value system is not weakened. Even if social workers have failed in ranking these chosen values individually, they have succeeded in ranking them in groups. This is already a giant step forward. They are now certain that they have a stronger preference for the highly preferables and less preference for the moderately preferables.

3. In case situations where the conflict of values is obvious, social workers tend to rearrange the rank ordering of some of these values.

When the case situations were not specified, findings of the Value Survey revealed that the rank ordering of the end-states of existence was as following:

equality, love, freedom, democracy,
peace, progress, happiness, security, pride, fraternity,
comfort, and power.

Similarly, when the case situations were not specified, the rank ordering of the modes of conduct was found to appear as following:

respect, justice, empathy,
honesty, authenticity, prudence, loyalty, benevolence,
courage,
cooperation, leadership, and ambition.

However, when the case situations were specified, findings of the Value-Action Relationship Survey revealed that of the end-states of existence,

- (1) the degree of preference for comfort, democracy, fraternity, power, and progress increased significantly;
- (2) the degree of preference for equality, freedom, happiness, and love decreased significantly; and
- (3) there was little change for peace, pride, and security.

Similarly, when the case situations were not specified, findings of the Value-Action Relationship Survey revealed that, of the modes of conduct,

- (1) the degree of preference for cooperation, courage, honesty, and prudence increased significantly;
- (2) the degree of preference for benevolence, empathy, and respect decreased significantly; and
- (3) there was little change in ambition, authenticity, justice, leadership, and loyalty.

What calls for this kind of rearrangement? Does it suggest that the practical application of social work values are

ultimately and always subject to some form of influence which is beyond the control of the social worker? (Horne, 1987, p. 94) Not so. Insofar as this researcher is concerned, this is merely a reflection of the need for further elaboration of the meaning of value. This will be done later on in this chapter.

4. In case situations where the conflict of values is obvious, social workers tend to hold different views on the issues involved.

Findings of the Value-Action Relationship Survey revealed that social workers had different views on how they would act in specific case situations. When social workers were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the action of the social worker in specific case situations, almost all respondents (ranging from 79% to 98.5%) gave the same answer in six case situations. In the six remaining case situations, the opinions were divided. Even the smaller group of respondents ranged from 37.5% to 48.5%. In all case situations, those who agreed and those who disagreed were found to have radically different preferences on values. Insofar as the most preferred end-states of existence were concerned, the choice seemed to be between (1) democracy and equality and (2) freedom, love, and progress. Similarly, insofar as the most preferred modes of conduct were concerned, the choice seemed to be between (1) honesty, justice, and prudence and (2) empathy and respect.

10.3 Implications for Social Work: A Personal View of Social Work

What is social work? Based on the research findings, social work is, first of all, an occupation within the social welfare institution which aspires to become a full profession.

The social welfare institution is here defined as a nation's system of social welfare policies and services that seeks "to prevent, alleviate, or contribute to the solution of recognized social problems, or to improve the well-being of individuals, groups, or communities" (Zastrow, 1990, p. 8).

What is a profession? What does it take for social work to become a profession? Is the professionalization of social work desirable? Even though each of the contemporary approaches to definition has its strengths, the experience of social work in its struggle for professionalization raises serious doubts about the adequacy of these approaches. As an alternative, this researcher tries to incorporate all their ideas and come up with the following definition:

a profession is an occupation which has been granted, by significant others in society, a status and, along with it, the power to deliver services and to control its work in a delimited area of activity, after having undergone a developmental process whereby it succeeded in leading significant others to believe that it has acquired a high degree of a constellation of characteristics society has

come to accept as distinctive of a profession.

This constellation of characteristics includes: (1) a body of knowledge, (2) a system of values, (3) a statement of purpose, and (4) a code of conduct. In this understanding, to become a profession, social work has to undergo a long process and to do at least two things, both at the same time. On the one hand, it has to acquire the characteristics of a profession listed above and, on the other hand, it has to obtain a licence and a mandate from significant others in society to deliver services and to control its work in a delimited area of human activity.

What is this delimited area of human activity? Since social work is defined as an occupation within the social welfare institution, the activities of the social worker are necessarily circumscribed by the scope of social welfare. Thus the social worker may be required: (1) to influence the development of social welfare policies, (2) to participate in the management and (3) to participate in the provision of social welfare services.

Who are the significant others in society? Are they prepared to enlarge the mandate of social work to cover (1) the development of social welfare policies, (2) the management of social welfare services, and (3) the provision of social welfare services? In the opinion of this researcher, the significant others in society may not necessarily include the elites. The consumers of social welfare services also have their influence in a democratic society. Provided that they are better organized,

they represent the significant others in society as much as the elites.

Nonetheless, the society is anxiously looking out for an occupation to assume full responsibility for the management of social welfare services and is, therefore, quite prepared to delegate this responsibility to any occupation which has indicated interest. Unfortunately, perhaps with the exception of social work, none of the occupations within the social welfare institution has done so. Consequently, if social work is interested in assuming this responsibility, it should have no difficulty in obtaining a mandate to do so. Insofar as the provision of social welfare services is concerned, the society sees the need for a collaborative effort and social work is prepared to work closely with other occupational groups.

The problem rests with the development of social welfare policies. Even though social work has long indicated interest in performing this task, the society is not prepared to delegate this responsibility to any occupation, including social work. This, however, should not be taken as a total rejection. In a democratic society, the development of social welfare policies should, at least in principle, involve all people in the society. If it is the people's wish to pursue greater democracy and equality, the responsibility for making this happen should fall upon all members of the society. No occupation should claim and be given full responsibility. However, this does not imply that social work, or any other occupation, should refrain from

exercising its influence. Even if the society is not prepared to delegate this responsibility to social work, it certainly welcomes the contribution of social workers.

Should social work become professionalized? On the surface it seems natural that social workers will actively support social work's move toward increased professionalization. Benefits to the profession include higher social status, stronger social influence, and greater bargaining power for pay and work conditions. The client will also enjoy better protection and a higher quality of service. Moreover, social workers tend to believe that professionalization will give them the authority to initiate social change.

In contrast to this benign approach to professionalism, a conflicting perspective suggests that the professions are merely the society's instruments for social control. Instead of giving clients the kind of protection they need, professionalization tends to protect the interest of the professionals. Thus increased professionalization is often blamed for increase in the price of services.

While not denying the evidences of abuses by some professionals, the fear that increased professionalization will force social work to abandon its social purpose is found to be unsubstantiated. Even though social work will not be able to claim a monopoly in the development of social welfare policies, it can play a major role in influencing the development of such

policies. In view of this, it is the contention of this researcher that the professionalization of social work is not undesirable.

What happens when the social worker is engaged in social work practice? In social work practice, the social worker draws upon a body of knowledge, screened by a system of values, to produce and reproduce practice principles which monitor his action in an effort to bring about effective changes either in the person, or in society, or in the interaction between them.

Our understanding of social work practice is noticeably enriched by the work of Anthony Giddens (1984) on structuration. In social work practice, the patterning of social relations between the social worker and the client leads to the formation of a social system. This social system can be extended to include the agency which the social worker represents and the environment in which the client functions. During the helping process, the social worker and the client become agents of social actions which are normally carried out in the practical consciousness of the agents. However, there are often times when the social worker is required to monitor reflexively his interaction with the client. What characterizes the reflexively monitored type of social action is when the social worker is asked to account for his activities, he is able to explain discursively. This usually happens when the social worker is confronted with situations which involve a conflict of values.

Knowledge in this definition of social work includes: (1) professional knowledge, i.e., all that one has learned in professional training - knowledge about the person, the social welfare institution, and the society; knowledge about practice methods and skills; knowledge about values and the professional code of conduct; and knowledge about one's authority and responsibility; and (2) personal knowledge, i.e., all that one has acquired in one's life experience - one's value system and moral codes, one's personal needs and adequacy of one's social functioning, one's outlook in life, past achievements, present lifestyle, and future aspirations. The integration of these two sources becomes the knowledge of the social worker. However, it needs to point out that even though one's professional knowledge may be standardized through the social work curriculum, his personal knowledge is unique to himself. This helps to explain why social workers who have undergone similar training programmes may have radically different views on many issues.

What is a social work value? In the fourth chapter of this report, four approaches to defining values were discussed and, in conclusion, the following definition of a social work value was suggested:

A social work value is a mode of conduct or end-state of existence which is believed to be professionally and socially more preferable than most modes of conduct or end-states of existence.

Similarly, a social work value system was defined as:

an organization of modes of conduct and end-states of existence which is believed to be professionally and socially preferable, along a continuum of relative preference.

In relation to action, values are of two types: (1) values as they are learned, either in one's professional training or in one's life experiences and (2) values as they are used in the production and reproduction of social action. In the case of the former, values may be acquired in one's life experience or in one's professional training. As a consequence, social workers with similar training may differ in the way they rank social work values. Values of this type form part of the social worker's body of knowledge. They are cognitive in nature. In the case of the latter, values function as a screen. It is here that selected knowledge, including learned values, is drawn upon by the social worker and used to produce and reproduce practice principles which monitor his action. This requires the social worker to make a decision on what knowledge is to be used and what practice principles are to be produced and reproduced. Used in this sense, values are evaluative in nature. When values are used to represent part of the social worker's body of knowledge, they have no direct relationship with action. Quite the contrary, when values are used as a screen, they shape the direction of action. This helps to explain why social workers were found to have rearranged the rank ordering of values when

the case situations were specified.

What are the purposes of social work? The purposes of social work are derived from one type of values - the end-states of existence. It has often been noted in the social work literature that social work has a dual purpose: the social and the personal. This is confirmed in the two surveys. Based on the research findings, it was revealed that democracy, equality, freedom, love, and progress were highly preferable among the end-states of existence. Thus the social purpose of social work is to contribute to the building of a society which promotes democracy and equality while safeguarding freedom and progress. This may seem to be self-contradictory but, in view of the political uncertainty of Hong Kong, it is a valid reflection of the feelings of its people. In other words, social change in Hong Kong means much more than the building of a social movement for the transformation to socialism. Social change requires social workers to promote democracy and equality without forsaking freedom and progress. Expressed in this way, social change is much more acceptable to the elites and to the consumers of social welfare services. To accomplish this task, social workers may find the method of intervention suggested by Jeffry Galper (1980) helpful. In providing services to clients, social workers may find it necessary to sow the seeds for bringing about a movement toward the kind of society that is conceived to be preferable, not by radical social workers, but by the society as a whole.

Since love is conceived to be the most preferred personal value, the personal purpose of social work must be to ensure that everyone is able to give love to and receive love from significant others. This points to the need to maintain ties with one's support systems and is in agreement with the concept of community care, whether it be care in the community or care by the community.

The attainment of social work purposes is guided by practice principles which are derived from another set of social work values - the modes of conduct. This does not imply that knowledge is unimportant. It only points to the need for a creative use of knowledge. Despite the importance of knowledge, there are often times when knowledge simply cannot provide social workers with specific instructions. Their creativity rests with their ability to make decisions about what to do and how to achieve them. This is what is referred to as using values as a screen.

In social work practice, the most preferred modes of conduct were found to include empathy, honesty, justice, prudence, and respect. Empathizing and respecting our clients is, beyond any doubt, important in social work, but this should not be taken to imply that we must allow our clients to have a freehand in whatever they want to do. Insofar as this researcher is concerned, the principle of self-determination has to be practised within certain limits. There should be a place for honesty, justice, and prudence. Respect implies the acceptance

of our clients' strengths as well as weaknesses, their ability as well as inability to make decisions at the time help is given to them. Thus we need to be honest with ourselves and with our clients and, after having analysed the problem situation prudently, we may choose to explain to the clients the way we think and the way we feel and then act according to what we think and feel is right and just. In other words, empathy and respect are not the only values of social work. Their use has to be tempered with honesty, justice, and prudence.

An important question can now be raised. What makes this definition of social work better than the ones provided by Bartlett (1958) and Gordon (1962)? In my view, this definition has included the essential components of social work - knowledge, value, purpose, and code of ethics. Having defined value in the way we do, we have also succeeded in formulating a social work value system which has incorporated values of different orientations. Moreover, based on the theory of structuration, we have succeeded in clarifying the functional relationship of these components to one another and to action in social work practice. Needless to say, knowledge is essential in social work practice but when confronted with such a wide array of knowledge to be chosen from and applied to such a wide variety of case situations, social workers must rely on personal judgment to make a decision on what knowledge is to be used in specific case situations. This is how values become functionally related to knowledge and are used to guide its selection.

10.4 Implications for Social Work Education

Social work is a value-laden profession. Its value base permeates the social work curriculum. Since values play such a crucial role in social work practice, it is essential that the educational programme: (1) helps students clarify their own values, and (2) foster the development of those values in students which are consistent with social work practice. Why, and how can this be accomplished?

First of all, we are all guilty of stereotyping which is often the result of the use of personal values instead of professional values to guide our judgment. This happens more often when there is a conflict of professional values. In Case Situation No. 5, for instance, the opinions of the social workers were very divided. Almost equal number of respondents indicated agreement or disagreement with the social worker's action to ask Edward to resign as a volunteer of the Big Brothers Programme. This result is, in fact, expected. In the absence of any clear indication within the profession of the relative importance of empathy and respect as against honesty and justice, social workers resort to personal judgment. However, in order to ensure that the judgment is based on one's knowledge of professional values instead of personal values, an understanding of how unconscious stereotypes become ingrained in one's personal value system, and how they can cloud judgment, is crucial for social workers. Hence, the educational programme must try to help social workers in training to clarify their personal values and

provide opportunities for them to discover how their judgments may be clouded by the unconscious use of stereotypes.

Secondly, in social work education, we tend to emphasize the importance of learning but learning the professional values does not necessarily imply the internalization of these values and the use of such values in social work practice. In Case Situation No. 3, for instance, even though the respondents were well aware of the importance of empathy and respect, almost all of them relied on courage and prudence to help them make their judgment. The reason for this may be explained in the following way.

Based on our understanding of values, every social worker in training must have two set of values - the personal and the professional. Before the internalization of social work values can take place, the social worker must go through a process whereby these two sets of values are compared. This process will take less time to complete if there is little difference between them. It tends to take a longer period if the difference between them is large. Fortunately, social workers in training tend to have personal values which are quite consistent with professional values. Otherwise, they would not choose to study social work in the first place.

If the difference is large, social workers in training may benefit from discussions which highlight the conflict between these two sets of values. My contention is that these two sets of values tend to include similar values. What

distinguishes one from the other is the way these values are described and ranked. Hence, the educational programme should include discussions which help social workers in training to clarify the meaning of these values and to compare the rank ordering of these two sets of values. Such discussions will help to foster the development of values which are consistent with their professional values.

Finally, even if the internalization process is successful and social work values are conceived by the social worker as being compatible with his personal values, there is yet another problem. In real life situations, there are many external constraints which may come from clients, colleagues, agencies, the profession, or the society. It is of little use to refer to the professional code of conduct because it does not offer any ready solution. In Case Situation No. 2, for instance, the conflict of interest between the family we served and the agency in which we worked was obvious. In view of the family's objection, would you postpone the plan for Beth's discharge? The opinions of the social workers were quite divided. Findings of the survey revealed that about 60 percent of the respondents would postpone while the remaining 40 percent would not postpone the discharge plan. In other words, only 40 percent of the respondents would ignore the external constraints and go ahead with their plan. The remaining 60 percent would take the external constraints into consideration and modify their plan accordingly.

How should social workers in training act within these external constraints? Unfortunately, there is no ready answer. The social work value system formulated in this study can only specify the degree of preference of these values. It cannot specify the rank ordering of these values. What is required to produce a more satisfactory answer is to conduct more research along this direction.

10.5 Implications for Research on Values

The method of ranking used in this study has proved to be effective in ordering social work values according to their degree of preference and the use of case situations has also proved to be effective in explicating the relationship between values and action. With some revision, the questionnaire can be used for comparative studies on values.

First of all, this study can be used to compare the value systems of social workers in different societies, of different ethnicity, or with different orientations. Findings of these comparative studies will be able to shed light on the existence or non-existence of a universal value system for the social work profession.

The study can also be used to compare the value systems of social work and the other occupational groups. Since social workers have to work collaboratively with many occupational groups in the provision of services, it would be helpful to know

that social work values are compatible or incompatible with the values of these occupational groups. Becoming aware of the similarities or differences of these value systems will ensure better cooperation with them.

In future research, it may be advisable to reduce the number of values from twenty-four to sixteen, including:

- (1) social values - democracy, equality, freedom and progress;
- (2) personal values - love, happiness, pride, and security;
- (3) moral values - benevolence, honesty, justice, and prudence; and
- (4) competence values - cooperation, empathy, respect, and leadership.

The values which have been left out are either the moderately preferred or the least preferred. Their absence will have little effect on the outcome of the study. Moreover, by reducing the number of values available for selection, the respondents will have to think more carefully in the way they rank these values. As a consequence, the reliability of the study will be increased.

10.6 Concluding Statements

Social work is a value-laden profession. The purpose of social work and the code of conduct of social workers are derived

from social work values. Even knowledge is helpful only if it is compatible with these values. Empirical research on values is, therefore, urgently needed and this exploratory study is nothing more than the beginning of an attempt to meet this need.

Social work values are basically the same for most social workers in most societies and, in this sense, they are universal. They define the purposes of social work and the code of conduct of its practitioners. However, social workers and societies tend to differ in the way they rank these values. Values which reflect unmet needs often receive higher rankings whereas values which reflect met needs are usually given lower rankings. As a consequence, social workers and societies also differ in their preference for the purposes of social work and the code of conduct. Based on this understanding, social work is socially more acceptable and culturally more compatible.

At this moment in Hong Kong, for instance, the major purpose of social work is the pursuit of greater democracy and equality. This does not imply that freedom and progress are conceived as unimportant but this does reveal that as a result of the political uncertainty of the current situation, democracy and equality are conceived to be more important.

Appendices

Appendix A: Letter No. 1

November 19, 1988

The Administrator
Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital
10 Bonham Road
Hong Kong

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am planning to conduct an exploratory study of social work values in Hong Kong. The study is first of its kind. Its findings is expected to be of great value to social work training in the local context. However, the success of the study depends entirely on your cooperation and the cooperation of your staff.

In this planning stage, I need your assistance in sending me a xeroxed copy of the Listing of Social Workers you submitted to the Social Welfare Department earlier this year. The list is to be used for one single purpose - sampling. You can have my assurance that all information provided will be kept in strict confidence. Moreover, all findings will appear as aggregate data. Any information on individual agency or worker will have no place in the report.

At a later stage, I shall have to interview some of your staff. Their participation is strictly voluntary. Even so, I would like to take this opportunity to seek your approval in approaching them individually or in groups.

To facilitate future contact, I would also like to have the name of one of your staff whom I can contact if and when such a need arises.

Thank you very much for your assistance. In case if you have any query, feel free to contact me at 0-6952546 during office hours.

Yours sincerely,

Daniel F. Chan
Lecturer

Appendix B: Letter No. 2

17th February, 1989

Dear Respondents,

Allow me to take up some of your precious time to explain the support that is needed of you. Included in this letter is a questionnaire which is specially designed for my long years of research on social work values and is distributed to hundreds of social work practitioners in Hong Kong, selected through a random sampling process. Please read it carefully, complete it, and return it to me in the self-addressed envelope. If you have any query, feel free to call me at 0-6952546 during office hours.

The questionnaire is a long one and one that may take you an hour or two to complete. Nonetheless, I can assure you that your effort will not be wasted. Findings of this research will be able to make a contribution to the clarification of values in social work practice.

The questionnaire is divided into FOUR sections. Section One is by far the longest. It involves an analysis of twelve case situations. Section Two and Section Three are similar. In each section you are required to rank a list of twelve values in order of your preference. Section Four is on personal particulars. Instructions for completing the questionnaire are given at the beginning of each section.

As an indication of my appreciation of your support, I am prepared to provide you with a summary of the research findings when it is available and, basing on the research findings, to organize a seminar on social work values and implications for social work practice. Please indicate below your interest in receiving the summary and/or attending the seminar.

1. I am interested/not interested* in receiving a summary of the research findings.
2. I am interested/not interested* in attending a seminar on social work values.

Thank you again for your support without which the research will stand no chance of completion.

Yours sincerely,

Daniel F. Chan
Lecturer

* please delete whichever is inappropriate

Appendix C: Letter No. 3

17th March, 1989

Dear Colleagues,

This is a letter of appeal, my personal appeal for your earnest support.

The questionnaire which I mailed to you on February 17 and the information derived from it form an important part of my research on social work values in Hong Kong. Undeniably, the questionnaire is a long one and one that may take an hour or two of your most precious time to complete. Nonetheless, I hope that you would respond to my appeal by going through the questionnaire carefully, completing it, and returning it to me on or before April 15. Needless to say, all information will be kept in strict confidence. However, if you choose not to include your name and address, you are welcome to do so. Moreover, if you need further clarification, feel free to call me at 0-6952546 during office hours.

Thank you again for your support without which the research will stand no chance of completion.

Yours sincerely,

Daniel F. Chan
Lecturer

Appendix D: List of Participating Agencies

Aberdeen Kai-fong Welfare Association Community Centre
Agency for Volunteer Service
Baptist Oi Kwan Social Service
Boys' & Girls' Clubs Association of Hong Kong, the
Caritas - Hong Kong
Chinese Rhenish Church Hong Kong Synod, the
Chinese University of Hong Kong, the
Chinese YMCA, the
Christian Family Service Centre
City Polytechnic of Hong Kong
Family Planning Association of Hong Kong, the
Friends of Scouting, the
Heep Hong Society for Handicapped Children
Hong Kong Association for the Mentally Handicapped, the
Hong Kong Baptist College
Hong Kong Catholic Marriage Advisory Council, the
Hong Kong Children & Youth Services, the
Hong Kong Christian Service
Hong Kong Council of Social Service, the
Hong Kong Family Welfare Society
Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, the
Hong Kong Juvenile Care Centre
Hong Kong PHAB Association
Hong Kong Playground Association
Hong Kong Polytechnic
Hong Kong Red Cross
Hong Kong Shue Yan College
Hong Kong Society for Rehabilitation, the
Hong Kong Society for the Aged, the
Hong Kong Student Aid Society
International Social Service Hong Kong Branch
Mental Health Association of Hong Kong
Methodist Epworth Village Community Centre
New Life Psychiatric Rehabilitation Association
Norwegian Missionary Society
Po Leung Kuk
Sheng Kung Hui Diocesan Welfare Council
Salvation Army, the
Social Welfare Department, Hong Kong Government
Society for the Aid and Rehabilitation of Drug Abusers, the
Society for the Rehabilitation of Offenders, Hong Kong, the
Society of Boys' Centres
Spastics Association of Hong Kong, the
St. James' Settlement
Tung Wah Group of Hospitals
University of Hong Kong, the
Yan Chai Hospital
Yan Oi Tong Community & Indoor Sports Centre
Yang Memorial Social Service Centre
Young Women's Christian Association, Hong Kong

Appendix E: Research Questionnaire

Section One : Analysis of Case Situations

In this part of the Questionnaire, twelve case situations are included. Following the presentation of each case situation is a short statement, an agreement-disagreement measuring scale and a list of six values each of which is briefly defined. The values included in the first six case situations represent modes of conduct that are found to be desirable for social workers in their interaction with clients or colleagues. On the other hand, the values included in the last six case situations represent end-states of existence that are found to be desirable for the recipients of social services or for the society at large. Read through these case situations carefully and do the following for each:

1. Specify whether you agree or disagree with the statement by placing a ✓ in the appropriate space.
2. Specify the intensity of your agreement or disagreement by placing a ✓ in the appropriate space.
3. Write 1 next to the value which you consider is the most important, 2 next to the value which you consider is second in importance, and 3 next to the value which you consider is third in importance in guiding you to your decision. Make sure that you have chosen three and have left the remaining three unnumbered.

The Sample is an illustration of how this section can be completed.

Sample

Mr. Chu, a client of yours, has been found to have a serious genetic disease, but one that does not manifest itself until later in life. He tells you that he does not want his wife to know about his condition because he wants to have children. He is afraid that his wife may not be willing to become pregnant if she knows about his condition. The chance that a child of theirs will inherit this genetic disease is 25 percent.

In view of Mr. Chu's genetic condition, you Agree ✓
comply with his request. Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

 ✓
Strong Agreement Strong Disagreement

Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:

Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one-self and consistent in one's thought and action	
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of others and the meaning of those feelings	
Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing with others; requires one to seek and tell the truth	
Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is right and what is wrong	1
Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of others; requires one to remain faithful to one's promises	3
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right to self-determination, confidentiality and privacy and ability to be rule-following	2

Explanation: I do not comply with Mr. Chu's request because I feel the need to be fair to both Mr. and Mrs. Chu, to respect Mrs. Chu's right to self-determination as much as Mr. Chu's. Besides, Mr. and Mrs. Chu belongs to a family and is, therefore, considered as a unit of attention. For this reason I feel obligated to serve in the interest of both.

1. You supervise a unit of eight social workers. Annie is by far the most experienced and the most capable one among them. In appreciation of her work, you have recently submitted a strong recommendation to the administration to support her bid for promotion.

Last week Annie was out all week on sick leave. She returned to work earlier this week bringing with her a note from her doctor confirming her illness. In the meantime your cousin had been on a trip to Malaysia all of last week. When you had dinner with her yesterday, she told you all about the trip and showed you the photos of the interesting people she had met on the trip. Annie was among them.

When you confronted Annie this morning, she readily admitted her fault, apologized for her dishonesty, and promised that she would not repeat the same mistake ever again.

In view of Annie's excellent performance in the past, you forgive her for her dishonesty and take no further action.

Agree _____
Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement _____ Strong Disagreement _____

Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:

Benevolence: a compassion for the suffering of others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, forgiving, and accepting

Courage: a readiness to take a stand on controversies; requires one to take risks, to withstand criticism & to endure danger or hardship

Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing with others; requires one to seek and tell the truth

Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is right and what is wrong

Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of others; requires one to remain faithful to one's promises

Prudence: a disposition to act cautiously; requires one to be broadminded and to exercise judgment based on knowledge and consultation

2. Beth, a client of yours, is an eight-year-old girl, the youngest of four children in the family. She has been a resident in a home for the mentally retarded for the last three years. According to the assessment she is trainable.

Both of Beth's parents are employed. They visit her about once a month. For the past year she has also spent one weekend a month at home. Her home visits have been successful. Both Beth and her family look forward to these monthly visits.

Beth is now ready to return to her family. She is excited about the idea. In a meeting with Beth's parents you explain to them about the home's recommendation and inform them about community resources which can be obtained in the neighbourhood where they live. However, Beth's parents refuse to consider the recommendation. They are happy with the present arrangement and they feel that it would be too much of a strain on the family if Beth is to live at home again.

In view of the parents' objection, you Agree _____
postpone the plan for Beth's discharge. Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Ambition: a commitment to work, to produce result, and to advance in knowledge and position; requires dedication and hard work	
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one-self and consistent in one's thought and action	
Cooperation: a willingness to work as a member of a team and to pursue the team's goals; requires one to be cooperative and follow instructions	
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of others and the meaning of those feelings	
Leadership: an ability to solicit support from others; requires one to be persuasive and to exercise one's power and authority	
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right to self-determination, confidentiality and privacy and ability to be rule-following	

3. Calvin, a sixteen-year-old student, has a spinal problem as a result of an injury suffered about a year ago. He has been receiving constant and painful treatments since the day he was injured.

Recently Calvin confided to you, a medical social worker at the hospital in which he is receiving treatment, that he had decided to commit suicide. The reason he wants to put an end to his life is that his widowed father wants to remarry and he feels that he is in the way. Besides, he also finds the pain increasingly intolerable.

Calvin does not want anyone, not even his father, to know about his decision. He asks you for help in finding a foolproof way to end his life.

In view of Calvin's medical condition, you Agree _____
comply with his request. Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one-self and consistent in one's thought and action	
Benevolence: a compassion for the suffering of others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, forgiving, and accepting	
Courage: a readiness to take a stand on controversies; requires one to take risks, to withstand criticism & to endure danger or hardship	
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of others and the meaning of those feelings	
Prudence: a disposition to act cautiously; requires one to be broadminded and to exercise judgment based on knowledge and consultation	
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right to self-determination, confidentiality and privacy and ability to be rule-following	

4. After marrying for eight years, Mrs. Chan divorced Mr. Chan and obtained custody of their child, May. However, six months after the divorce, Mrs. Chan was informed that her husband had remarried and was planning to appeal to court for the child's custody. Disturbed by the information Mrs. Chan approached a family service agency and requested for counseling service.

In a series of four weekly interviews Mrs. Chan brought up a number of issues, including her fear about loosing May and her concern about her inability to cope with her daughter's temper tantrums. She also talked about various ways of handling her frustrations, including the use of physical restraint.

This morning, you received a phone call from a social worker at the Social Welfare Department. She mentioned that she was preparing a report on the Chans for the custodial hearing. She requested for information about your interviews with Mrs. Chan. In her view, Mrs. Chan was incapable of raising May properly.

In view of Mrs. Chan's present condition you Agree _____
refuse to release information about your Disagree _____
interviews with her.

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Ambition: a commitment to work, to produce result, and to advance in knowledge and position; requires dedication and hard work	
Benevolence: a compassion for the suffering of others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, forgiving, and accepting	
Cooperation: a willingness to work as a member of a team and to pursue the team's goals; requires one to be cooperative and follow instructions	
Courage: a readiness to take a stand on controversies; requires one to take risks, to withstand criticism & to endure danger or hardship	
Leadership: an ability to solicit support from others; requires one to be persuasive and to exercise one's power and authority	
Prudence: a disposition to act cautiously; requires one to be broadminded and to exercise judgment based on knowledge and consultation	

5. You are the social worker in charge of the Big Brothers Programme which has proved to be extremely successful and is serving 100 young boys. Among the Big Brothers, you are particularly impressed by the performance of Edward who has been a big brother for seven months.

One afternoon Edward mentioned that there was one problem he wanted to share with you in strict confidence. You assured him of your belief in the principle of confidentiality.

Edward explained that he was originally unaware of the programme's formal policy against accepting homosexuals as big brothers. Now that he knew he felt it obligated to inform you that he had been a homosexual for five years. He added that he would like very much to remain as a big brother, at least for Tommy, because their relationship was strong and seemed to be beneficial to both. He assured you that his homosexuality would not get in the way of this relationship.

In view of Edward's homosexuality you ask him to resign as a volunteer of the Big Brothers Programme. Agree _____
Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one-self and consistent in one's thought and action	
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of others and the meaning of those feelings	
Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing with others; requires one to seek and tell the truth	
Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is right and what is wrong	
Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of others; requires one to remain faithful to one's promises	
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right to self-determination, confidentiality and privacy and ability to be rule-following	

6. Flora Lee is fifteen but is functioning at the intellectual level of an eleven-year-old. One evening, Mrs. Lee noticed swelling in her daughter's abdomen. Mrs. Lee took Flora to see Dr. Wong who explained to Flora that the swelling in her stomach was due to an infection and, because of that, she would have to go to hospital at a later stage to have the problem corrected.

Later, in the absence of Flora, Dr. Wong informed Mrs. Lee that her daughter was already five months pregnant. He suggested that Flora should not be told about her pregnancy. He was concerned about confusing and distressing Flora and felt that it was in her best interest not to be informed. He also suggested that Mrs. Lee should contact the Social Welfare Department to arrange to have Flora's baby adopted.

In your meeting with Mrs. Lee she expressed her ambivalence toward both of Dr. Wong's suggestions. She would like to have a second opinion from you.

In view of Flora's limited intelligence you Agree _____
advise Mrs. Lee not to tell Flora about her Disagree _____
pregnancy.

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Ambition: a commitment to work, to produce result, and to advance in knowledge and position; requires dedication and hard work	
Cooperation: a willingness to work as a member of a team and to pursue the team's goals; requires one to be cooperative and follow instructions	
Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing with others; requires one to seek and tell the truth	
Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is right and what is wrong	
Leadership: an ability to solicit support from others; requires one to be persuasive and to exercise one's power and authority	
Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of others; requires one to remain faithful to one's promises	

7. You are the superintendent of a residential training institution for boys with behavioural problems. It is located not too far away from private homes. Over the past years there had been many incidents of burglary in these private homes some of which were committed by boys living in the Hostel.

About a week ago, you received a letter from the Government explaining that the site for the hostel would have to be reclaimed for the purpose of redevelopment into private homes. In return, you would be offered a site in a more remote area where a brand new hostel could be built.

At the staff meeting, most staff resented the idea. They were of the opinion that the decision for reprovisioning was undemocratic. It favoured private developers and residents of private homes in the neighbourhood but it ignored their interest and the interest of boys living in the hostel. They proposed that the Government's offer be rejected.

In view of the reasons given by your staff, Agree _____

you refuse to accept the Government's offer. Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement

Strong
Disagreement

Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:

Democracy: a sense of involvement, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to take part in the governing process which affects them

Equality: a sense of fairness, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to equal treatment and an equal share of society's resources

Fraternity: a sense of brotherhood, resulting from society's commitment to promote mutual help and social responsibility

Freedom: a sense of autonomy, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to live or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly

Peace: a sense of social harmony, resulting from society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain order and stability, and to enforce law

Progress: a sense of well-being, resulting from society's commitment to improve the quality of life of everyone in society

8. Mr. and Mrs. Hung were happily married for sixty-two years. Until about a year ago, both of them managed to maintain good health. However, during the week before his eighty-first birthday, Mr. Hung suffered a severe stroke. Since then he was unable to walk without being held, could no longer read or understand conversations, was incontinent, and had considerable difficulty expressing himself clearly.

After several weeks you informed Mrs. Hung that the hospital had done about all it could to help her husband and that a decision would need to be made about his future care. In response, Mrs. Hung said that she could not bear the thought of having someone else care for her husband and that she would like to try to care for him herself. She realized that she would need to be available to her husband nearly twenty-four hours a day and that it might be very hard for her to provide such care in view of her advanced age.

In view of Mrs. Hung's determination you support her plan and prepare her for what caring for her husband might entail

Agree _____

Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Comfort: a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from one's possession of basic goods essential for quality living	
Happiness: a feeling of contentment, deriving from one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one hopes to obtain, or achieve	
Love: a feeling of being accepted, deriving from one's ability to give affection to and receive affection from significant others in one's life	
Power: a feeling of self in control, deriving from one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's resources to cope with one's problems	
Pride: a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving from society's and significant other's recognition of one's contribution to work, family, and society	
Security: a feeling of inner harmony, deriving from the absence of fear of death and violence and uncertainty of future	

9. Mr. Ip was placed in a mental hospital about two years ago for killing and wounding several young children. According to the medical staff of the hospital, they have done all that is possible to help him recover. In their view, Mr. Ip is now ready to be released to a halfway house for discharged mental patients where he can learn to readapt himself to life in the family and the society.

You are the superintendent of the halfway house. In a way you share the view of the medical staff and you believe that the halfway house will be able to give him the support that is most needed at this stage of his life. However, in view of Mr. Ip's violent behaviour which led to his admission, you can foretell the residents' reluctance in accepting him into the halfway house. You can also predict the society's reaction to the halfway house once its people learn about his presence.

In view of the threat which Mr. Ip may bring to the halfway house, you refuse to admit him. Agree _____
Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Comfort: a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from one's possession of basic goods essential for quality living	
Freedom: a sense of autonomy, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to live or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly	
Love: a feeling of being accepted, deriving from one's ability to give affection to and receive affection from significant others in one's life	
Peace: a sense of social harmony, resulting from society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain order and stability, and to enforce law	
Progress: a sense of well-being, resulting from society's commitment to improve the quality of life of everyone in society	
Security: a feeling of inner harmony, deriving from the absence of fear of death and violence and uncertainty of future	

10. Residential institutions of the voluntary sector had been planning for the past twelve months to remove some children under their care to small group homes in areas which traditionally had high rates of referrals to them. It is believed that this move will be able to provide the children with better care and will enable them to participate more in the life of the community.

After several months of hard work, you succeeded in setting up the first small group home in a public housing estate. However, a week before the small group home was to begin operation, you found yourself besieged with telephone calls from residents who were outraged about its opening in their community. You responded to most of the calls by explaining the reason for this move. You also assured each caller that the children being referred were carefully selected and would not pose a significant threat to the surrounding community. Even so, you received a signed petition early this morning, protesting the opening of the small group home in their community.

In view of this petition you postpone the Agree _____
date of opening of the small group home. Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Freedom: a sense of autonomy, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to live or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly	
Happiness: a feeling of contentment, deriving from one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one hopes to obtain, or achieve	
Peace: a sense of social harmony, resulting from society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain order and stability, and to enforce law	
Power: a feeling of self in control, deriving from one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's resources to cope with one's problems	
Pride: a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving from society's and significant other's recognition of one's contribution to work, family, and society	
Progress: a sense of well-being, resulting from society's commitment to improve the quality of life of everyone in society	

11. You are a young, promising social worker from a low-income family. You also serve as a member of the district board. With the support of your colleagues at the district board, you have been able to stimulate great interest in community care for the elderly and the handicapped.

Early this week, you were approached by the executive director of your agency who informed you that you would be transferred to the headquarters to take up administrative duties. This meant that you would be given a promotion and, along with it, a substantial increase in salary. In view of the nature of work, this also meant that you would not have time to serve in the district board.

You accept the promotion and cease serving as a member of the district board. Agree _____ Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement	Strong Disagreement
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:	
Comfort: a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from one's possession of basic goods essential for quality living	
Democracy: a sense of involvement, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to take part in the governing process which affects them	
Equality: a sense of fairness, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to equal treatment and an equal share of society's resources	
Fraternity: a sense of brotherhood, resulting from society's commitment to promote mutual help and social responsibility	
Love: a feeling of being accepted, deriving from one's ability to give affection to and receive affection from significant others in one's life	
Security: a feeling of inner harmony, deriving from the absence of fear of death and violence and uncertainty of future	

12. As a community worker you have devoted great effort in developing indigenous leaders in the community where you work.

In the forthcoming by-election for a member of the district board, you have been approached by both of the candidates. You are personally more impressed by the performance of Mr. Lee who has instigated quite a number of worthwhile projects in the community. In your opinion, Mr. Lee has the ability and the commitment to serve in the interest of the neighbourhood. Moreover, Mr. Lee has openly indicated his plan to make his work at the district board a lifelong career.

Comparing with Mr. Lee, Mr. Leung seems to have neither of Mr. Lee's strengths but he has the support of most indigenous leaders in the community. They find him more sociable and more compliant. They have, in fact, pledged support for Mr. Leung and requested you to do the same.

In view of Mr. Leung's popularity among the indigenous leaders, you pledge support for him.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

Intensity of your agreement or disagreement:

Strong Agreement

Strong Disagreement

Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance in helping you come to a decision:

Democracy: a sense of involvement, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to take part in the governing process which affects them

Equality: a sense of fairness, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to equal treatment and an equal share of society's resources

Fraternity: a sense of brotherhood, resulting from society's commitment to promote mutual help and social responsibility

Happiness: a feeling of contentment, deriving from one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one hopes to obtain, or achieve

Power: a feeling of self in control, deriving from one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's resources to cope with one's problems

Pride: a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving from society's and significant other's recognition of one's contribution to work, family, and society

Section Two : Ranking of Values (1)

You have here a list of twelve values each of which is briefly defined to indicate an end-state of existence which we, as social workers, hope to acquire either in society or for our clients. Read through this list carefully, write 1 next to the value which you consider is the most preferable, 2 next to the value which you consider is second in preference, 3 next to the value which you consider is third in preference, and continue with this method of ranking until you have assigned a number (ranging from 1 to 12) to each value on the list to indicate your order of preference for these values. No number should be repeated.

Ranking of values in order of your preference.

----- Comfort: a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from one's possession of basic goods essential for quality living -----	-----
----- Democracy: a sense of involvement, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to take part in the governing process which affects them -----	-----
----- Equality: a sense of fairness, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to equal treatment and an equal share of society's resources -----	-----
----- Fraternity: a sense of brotherhood, resulting from society's commitment to promote mutual help and social responsibility -----	-----
----- Freedom: a sense of autonomy, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's right to live or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly -----	-----
----- Happiness: a feeling of contentment, deriving from one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one hopes to obtain, or achieve -----	-----
----- Love: a feeling of being accepted, deriving from one's ability to give affection to and receive affection from significant others in one's life -----	-----
----- Peace: a sense of social harmony, resulting from society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain order and stability, and to enforce law -----	-----
----- Power: a feeling of self in control, deriving from one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's resources to meet one's needs -----	-----
----- Pride: a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving from society's and significant other's recognition of one's contribution to work, family, and society -----	-----
----- Progress: a sense of well-being, resulting from society's commitment to improve the quality of life of everyone in society -----	-----
----- Security: a feeling of inner harmony, deriving from the absence of fear of death and violence and uncertainty of future -----	-----

Section Three : Ranking of Values (2)

You have here another list of twelve values each of which is briefly defined to indicate a preferable mode of conduct to be found in social workers, particularly in their interaction with clients or colleagues. Read through this list carefully, write 1 next to the value which you consider is the most preferable, 2 next to the value which you consider is second in preference, 3 next to the value which you consider is third in preference, and continue with this method of ranking until you have assigned a number (ranging from 1 to 12) to each value on the list to indicate your order of preference for these values. No number should be repeated.

Ranking of values in order of your preference.

Ambition: a commitment to work, to produce result, and to advance in knowledge and position; requires dedication and hard work	
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one-self and consistent in one's thought and action	
Benevolence: a compassion for the suffering of others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, forgiving, and accepting	
Cooperation: a willingness to work as a member of a team and to pursue the team's goals; requires one to be cooperative and follow instructions	
Courage: a readiness to take a stand on controversies; requires one to take risks, to withstand criticism & to endure danger or hardship	
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of others and the meaning of those feelings	
Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing with others; requires one to seek and tell the truth	
Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is right and what is wrong	
Leadership: an ability to solicit support from others; requires one to be persuasive and to exercise one's power and authority	
Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of others; requires one to remain faithful to one's promises	
Prudence: a disposition to act cautiously; requires one to be broadminded and to exercise judgment based on knowledge and consultation	
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right to self-determination, confidentiality and privacy and ability to be rule-following	

Section Four : Personal Particulars

Needless to say all information provided in this section will be kept in strict confidence. To facilitate contact in case if it is needed in future, you are requested to fill in your name, mailing address and telephone number in the spaces provided.

Among the items, 3, 4 and 9 are self-explanatory.

In Item 5, the rank of social workers refers to the substantive rank. The acting rank of any worker, who is acting at a higher rank either with a view for promotion or for administrative convenience, is ignored. The rank 'SWO & above' includes SWO, SSWO, CSWO and all ranks above these; 'Lecturer, Field Instructor and Supervisor' includes all those whose main employment, either full-time or part-time, is in training institutions.

In Item 6, 'Highest Qualification' refers to the highest recognized qualification attained by social workers. 'Degree training in SW' includes both undergraduate or post-graduate training in social work; 'Non-degree training in SW' includes diploma in social work, certificate in social studies, certificate issued by the former Institute on Social Work Training, and cadetship; 'Untrained in SW' includes non-social-work degrees, non-social-work diplomas, matriculation, and school certificate.

In Item 7, 'Area of Service' refers to those areas of service reported by social workers in the data-input form. For social workers who are engaged in more than one type of service, the service in which they spend the highest proportion of their time should be recorded.

In item 8, 'Job Role' refers to the social worker's primary function as reported in the data-input form. For social workers who are engaged in more than one type of function, the function in which they spend the highest proportion of their time should be recorded.

Personal Particulars:

1. Name and Mailing Address:

2. Telephone Number:

3. Sex:

Male _____

Female _____

5. Rank:

SWO & above _____

ASWO _____

SSWA & SWA _____

Lecturer, Field
Instructor &
Supervisor _____

7. Area of Service:

Offenders and
drug abusers _____

Family welfare _____

Elderly _____

Community
development _____

Young people _____

Rehabilitation _____

Medical social
service _____

Training _____

Central
administration _____

Others _____

4. Age:

20 - 34 _____

35 & above _____

6. Highest Qualification:

Degree training
in SW _____

Non-degree training
in SW _____

Untrained in SW _____

8. Job Role:

Frontline _____

Supervisory _____

Administrative _____

Teaching &
training _____

9. Length of Service
in SW Field

5 years or less _____

over 5 - 10 years _____

over 10 - 15 years _____

over 15 - 20 years _____

over 20 years _____

Appendix F: Bibliography

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