Poland's Shifting Security and Defence Roles: Implications for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

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Introduction

ESDP¹ has developed rapidly since its inception in 1999 with a total of 23 ESDP missions, including six military operations, conducted between 2003 and today. In this respect, it has been the larger Member States which have moved the policy forward politically and contributed the most operationally. Nonetheless, the development of ESDP has and will require more than the political will and military contributions of France, the UK and Germany. This is especially significant considering the differences in threat perception between 'old' and 'new' Member States, particularly concerning Russia which could affect the development of ESDP. The relatively small size and scope of ESDP missions conducted thus far in addition to initiatives such as the EU Battlegroup Concept, which allows smaller states to take a leadership role, means that medium sized Member States can likewise take on a role in developing ESDP. Indeed in order for ESDP to truly represent the EU, it is vital that they do so. Therefore, as a vocal, medium sized country and the largest of the new EU member states in terms of size and military capabilities, who has come under pressure to do more to participate, Poland has the potential to make an impact on ESDP. Indeed it is essential that the country does so, in order to ensure that ESDP continues to evolve in accordance to Polish security and defence interests, including their desire for closer EU-NATO working relations and for ESDP to become more active in the Eastern neighbourhood.

Nevertheless, as an Atlanticist, with a strong attachment to NATO's Article Five guarantee underwritten by the Americans and concerns regarding Russian intentions in its immediate neighbourhood, Poland initially reacted sceptically to the creation and development of a European Security and Defence Policy. This pro-Atlanticist stance was highlighted during the 2003 Iraq war when the Poles, as part of 'new Europe', supported their American allies. Despite this, 2003 also saw Poland begin to take an active part in ESDP, including in the discussions on the European Security Strategy (ESS) and participation in ESDP missions. This more realistic stance has gathered pace as Poland has looked to play an increasingly constructive role within ESDP. What is so surprising about Poland's more positive outlook is that the country is participating in missions outside of its immediate defence interests, which at first sight conflicts with Polish threat perceptions and where the Poles believe force should be used.

The aim of this article is therefore to analyse continuity and change in Poland's security and defence views, how this has impacted upon Polish engagement in ESDP and consequently what the implications are for the development of ESDP. It does so through the use of two interconnected concepts: strategic culture and role theory. The former highlights the central role played by the interpretation of historical events in the formation of how a country's policy-makers view the use of force. It provides policy-makers with a range of beliefs, attitudes and norms concerning appropriate actions within the security and defence arena, which then subsequently shapes a country's policy-makers' conceptions towards defence issues. Role theory meanwhile considers the process by which a country's policy-makers implement the country's role conceptions. Within its framework of role conceptions, role expectations and role behaviour it provides a clearer understanding as to how a foreign policy actor will perform on the world stage. Thus it links policy outcomes with the beliefs, attitudes and norms displayed by the ruling elite. Whilst both approaches highlight continuity over change, the latter can still occur when

external factors challenge two or more aspects of a country's role conceptions, which are based on its strategic culture, causing conflict between them.

It is argued that change in Polish security and defence policy has occurred due to three main developments which have caused a conflict between key Polish role conceptions. First was the transformation of the international situation following 9/11 which underlined the new security threats. Interconnected with this have been increased international expectations on Poland to enhance its role in the military sphere. Indeed due to Poland's allies' reactions to the changed international environment, Poland has found itself having to participate in missions outside of its security interests in order to retain its role as a 'reliable ally' as seen in Iraq. Finally, Poland's accession to the EU allowed the country to fully contribute to ESDP. Thus Polish decision-makers' pro-active view of military force combined with a desire for the country to be a 'reliable ally' and to be included in decisions affecting the country's interests has ensured increased Polish participation in ESDP. This is despite the fact that the Poles' threat perceptions and immediate defence concerns are focused on the neighbourhood.

Finally, the article concludes that Poland's shift in security thinking and increased support for the EU as a security actor in its own right, so long as it remains within the civil-military domain, thus leaving the hard security components to NATO, has positive implications for the development of ESDP. In particular, Polish acceptance of ESDP highlights that despite divergences between Polish approaches to security and those of other Member States, particularly in relation to conceptions of Russia, where force should be used and multilateralism, active participation and even a leadership role at the EU level is possible. This underlines the possibility that the beginnings of a European strategic culture can be seen, one which is based upon a comprehensive view of security, thus stressing a civil-military role. Most importantly, Poland's positive approach acts as a role model for other Member States to increase their contributions, turning ESDP into more than a German, French and British exercise.

Constructing an analytical approach to explore Poland's security and defence policy orientation

As stated in the introduction, strategic culture and role theory will form the analytical foundation of this article. Both are subsets of foreign policy analysis and are based on the premise that foreign and security policies are 'socially constructed'.² Strategic culture relates to the beliefs, attitudes and norms concerning the use of force, held by a security community which has had a 'unique historical experience'.³ It is the interpretation of these historical events which is key to the understanding and advancement of strategic culture. The development of a 'strategic culture' takes place over a period of time and is highly stable as values, beliefs and the way they are interpreted become embedded and reinforced in society.⁴ It can however be subject to change, usually in reaction to events in the external security environment, although it is not necessarily the case that change will automatically arise. This is because strategic culture once socialised is difficult to change as it is also institutionalised.⁵ It should also be noted that strategic culture shapes a country's security policy preferences, rather than ranking the various available options. Thus behaviour is an integral part of strategic culture as opposed to being separated from it.⁶ Finally, concentration on strategic culture highlights that a relatively narrow definition of a country's security policy which encompasses solely military aspects is taken here, as opposed to a wider definition encompassing non-military attributes.⁷ In the Polish case, this is necessary as military issues still form the core of Polish perceptions of security and it is therefore more salient to analyse continuity and change concerning the country's views on the use of force.

Nonetheless, whilst strategic culture is a valid tool to use when assessing what a country's security and defence policy is founded upon and how this might impact upon how a country's policy-makers choose to act, it is difficult to ascertain how this reaches or influences the EU or international levels. Thus, role theory will be used in order to activate strategic culture, whilst at the same time encompassing other factors which are of importance to the way in which a country defines its role. These include international expectations and a country's position vis-à-vis the EU. Therefore the utility of role theory is in the depth of understanding that it provides as to how certain beliefs and attitudes find expression in a country's security and defence policy and which elements of a country's role set provides policy-makers with guidance for action in various situations in the international environment.

Role theory comprises role expectations (the role(s) that an external actor believes another actor should play), role conceptions (the role(s) a foreign policy actor believes it should play) and role performance (the role(s) which are played).⁸ Role conceptions in particular are extremely persuasive in shaping a country's security and defence policy as they incorporate a country's strategic culture in addition to other factors such as a country's status vis-à-vis the EU. They can be defined as 'the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decision, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state and of the functions, if any their state should be performing on a continuing basis in the international system'.⁹ Indeed strategic culture provides the foundation for the development of a country's role conceptions as it acts as a lens through which all beliefs, attitudes and norms have to be filtered.

International expectations meanwhile only have a minor influence on a country's security and defence policy.¹⁰ This is because its policy is culturally rooted in its strategic culture. Nonetheless, international expectations can in turn produce role conflicts because they can impact upon core components of a country's strategic culture which can lead to a shift in a country's role conceptions. Hence role expectations are crucial when investigating change in a country's role. In essence role expectations, role conceptions and role performance combine to form a role set, which includes various roles that a country holds, although these are not always complimentary. As long as conflicting roles are used in different circumstances there is no conflict. It is when different dominant conceptions of role collide in the same policy area that there is the potential for role change. However the circumstances in which roles are used can change, which automatically impacts upon those roles. In particular this concerns changes in the international environment as roles are initiated and developed within specific contexts. Thus, when the international situation changes a country's role(s) can be placed in conflict. When conceptions of role collide then this usually indicates that parts of a strategic culture are also in conflict due to the linkage between the two.

Activating the Analytical Framework: Polish Strategic Culture and Initial Role Set

In order to activate the analytical framework outlined above four categories will be used which underline the key issues within European security and defence: threat perception, the use of force, multilateralism and the rule of law and the EU as an independent security and defence actor. Through an assessment of continuity and change in Polish views towards these areas it will be possible to assess what leadership role (if any) Poland wishes to take on and how in turn this will impact on ESDP. Finally, only the views of policymakers will be taken into consideration rather than public opinion as a whole, as it is the elites who are central to forming a country's security and defence policy and their views are therefore more relevant as well as accessible.¹¹ In addition it is possible to interview them, which forms the foundation of this research.

Domestic politics will, however, not form part of the assessment. Once a country's strategic culture has been formed it is extremely difficult to change and when change does occur it will be incremental and in reaction to external sources which cause conflict within a country's role conceptions, of which strategic culture forms a part. Indeed there has been agreement on the main tenets of Polish security and defence aims across the political spectrum as will be highlighted throughout this article. Poland's changing view towards ESDP began slowly to change within the Buzek led AWS government which was in power from 1997 to 2001 and this continued within the 2001-2005 parliamentary term. Whilst there was a change of Prime Minister from Leszek Miller to Marek Belka (both of whom were from the left wing SLD) and cabinet in 2004 (although it should be noted that no election was held), Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz continued as Foreign Minister and Szmajdziński as Minister of Defence. The pragmatic approach which was built up during this period continued under the more EU critical right wing Law and Justice led government which came to power in 2005 under the leadership of Lech Kaczyński who replaced Kwaśniewski as President and Jarosław Kaczyński who eventually became Prime Minister in 2006.¹² Finally the current centre-right Civic Platform government led by Donald Tusk which came to power in 2007 has continued Poland's active participation in ESDP. Whilst Tusk's government is more pro-EU than its predecessor, change has occurred in style rather than substance.¹³

In order to analyse continuity and change in Poland's approach to security and defence it is first necessary to outline the key tenets of the country's strategic culture. This is founded on its history of heroic defeat and its status as a victim of *Realpolitik*.¹⁴ In particular the Poles betrayal by their allies at Yalta in 1945 is especially significant and has led to the Polish belief that the country should be a dependable ally, it should support the principle of self-determination and that Poland should always participate in decisions concerning its interests.¹⁵ This has resulted in the country's pro-Atlanticist orientation and a fixation with NATO and its Article Five security guarantee, underwritten by the Americans, as well as a proclivity to use force. Essentially, Poland's European allies had failed at every point to support and protect the country against invasion in 1939 and this scepticism regarding the European's security and defence competence remained.

Polish strategic culture then feeds into a number of security and defence roles which subsequently shaped the country's approach to security and defence issues. These are outlined here in order to provide the foundation on which to assess Polish reactions to the creation and initial development of ESDP which shall be advanced in the next section. First, Poland can be seen as an American 'protectee' and 'territorial defender'. The latter is focused on the defence of Poland in case of invasion primarily by Russia which continued to be viewed as a threat to Polish independence. This led to the former whereby only the US was trusted to protect Poland's security if necessary. Connected with Poland's threat perception roles are its use of force roles as a 'reliable ally' and using force pro-actively. Despite the centrality of NATO and the US in Polish security, highlighting the country's 'Atlanticist' role conception, Poland was still a 'sceptical multilateralist'. Although this role might seem surprising, considering the emphasis placed on the 'return to Europe' through EU and NATO membership, it relates more specifically to the UN. Due to Poland being let down by their allies such a multilateral organisation, representing differing values, was seen sceptically. Finally, in recognition of the importance of Eastern Europe to Polish security, the Poles looked to play the role of promoter of regional cooperation so as not to become a buffer zone or security grey area. Indeed Poland has been portrayed as a regional leader in the east, with the potential to shape Europe's security and defence policy.¹⁶ However as will be seen, Polish decision-makers have downplayed this role.

The roles identified above (American ‘protectee’, ‘territorial defender’, ‘reliable ally’, pro-active regarding the use of force, ‘sceptical multilateralist’, ‘Atlanticist’ and promoter of regional cooperation) have combined to form a role set. This shaped Poland’s security and defence perspectives and thus the Poles’ reaction to ESDP. It should be noted that changes in the external environment or in a country’s international standing do not necessarily conduce a country to alter their security and defence policy. Rather it is how these changes are interpreted which is of significance. In Poland’s case, the new international situation, which has brought about new threats and ways of dealing with them, has challenged key aspects of Poland’s security and defence policy and has brought key roles into conflict with each other. As will be highlighted, this combined with increased role expectations from Poland’s allies and the country’s own change in circumstances due to membership of the EU has led to incremental adaptation in the country’s security and defence policy which has impacted upon the role it wishes to play in ESDP.

Poland’s initial views on ESDP: From scepticism to pragmatism

The foundations of ESDP can be seen in the Anglo-Franco St Malo declaration of December 1998 although its formal creation at the EU level occurred at the Cologne European Council in June 1999; three months after Poland had joined NATO in March 1999. It arose out of a finely balanced compromise which brought together ‘Europeanist’ and ‘Atlanticist’ visions of security. Nonetheless, there is continuing divergence between the Member States regarding how ESDP should work with NATO in addition to disagreements concerning when, where and how force should be used. ESDP has also been hindered by a lack of military capabilities, held back by Member States’ static or declining defence budgets and political willingness which have arisen out of this incoherence concerning the direction of ESDP.

The Atlanticist orientated UK had agreed to the creation of ESDP as a response to US calls for Europe to take up the responsibility of its own regional security and thus ESDP was seen as strengthening rather than weakening the alliance. Combined with this was the realisation that the EU needed to strengthen its capacity to act following Kosovo. Despite these arguments, Poland’s leaders initially reacted extremely sceptically to ESDP. They were particularly concerned that ESDP would challenge NATO, alienate the US and in turn give Russia more influence. Additionally, Poland’s leaders were worried that ESDP would exclude non-EU European NATO members in an area which was crucial to the continent as a whole.¹⁷ As Kuźniar underlines ‘for a state, which was not a European Union member, and which had just obtained NATO membership – predominantly thanks to Washington’s pressure in favour of enlargement – the situation became extremely uncomfortable’.¹⁸ Thus Poland’s policy-makers’ response followed that of the US.¹⁹ This initial scepticism has gradually been replaced with a more realistic assessment of the policy. As the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cimoszewicz, highlighted ESDP ‘should be able to provide the means necessary for combating terrorism and help preserve the commitment of the United States to the security of its European allies’.²⁰ Poland’s policy-makers therefore suggested the 15+6 framework which brought together the fifteen EU Member States and the six non-EU European NATO states into a forum in which they could discuss European security and defence issues.²¹

However, prior to accession, Poland’s leaders still needed to be convinced about the rationale behind ESDP. Indeed, Poland’s inclusion or otherwise, shaped the country’s policy-makers’ approach to certain ESDP initiatives. In particular, the Poles were sceptical of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ which was initially incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty. As the current Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich stated in an interview ‘we were

indeed a bit hesitant in the first round of the constitutional debate on permanent enhanced cooperation because we found ourselves faced with a concept of a 'select' club, with just a few participating states'.²² Thus Polish policy-makers were fearful that the country would be 'excluded'. In addition there was the concern that permanent structured cooperation would result in collective defence, leading to duplication with NATO's core function.²³ The other item which could also have caused problems for Poland was the solidarity clause. Nonetheless, Polish policy-makers' reaction was practical though scepticism remained. As the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Cimoszewicz stated in 2003, 'Poland would accept a solidarity clause in the Treaty, in case of a terrorist attack, nevertheless limited to dealing with its effects on the territory of a member state. Finding the security of all member states indivisible, Poland has serious reservations about the idea of closer co-operation in ESDP'.²⁴ Yet, as Kuźniar highlights 'Polish fears diminished in the course of the evolution for the project and the establishment of regular contacts between the European Union and NATO. Towards the end of 2000, Warsaw remained dissatisfied with the extent of her participation in work concerning ESDP (...) Nonetheless, an essentially positive attitude was expressed by Poland'.²⁵

Thus, Poland's Atlanticism, highlighted through its role as American 'protectee' combined with its 'outsider' status coloured the country's policy-makers' response to ESDP. As such, Poland was sceptical of the EU as an independent security and defence actor. Whilst politically this can be highlighted through the Poles' response to the European Security Strategy (ESS), militarily there was an evolving pragmatism in Polish policy-makers' stance towards ESDP, demonstrated through Polish participation in ESDP missions.

Poland and the European Security Strategy (ESS)

Polish apprehensions regarding ESDP can be emphasised through the changes that Poland suggested to the ESS in 2003 which were focused on regional security and EU-NATO relations. In relation to the former the Poles highlighted that Russia should be mentioned as a potential source of instability in addition to a possible international partner, they wanted more emphasis on traditional security threats and they did not want Ukraine placed besides Belarus as a country, which threatened instability.²⁶ Whilst their suggestion regarding traditional security was included, although they were not the only ones to raise this issue, their concerns regarding Russia were not incorporated. Meanwhile, Ukraine, Belarus as well as Moldova were removed altogether. In regards to EU-NATO relations, they wanted more emphasis placed upon NATO, which was not included. As such the ESS did not completely reflect Poland's security stance. It failed to fully emphasise more traditional defence tasks and highlighted a greater role for the EU in international security tasks in contrast to Poland's more regional focus on its security. Evidently, these suggestions emphasise Polish strategic culture and security and defence roles as an American 'protectee', territorial defender as well as highlighting the importance of Polish relations to countries on its eastern border.

Considering the above, the response in Poland to the ESS was muted. Therefore, whilst the ESS was uncontroversial, likewise there was little that really corresponded to the Poles' own vision of their security. Polish policy-makers did not have a global vision of the countries' defence interests mainly because the country has never had an overseas empire. Therefore its global defence interests in places such as Africa are limited. This contrasts with the ESS which gives the EU a global security vision. Additionally the ESS' emphasis on effective multilateralism suggests a stronger connection to organisations such as the UN than is the case in Poland. Interestingly though, the Poles did accept the original phrase 'pre-emptive engagement' contained within the ESS draft,²⁷ highlighting their pro-activeness towards the use of force.

However, it should also be remembered that they were at the time, participating in the US' 'coalition of the willing' in the invasion of Iraq, highlighting the Poles' role as a dependable ally.

Despite the indifferent reaction, the ESS has clearly had an influence on Poland's own security strategy, as the authors of the 2003 National Security Strategy (NSS) were the same as those who submitted Poland's input into the ESS draft.²⁸ Although new security threats such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states have been included these exist alongside older threats. As is stated in the NSS 'the changes in our security environment essentially consist in a shift of emphasis away from the classical risks (armed invasion) that decrease in importance and towards the unconventional risks (...)' However, monitoring the situation for any resurgence of conventional risks also remains a valid priority'.²⁹ Another area of convergence relates to the holistic nature of security which is central to the ESS and which also appears in Poland's NSS. However, the NSS underlines the absolute importance of NATO to Polish security and that complementarity between the organisations is essential.³⁰ The question is how far the ESS has helped to widen Polish security and defence interests as the new international situation demanded and whether divergences between the EU and Polish levels are narrowing.

Poland's early military involvement in ESDP

Whilst politically, the ESS and Polish security and defence interests did not always coincide, this did not prevent Polish policy-makers from supplying personnel to ESDP missions. Of the four missions which were deployed prior to Polish accession (EU Police Mission (EUPM) Bosnia and Herzegovina, Operation Concordia – FYR Macedonia, Operation Artemis – DR Congo and EUPOL Proxima – FYR Macedonia), the Poles took part in all but Artemis. Whilst the numbers sent were small, Poland still contributed more than any other accession country.³¹ Clearly Polish policy-makers' commitment to ESDP missions has been directed towards the Balkans as opposed to the Congo, as the country's security interests are concentrated on the neighbourhood.

Another area where Poland contributed positively was to the Force Catalogue in 2000. The Polish input included 500 personnel, half a brigade, one aircraft, two helicopters and two ships.³² This compared favourably with the other two central and eastern European countries who were members of NATO but not the EU: the Czech Republic (500 personnel, one nuclear/bacteriological/chemical battalion, one infantry battalion, one field hospital, two aircraft and two helicopters) and Hungary (250 personnel and one mechanised infantry battalion).³³ The question remains – why did Polish policy-makers contribute to a policy which they were politically sceptical about? There are two reasons behind this. First was the importance of the EU for Poland's identity and economic prosperity. However Poland's European credentials were being called into question due to Polish participation in the Iraq war. Thus Polish policy-makers wanted to prove that the country was a reliable ally to its European partners.³⁴ The second reason was to ensure that Polish security perspectives were taken into consideration, including the central importance of EU-NATO compatibility and that ESDP did not discriminate against the non-EU European NATO members. Thus Polish role conceptions ensured the country's policy-makers participated in a policy which was still seen sceptically prior to accession.

Continuity and Change in Poland's Approach to Security and Defence Issues

The section above has outlined Poland's initial sceptical but pragmatic approach to ESDP. Essentially the newly created ESDP was seen within the context of NATO rather than as a policy in its own right. However Polish policy-makers' opinions on ESDP have shifted as Poland went

from candidate country to full member, which allowed the Poles to have a full say in decisions affecting their interests. The Poles' emphasis on playing an active role in ESDP has ensured a change in some of the views concerning Polish security and defence interests, although reservations on a number of important issues remain. This section will outline where change has occurred and why in other areas continuity can be seen.

Threat perceptions

The fast changing international situation following 1989 and then 9/11, which reinforced the new security threats, has changed the way in which Poland's allies such as the US view security issues. Thus Poland's roles as American 'protectee' and territorial defender were placed under continued pressure as the Poles were expected to take on the new security tasks. Whilst these have been incorporated into Poland's 2003 and 2007 National Security Strategies, they failed to undermine old security threats. Essentially, Polish threat perceptions are concentrated on the neighbourhood and in particular Russia. As Cichocki states, 'Russia will attempt to expand its influence in East Central and Eastern Europe. (...) The question is whether our partner countries see this risk and are prepared to fulfil their obligations to provide for our security'.³⁵ However, concerns over Russian influence referred more to energy security than to any immediate military threat. As the Polish 2007 NSS states 'the dependence of the Polish economy on supplies of energy resources – crude oil and natural gas – from one source is the greatest external threat to our security'.³⁶ There have also been concerns over instability and unpredictability of development in Russia as well as Russian behaviour regarding democracy in Ukraine.³⁷

Considering the importance of neighbourhood security concerns, NATO's Article Five guarantee, underwritten by the Americans continued to be placed centre stage. As the previous Foreign Minister, Anna Fotyga stated 'we steadfastly promote the view that the North Atlantic alliance should remain an effective instrument of collective defence, while being fully capable of confronting new threats. We want continuation of the American engagement in Europe, as a guarantee of security and politico-military stability on the continent'.³⁸ The significance of NATO's Article Five guarantee is also highlighted in Poland's National Security Strategies highlighting broad consensus on the country's security and defence policy among Polish policy-makers.

NATO's Article Five guarantee has however come up for discussion in the context of NATO's new strategic concept. Kamp highlights the main areas of disagreement between the Member States where NATO's role is concerned including, most importantly in the Polish context, the balance between NATO's territorial defence role and its expeditionary operations and maintaining the credibility of Article Five.³⁹ In the case of the former, the argument revolves around those who want NATO to concentrate more on the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly after the Georgia crisis and those, such as the UK and the US, who want NATO to intervene and integrate globally and to acknowledge more explicitly today's global threats including such issues as cyber terrorism.⁴⁰ Poland evidently falls into the first camp. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikorski states, 'NATO should recover its traditional role not just as an Alliance but as a military organization, and once again devote a portion of its energy to the treaty area'.⁴¹ In this respect, Polish policy-makers want to see a balance between Article Five tasks and expeditionary missions. In relation to the latter, Polish policy-makers also want the Article Five guarantee to be made more credible. Sikorski comments that 'we need contingency planning that is not immobilized or guttered by political correctness. We need to make the NATO guarantee credible again'.⁴² Whilst the Poles accept that NATO should engage in stabilisation missions outside the Euro-Atlantic area, this should not deflect from the importance of Article Five and steps should be taken to ensure its credibility. As former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rotfeld is a

member of the group of 12 “wise men”, which has been set up under the leadership of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to draft NATO’s strategic priorities; Polish views will be well represented.

Despite a seeming conflict between Poland’s policy-makers’ focus on old security threats and the ESS’ concentration on new security tasks, this has not prevented the Poles from taking up an increasing military role in ESDP. This is partly because Polish policy-makers’ concerns encompass hard rather than soft security tasks as seen with the Poles’ stance on Article Five. Whilst the country still sees the Americans as guarantors of Poland’s security, Polish threat perceptions have widened. Hence the role of territorial defender has shifted towards a territorial defender ‘plus’ role, whereby both new and old threats are taken into consideration but the focus is placed on the country’s neighbourhood and particularly the potential threat from Russia as a regional de-stabiliser. Essentially, the Poles find it easier to see the rationale behind actively engaging in their neighbourhood in comparison to Africa for example and are not as focused on the new security tasks as these are not seen to be as important for Poland’s security and territorial integrity.

The use of force

As highlighted above, Polish policy-makers have a pro-active view regarding the use of force, especially when supporting their allies. This can be seen through Polish participation in NATO missions (see table 1). However it was Polish participation in the US’ coalition of the willing in Iraq which emphasised Polish policy-makers’ desire for the country to be seen as a dependable ally and as Cimoszewicz highlighted ‘one of the most important partners of the USA in Europe’.⁴³ Whilst Polish policy-makers see the use of force as a last resort, the threshold is lower than for countries with stricter definitions such as Germany. The country’s stabilisation role was underlined in the 2003 NSS as enhancing ‘Poland’s international standing and will add to Poland’s prestige and image as a responsible and dependable partner on the international scene’.⁴⁴ Thus Poland’s role as a reliable ally has ensured that the Polish armed forces are deployed wherever in the world they are needed irrespective of the country’s immediate defence interests. Despite Poland’s dependability which was rewarded with the control of one of the Iraqi zones, this did not bring about the rewards that had been expected. As Melamed states, ‘expectations –many of them overly optimistic – ranged from loosened visa restrictions on Polish citizens, economic investment opportunities for Polish companies in Iraq and international recognition of Poland as a regional power enjoying a “special relationship” with the US’.⁴⁵ This has led to a more realistic approach to Polish-US relations.

Table 1 - Polish Participation in ESDP, NATO and UN Military Missions⁴⁶

ESDP Military Missions	Year	Total number of personnel	Polish personnel
Operation Concordia – FYR Macedonia	March-December 2003	400	17 – 6 th largest contributor
EUFOR Althea – Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 2004 to present	7000 personnel in 2004 to 2500 personnel by the end of 2007	2005 – 226 Before February 2007 - 195 2009 - 203 8 th largest contributor

EUFOR Congo	June-November 2006	2300	130 - joint 3 rd largest contributor
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA	January 2008-March 2009	3700	400 - joint 2 nd largest contributor
NATO Missions			
IFOR	December 1995 – December 1996	60,000	670
SFOR – Bosnia-Herzegovina	December 1996-2004	1996 – 31,000 Early 2001 – 19,000 End 2002 – 12,000 2004 – 7,000	1997 - 500 December 2000 - 289
AFOR - Albania	April-September 1999	8,080	140
KFOR – Kosovo	1999 – present	1999 – 50,000 Early 2002 – 39,000 June 2003 – 26,000 End 2003 – 17,500 2010 - 10,713	545 in 2000 reduced to the current level of 320 personnel
ISAF - Afghanistan	2001-2003 – ‘coalition of the willing’ operating under a UN peace-enforcement mandate August 2003 to present – under NATO command	2003 – 5,000 Beginning 2006 – c. 10,000 Summer 1996 – c. 20,000 January 2007 – 35,460 February 2008 - 43250 February 2009 - 55100 February 2010 – 85,795	January 2007 - 160 February 2007 - 943 February 2008 - 1100 February 2009 - 1590 February 2010 - 1955
Active Endeavour – Mediterranean	2001 to present	2001 – 9 ships 2002 – 11 warships and a submarine	July-November 2008 – 1 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate November 2008 – Polish Kobben-class submarine.
UN Missions			
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) – Golan Heights	31 May 1974 to present	December 2001 – 1036 December 2005 – 1047 December 2008 - 1039 December 2009 – 1043	December 2001 – 356 December 2005 – 343 December 2008 – 337 December 2009 - 2
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	March 1978 to present	December 2001 – 3639 December 2005 – 1989 December 2008 - 12435 December 2009 – 11,862	December 2001 – 481 December 2005 – 212 December 2008 – 492 November 2009 - 222 December 2009 - 0
UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	25 September 2007 to present	December 2008 – 279 March 2009 – 2303 December 2009 - 2777	February 2009 - 2 March 2009 - 315 December 2009 - 17

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Polish policy-makers have to a certain extent been pursuing the same strategy in ESDP. As highlighted above, Poland participated in three out of the four ESDP missions which took place prior to Polish accession. The country's active engagement in ESDP has continued as highlighted through the country's military participation in a number of ESDP missions (see table 1). As can be seen, whilst the Poles' commitment to ESDP was initially concentrated on the Balkans, their activeness has geographically broadened to areas where the country has few immediate defence interests. The question is whether sending 130 troops to Congo and 400 troops to Chad proves that Poland's political elites are moving away from the country's regional defence focus or not? Although this demonstrates the Poles' good will and European solidarity, it can also be seen as a political investment.⁴⁷ Essentially ESDP could be needed for possible contingencies and so there is a need to build a link for reciprocity.⁴⁸ In essence, if Poland participates in a mission which is in other countries' interests, then there is the expectation that when a potential mission comes up in Eastern Europe that these countries will be more in favour of participation.⁴⁹ This highlights the Poles' emphasis on neighbourhood security and their desire for ESDP to be more active in this area, particularly in Moldova and the Balkans,⁵⁰ where Poland can add value and which has a larger impact on the country's security. However Poland's commitment to ESDP should be seen in the context of the EU's continued activity in Eastern Europe, particularly vis-à-vis Russia. If Poland's views in this area are not taken into consideration or if the EU does not appear to be engaging in Eastern Europe then Poland's support might weaken. Whilst there appears to be little change in Polish perceptions towards where force should be used, other factors in Polish security and defence policy have come into conflict with this narrow definition. In particular being a reliable ally is key and if Poland is to meet the expectations of its partners then being ready to participate in missions outside of the country's neighbourhood is essential. This combined with 'nothing about us without us' has served to override the Poles' territorial defender 'plus' role conception.

Multilateralism and the rule of law

Poland is a sceptical multilateralist, as previously highlighted, although Polish policy-makers are focused on reforming the UN and in particular the Security Council. In regards to global security, multilateralism was seen more as a guiding approach and if the Poles considered the situation serious enough, the country would act in concert with its allies without a UN resolution. Thus a UN mandate is not compulsory for action although as far as possible one should be obtained.⁵¹ Despite this scepticism, effective multilateralism as outlined in the ESS is still seen to be important. As the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rotfeld stated, 'in shaping Polish foreign policy, we act on the assumption that effective multilateralism is the key to ensuring world peace and stability. We shall make every effort to preserve and strengthen the multilateral institutions of global management, particularly the United Nations'.⁵² Therefore emphasis is placed on the adaptation of the UN to today's security environment, particularly considering the political and institutional shortfalls. Poland has also sent military personnel to UN peacekeeping missions (see table 1). At the end of 2008 Poland had 852 personnel in UN missions, making the country the 26th largest contributor and the 4th largest contributor from the EU Member States behind Italy, France and Spain.⁵³ However Poland's contingent in UNIFIL has been withdrawn and its personnel in UNDOF have been drastically reduced. This is due to the fact that priority is being given to operations conducted in an EU and NATO context.⁵⁴

Evidently the Poles' multilateralism is more visible in regards to NATO. As highlighted in the previous section, Poland has contributed to NATO missions and most recently to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, where Polish contributions have continually risen (see table 1).⁵⁵ This followed Tusk's decision to withdraw Polish troops from Iraq in 2008, which allowed the Poles to increase their contribution to Afghanistan. Nonetheless, as previously stated, Polish policy-makers remain concerned about the functioning of the Article Five guarantee. Although the Poles are clearly operating further afield, their hard security interests remain focused on the neighbourhood.

Coupled with Polish concerns regarding Article Five as well as the strengthening of Russia, has been an increasing bilateralism with the US as highlighted through the purchasing of 48 F-16s and more recently negotiations on the missile defence shield. Despite the Polish experience in relation to Iraq, the US represents the only country which could offer the Poles another security guarantee. Evidently Polish participation in the previous missile defence shield plans had more to do with this than with any potential nuclear threat from Iran which is coupled with concern as to whether their European partners accept a Russian sphere of influence in the region.⁵⁶ However in line with the Poles' more realistic approach to the US, they wanted something in return for their loyalty. In this instance the current government under the leadership of Donald Tusk pushed for more US investment in the modernisation of the Polish armed forces.⁵⁷ This was incorporated into the declaration on strategic cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland, which also states that 'the United States is committed to the security of Poland'.⁵⁸

Nonetheless, following the election of Barack Obama as US President in November 2008, there are increasing concerns that the US is losing interest in the region, which was of particular concern in the aftermath of the 2009 Georgian war. This was the subject of an open letter to the Obama Administration from senior east European politicians and intellectuals in July 2009.⁵⁹ These included former Polish Presidents Lech Wałęsa and Aleksander Kwasniewski, former Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Rotfeld, who was involved in the drafting of the letter. It called for the strengthening of relations with the US, particularly as a new generation is coming to office which has not experienced totalitarianism and does not feel as indebted to the US as the previous generation.⁶⁰ In relation to missile defence, the letter stated that it had become 'a symbol of America's credibility and commitment to the region. How it is handled could have a significant impact on their future transatlantic orientation. (...) Abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the United States across the whole region'.⁶¹ Essentially the signatories underlined that nothing involving the Central and Eastern European countries should be done without first consulting them. Whilst it should be remembered that the Polish signatories are former leaders, it certainly underlines some Polish concerns, particularly among the older generation. In fact Polish President, Lech Kaczyński has come out in support of the letter.

Following the letter, the missile defence shield was cancelled which came as no surprise to Warsaw. Reaction in Poland was divided with the opposition Law and Justice Party, who had originally agreed to the missile defence shield, accusing Tusk's government of not doing enough to secure the deal and voicing concern that Poland will lose its special status in Washington. Additionally how and when it was communicated (via a telephone call after the first reports had appeared in the US media and on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland – 17 September 2009) was not well received within Warsaw.⁶² Indeed, the concerns expressed within the open letter to Obama concerning being consulted, appeared to have been borne out. Nonetheless, the Tusk government had not made the missile defence shield a foreign policy

priority, although evidently military cooperation with the US is in Poland's interest. In this respect, Poland expects the US to honour the declaration on strategic cooperation made in 2008.⁶³

The US did however give Poland the 'right of first refusal' to host SM-3 missiles (short range) as part of a more mobile missile defence system being planned, which the country has accepted. As Prime Minister Tusk highlighted during the visit of US Vice President Biden in October 2009, 'the project of a new configuration of anti-missile defence is seen by Poland as very interesting and much needed and we are ready to participate in its implementation to an adequate extent'.⁶⁴ Indeed Tusk also stressed the US-Polish partnership, in particular that Poland was an equal partner and would contribute as such and the commonality of views between the two countries. Defence Minister Klich also highlighted that 'this system is as equally beneficial as the previous one. For us, this is an important enshrinement of the presence of our main ally on Polish territory. And since we have strategic partnership with the United States, the presence of US installations and military garrison is the confirmation of our security'.⁶⁵ This deal became even more important when Russia conducted military exercises in neighbouring Belarus, which became a cause for concern in Warsaw and led to a call from Sikorski for US troops to be stationed in Poland.⁶⁶ The US and Poland signed a status of forces pact in December 2009 which allows US troops to be stationed in the country, specifically to set up the missile system. The missiles will be stationed in Morąg, close to the border with Kaliningrad and was reportedly chosen due to logistical reasons, rather than its location.⁶⁷ The Polish Cabinet finally signed a protocol in March 2010 which alters the original US-Polish missile defence shield agreement to the new system.

Where does this leave Polish Atlanticism? It is clear that Poland's importance to the US is decreasing, although the fact that the Obama administration came up with another missile defence plan within a month of cancelling the missile defence shield and invited Poland to participate reveals that Poland is not unimportant either. Nonetheless, when it comes to the country's hard security, Polish policy-makers will still look to the US as the only country able to offer them a credible security guarantee. This reveals Polish scepticism regarding the reliability of NATO's Article Five guarantee. Poland's relations with the US also show that Polish policy-makers are trying to be more realistic by extracting something in return for their commitment. In this respect the Poles want to be treated as an equal partner. Thus, Polish Atlanticism has been toned down and has become more realistic. This has however, not had much impact on how the country views multilateralism in hard security aspects where, as previously stated, the Poles rely on the Americans. Meanwhile, in terms of softer security issues, they are more likely to accept multilateralism. Consequently Poland remains a sceptical multilateralist even if this has diminished.

The EU as an independent security and defence actor

As highlighted above Poland's initial sceptical reaction to ESDP meant that the policy was seen in the context of NATO rather than as a security policy in its own right. Thus ESDP-NATO compatibility took centre stage. However this stance gradually evolved as Polish accession to the EU contributed to a more realistic assessment of the policy and Poland's role within it. Thus the aim of compatibility developed into the need to ensure that ESDP did not mount a challenge to NATO's supremacy in hard security tasks. Since accession Poland has become increasingly involved in ESDP, including in military missions in the Congo and Chad, the Battlegroup Concept as well as a desire to contribute to the Gendarmerie forces and to develop the EU's capabilities through the European Defence Agency. Indeed as the rationality behind ESDP became clearer, in particular that ESDP would not undermine NATO's Article Five guarantee,

the Poles were able to accept the policy as a value added tool in the civil-military dimension, including humanitarian tasks. As the Undersecretary of State for Defence Policy, Stanisław Komorowski stated ‘some specialisation has already started to develop: NATO concentrating on high-intensity military operations, while the EU focusing mainly on civilian missions and lower-intensity military operations. Such a burdensharing has a promising potential’.⁶⁸

Polish policy-makers also became accepting of permanent structured cooperation, which was finally included in the Lisbon Treaty. As Klich pointed out, ‘the concept that was endorsed in the end, and which is laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, was made more flexible and enlarged. And so we are now an ardent supporter of the idea. Poland is willing and is a candidate for participation from the start-up of implementation’.⁶⁹ This highlights the importance of inclusion, both as a guiding principle and also to ensure that Poland’s interests are represented.

Whereas previously the EU was seen in the context of providing social, political and economic stability and NATO as providing security, this stance has weakened. In line with the Poles’ Atlanticist stance, Polish policy-makers want to ensure that ESDP stays on an Atlanticist track and thus they are keen to promote EU-NATO relations. Poland’s focus is on making sure that ESDP develops in line with the country’s own security and defence policy and by consensus of all Member States, thus emphasising inclusiveness. As such, the country has moved from a sceptical position towards supporting the EU as an independent security and defence actor within the civil-military realm. This is put in the context of promoting EU-NATO compatibility wherever possible.

Poland’s evolving leadership role: active participant and a potential military leader?

Evidently, prior to enlargement, Poland could only participate in ESDP missions and therefore no leadership role was possible. Instead, any leadership aspirations were directed towards regional cooperation in Eastern Europe. The Poles’ role as promoter of regional cooperation has continued after enlargement as highlighted more recently by the Eastern dimension, a policy which was initiated by Poland and Sweden. As the Polish 2007 Security Strategy states ‘we shall focus our attention especially on measures the aim of which is to increase the EU’s active role in Eastern Europe’.⁷⁰ This activeness in the region highlights the Poles’ roles as territorial defender ‘plus’ and a reliable ally as well as fitting into Polish threat perceptions regarding Russia. However Polish policy-makers downplay any leadership role in the region. As the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Rotfeld stated ‘our partners have had an opportunity to become convinced that Poland does not treat the region as a base for its political ambitions at the EU forum. Nor do we make pretensions to playing the role of a regional leader’.⁷¹ Instead the Poles prefer to act as a facilitator.⁷² This does not mean however that Polish policy-makers will sit on the sidelines. As Sikorski states ‘after 20 years of successful system transformation and integration with the Western structures, Poland takes its deserved place among the leading players of the European league’.⁷³ Nonetheless the emphasis is on bringing initiatives to the table, particularly concerning the Eastern dimension as opposed to leading other countries within the neighbourhood.

Polish policy-makers’ facilitating role is more connected to the wider Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In relation to ESDP, Poland is an ‘active participant’ rather than a leader, particularly in the political aspects, although the previous government did announce the idea of a ‘euroarmy’ comprising of 100,000 troops. This idea was seen as completely unfeasible for a number of reasons including duplication with NATO, the command structure which would see the president of the European Commission as the commander-in-chief and the subordination of the force under NATO.⁷⁴ Despite the lack of enthusiasm for the idea amongst EU Member States, this does underline the Poles’ focus on NATO. Essentially, Polish policy-makers wanted

to ensure that ESDP stayed on an Atlanticist track and thus they played the role of advocate of EU-NATO relations. This was stressed in the security issues that the Poles wanted to see adequately reflected in the 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS, which included a reconsideration of EU-NATO relations in addition to the eastern policy dimension and energy security.⁷⁵

It is in the military dimension of ESDP where Polish activity has been the most noticeable. In particular, Polish military engagement has geographically widened as previously stated. This activeness has been brought on by the realization that Poland's policymakers must take on more responsibility not only in Poland's immediate environment but also in other parts of the world, a change caused by the new security environment and Poland's allies' reaction to it. Thus whilst the Poles were not always seen to be fully contributing at the EU level due to their political preference for Polish-US relations and NATO,⁷⁶ this perception is changing. Indeed Poland is now seen as an active and reliable contributor to ESDP missions and projects.⁷⁷ As has been highlighted, Poland's active approach within ESDP has been the product of the country's accession to the EU which allowed it to fully participate in a security area affecting its interests and has enabled the country to begin to pursue a leadership role. This is combined with its allies' reaction to the new security environment which has placed pressure on Poland to change its view of security.

As Poland's military activity within ESDP has increased, so have the tasks that the Poles have had to undertake. In EUFOR RD Congo, the Poles were charged with protecting the headquarters at Kinshasa. Meanwhile, their role in the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA mission two years later was far more complex. The mission has been logistically challenging for the Poles as Polish troops had to build up their camp in a territory with no infrastructure in addition to the difficulties in transporting equipment to the operational area.⁷⁸ However the mission is seen as an opportunity to acquire knowledge of how EU-led operations are run which can impact positively on Polish training procedures.⁷⁹ The Poles' increased involvement in ESDP can also be highlighted in relation to the EU Battlegroup Concept which enables smaller or poorer Member States to take on the role of Framework Nation which they could not otherwise do with larger types of ESDP missions. In Poland's case, the country is participating in a Polish, German, Latvian, Lithuanian and Slovak Battlegroup on standby in the first half of 2010, a Weimar Triangle Battlegroup comprising of Poland, France and Germany, which will be on standby in 2013 and a Visegrad Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) plus Ukraine Battlegroup in 2015. Not only does this show an increase in participation from 2010 onwards but interestingly, Poland is the Framework Nation for all three Battlegroups, highlighting the Poles' interest in a military leadership role, although the country still faces restrictions due to their lack of military capabilities.

In ESDP, Poland's actions back up the statements made in official documentation. For example the 2009 Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland underlines that the state of cooperation in ESDP 'is a determinant of European integration in a broad sense. At its root lies a desire to ensure peace, stability and greater prosperity for European Union Member States and of its neighbours. Rapid reaction forces engaged in military operations and the conceptual development of the EU Battlegroups in which Poland takes an active part serve this purpose'.⁸⁰ While Poland can be seen as both an 'active participant' and a potential military leader, which complements their emphasis on nothing about us without us and an increased desire to influence the direction of ESDP, their lack of military capabilities can be seen as a hindrance to acquiring a greater role. Thus the Poles also underline that they 'will support and will be actively involved in further development of the European Defence Agency, regarding it as a basic centre of stimulation and coordination of the development of capabilities and of the European defence

market'.⁸¹ A more capable Poland will certainly enhance the capabilities and development of ESDP.

Conclusion

This article has highlighted that three main causes of change have impacted upon Poland's role conceptions, causing incremental change and subsequently affecting Poland's perception of and role within ESDP. These are the changing international situation which has brought to the fore new security threats; international reaction to these, which has increased international expectations on Poland to alter its security thinking and to increase its role and finally Poland's accession to the EU which has enabled the country to pursue its security and defence interests.

This has in turn caused conflict between Polish role conceptions, particularly as some roles are pre-eminent which has caused adaptation in less central roles. First Polish policy-makers' emphasis on 'nothing about us without us' involving the ability to be included in decisions affecting the country's interests, has conflicted with their more narrowly defined threat perceptions and where, when and how force should be used, pushing the boundaries of the latter. Second Polish policy-makers' sceptical but pragmatic view concerning multilateralism contrasts with the country's desire to be an active participant and in some cases leader. However, as ESDP concentrates on civil-military tasks this sceptical stance is lessened as this relates to the inability of international organisations to protect the country's hard security interests. Finally, a conflict has emerged between the Poles' territorial defender 'plus' role and their proactive view on the use of force and reliable ally roles. The new security environment has not only seen a shift in emphasis on the security tasks that are likely to be carried out but also on the expectations that have been placed on larger countries such as Poland to take up their share of the security burden. Due to the importance of being a reliable ally, the Poles have deployed troops outside of the country's immediate defence interests both within an EU and NATO context.

The country's desire to be a reliable ally and thus active participant and to gain a military leadership role highlights the increasing salience of ESDP for Polish security and defence ambitions. Indeed it underlines the importance of ensuring that ESDP is inclusive, as this not only guarantees Member States' more positive approach to the policy but could also facilitate the emergence of a commonality of view. Indeed Poland's incremental convergence with the broad goals of ESDP encompassing a comprehensive global approach to security, focusing on civil-military tasks and based on effective multilateralism and compatibility with NATO, underlines the potential for the emergence a European strategic culture, relating specifically to when, where and how the EU uses force.

This slow convergence of views concerning ESDP does not however impinge on Polish Atlanticism, particularly as there are other Atlanticist EU Member States including the UK. As highlighted, Polish Atlanticism has become more realistic and has increasingly focused on the US as opposed to NATO. Whether the Poles' confidence in NATO and its Article Five guarantee is regained will potentially depend on the outcome of the discussion on NATO's new strategic concept. Meanwhile, whilst Polish policy-makers have a more realistic approach to relations with the US, Polish threat perceptions which focus on Russia, ensures the continuing importance of the country as Poland's security guarantor, despite a weakening in Poland's position since the election of Obama.

Despite a seeming Europeanist turn in Poland's security and defence policy, there are still areas of divergence between Poland and other EU Member States such as Germany. In particular

is Poland's perception of Russia, which is shared by the Baltic States. Nonetheless, Poland's concerns up to a point reflect hard security issues which would be dealt with under NATO. Additionally, the Poles are trying to deal constructively with Russia to try and improve relations which is assisted by Tusk's more diplomatic approach in comparison to his predecessor. The Georgian war along with Russian military exercises in Belarus did little to assist in this process though. The second area of divergence concerns multilateralism. However, as long as ESDP does not encroach upon hard security tasks which are assigned to NATO and ESDP-NATO relations are promoted, the Poles will continue to support the further development of a separate security and defence policy at the EU level.

The question is whether the country's growing role within ESDP will continue to widen Polish threat perceptions and stance towards where force is used, the latter of which highlights another divergence between Polish and EU security and defence policies. In part, this will depend upon whether the EU actively engages in Eastern Europe and addresses Polish concerns regarding Russia, underlining that the Poles expect their views to be taken into consideration. This again is more likely to occur in consideration of the fact that a change in style under the Tusk government means that it is expected that Polish views will be considered more favourably if security and defence issues get politicised. Nonetheless, considering the divergence between the Member States in relation to Russia, incursion into the Russian 'sphere of influence' is still handled carefully at the EU level.

If no further convergence occurs then a European strategic culture will at best represent the lowest common denominator and will fall short of the EU's own ambitions highlighted in the ESS and the EU Headline Goal 2010. Further convergence will above all require political willingness, something which is not lacking in the Polish case. Indeed, Poland's original scepticism has not just been replaced by pragmatism but also activism and potential leadership. As a medium sized Member State, with increasing military operational experience and political willingness to send Polish troops into conflict situations in areas outside of Europe, Poland's value to its allies is only expected to intensify with positive implications for the development of ESDP.

¹ Following the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 ESDP is now the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

² A.Hyde-Price, *Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU*, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), p11.

³ Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', *International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1999), pp.51-52.

⁴ See John Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998).

⁵ Indeed there is a double brake as the country's strategic culture can become enshrined in laws and constitutions as well as in the minds of that country's policy-makers. See Christoph O. Meyer. *The Quest for A European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p25.

⁶ One of the more contentious debates among scholars exploring strategic culture is the relationship between attitudes and behaviour and revolves around whether or not strategic culture can be made falsifiable by breaking the link between attitudes and behaviour. The debate is best reflected in the opposing views of Johnston, who arguing from a rationalist perspective, believes the link can be broken and Gray who underlines that behaviour is part of strategic culture. As the theoretical position taken here is located within social constructivism this article sides with Gray. See Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Culture as Context* (note 3) and Alastair. I. Johnston. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China*, (Alas-Princeton, N.J; Chichester, Princeton University Press, 1995).

⁷ See for example Berger's use of 'political-military culture', Duffield's use of 'national security culture' and Katzenstein's focus on the cultural-institutional context and the constructed identity of political actors as

determinants of security policy. Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, (London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p15; John Duffield, *World Power Forsaken* (note 4), p14 and P. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p4.

⁸ Lisbeth Aggestam, *A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany* (Stockholm Studies in Politics 106, Stockholm University Department of Political Science, 2004); K. Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1970), pp. 233-309 and S. Walker (ed.), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1987).

⁹ Holsti, *National Role Conceptions* (note 8), pp. 245-246.

¹⁰ See K. Holsti, *National Role Conceptions* (note 8), p243.

¹¹ See Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth and Russel Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998), pp8-9; Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force*, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004), p22 and John Duffield, *World Power Forsaken* (note 4), pp33-4.

¹² Originally Jarosław Kaczyński decided not to become Prime Minister in 2005 in order not to negatively impact on his twin brother's Presidential campaign. As such Marcinkiewicz became Prime Minister but stepped down in 2006 to be replaced by Jarosław Kaczyński. The continuation of Polish pragmatic views towards ESDP can be seen through increased Polish participation in ESDP missions and concepts. It was also confirmed in confidential interviews conducted by the author with a number of Polish civil servants and researchers in 2006 and 2007.

¹³ See Longhurst, Kerry. *Élections législatives en Pologne: un changement absolu pour la politique étrangère?*, *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 1 (2008), pp1-12 and Aleksandra Krakiewicz, Polish Defence Policy under the New Government: The First 100 Days, *SWP Comments* 3 (March 2008), p1.

¹⁴ Olaf Osica, 'Poland: A New European Atlanticist at a Crossroads?', *European Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), pp.304-305.

¹⁵ Osica, *Poland: A New European Atlanticist at a Crossroads?* (note 14), p. 305.

¹⁶ Kerry Longhurst, 'From Security Consumer to Security Provider – Poland and Transatlantic Security in the Twenty-First Century', *Defence Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002), pp.56-57.

¹⁷ David Dunn, 'Poland: America's New Model Ally', in Marcin Zaborowski and David Dunn (eds.), *Poland – A New Power in Transatlantic Security*, (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 7. See also Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, *The New Atlanticist Poland's Foreign and Security Policy Priorities*, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p43.

¹⁸ Kuźniar was at the time working in the Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was the director of the department from 2000-2002. Roman Kuźniar, *Poland's Security Policy 1989-2000*, (Warsaw, Scholar Publishing House, 2001), p87.

¹⁹ The US position was highlighted by Madeleine Albright's '3 Ds', which included no duplication, no de-coupling and no discrimination.

²⁰ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, *Transatlantic relations today and in the future – A speech by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland*, 10 September 2002. Available from: www.ms.gov.pl/publications/2002/cd3/2_Selected%20statements/02.09.10%20Washington/02.09.10%20Washington-Georgetown%20University.htm [Accessed 10 September 2002], p. 3.

²¹ The six included Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway and Turkey.

²² 'Interview with Bogdan Klich, Polish Defence Minister: Poland Backs Integrated Defence Mechanisms', *European Report*, 27 May 2008, p1.

²³ See Rafał Trzaskowski, 'Poland', in Antonio Missiroli, *Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP? The view from Central Europe*, Occasional Paper 34, (Paris, The European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2002), p24.

²⁴ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, *Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – Lecture by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz*. 12 March 2003. Available from: http://www.ms.gov.pl/publications/2003/cd3/2_Selected%20statements/030312_Berlin.htm, [Accessed 11th June 2007], p6.

²⁵ Roman Kuźniar, *Poland's Security Policy* (note 18), p87.

²⁶ Olaf Osica, 'A Secure Poland in a Better Union? The ESS as seen from Warsaw's Perspective', in Marco Overhaus, Hans W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch (eds), *The European Security Strategy Paper Tiger or Catalyst for Joint Action? – Part II Perspectives from Italy, Poland, Austria and Finland* (German Foreign Policy in Dialogue 5, 2004). Available from: www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue15.pdf [Accessed 25 January 2007], p. 13.

²⁷ Confidential interview conducted by the author with a Polish Civil Servant, Warsaw, 2006.

²⁸ Antoni Podolski, 'Polska Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego jako praktyczna implementacja Europejskiej Strategii Bezpieczeństwa – między teorią a praktyką', Reporty I Analizy, 01/2005, (Warsaw, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, 2005). Available from: www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/raporty/2005/rap_i_an_0105.pdf [Accessed 9 March 2006], p3.

²⁹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (Warsaw, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2003), p2.

³⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2003* (note 29), p6.

³¹ Gustav Lindstrom, 'On the Ground: ESDP Operations' in N. Gnesotto (ed), *EU Security and Defence Policy the First Five Years 1999-2004* (Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 113 and 117.

³² Assembly of the West European Union, 'Contribution of European non-EU countries to military crisis management in Europe', 19 June 2001. Available from: www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2001/1735.pdf [Accessed 10 September 2008], p. 17.

³³ Assembly of the West European Union, *Contribution of European non-EU countries* (note 32), p. 17.

³⁴ Confidential interviews conducted with the author with Polish civil servants, Warsaw, 2006 and 2007.

³⁵ 138th Bergedorf Round Table, *Can the EU Ensure Europe's Security?* (Hamburg, Körber-Stiftung, 2007), p. 37.

³⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (Warsaw, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2007), p. 8.

³⁷ Confidential interviews conducted by the author with a researcher and a Polish civil servant, Warsaw 2007.

³⁸ Anna Fotyga, *Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2007 presented at the session of the Sejm on May 11 2007 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Anna Fotyga*, 11 May 2007. Available from: www.msz.gov.pl/Ministers,Annual,Address,2007,10134.html [11 June 2007], p. 12.

³⁹ Karl-Heinz Kamp, 'Towards a New Strategy for NATO', *Survival*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2009), p23.

⁴⁰ Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning. 'Come Home, NATO? The Atlantic Alliance's New Strategic Concept', *DIIS Report*, 2009:04, 2009, pp17-18.

⁴¹ Radosław Sikorski, *Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland. "The Barack Obama Promise: a European View"*, The Atlantic Council Washington, 19 November 2008. Available from: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php?document=23143> [Accessed 8 March 2010], p5. See also Radosław Sikorski, *The New Poland in a New Europe*, San Francisco, 5 August 2009. Available from: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/Address,by,the,Minister,of,Foreign,Affairs,of,the,Republic,of,Poland,Radoslaw,Sikorski,,San,Francisco,,August,5,,2009,,World,Affairs,Council,of,Northern,California,29419.html> [Accessed 8 March 2010], p5.

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