STUDYING THE EUROPEAN UNION: CURRENT AND FUTURE AGENDAS

(Eds. Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent, William Patterns)

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2010

CHAPTER 7

NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEANIZATION RESEARCH ¹

Claudio M. Radaelli and Theofanis Exadaktylos

3 September 2008

INTRODUCTION

Fifty years since the inception of European integration, political scientists are increasingly attracted by the theoretical and empirical puzzles of how to establish if and how the EU has changed representation, governance and public policy in the member states and beyond. Broadly speaking, this is the domain of Europeanisation research. In this chapter, we first make the argument that the concern with Europeanisation is somewhat in the genes of the academic study of European integration. In a sense, this field of research has always existed. But in another sense, Europeanisation as research field is prominent, as shown by several literature reviews and internet sites² dedicated to

¹ We wish to gratefully acknowledge the support of the Jean Monnet Chair in EU Policy Analysis at the University of Exeter. Neill Nugent kindly sent us suggestions and comments and provided major help in focusing this chapter. We wish to thank him for his friendly and firm stewardship. The usual disclaimer applies.

² Queen's University at Belfast has a site dedicated to Europeanisation papers, see <http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Research/PaperSeries/EuropeanisationPapers/>

this topic (Axt, Milososki, and Schwarz, 2007; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Graziano and Vink, 2007; Lenschow, 2005; Olsen, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2007).

Accordingly, we will first present classic ways to make observable propositions about Europeanisation, rooted in neo-functionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist integration theories, multi-level governance, and comparative public policy. Then we will move on to the more recent field that is commonly associated to the label ‘Europeanisation’. One point throughout the chapter is that Europeanisation is not a new theory, but provides interesting ways to engage with existing theories of international politics, theories of the policy process, and theories of governance. Hence, before we set out to search for the Holy Grail of the new Europeanisation theory (something that does not exist and in our view should not even exist), we need to reflect on if and how Europeanisation *concepts, mechanisms, and explanations*, add to our theoretical *acquis*. If they add something useful, they can corroborate existing theories, rather than requiring the development of a new theory.

We will discuss definitional and conceptual issues first. Further, we will introduce the substantive scope and the territorial extension of Europeanisation. The next step will be entirely dedicated to explanation: what do the existing models explain and how? This will bring us right in the territory of causal explanation. We will look at a sample of highly-cited articles, to review the causal structure of scholarship on Europeanization. We will then compare our sample with more recent articles, to see whether the field is going in some new directions or, alternatively, the highly-cited articles have somewhat already formatted the field. In the Conclusions we will take stock of our analysis and present some questions for future research.

CLASSIC (BUT IMPLICIT) EXPECTATIONS ABOUT EUROPEANISATION

As mentioned, Europeanisation has always been around scholarly work on European integration politics. In this section we consider classic integration theories, the relatively more recent approaches of multi-level governance and historical institutionalism, and the comparative public policy research on compliance, transposition of EU legislation and implementation.

Classic theories of European integration do not use the language of Europeanisation, yet they come very close to formulating clear observable predictions on how integration processes transform state structures (a point made by Bulmer, 2006). For neo-functionalists, integration shifts loyalty and political dynamics from the national to the EU level. In this logic, policies like the single market and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) established with the Treaty on European Union (1992) make the economic fate of the Euro-zone countries one and indivisible. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has redefined the scope and role of national legislation versus EU law – a massive displacement of power from national legislatures to the Community of Courts operating in the EU (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998). Pressure groups and transnational society re-orient their activity towards the EU level, following the power shift towards Brussels. The institutionalisation of Europe (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997) provides an expectation about Europeanisation: the nation state will gradually dissolve some of its essential properties into the institutions of the EU. In this context, recent work has shown that the institutionalisation of the single market has not created de-regulated economies.

Political power has not been significantly reduced to the advantage of the market. It has been shifted towards the EU institutions (Jabko, 2006).

The expectations of liberal-intergovernmentalist theories of European integration could not be more different. Historians like Alan Milward and political scientists like Andrew Moravcsik have argued that integration makes the nation state stronger, not weaker (Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998). This is because national leaders enter EU negotiations with preferences that are often well-defined. If they know what they want, member states negotiate EU institutional bargains only when there is an economic or political benefit from cooperation. They then ‘lock in’ the outcome of their bargain in an institutional choice, typically by signing a treaty (Moravcsik, 1999). Integration Europeanises national politics in the sense of creating more executive capacity to deal with international political and economic externalities, and also by increasing the power of the executive in relation to elected assemblies and pressure groups. The previous example of EMU can therefore be seen in a totally different way. EMU – the argument goes - has made the core executives stronger. In some cases it has been a lever for domestic, government-led reforms that would have otherwise been blocked by Parliament and the unions (on Italy see Della Sala, 1997; Dyson and Featherstone, 1996).

A second way in which existing theoretical work has shed light on the dynamics of Europeanisation arises out of the conceptual approaches labelled ‘multi-level governance’ (MLG, see Hooghe and Marks, 2001) and historical institutionalism (HI, Pierson 2004). MLG designates a profound transformation of politics that integrates both vertical and horizontal levels in dense networks. In turn, these networks involve both public and private actors. For multi-level governance theorists, therefore, Europeanisation

is a process in which power is re-defined (within networks) as much as it is redistributed (between centre and periphery, between state actors and private actors). In HI, Europeanization is a process of slow but big movements – in contrast with the inter-governmental emphasis on treaties HI scholars are more interested in what goes on between one treaty revision and another (Pierson 2006). In HI theorising, Europeanisation would look like the evolutionary process through which unforeseen contingencies (such as ECJ decisions) lock-in the member states in temporal causal sequences that are difficult to revert.³

A third, and classic way to study Europeanisation, yet again without explicitly having used this term until recently, is through comparative public policy analysis, and more particularly through the examining the transposition of Community law into national legislation, compliance with EU rules, and more generally implementation (Dimitrakopoulos and Richardson, 2001; Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, and Leiber, 2005). Since no perfect implementation is possible, this strand of research does not argue that Europeanisation will make the national and EU level systems more similar (with power all re-directed towards the EU institutions, or re-calibrated around national executives, or meshed in policy networks). The expectation is one of variable country and policy outcomes. A key reason for this is that responses to European integration depend on implementation capacity and bureaucratic cultures, both of which vary. National bureaucracies may have become the agents of implementation of EU policies at the domestic level, but whilst the EU proposes a model of delivery based on New Public Management values of control via evaluation, autonomy and bureaucratic legitimacy by

³ We found two examples of linkages between Europeanisation and HI: a theoretical paper by Daniel Wincott (2004) and an empirical study by Lene Pedersen (2006).

efficient results and intense consultation with stakeholders, bureaucracies in countries as diverse as France, Germany and Italy are anchored in cultures of parliamentary control and the separation of politics and administration (Damonte, 2007).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Expectations about Europeanisation can be drawn from propositions put forward by integration theorists and comparative analysts. But the field that we nowadays associate with Europeanisation is distinctively different, for three important reasons. First, it takes the issue of defining the nature, substantive scope and territorial extension of Europeanisation explicitly. A difference with integration theories is that these theories are concerned with the explanation of the ontology of European integration (that is, why do the member states create institutions at the EU level?), whilst Europeanisation scholars take the presence of EU institutions for granted and explore ‘post-ontologically’ how the political system of the EU is or is not transforming the state, party politics, and public policies. Second, it goes beyond the narrow focus of classic integration theories with state structures and the emphasis of implementation studies with public policies. Without denying these important dimensions, Europeanisation as a research programme covers politics, policy, and polity, as shown by Vivien Schmidt (2002; 2006). Third, Europeanisation is more theoretically and methodologically aware of the problems of explaining processes, whilst the classic reasoning is arguably more concerned with outcomes. In fact, most scholars see it as a process, not an outcome. The interest in outcomes has not withered away, but at the margin more efforts are put into describing how Europeanisation as process affects policy, politics, and polity, and with what

consequences on the nature of governance, identities and representation at the national and sub-national level.

Turning to definitions, it is fair to say that this is a still contested domain. However, there is some common ground in the definitions that have been proposed over the last ten years or so. One point that most definitions have in common is the identification of Europeanisation with the domestic impact of European integration. This is what Lenschow, in her recent textbook review, calls the *top-down* view of the concept (Lenschow, 2005). All scholars accept that this is a dimension of Europeanisation, but some think there are also *bottom-up* dimensions, and, perhaps *roundabout* effects too (Lenschow, 2005) - in essence, a circular process with multiple feedback loops. Let us briefly look at some examples of definitions.

Risse *et al.* include within Europeanisation ‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance’ (Risse, Caporaso, and Cowles, 2001: 3). Heritier and her associates contribute to the top-down approaches by specifying that Europeanisation is ‘a process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’ policies and political administrative structures’ (Héritier, Kerwer, Knill, Lehmkuhl, and Teutsch, 2001: 3). Olsen’s four-way definition is the most inclusive, covering diverse issues such as adjustment to Europe and the process of political integration (Olsen, 2002). Giuliani instead goes for a strict definition, calling Europeanisation the process of institutionalisation of Europe (Giuliani, 2004). Dyson and Goetz seem to be informed by circular notions of the concept when they speak of a ‘complex interactive top-down and bottom-up process in which domestic polities, politics and public policies are shaped by European integration and in which domestic actors use

European integration to shape the domestic arena' (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 20).

Bomberg and Peterson (2000) collapse Europeanisation to the horizontal transfer of policies – and by doing so, they shed light on diffusion across the member states. Indeed, by using Europeanisation in this way they suggest that mutual influence, transfer, benchmarking, and lesson-drawing do not necessarily presuppose that the EU is there all the time to provide Europeanising templates. A country can also imitate or import or learn from another bilaterally, although the EU often provides the architectures and the procedures for horizontal transfer, like in the case of the open method of coordination (de la Porte and Pochet, 2002; Nedergaard, 2007; Zeitlin, Pochet, and Magnusson, 2005).

But though broad definitions are useful, they obviously suffer from lack of precision. For example, what does 'to shape the domestic arena' mean in terms of clearly measurable processes and outcomes? And if Europeanisation is also the path to political integration, how do we disentangle positive from normative issues? Further, if Europeanisation covers the emergence of EU structures as well as the impact of these structures on domestic systems, we may not see the difference between ontological and post-ontological analysis mentioned above.

Ladrech has made an important step with his notion of 'an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EU and political dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making' (Ladrech, 1994: 69). Drawing on Ladrech, Radaelli has argued that Europeanisation consists of processes, rather than outcomes. Specifically, processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, and 'ways of doing things'. It also consists of shared beliefs and norms that are

first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities political structures and public policies (Radaelli, 2003: 30). Thus, Europeanisation is an interactive process, rather than as a simple process of uni-directional reaction to 'Europe'. It covers both the notion of Europeanisation as 'domestic impact of Europe' (or pressure) and Europeanisation as creative usages of Europe (Jacquot and Woll, 2004).

In this approach, the presence of a clearly defined European policy is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for Europeanisation to take place. If a clearly defined EU policy exists, the system of interaction at the domestic level may or may not be influenced. It depends, as Ladrech would put it, on whether the EU policy template is incorporated in the organizational logic of the domestic constellations of actors or not. Absent a policy instructions from Brussels, and even in the absence of decisions to create EU public policy *tout court*, domestic constellations of actors can still be influenced by the ideas, discussions, suggested policy templates etc discussed in the EU arena. What is necessary for Europeanisation to occur (albeit not sufficient) is the presence at the EU level of a forum of discussion, an arena for negotiation, or a political architecture for interaction and discourse.

Here we come to an important point – well synthesised by Lenschow (2005) in the two notions of Europe as pressure and Europe as usage. On the one hand, European integration can put pressure on the member states, so that change will be brought about as a response to pressure. On the other hand, for domestic actors the EU is, apart from pressure, also an institutional repository of discourse, opportunities, and levers that can suit the purposes of those who are engaged with reforms at home. These actors can use

the perceived threat of action from the ECJ (for example, by arguing that reform is needed at home ‘otherwise we will end up as country X who saw its laws in Sector Y struck down by the Court’), new policy instruments discussed in Brussels, White Papers and Communications from the Commission to gain leverage on domestic reforms. The two levels (EU and domestic) are therefore connected both by pressure and usage.

Some authors have, it should be said, even questioned the notion of two distinct arenas by observing that “the [domestic and EU] levels are nothing but playing fields, where actors move between one and the other, and play with them” (Ravinet, 2007: 24, our translation). Yet ultimately there are two playing fields, not just one. Ravinet’s observation is nevertheless important because it draws attention to complex interaction effects, to actor-centred analysis, and to the strategic linkages between EU and domestic policy arenas (Jacquot and Woll, 2004; Salgado and Woll, 2007).

THE DOMAINS

In this section we discuss the substantive and territorial scope of Europeanisation. Granted that Europeanisation is a process, who/what is affected by this process? To begin with, the EU can influence domestic political systems in three different ways – as *opportunity structure*, as *discourse*, and as *forum*.

Beginning with the political opportunity structure (that is, a framework of rules that enables or constrains the political behaviour of actors), this is constantly affected by changes in EU rules (treaties, directives and regulations) and by the evolving jurisprudence of the ECJ. No matter whether the EU is engaged with building new markets or in correcting market failures, its impact on national-level constellations of

actors is not neutral. Authors like Thatcher (2004) have rightly spoken of winners and losers in Europeanisation processes to draw attention to this phenomenon.

Second, the EU has discursive impacts. In a rather obvious way, this notion covers the impact of ideas generated in Brussels. Jabko (2006) has illustrated how the idea of the single market has been propagated by the Commission in different ways depending on the target sector and the target country – this is why his book is called *Playing the Market*. But of course this also means that EU discourses are refracted, edited, and interpreted at home by actors in what can be quite different ways. An example is the Saint-Malo declaration of a common defence and security policy. According to Howorth (2004), the declaration was discursively constructed by the British negotiators as a way to embed the EU in NATO, and by the French as the crucial step is making the EU autonomous from the US and NATO. Thus, ideas and strategy are intimately linked – as shown by the increasing presence of strategic constructivism in recent work on Europeanisation (Jabko, 2006; Radaelli and Kraemer 2008). Yet again we see ‘Europe as (ideational) pressure’ in some cases, and Europe as political use by domestic actors in others.

Third, the notion of forum refers to the domains where the EU does not legislate, but provides architectures for the discussion of policy goals, the definition of common targets, the diffusion of innovations and the stimulation of learning processes. As mentioned, the open method of coordination has become a label to describe these types of processes. Clearly, the presence of the EU as facilitator but not as legislator (the open method is based on agreements on policy, but the reforms are carried out at the national level, not via EU law) puts the whole question of ‘Europe as pressure’ and ‘Europe as

usage’ in a different light. Some authors have noted that the open method has created the pre-conditions for more institutional coordination at home, and in some cases facilitated the re-calibration of domestic welfare states (Zeitlin, Pochet, and Magnusson, 2005) and foreign – defence and security policy (Major, 2005; Rieker, 2006; Smith, 2003). Others are sceptical on the possibility to bring about policy learning and genuine experimentation ‘from below’ via the open method (Radaelli, 2008).

As mentioned, the substantive domains include policy, politics, and polity. The latter covers administrative structures, executive-parliamentary relations, the role of courts, and inter-governmental relations. The ‘politics’ dimension of Europeanisation is about effects on public opinion and electoral behaviour, party competition, pressure groups, and social movements. Poguntke, Aylott, Ladrech, and Luther (2007) show that Europeanisation is changing the balance of power within parties, giving more resources to the segment of party elites and officers dealing with EU affairs, and empowering the party-in-office versus the parliamentary party. **ONE SENTENCE ON PUBLIC**

OPINION? SEMETKO etc in our sample? Does Cini summarize this literature?

Crucial in this field is the emergence of new cleavages in domestic politics as a result of European integration. In most member states, the classic right-left cleavage has lost importance. But major political parties are now divided internally by an emerging new cleavage, about more or less European integration (Edwards, 2008a, 2008b; Marks, Wilson, and Ray, 2002).

The policy domain includes the effects on constellation of actors, their material and ideational resources, the emergence of new policy instruments, and implementation structures. Two authors have linked policy, politics and polity in far-reaching claims

about Europeanisation. Mair (2001) has argued that integration had produced an imbalance: parties contest elections in national political systems by supplying different options for policy to the electorate. Yet policies are decided in Brussels, where there is no proper system of democratic representation and party politics. Hence political competition at the domestic level becomes irrelevant in terms of choosing between one policy option and another, but citizens cannot make up for this by engaging in a fully democratic EU-level arena. Schmidt (2006) takes an institutional discursive approach to European integration, but comes to a similar conclusion: the EU is *policy without politics*, whilst the national systems are *politics without policy*. The democratic deficit – this is the innovative implication of her reasoning – is not a matter of EU constitutional politics. It is indeed profoundly rooted in national political systems. These two examples show how Europeanisation can be used to bridge the gap between positive and normative analysis, tackling issues of democracy and accountability .

One final word on the territorial scope. Although most authors are concerned with the impact of the EU, there is no logical reason why Europeanisation should be confined to EU-ization (WALLACE PIECE IN NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY). There are other institutions in Europe that trigger Europeanisation, such as bi-lateral agreements and the Council of Europe. But because of its unique political role and its profound impact on public policies, public opinion, party politics and polity, the EU is and will be the main focus of Europeanisation scholars. Looking at the targets of Europeanisation, yet again there is no reason to consider only the member states. The EU has an external dimension that affects countries that trade with the member states or obtain aids. The most-studied of the external dimensions of Europeanisation is the impact of integration on candidate

countries in the context of accession processes (Agh, 1999; Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig, 2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Others have investigated how countries that have no intention to join the EU are being Europeanised via agreements with the EU, trade, and the incorporation in their legislation of single market regulations. Switzerland is perhaps the most paradigmatic case (Fischer, Nicolet, and Sciarini, 2002). Take taxation, one of the most sacred Swiss cows in the policy debate, to illustrate this point: recent EU agreements on direct taxation have forced Switzerland to negotiate and partially adapt its tax rules to ‘match’ the EU 2003 directive on the taxation of savings (Afonso and Maggetti, 2006).

EXPLANATION

How does one establish that European integration has a causal effect on domestic political systems? This is a difficult question given the complexity of Europeanisation processes. Researchers can wrongly attribute causality to EU-level variables, whilst the changes observed may be the result of global forces or domestic-level variables. There is the risk of assuming that if some domestic changes look similar to ‘what Brussels wants’, this must be an instance of Europeanization. It is even more difficult to establish, given a certain change at the domestic level, how globalisation, European integration, and domestic forces have contributed to the change. One option is to be explicit and rigorous in formulating rival alternative hypotheses. Hence, a research design on Europeanisation should always control for the null hypothesis that European integration ‘does not matter’. It should also specify rival hypotheses that tell us what factors, other than Europeanisation, may have generated the outcome.

Another valuable approach to this type of complexity is to formulate clear theoretical expectations about the mechanisms of Europeanisation. Here we have a baseline model and a bottom-up research design. The two are conceptually different, yet in a single project one can draw on both of them to reduce bias from different sources (Quaglia and Radaelli, 2007). The baseline model was put forward by Caporaso, drawing on his previous work with Risse and Green Cowles (Caporaso, 2007). Caporaso's research design is based on a process that starts with the presence of EU-level decisions or EU-level phenomena, for example, a new public policy. To create change, the EU must create some adaptational pressure on the domestic level. Pressure is mediated by intervening variables at the domestic level. If pressure is very low, there will be no change. If pressure requires fundamental change there also will be no change, perhaps because a country has not achieved the necessary administrative capacity to comply with EU rules or implement policies agreed in Brussels. In intermediate situations, however, pressure will create change. Domestic change has a feed-back effect on the EU, thus closing the loop. Pressure – drawing on the template provided by Börzel and Risse (2003) – is clarified in terms of 'goodness of fit', which is not just the fit or lack thereof between EU and domestic policies, but covers structural-institutional fits as well (Caporaso, 2007). Intervening variables are grounded in either social constructivism or rational choice institutionalist frameworks (Börzel and Risse 2003). The two broad interpretations – rational choice and social constructivism – are treated as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

Since empirically there is no neat separation between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of choice, the question remains what should a researcher test exactly, and

on the basis of what type of research design? Radaelli (2003) suggests process-tracing based on temporal causal sequences. Empirically, process-tracing starts from the set of actors, ideas, problems, rules, styles and outcomes at the domestic level at time zero – in short, the domestic system at a given time. Then the analyst process-traces the system over the years, and identifies the critical junctures or turning points – for example, when major ideational change takes place, or the constellation of dominant actors is altered, or when the major problem is re-defined (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007). For each juncture, the question becomes: was the cause of this major change domestic, or did the change come from exogenous variables like the EU-level variables or global-level variables? In order to assess the contribution of the variables from outside the domestic system, the researcher goes “up” – from the domestic level to the EU - and controls the causal patterns. Causality is examined *in vivo* by looking at temporal causal sequences.

Within this discussion on causality and how to draw inferences from empirical evidence, some authors have also made progress in identifying typologies of mechanisms (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002) and outcome (Héritier et al., 2001). Schmidt (2002) has made a distinction between the mechanisms involving structural variables and the special ways in which discourse has a causal impact and may transform structural variables. She shows how discourse can change preferences, re-model policy problems, and enable or constrain actors, without exercising a direct causal effect on them.

Another strand of the literature on Europeanization focuses on the complexity of causal chains in the context of temporal sequences connecting major EU policies, like Economic and Monetary Union, to domestic changes Dyson (2000: 646-647; 2002). Most of Dyson’s research is concerned with avoiding the pitfall of pre-judging the role of

European policies. In his carefully designed collection of case studies on EMU and domestic changes, Dyson and his associates show how previous work on EMU exaggerated the influence of the EU in domestic political change (Dyson, 2002). Recent work by Stolfi (2008, [page no missing in list of references at the end](#)) shows how the notion of the EU as external constraint bringing about domestic change has obfuscated the more important role of domestic policy communities. Interestingly, Stolfi uses the bottom-up research design to substantiate his theoretical claims, thus connecting the methodological discussion with empirical analysis.

Finally, other authors have entered the debate on research design by using the notion of control group. The question is simple: even if n EU member states are experiencing change, it well may be that k countries outside the EU are also going through the same process of change – for example because they are all part of a global process of diffusion. Saurugger (2005) in her study of interest groups in the EU introduces a test variable studying the activities of actors outside the Union. Levi-Faur (2004) in his study of the liberalization of the telecom and electricity industries in the EU measures the net impact of Europeanization as compared to other factors like globalization trends by considering a Latin-American and a rich and developed countries control group.

A LOOK AT BIBLIOMETRIC DATA

In this section, we carry on with the discussion of the field by considering simple bibliometric information. We deal with methodological aspects first, and then compare established and emerging literature. Due to the complex role of causality in this field,

awareness of research design issues in Europeanisation is on the rise. Most of the debate is about important trade-offs, such as conceptual analysis versus measurement, parsimony versus richer explanations, Pierson-type analysis of temporal causal sequences or more classic treatment of time, and baseline research design versus bottom-up designs. This reflects a much wider discussion on research design that has occupied mainstream political scientists for quite a while, especially since the publication of the landmark book *Designing Social Inquiry* by King, Keohane and Verba (1994).

In applying the gist of this discussion to Europeanization, the following categories of trade-offs in causal analysis have been identified:

- (1) cause of effects versus effects of causes;
- (2) concept formation versus measurement;
- (3) complex notions of causation (including multiple-conjunctural causation) versus singular linear causation;
- (4) omitted variables bias versus multi-collinearity - operationalised as a rich set of independent variables versus parsimony;
- (5) time as a qualitative factor in politics versus time as quantity of years;
- (6) mechanism-oriented research versus variable-oriented; and
- (7) top-down versus bottom-up designs.

Some of the trade-offs have been already explained and others, such as explanation rooted in *Mechanisms* versus *Variables-oriented explanation*, are well-known to students of political science. In the debate on Europeanisation, the mechanisms have been classified in 'positive integration', 'negative integration' and 'framing' (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). Bulmer and Radaelli distinguish between 'horizontal' and 'vertical' mechanisms (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005). They also argue that Börzel and Risse's (2003) mechanism of 'goodness of fit' is only one possible explanation of Europeanisation, particularly useful for positive integration. The other two explanations are 'regulatory competition' (in which the issue is not to adapt to EU templates, but to respond to market

incentives created by negative integration) and ‘learning’ via facilitated coordination (in policies such as asylum, foreign and security, social inclusion, enterprise and pensions).

Oliver Trieb has added to the debate the observation that politics can alter the direction of change predicted by the ‘goodness of fit’ explanation. In fact, party identification and the shifts in governmental majorities may lead even a poorly fitting country to adapt to EU policy and comply better than countries with high fit (Falkner et al., 2005; Treib, 2003).

‘*Cause of effects*’ versus ‘*effects of causes*’ deserves a few words of explanation.

One of the most important overarching goals of a research design is to produce valid descriptive and causal inferences about significant incidents in the world of political science (Brady and Collier, 2004: 221). ‘Cause of effects’ refers to studies that start with a dependent variable in terms of outcomes – for example, constrained policy autonomy – and investigates the possible cause, be it global economic interdependence or European integration. ‘Effects of causes’ is typical of studies that are interested in tracking down how a specific cause, for example European integration, has different effects (for example on domestic politics and policy).

We also need to introduce *Complex causation* versus *singular linear causation*:

Complex causation includes non-linear econometric models (such as structural model equations), multiple conjunctural causation, qualitative comparative analysis, equifinality, increasing returns, punctuated equilibria and models where the causal logic changes before and after a threshold level of a variable (Hall, 2003; Pierson, 2004; Ragin, 1987; . Ragin, 2000). The concept is typically applied to research designs with a small-*N* sample as it refers to the explanation of a particular outcome rather than the generalization of average causal effects.

Omitted variables bias versus *multi-collinearity* is a trade-off between trying to reduce bias generated by neglecting some important variables and reducing bias arising out of the correlation between independent variables. The more one includes independent variables in the explanation, the higher the likelihood of multi-collinearity problems – e.g., two or more explanatory variables are correlated to such a degree that it is impossible to separate their causal effects (King *et al.*, 1994: 119). This issue can be addressed by collecting additional observations to provide more leverage in the differentiation of the causal effects (King *et al.*, 1994: 123). However, according to Brady and Collier (2004: 48), increasing the number of observations “make[s] it harder to achieve other important goals, such as maintaining independence of observations, measurement validity, and causal homogeneity.” We operationalise this trade-off as one between parsimony (the obvious way to avoid multi-collinearity) and explanations based on a rich set of variables (the intuitive way to avoid omitted variables bias).

We compiled a first sample on the literature on Europeanization based on the Social Science Citation Index (search on ‘Europeanisation’ AND ‘Politics’; period 1997-2007), from which we extracted the most frequently cited articles of the discipline. We then excluded review articles, normative articles without any empirical analysis, industrial relations articles, and statistical artefacts (there are a few articles with Europeanization somewhere in the abstract but no real engagement with this topic). This left us with 32 Europeanization articles, cited at least 5 times. We created a control group of 32 highly-cited articles on European integration politics (a much broader field) with similar criteria.

On average, Europeanization articles are still several citations away from the pack of highly cited articles on the politics of European integration. Further, Europeanization scholars are disproportionately more interested in policy analysis (including of course regulation, transposition of directives, comitology, and implementation analysis), country-based case studies, and historical narratives. Highly-cited control group articles are much more diverse, with several articles on the substance of law-making and voting in the EU institutions, public opinion, and identity, as well as public policy and modes of governance.

We created a scorecard which included the six trade-offs – plus the trade-off specific to Europeanization studies only for sample A. Each trade off was split into three categories. If an observation was in accordance with one of the two options of the trade-off it was marked with the value “1”, otherwise it was marked with “0”. Observations that fell under the “not applicable” option were marked with a “-1” value, although in the data analysis the category was not considered as a ‘missing case’. In terms of scoring the actual sample, upon construction of the survey protocol, we employed ourselves as the two coders and utilized inter-coder reliability. Inter-coder reliability may not increase the validity of the actual scoring in a sample size similar to ones of this exercise, but it increases transparency and congruence (Krippendorff, 2004).

When we started coding, it turned out that most of the articles do not show awareness of the methodological trade-offs mentioned above. The authors do not have explicit sections on research design; neither do they discuss whether they are more likely to have a problem of multi-collinearity or a problem of omitted variables bias. In consequence, we had to extrapolate the choice made by the author in terms of research

design by carefully considering the substance of the article. In some cases, however, the trade-offs are genuinely not applicable to the study in question 0 hence a value of -1 was assigned.

Turning to findings⁴, table 1 compares the results for sample A (that is, Europeanization) and sample B (our control group). Table 2, in particular, shows that most Europeanization articles are based on the top-down research design (21, against only 5 bottom-up articles). Both samples (table 1) show a balanced distribution between cause of effects and effects of causes – albeit in the control group with a slight orientation towards the former. Turning to the trade-off between concept and measurement, we expected to find Europeanization articles more interested in developing the concept rather than measurement, and the opposite for the control group. This is because the field of Europeanization is relatively new. Hence – we reasoned – researchers will spend more time in discussing their concepts. In addition, the review articles on Europeanization (Lenschow, 2005; Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 2003) suggest that definitional issues and concept formation have somewhat been prominent. The highly-cited articles, by contrast, seem to suggest that there is a preference for measurement. This characteristic features in the control group too.

On the type of causation (table 1: column 3), yet again the two samples do not show much difference, although Europeanization articles have a slight preference for complex notions of causation. This is arguably the result of a field that was created around a causation puzzle: how can one grasp the essence of the Europeanization process if there are multiple feedback loops between domestic and EU variables in this process (Radaelli, 2003)? Unsurprisingly, researchers are working with complex notions of

⁴ Detailed tables and dataset are available on the Palgrave' website.

causation in this area. Singular causation is preferred by those who think of Europeanization as implementation of EU decisions – for these authors causation is more straightforward.

Both Europeanization articles and the control group seem to prefer a rich set of explanatory variables to parsimony (table 1: column 4). Regarding time (table 1: column 5) the Europeanization sample deals with the qualitative aspects of this variable more than the control group. The difference is small, however. It can be explained by noting that several articles on Europeanization are based on policy analysis, longitudinal case studies and-or process tracing. Since the debate on Europeanization has spent much time discussing how exactly this process works, there is a major emphasis on mechanisms that we do not find in the control group (table 1: column 6).

We now contrast our 32 Europeanisation articles with a sample of recently published Europeanisation articles (2007 and 2008) obtained with the same keywords and the same criteria (table 3). By doing so, we go beyond research design, and consider the substantive issues dealt with by the Europeanisation scholars in their highly-cited articles. We also answer the question whether there is a stable trend or new articles are addressing different, perhaps emerging issues, with the caveat that an article can produce multiple entries, since it may deal with two categories, like enlargement and identity. Hence our scores do not total 32 this time.

When “Large N” is used we denote the presence of a comparative study of either all of the member states (be it EU-15 or EU-25), or e.g. OECD Countries, in other words, when it involves a broader group of countries. By CEEC, we denote the 8 Central and Eastern European Countries that gained accession status in the 2004/2007 enlargement:

Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Eurozone implies the first 12 member states that had adopted the Euro: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland and Greece. Comparing most-cited and most-recent articles, some interesting features emerge (table 3). Enlargement seems much less popular than in the past, due to the completion of a big round of accessions to the EU. Implementation analysis is and seems to remain a staple feature. The interest in comparison is somewhat dwindling. Due to the vicissitudes of the constitutional project, more attention is paid to emerging issues of identity, public opinion, representation, scope of governance, bringing Europeanisation research closer to some issues in the normative turn in European studies. Economic and social policies are more prominent in the recent articles, whilst the number of articles on environmental policy decreases when we move from the highly-cited to the most-recent articles (table 4). Work on the big three (France, Germany and the UK) tops up the list of highly-cited papers, but new articles are more evenly distributed – with Poland and Denmark well represented, as well as Italy (table 5). Finally, the number of large-n studies is exactly the same in the two groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Europeanisation is still a much debated and, to some extent, controversial concept. But different definitions share some common ground. Turning to explanation, Europeanisation has assisted political scientists in organising different types of mechanisms for change, such as EU pressure, regulatory competition, and learning via facilitated coordination (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005). The ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis of

the baseline model has opened up an empirically rich debate on how exactly countries respond to adaptational pressure, and qualifications about the role of party politics and party identification have been added (Treib, 2003). Others have explored more general models that include the ‘goodness of fit’ but track down causality from the bottom-up perspective (Radaelli, 2003). Research on implementation has been re-invigorated by the academic turn towards Europeanisation. The comparison of most-recent and most-cited articles shows that the field is not stable, and the choice of specific topics is changing. This can be an indicator of an expanding field, but can also show that researchers have not settled around core topics.

On balance, although this strand of European Studies is still controversial and the discussion is lively, and there is evidence of symbolic, even faddish engagement with the term Europeanisation, we do not share the pessimism of Lenschow (2005) about the state of the art. To blame Europeanisation for not having reached the status of a theory is unfair. Europeanisation is not trying to become a new theory with its own ad-hoc vocabulary. Instead, it helps us to organise concepts and orchestrate mainstream theories of political science, political economy and international relations (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Hassenteufel and Surel, 2000). The aim is to make the whole field of European Studies more integrated with major theories.

Looking to the future, research should usefully explore more ambitious questions, such as: what does Europeanisation tell us about the politics of integration, power and legitimacy?; does it give new insights for classic middle-range concepts and theories of comparative policy analysis, such as policy learning and implementation analysis?; and does it provide methodological innovation?

Europeanisation is a process of power generation. After having discussed *Europe as usage* and *Europe as pressure*, scholars should try to formulate general statements about *Europeanisation as socialisation* – considering the power shifts implied by changes in European identities and most importantly policy paradigms (Quaglia, De Francesco, and Radaelli, 2008; Radaelli and Banducci 2008). Here Europeanisation as socialisation could usefully cross roads with the literature on the clash of capitalisms (Callaghan, 2008; Menz, 2005; Schmidt, 2002).

Another central theme is discourse (Schmidt 2002). Actors use the EU instrumentally, to provide, via discourse creation, legitimacy for choices already taken at home (Kallestrup, 2002). Domestic actors can also refer to norms and ideas originally displayed for different purposes in a post-decisional mode to entrap their opponents (Schimmelfennig, 2001). However, we should consider testing the post-decisional legitimising use of EU policies and commitments. In the current climate, it is not at all certain that the EU can be used to produce more legitimacy at home – public opinion sentiments seem to go in the other direction. Hence policy-makers may find it impossible to draw on the EU to generate legitimacy if the EU generates hostility and opposition.

For comparative policy analysts, a disappointing feature of early studies was the implicit adoption of simplistic theories of implementation. Scholars seemed surprised to observe that EU policies were filtered by domestic actors and institutions, and that the end result was not convergence. However, this is absolutely conventional and even obvious in the light of any contemporary model of implementation. Eventually, some attempts to fertilise Europeanisation research with the insights of sophisticated theories of implementation are emerging (Zahariadis, 2008).

The final issue is methods and research design. We have dedicated a whole section of this chapter to show what Europeanisation scholars are doing about trade-offs in causal analysis. The main question is still how to measure the causal role of the European factors in domestic changes. European Studies has always been beleaguered by the small-n problem when dealing with quantitative methods. Qualitative research has faced the problem of going beyond the uniqueness of the EU and ad-hoc conceptualisation. The following are some examples of how the emerging literature is dealing with methodological complexities. Precision on measures of Europeanization of national legislation (the issues raised by public policy, of which legislation is only a component, are still daunting) can be increased by using indicators sensitive to breadth, countries, and policy domains (Toller, 2008 forthcoming **NOT IN REFERENCES**). Longitudinal analysis can be used to combine the historical perspective with systematic controls on ‘test cases’ outside the EU (Saurugger, 2005, Levi-Faur 2004). Process-tracing and the bottom-up research design have successfully controlled for the two directions of causality, from the EU to the member states, and vice versa, in areas as diverse as foreign policy, gender equality and telecoms (**Exadaktylos 2008**, **Martisen and Sindbjerg 2007**; Thatcher 2004). In turn, bottom-up and top-down designs provide two different ways to run the same story, so that the bias created by one design is reduced by the other (Quaglia and Radaelli 2007). These are only partial solutions to some methodological problems – and the list of problems is very long indeed. Since there are classic problems faced by researchers working on international politics and domestic change, future research should integrate Europeanisation with major disciplines rather than trying to solve the problems with *ad-hoc* theorising.

REFERENCES

- Afonso, A., and Maggetti, M. (2006). Bilaterals II: Reaching the Limits of the Swiss Third Way. In C. H. Church (Ed.), *Switzerland and the European Union. A close, contradictory and misunderstood relationship* (pp. 215-233). London: Routledge.
- Agh, A. (1999). Europeanization of policy-making in East Central Europe: the Hungarian approach to EU accession. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(5), 839-854.
- Bomberg, E., and Peterson, J. (2000). Policy Transfer and Europeanization: Passing the Heineken Test?, *Queen's Papers on Europeanisation no.2-2000*:
<http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/FileStore/EuropeanisationFiles/Filetoupload,38445,en.pdf>.
- Brady, H., and Collier, D. (2004). *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Bulmer, S. (2006). Theorizing Europeanization. In P. Graziano and M. P. Vink (Eds.), *Europeanization: New Research Agendas* (pp. 46-58). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Bulmer, S., and Radaelli, C. (2005). The Europeanization of National Policy. In S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (Eds.), *The Member States of the European Union* (pp. 338-359). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Callaghan, H. (2008). *How multi-level governance affects the clash of capitalisms*. Cologne, Germany.
- Caporaso, J. A. (2007). The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory. In P. Graziano and M. P. Vink (Eds.), *Europeanization: New Research Agendas* (pp. 22-34). Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan.
- Cole, A., and Drake, H. (2000). The Europeanization of the French polity: continuity, change and adaptation. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 7(1), 26-43.
- Damonte, A. (2007). Changing tools to catch the beast, *EUSA Biennial Conference*. Montreal, Canada.
- Della Sala, V. (1997). Hollowing Out and Hardening the State. European Integration and the Italian Economy. *West European Politics*, 20(1), 14-33.
- Dimitrakopoulos, D., and Richardson, J. (2001). Implementing EU public policy. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy-Making* (pp. 335-356). London: Routledge.
- Dyson, K. (2000). EMU as Europeanization: Convergence, diversity and contingency. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(4), 645-666.
- Dyson, K. (Ed.). (2002). *European States and the Euro*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dyson, K., and Featherstone, K. (1996). Italy and EMU as 'Vincolo Esterno': Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State. *South European Society and Politics*, 1(2), 272-299.

- Dyson, K., and Goetz, K. (2003). Living with Europe: Power, constraint, and contestation. In K. Dyson and K. Goetz (Eds.), *Germany, Europe, and the Politics of Constraint* (pp. 4-35). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M., and Leiber, S. (2005). *Complying with Europe: EU Harmonization and Soft Law in the Member States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Featherstone, K., and Radaelli, C. M. (2003). *The Politics of Europeanisation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fischer, A., Nicolet, S., and Sciarini, P. (2002). Europeanisation of a non-EU country: The case of Swiss immigration policy. *West European Politics*, 25(4), 143-170.
- Giuliani, M. (2004). Europeizzazione come istituzionalizzazione : questioni definitorie e di metodo. *Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche*, 1, 141-161.
- Grabbe, H. (2001). How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8(6), 1013-1031.
- Hall, P. A. (2003). Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research. In J. Mahoney and D. Rueschmeyer (Eds.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Science* (pp. 373-404). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hassenteufel, P., and Surel, Y. (2000). Des politiques publiques comme les autres? Construction de l'objet et outils d'analyse des politiques européennes. *Politique européenne*, 1, 8-24.
- Héritier, A., Kerwer, D., Knill, C., Lehmkuhl, D., and Teutsch, M. (2001). *Differential Europe—New Opportunities and Restrictions for Policy Making in Member States*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2001). *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Howorth, J. (2004). Discourse, ideas and epistemic communities in European security and defence policy. *West European Politics*, 27(2), 211-234.
- Jabko, N. (2006). *Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Jacquot, S., and Woll, C. (Eds.). (2004). *Les usages de l'Europe : acteurs et transformations européennes*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Kallestrup, M. (2002). Europeanisation as a Discourse: Domestic Policy Legitimation through the Articulation of a 'Need for Adaptation'. *Public Policy and Administration*, 17(2), 110 - 124.
- King, G., Keohane, R. O., and Verba, S. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Knill, C., and Lehmkuhl, D. (1999). How European matters: different mechanisms of Europeanization.
- Knill, C., and Lehmkuhl, D. (2002). The national impact of European Union regulatory policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41(2), 255-280.

- Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology* (2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications.
- Ladrech, R. (1994). Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: The case of France. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 32(1), 69-88.
- Lenschow, A. (2005). Europeanisation of public policy. In J. J. Richardson (Ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy-Making* (3rd ed., pp. 55-71). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Levi-Faur, D. (2004). On the 'net impact' of Europeanization: the EU's telecom and electricity regimes between the global and the national. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(1), 3-29.
- Mair, P. (2001). The limited impact of Europe on national party systems. *West European Politics*, 23(4), 27-51.
- Majone, G. D. (2008). Liberalization, re-regulation, and mutual recognition: Lessons from three decades of EU experience, *Second biennial Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance*. Utrecht, NL.
- Menz, G. (2005). *Varieties of capitalism and Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Milward, A. S. (1992). *The European Rescue of the Nation State*. London: Routledge.
- Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Moravcsik, A. (1999). A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation. *International Organization*, 53(2), 267-306.
- Nedergaard, P. (2007). Maximizing policy learning in international committees: An analysis of the European open method of coordination (OMC) committees. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30(4), 521-546.
- Olsen, J. P. (2002). The many faces of Europeanization. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(5), 921-952.
- Pedersen, L. H. (2006). Transfer and transformation in processes of Europeanization. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(6), 985-1021.
- Pierson, P. (2004). *Politics in time: history, institutions and social analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pierson, P. (1996). The path to European integration. A historical institutional analysis, *Comparative Political Studies*. *Comparative Political Studies*, 29 (2) April, 123-163.
- Poguntke, T., Aylott, N., Ladrech, R., and Luther, K. R. (2007). The Europeanisation of national party organisations: A conceptual analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(6), 747-771.
- Quaglia, L., De Francesco, F., and Radaelli, C. M. (2008). Committee governance and socialization in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(1), 155-166.
- Quaglia, L., and Radaelli, C. M. (2007). Italian politics and the European Union: A tale of two research designs. *West European Politics*, 30(4), 924-943.

- Radaelli, C. (2003). The Europeanization of public policy. In K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (Eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization* (pp. 27-56). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Radaelli, C., and Pasquier, R. (2007). Conceptual Issues. In M. P. Vink and P. Graziano (Eds.), *Europeanization: New research agendas* (pp. 35-45). Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan.
- Radaelli, C. M. (2003). The Europeanization of public policy. In K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (Eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization* (pp. 27-56). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Radaelli, C. M. (2008). Europeanization, policy learning and new modes of governance. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 10(3): 239-254.
- Radaelli, C.M. and S.A. Banducci (2008) Bureaucratic elites in the European Union: Socialization, institutional effects and policy domains, Paper delivered to the Annual meeting of the American Political Science Conference, Boston, 27-31 August 2008.
- Ragin, C. (1987). *The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ragin, C. C. (2000). *Fuzzy-set social science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ravinet, P. (2007). *La genèse et l'institutionnalisation du processus de Bologne : Entre chemin de traverse et sentier de dépendance*. Ecole doctorale de Sciences-Po, Cevifop, Paris.
- Risse, T., Caporaso, J. A., and Cowles, M. G. (2001). Europeanization and domestic change: Introduction. In M. G. Cowles, J. A. Caporaso and T. Risse (Eds.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change* (pp. 1-20). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Saurugger, S. (2005). Europeanization as a methodological challenge: The case of interest groups. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 7(4), 291-312.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*, 55(1), 47-80.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2007). Europeanization beyond Europe. *Living Reviews in European Governance*
<http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2007-1/>, 2007-1.
- Schimmelfennig, F., and Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(4), 661-679.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2002). Europeanization and the mechanics of economic policy adjustment. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9(6), 894-912.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2006). *Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stolfi, F. (2008). The Europeanization of Italy's Budget Institutions in the 1990s. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(4).
- Stone Sweet, A., and Brunell, T. L. (1998). Constructing a supranational constitution: Dispute resolution and governance in the European Community. *American Political Science Review*, 92(1), 63-81.

- Stone Sweet, A., and Sandholtz, W. (1997). European integration and supranational governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4(3), 297-317.
- Thatcher, M. (2004). Winners and losers in Europeanization: reforming the national regulation of telecommunications. *West European politics* 27, 284-309.
- Treib, O. (2003). EU governance, misfit and the partisan logic of domestic adaptation: An actor-centered perspective on the transposition of EU directives, *EUSA biennial conference*. Nashville, USA.
- Zahariadis, N. (2008). Europeanization as program implementation: Effective and Democratic? *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 10(3): 221-238.
- Zeitlin, J., Pochet, P., and Magnusson, L. (2005). *The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies*. Brussels: Peter Lang.
- Wincott, D. (2004). Policy change and discourse in Europe: Can the EU make a 'square meal out of a stew of paradox'? *West European Politics*, 27(2), 354-363.

APPENDIX

Table 1 Comparison of the Europeanisation sample and the control group of highly cited articles on the politics of European integration. Each sample n=32

ID	SAMPLE	TRADE-OFFS IN CAUSAL ANALYSIS																	
		1			2			3			4			5			6		
		Cause of Effects	Effects of Causes	N/A	Concept	Measurement	N/A	Complex	Singular causation	N/A	Parsimony	Rich set of independent variables	N/A	Time-quantity	Time-quality	N/A	Mechanism-oriented	Variable-oriented	N/A
1	Europeanisation	16	16	0	9	23	0	16	12	4	9	19	4	12	15	5	18	14	0
2	Politics of European integration	17	14	1	8	24	0	14	14	4	12	20	0	16	13	3	12	17	3

Table 2: Scorecard of the Europeanization sample

ID	AUTHOR (Year)	TRADE-OFFS IN CAUSAL ANALYSIS																				
		1			2			3			4			5			6			7		
		Cause of Effects	Effects of Causes	N/A	Concept	Measurement	N/A	Top-Down	Bottom-Up	N/A	Compl.-conjunctural	Sing.-conjunctural	N/A	Parsimonious	Rich set of indep. var.	N/A	Time-quantit	Time Quality	N/A	Mech-orient	Var-orient	N/A
1	Ágh 2002	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
2	Andersen 2002	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
3	Anderson JJ 2002	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
4	Benz and Eberlein 1999	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
5	Beyers and Trondal 2004	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	1	0	0
6	Börzel 1999	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
7	Börzel 2002	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	1	0	0	1	0	0
8	Bursens 2002	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
9	Cole 2001	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
10	Cole and Drake 2000	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
11	Dimitrova 2002	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0
12	Dyson 2000	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	0	0
13	Eyre and Lodge 2000	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	1	0	0
14	Falkner	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
15	Fischer; Nicolet; Sciarini 2002	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
16	Gilardi 2005	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
17	Grabbe 2001	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
18	Harmsen 1999	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
19	Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	0	0
20	Ladrech 2002	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
21	Lavenex 2001	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
22	Levi-Faur 2004	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
23	Lippert, Umbach, Wessels 2001	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
24	Lodge 2000	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	1	0	0	0	0	-1	1	0	0	1	0	0
25	Marcussen, Risse et al. 1999	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
26	Radaelli 1997	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
27	Scharpf 1997	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	-1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
28	Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
29	Schmidt 2002	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
30	Semetko; De Vreese; Peter J 2000	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
31	Smith J 2001	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0
32	Warleigh A 2001	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	-1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0
	TOTAL OBSERVATIONS (N=32)	16	16	0	9	23	0	21	5	6	16	12	4	9	19	4	12	15	5	18	14	0

Table 3: Comparative analysis of most-cited and most-recent articles on Europeanisation

	Enlargement	Implementation	Comparative	Citizens, Identity, Public Opinion
Most-Cited articles on Europeanisation	5	13	25	16
Most-Recent articles on Europeanisation	0	11	18	21

Table 4: Policy areas

	Most-Cited	Most-Recent
Environmental Policy	5	1
Competition/Internal Market Policy (broadly)*	5	3
Economic Policy (broadly)**	3	6
Refugee/Immigration Policy	2	0
Social Policy***	1	4
Urban/Regional Policy	1	2
Minority rights/Equality Policy	0	3
Foreign Policy	0	2
Cohesion Policy	0	1
Agricultural Policy	0	1

* Competition and Internal Market include areas of free movement of labor, electricity, telecommunications, transportation, taxation et al.

** Economic policy is an umbrella category that includes EMU, fiscal policy, research and innovation as defined in the Lisbon Strategy, budget issues and public sector restructuring.

*** Social policy includes areas of social welfare, income protection and health care.

Table 5 - Country selection as case studies

	Most-Cited	Most-Recent
Large N	8	8
CEEC	4	3
Eurozone	1	0
Non-Geographic	1	1
France	7	5
Germany	7	2
UK	5	1
Belgium	2	1
Hungary	2	3
Austria	1	1
Czech Republic	1	2
Denmark	1	4
Estonia	1	1
Italy	1	4
Netherlands	1	1
Poland	1	4
Slovenia	1	2
Spain	1	1
Sweden	1	1
Switzerland	1	1
Bulgaria	0	1
Greece	0	2
Romania	0	1
Russia	0	1
Turkey	0	1